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THE FIRST DAYS OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT

BY ROBERT G. ALBION*

This year, 1948, is the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Navy Department. Various dates may be given for the beginning of United States naval history, such as 1775 for the small Navy of the Revolution, or 1794 for the authorization of the first ships of the post-Revolutionary Navy, or 1798 when that revived Fleet was ready for action and the Navy Department was created. But whatever the preferred starting point in the story of operations or policy, the year 1798 is the most logical one for the record of naval administration. In the same spring weeks of that year, the Fleet came into actual service and the Navy Department began its continuous development to the present.

Previously in the new Republic, naval affairs had been the responsibility of the War Department. During the Revolution, to be sure, there had been a separate Naval Establishment, but it was an isolated phenomenon and disappeared completely with the close of hostilities. The last ship of the Revolutionary Navy was sold in 1785; all that was left were some experienced captains to return in 1798, some traditions, and, perhaps one might add, the interest in naval matters which John Adams later brought to his presidency.

Naval affairs remained under the War Department for less than ten years, during the incumbency of three secretaries. The inadequacy of the last of this trio was in no small measure responsible for the creation of a

separate Navy Department. The first Secretary of War, General Henry Knox, a pompous three-hundred-pound former Boston book-seller, appointed as soon as the Constitution was adopted in 1789, had been Washington's chief of artillery in the Revolution and had been administering such military affairs as had existed in the interim since the fighting stopped. With an army of only a few hundreds and with no ships at all in the Navy, these were not onerous duties. Thanks to the Indians, who wiped out an untrained force in the Old Northwest two years after Knox became Secretary, the need for a regular army was realized, and two years later the capture of fifteen American merchantmen by the Algerine pirates also caused Congress to legislate the beginnings of a real navy. That embryo Fleet, authorized by Congress on March 27, 1794, took four years to fit for sea.

In one of the important decisions in early naval administration, Knox turned to the principal shipbuilders for advice about the new vessels and backed the recommendations of Joshua Humphreys for "super-frigates," which were planned to be stronger than anything of their class in other navies. Knox also built up a provisional Shore Establishment by using rented yards scattered along the coast. This policy distributed naval spending among various states with beneficial results within Congress, then fairly evenly divided as to the merits of having any navy at all. Local business arrangements were put in the hands of civilian navy agents, and the captains of the proposed new frigates were chosen by Knox and President Washington from among Revolutionary naval veterans.

*Dr. Albion, Historian of Naval Administration and Professor of History, Princeton, has based this article on material used in his first volume of the history of naval administration, *Makers of Naval Policy*, which is scheduled for publication this fall.

Knox's successor in 1795, Colonel Timothy Pickering, also a former member of Washington's staff, was shifted to the Secretaryship of State within the year; and Washington did not easily find another Secretary of War. "After vain attempts to enlist abler men," he was "forced to pitch upon James McHenry of Maryland, as the only person who could be persuaded to serve." A one-time army surgeon, who had been for a while the secretary of Washington and then of Lafayette, McHenry seems to have owed his appointment to Alexander Hamilton's desire to have a safe henchman in the cabinet. At any rate, he soon demonstrated that he lacked adequate qualifications for the post. As the three new frigates—Congress had cut the original order in half—neared completion, McHenry was faced with incessant problems which called for expert direction. The needless delays of the bungled launchings, excessive costs, and ordnance so faulty that even the guns had to be borrowed from harbor forts, all served to convince official circles and the public that all was not going well with the frigate program. The murmurs grew louder that McHenry would have to be given some adequate assistance in maritime matters.

As the troublesome situation with France over the seizure of American merchantmen approached a crisis in the spring of 1798, the demand grew in Congress for a separate Naval Establishment. Economy and efficiency were the keynotes in the principal House debate. Late in March, McHenry himself, faced with a Congressional investigation into the frigates' delay, had wound up a long report full of excuses with the suggestion that perhaps "the marine business . . . ought to be separated from the Department of War." Not even those Congressmen who opposed a separate naval organization defended McHenry's administration. Among them was Gallatin, the future Secretary of the Treas-

ury, who was inclined to be a chronic critic of naval expenditures and now felt an independent setup would increase them. Proponents of the new department, who were chiefly Federalists, were specific in calling for an administrator acquainted with maritime affairs in general and with shipbuilding in particular. Samuel Smith of Baltimore, who with his brother would later be intimately concerned with the new Navy Department, declared: "a man knowing something of naval architecture will be able to save more in the course of a year to the United States than will pay ten years of the expenses of this office. A merchant going into the building of vessels without a knowledge of the business will find the truth of this fact." Harrison Gray Otis of Boston, a Representative from Massachusetts, pointed out in a similar vein that the expense of the office could be:

more than saved, by the additional information and care employed by our naval concerns, as it was a thing impossible for one man to undertake the business of the War and Navy Departments.

As well might a merchant be set to do the business of a lawyer; a lawyer that of a physician; a carpenter that of a bricklayer; or a bricklayer that of a carpenter . . .

The need for expert control was intensified when in addition to the three warships already launched, the building program was expanded by an act to build, hire, or purchase a dozen small cruisers.

As a result, the bill was passed by Congress, and President Adams set his signature to it on April 30. It authorized a:

Secretary of the Navy whose duty it shall be to execute such orders as he shall receive from the President of the United States, relative to the procurement of naval stores and materials and the construction, armament, equipment and employment of vessels of war, as well as all other matters connected with the naval establishment of the United States.

To secure the man best suited for the position was not easy. Three possible categories seemed to offer Adams the obvious field for his choice: naval officers, shipbuilders, or shipping merchants. Although Samuel Smith had in the House referred to a "naval man" in connection with the post, there were good reasons for not following the precedent that had been set in the War Department with the appointment of General Knox as the first Secretary. Unlike the Army, the Revolutionary Navy had been a distinctly small affair and had given none of its cruiser captains experience on a scale comparable to the staff service of Knox and Pickering. A civilian shipbuilder did not meet with approval either; a possible Secretary from that group had been opposed in the House debate when Edward Livingston called such a person not "fit to be one of the great council of the nation; and it must be recollected that the person who holds this office will become one of the councillors of the President on all great concerns." Adams, therefore, turned to the shipping merchants who were said to have "had everything." A century later, when naval matters had become infinitely more complex, there was no single occupational group as well fitted by experience to be in charge of naval matters, although even then a successful business career often furnished a useful background.

But for the first twenty years of the separate Naval Establishment, merchant shipowners were sought for its head. The experience of these representatives of early big business admirably fitted them for the whole administration of the Navy in that period. First, several of them owned fleets which compared favorably in number and size with the new little Navy; and at that time merchantmen differed little from warships. In fact, within a few weeks of the establishment of the Department, several merchantmen were taken over by the Navy and sent to sea

as formal cruisers. Second, the merchant shipowner's relation to his fleet of trading vessels was of the same general sort as that of a Secretary of the Navy toward the warships. Third, the merchant already had intimate knowledge of shipyards; he knew what to specify in the way of construction or repair, and was able to check the progress, quality, and cost of the results. Fourth, he even had an acquaintance with ordnance since most of the larger merchantmen went armed for protection. Fifth, the recruiting of crews was likewise a familiar story as well as the selection of qualified officers, although the naval service even then had its jealously guarded seniority and tenure instead of the free "hire and fire" system of the merchant marine. Sixth, merchant seamen ate the same sort of salt beef, hardtack, and beans as had to be procured for naval crews. Seventh, as for fiscal control—a major problem of every Secretary under the perennially vigilant and suspicious eye of Congress—it could be assumed that a successful shipowner had had long years of practice in getting his own money's worth, if not more. Eighth, even in the sphere of operational control, where civilian ability might be a matter of doubt, many of the shipowners had operated fleets of privateers during the Revolution. And finally, shipowners did not come under the somewhat snobbish objection Livingston had against shipbuilders, for socially and politically most of the large shipowners were leaders in their communities.

Altogether the merchant shipowner of that day seemed made for the new post, the only question being whether he would accept it. That final "if" was to present a major problem. In fact, the first man appointed as Secretary of the Navy turned the job down even though he had already been confirmed by the Senate. This was George Cabot, one of the Cabots who "speak only to Lowells," and long prominent in Massachusetts

maritime circles. At this time, Cabot had retired from his shipping business with a comfortable fortune, had resigned his seat in the Senate after five years of his term, and settled down to gratify his "invincible indolence of disposition." Such was his mood when on May 5, 1798 he received two letters from his friend Secretary of State Pickering, one official and one personal, informing him of his appointment and its ratification by the Senate. His gracious refusal of the proffered post, in his personal reply to Pickering, set forth his views on what might be expected of the perfect Secretary in the Navy:

It is undoubtedly requisite that the officer at the head of the naval department should possess considerable knowledge of maritime affairs; but this should be elementary as well as practical, including the principles of naval architecture and naval tactics. He should also possess skill to arrange systematically the means of equipping, manning, and conducting the naval force with the greatest possible despatch, and with the least possible expense; and, above all, he should possess the inestimable secret of rendering it invincible by an equal force. Thus a knowledge of the human heart will constitute an essential ingredient in the character of this officer, that he may be able to convert every incident to the elevation of the spirit of the American seaman . . .

It is not to be expected that a man will be found possessing the ability to perform at once all the duties of an office, new and difficult; but I trust men may be found—and it seems to me indispensable that such should be found—who will, by industrious application of genius and talents, soon acquire the requisite qualifications.

Adams' second choice for Secretary was a most fortunate one; able and energetic Benjamin Stoddert at 47 possessed a good share of those desirable qualities. One of the leading shipping merchants of Georgetown, close to the projected Federal capital, Stoddert, though lacking the actual seagoing experience which Cabot had had as a young man, was well acquainted with shipping through the

house of Forrest, Stoddert, & Murdock, which held a commanding position in the flourishing Potomac trade and maintained branches in London and Bordeaux. In the Revolution, he served as a captain for a while; then became secretary to the Continental Board of War from September 1779 to February 1781. This board, set up by the Continental Congress "in general to superintend the several branches of the military department," had been a sort of War Department, and gave its tireless young secretary ample opportunity to understand policies and details concerning personnel, material, and finance. This had been an invaluable background for the work of Secretary of the Navy and at the same time had afforded useful contacts with persons prominent in the government.

Stoddert, too, hesitated at accepting the offer, as this letter to his brother-in-law on May 26 indicated:

I suppose you have heard of my appointment to be Secretary of the Navy of the United States. I have not determined to accept—and what you will think more extraordinary—I have not determined to refuse. I hate office—have no desire for fancied or real importance and wish to spend my life in retirement and ease without bustle of any kind. Yet it seems cowardly at such a time as this to refuse an important and highly responsible position. . . . You know I have heretofore managed Peaceable ships very well. Why should I not be able to direct as well those of War? After all this preface I think there is about thirty to one that I shall not accept. But that I may be able to consider every side of the question let me know whether you will in case I do accept, undertake to act as owner of my concerns on the Beaver Dam for two years and a half . . . All this would require some of your time and some attention. I know if you would take it at all it would be to serve me. But to have a proper tie upon your conscience I should insist on your receiving a commission on all the money received for the wood and the products of both places. . . . After two and a half years, both Becky (who is not alarmed at the Idea

of Philadelphia) and myself shall be fond enough of spending the rest of our time in tranquillity at Bladensburg.

While the merits of the job were thus being debated, first by Cabot and then by Stoddert, McHenry's troubles were multiplying. Six weeks elapsed, in those days of slow communications, between the creation of the separate Navy Department and Stoddert's arrival at Philadelphia to take over the new duties, and those were the weeks which brought the nation into its so-called "Quasi-War" with France. Those final weeks of controlling the Navy from the War Department must have been a nightmare for McHenry. Not only were affairs at sea in a perilous condition but army preparations, as well as naval, had to be pushed at top speed. On the naval side, the acquisition, reconversion, and manning of additional war vessels was a major necessity. Then there was the problem of operational orders when the ships were ready for sea duty, a definitely delicate matter in 1798 as in 1941, since war had not been formally declared. McHenry turned to Hamilton for advice on May 12, writing, "Can you spare an hour or two to help me to the instructions that it will be proper to give" in case of encounters with French privateers, but was told to ask the President, who would doubtless address Congress on the matter.

Two weeks later, the "Quasi-War" was on when Congress on May 28 authorized commanders to "seize, take, and bring into any port, any hostile vessels. That same day Stoddert accepted his appointment as first "Sec-Nav", but needed time to wind up his personal affairs, which meant that McHenry was forced to continue his bungling of naval problems. Within a few days, Hamilton was urgently showing his impatience with his friend:

My Dear Sir: Our citizens are extremely anxious that some further measures for their defence should take place. Do me the favour to inform me confidentially what means are

actually in the disposition of your department for this purpose when & how they will be applied.

The navy agent at Boston added his criticism by writing to McHenry: "I am glad Mr. Stoddert accepts, if he is a good man for the office he will soon put our Naval Affairs in train to become more respectable."

Under such an emergency and in such chaotic circumstances did the Navy Department come into being. The accompanying table of events indicates chronologically the confusion and crises of the months before and after its birth. These dates are of particular interest in view of the frequently heard statement that there was a Navy before there was a Navy Department. That was not the way it happened; more accurately, it should be said that the two came into existence almost simultaneously. Actually not a single warship had gone to sea when the Department was created on April 30, although the first three frigates had been launched; and only one converted merchantman had gone to sea seven weeks later when the Department went into operation on June 18. Not only that, but Secretary Stoddert could have counted on the fingers of one hand the warships of the Fleet ready to sail when he took over; and on the other hand, the personnel of his new Department. Thus did the Fleet and the Department get off to an almost even start. As for the third major part of the Navy, the Shore Establishment, that, too, was almost non-existent, with only rented yards and part-time civilian agents.

SIGNIFICANT DATES—BEGINNING OF NAVY DEPARTMENT

1797

- May 10 *United States*, 44, launched, Philadelphia
- July 1 Act providing for naval armament; manning and employment of three frigates; personnel legislation
- Sept. 7 *Constellation*, 36, launched, Baltimore
- Sept. 30 *Constitution*, 44, launched, Boston

- Nov. 22 President Adams in Annual Message strongly recommends adequate protection of commerce
- 1798
- Jan. 15 House inquires about delay in completing frigates
- Mar. 8 House committee recommends Commissioner of Marine in War Department
- Mar. 22 Secretary of War McHenry suggests separate naval establishment
- Mar. 27 Additional appropriation for completing frigates
- Apr. 19 (Bonaparte sails with Marseilles and Toulon divisions of expedition for Egypt)
- Apr. 27 Act providing additional armament, 12 vessels, not over 22 guns each, to be built, purchased, or hired
- Apr. 30 *Act creating Navy Department*
- May 3 Philadelphia merchantman *Ganges* purchased for conversion
- May 3 Senate confirms George Cabot as first Secretary of Navy
- May 4 Act authorizing acquisition of small vessels as galleys, etc.
- May 11 Cabot declines appointment
- May 21 Senate confirms Benjamin Stoddert as Secretary of Navy
- May 22 First operational orders, to Capt. Dale, *Ganges*
- May 24 *Ganges* first warship to put to sea, from Philadelphia
- May 28 Stoddert, at Georgetown, accepts appointment
- May 28 Act to protect more effectually the commerce and coasts of the U. S., authorizes commanders "to seize, take and bring into any port" hostile vessels; Presidential instructions to commanders
- June 13 Stoddert arrives in Philadelphia
- June 18 *Stoddert begins duties as Secretary of Navy*
- June 22 Act regarding personnel details, etc.
- June 24 *Constellation* starts to sea with convoy, first of regular frigates
- June 25 Act to authorize the defense of merchant vessels
- July 5 *Delaware* sails from Philadelphia
Stoddert arranges status of revenue cutters in naval service
- July 7 *United States* sails from Philadelphia
- July 7 *Delaware* captures French privateer *La Croyable* off Egg Harbor
- July 9 Act authorizing special commissions for private armed vessels
- July 11 Stoddert orders operations in West Indies
- July 11 Act establishing Marine Corps
- July 16 Act providing added appropriation for naval armament
- July 16 Accountant's Office established in Navy Department
- July 23 *Constitution* puts to sea from Boston
- Aug. 1 (Nelson crushes main French fleet in Battle of the Nile)
- Aug. 13 Navy Department moved temporarily to Trenton because of yellow fever at Philadelphia

Benjamin Stoddert had a rugged initiation starting from scratch and plunged into the midst of the short "Quasi-War" with France, which forced him to handle everything under emergency conditions. Arriving in Philadelphia in the middle of June, he found himself virtually a one-man Department and with not even McHenry on hand to explain anything. With time pressing, he did not wait to be sworn in but, getting right down to business, immediately wrote three letters. One went to a Treasury clerk, asking for "any information in your power in relation to the Department of the Navy;" the other two, sent to the navy agent at Baltimore, included instructions for expediting the shipment of cannon and the following criticism of the situation at Philadelphia:

Mr. McHenry has been absent ever since my arrival here,—now Mr. Wolcot is gone to New York, these circumstances have kept back the Business of my Department, I hope it will be better attended to in future, and while the assistance of Gentlemen of your knowledge & worth can be obtained, I shall not despair of discharging the duties of my Office with promptness, and economy, two things highly essential to be observed in the present crisis of our Affairs.

Stoddert tackled his many-sided work with remarkable intelligence and vigor. The combination of experience on the Board of War and as a shipping merchant gave him a sure-

ness of touch and a knowledge that had been sadly lacking in McHenry, a difference reflected even in the dead correspondence files. Small details by the score had to have his attention, but he found time to formulate policy and also strategy. Constantly mindful of the need for speed, he quickly built up a naval force to handle the French hostilities; pushed some important legislation through Congress; and, establishing precedents almost daily, laid the foundations so firmly that the infant Naval Establishment was able to survive.

Examining in some detail the achievements of his first month in office, one finds that he simplified matters greatly by insisting upon a policy of decentralization in the procurement of ships, men, and materials. Whatever the merits of such a practice might be on a long-run, permanent basis, the immediate situation called for getting the largest number of ships to sea in the shortest possible time. Not only did he thus relieve himself and his tiny staff from minutiae which would have swamped them, but he also prevented the delays inherent in the red tape of other offices at the "seat of government." He likewise avoided dependence upon the slow and expensive means of communication; and, a consideration which was ever present in those days when votes in Congress were likely to be close, he distributed the powers and profits of naval business along the coast. In his own hands, he retained the control of the broad general policy and of essential specifications; otherwise he depended upon the judgment, energy, and integrity of his navy agents and others at the various ports.

This decentralization policy was summed up in a letter to Secretary of the Treasury Wolcott, asking him to contract for the building of a ship at New York: "I shall with the utmost pleasure subscribe to whatever you may do;—remember your own system,—leave nothing to be done here." To

the agent at Baltimore, he wrote, "Please to keep in mind, that you are to procure every thing for the compleat equipment of the Ship, or Ships for Sea & War if in your power,—those things which you cannot procure, & those only be pleased to apply for here." And to the Boston agent, he was yet more explicit:

You have Judged right in procuring, every thing for the Ship, building at Portsmouth, which cou'd be got with you; instead of depending on Phila^a.—This line of Conduct will be right in all future instances—The freight; delay &c^a will always make up for more than any difference in price, even if the Articles could be procured cheaper here, which is doubted. . .

Adams' wisdom in selecting a merchant shipowner as Secretary was confirmed by Stoddert's successful expansion of the force at sea from the solitary *Ganges* to the ultimate impressive fleet of 54 ships. These acquisitions came from several sources. Some were built as the *Constitution* had been in rented yards by "the Public," as the Government was called. Some merchantmen were purchased and hastily converted into cruisers; others, under construction, were taken over while still on the stocks. Finally, and this required eloquent persuasion on Stoddert's part, the citizens of various communities were invited by Congress to subscribe toward the building of frigates, to be reimbursed in "six per cent Stock of the United States."

During those first weeks, Stoddert worked busily along all these various lines. Buying ships had something in common with buying horses, and he knew the vernacular and the tricks. He told Gibbs & Channing at Newport, for instance, that the five per cent commission they wanted was too high. He gave detailed specifications for a 24-gun ship at New York: "No timber inferior to seasoned white Oak to be used; . . . to be pierced for 20 Guns, exclusive of the Bridle Ports on the main Gun Deck, and two on the Quar-

ter Deck—to have an Orlope Deck . . .” and so on. He asked Joshua Humphreys, the designer of the new frigates, to investigate a fast-looking vessel, lying at Philadelphia, apparently intended as a French privateer; probably he took further advantage of the experience, skill, and proximity of Humphreys.

Another form of ready-made warships were the small revenue cutters, already in existence before there had been a Navy. Now they were to begin their distinguished record of service in wartime with the Navy, and Stoddert had to work out the details with the Treasury Department, under which they ordinarily operated. He wrote to Secretary Wolcott on July 5, “I think it is understood that you direct every Thing relating to the Cutters and when They are ready for a cruise that you then turn Them over to my Department.”

Stoddert’s decentralization policy also relieved him of most personnel matters in the Fleet. The selection of officers was left largely to the local navy agents; their nominations, even down to midshipmen, were then transmitted by the Secretary to the President, and by him to the Senate for confirmation. This process not only saved Stoddert’s time, but also built up local interest in particular ships, while the misfits who unavoidably crept in under such a system could be weeded out later. Sometimes the process was highly informal, especially when time was short. To Captain Sever, who was fitting out the *Herald* at Boston, he wrote on July 6:

Inclosed you will receive the Commissions for the Officers recommended by you—As to the Stations, not yet filled, you must in concert with Mr. Higginson find proper Characters for them—and as there will not be Time for the Formality of a regular Appointment, before you are ready for a Cruise, they must for the present be under your Warrant—The Names you will take the first opportunity to transmit to me.

In the serious matter of selecting captains, Stoddert doubtless consulted the President. The crews were secured locally, as had been the shipping practice for years; but Stoddert had to give instructions concerning numbers, pay, status, and the like.

Yet for all this delegation of authority, Stoddert had to have many minor details on his mind. He gave one captain, for example, detailed information about allotments: “The Officers and Men, engaging in the Navy Service who leave Wives or Children behind, may have any Proportion of their Monthly Pay, not exceeding one half, advanced Quarterly to their Families . . .” and enclosed a form of the power of attorney to be used. On one occasion, the Speaker of the House gave him a letter from someone in the *Constellation’s* crew complaining about conditions aboard. Stoddert wrote Captain Truxton that the letter:

has created a little Alarm among some of the Members of Congress, I hope without Reason, but it shews that there is a spirit of Mutiny in some part of your Crew, which should be suppressed by every prudent Means.

I send you the original Letter that you may discover the Writer—I should presume, that your safest Line of Conduct would be, to take no notice of having received such a Letter—to examine well, whether the Sailors have any just cause of Dissatisfaction on the score of ill Treatment from any of the Officers, which I cannot suppose,—to reform silently any abuse of Authority:—and to suffer to exist no just cause of Complaint, against oppression by the Officers—nor on the score of Provisions. . .

Again he wrote, this time to a doctor, on July 2:

The Ship *Delaware*, now on her way out on a Cruise, will be past your reach if you wait to get a regular Appointment of Surgeon’s Mate—which will require Two days, perhaps three—

If you will immediately proceed after the Ship, & enter upon the duties of Surgeon’s Mate, I will present your Name to the President for that Appointment, and there can be no doubt of your receiving it.—

The following day, the Secretary descended to the pettiest of minutiae when he sent a hasty note to the Purveyor of Stores, as the *United States* was about to sail:

Capt. Barry informs me that he is waiting only for two Coil of Rope, one Coil $7\frac{1}{2}$ Inch rope, the other Coil $5\frac{1}{2}$ Inch rope & 50 lb. of marline; His Gunner calls on you with this to get the rope, the Boat is waiting for it & I want to get Capt Barry off this day; pray therefore furnish these articles without the least delay.

There is no room here to follow further the constant rush of details, large and petty that he had to handle; they are available in rich quantity in the seven admirably edited volumes of *Naval Documents Related to the Quasi-War between the United States and France*.

Such minutiae, although time-consuming and tiring, formed but one small aspect of the secretarial picture. At this crisis with France Stoddert was the responsible official who determined how the warships were employed and who transmitted those decisions in understandable orders. Strange as it seems, that very military function continued to remain in the hands of the civilian Secretaries for more than a century. In this vital field Stoddert was fortunate in having for consultation a President, who had been active in naval matters during the Revolution, and, like a few later Presidents, took a direct interest in them. This cooperation with Adams was particularly valuable in view of the irregular nature of the conflict. Professional naval direction, however, was conspicuously absent, and, except for spasmodic advice, this continued to be true down to the twentieth century.

Before Stoddert had come into office, Captain Dale of the *Ganges* and Captain Truxtun of the *Constellation* had already received sailing orders from McHenry. The first sea orders from the new Navy Department were issued on June 26 to Captain Stephen Decatur, Sr. (the father of the more famous

Stephen) in command of the *Delaware*, recently the merchantman *Hamburgh Packet* at Philadelphia. As the first such orders from the pen of a Secretary of the Navy, they seem worth quoting:

Navy Departm^t. 26. June, 1798

Capt. S. Decatur

Sir, The Ship *Delaware*, under your Command, being equipped, manned and armed, you will proceed to Sea, with the first fair wind.—

Capt. Dale of the *Ganges*, whose cruising Ground extends from Cape Henry to Long Island, being but badly prepared to meet an Enemy, you will endeavour to fall in with him as early as possible and will cruise in Company with him, until the 10th of July, unless you should be sooner joined by Capt. Barry of the Frigate *United States* — Whenever you are joined by Capt. Barry, or on the 10th day of July, whether Capt. Barry should have fallen in with you, or otherwise—You will proceed to the Southward, and endeavour to fall in with the Frigate *Constellation*, Capt. Truxtun.— When you have joined Capt. Truxtun, he being your superior Officer, you will of course consider Yourself under his Command. His cruising Ground extends from Cape Henry, to the Extremity of our Southern Limits: You will consider your's to be the same, until further orders.—

The President expects that in Conjunction with Capt. Truxtun, you will protect this Extent of Coast, to the utmost of your Power—that you will pay particular attention to the principal Harbour of South Carolina & of Georgia: and that you will so act as to afford all possible Protection to the Vessels of the United States, coming on, or going off the Coast against the Depredations of the French Cruisers.—

You will as often as opportunities offer, transmit to Me, a Journal of your Preceedings, & such Events as may be proper to communicate.—

I am instructed by the President, to mention to you, his entire Confidence in your Activity, skill and Bravery—and that the Rights and honor of your Country will not suffer in your Hands.—

Inclosed you will receive your Instructions; founded on the present Acts of Congress, & by which you are for the present to be governed.—

Wishing you a pleasant, successful & honorable Cruise, I am &c

With policy and circumstances constantly in a state of flux in the "Quasi-War," Stoddert continued the practice, begun by McHenry, of sending a pilot boat off the Delaware Capes with any revised instructions for the cruiser captains. Otherwise in those days of slow communications, the captains were beyond the control of the Department and definitely on their own when once off soundings. There was need of such contact, because Stoddert began almost at once to plan a more ambitious use of the new Navy as additional ships became available. Instead of being content simply to guard the coast, he ordered most of them on successive cruises to the West Indies, where French depredations were taking the heaviest toll of American shipping. President Adams concurred at once with this policy, which Stoddert later concisely explained to him: "By keeping up incessant attacks upon the French Cruisers on their own ground, they will in a degree at least be prevented from coming on ours. . ." The subsequent success of this new strategy is a matter of history. It was inaugurated on July 11 by orders to Captain Barry of the *United States*, which read in part:

From the best Information, to be obtained here, it does not appear that the French have any considerable Force, in the West-Indies; three light Frigates, blocked up by the English, at Cape Francois, comprise, as I understand, the whole of their Public Force, and these, it is believed, only wait a safe Opportunity to leave the Island and return to France. Their Cruisers of smaller size, are numerous & find Shelter in the Spanish, Danish & Dutch Islands, as well as their own.—

Under such Circumstances, it is thought probable, that a small Squadron, under the Command of an Officer of your Intelligence, Experience & Bravery might render essential service, & animate your Country to Enterprize, by picking up a Number of Prizes in the short Cruise to the Islands.—

Writing to his navy agent at Boston the

following day regarding this new plan of attack, Stoddert thus summed up his reactions to his first weeks as amateur strategist, expediter extraordinary, creator of precedents, and general factotum of the new Navy Department:

I wish you would give me your candid opinion of this Arrangement, and add such Observations as shall direct me better in future—It was unfortunate, that in conferring the Appointment of Secretary of the Navy upon me, the President, cou'd not also confer the knowledge necessary for the Secretary of the Navy to possess, to make him most useful to his Country—No person could have a greater desire to acquire this knowledge, or could be more grateful to those enlightened men who will assist him than myself—I fear many things have been neglected from this quarter respecting Capt. Sever—I have been obliged to Act—& under great disadvantages—without having a moment to think—I shall soon have time to make better arrangements. . .

Even in those hectic first 25 days in office, amid the memoranda on coils of rope and copper sheathing, Stoddert was beginning to think out many of the fundamental needs of the Navy and develop broad, far-reaching policies. His three-year administration was to show that he had the skill to translate many of these into realities and to utilize those first formative years so that the Naval Establishment would weather the anti-Navy Jeffersonian period that followed Stoddert's term of office.

A combination of the statesman's vision and the politician's shrewd tactical skill is shown in Stoddert's report to Congress on December 29, 1798. Laid alongside McHenry's collection of excuses of nine months earlier, the calibre of the new Secretary is the more evident. Anticipating Mahan's arguments by almost a century, Stoddert argued for a modest force of capital ships as the best guarantee of national security:

Twelve ships of seventy-four guns, as many frigates, and twenty or thirty smaller vessels, would probably be found (our geographical

situation and our means of annoying the trade of the maritime Powers considered) a force sufficient to ensure our future peace with the nations of Europe. . . . Whether this security can be afforded, unless we are able to command our own coast, and whether the union of all the States can long be preserved without it, are questions which merit the most serious and attentive consideration of American legislators. I forbear to dwell on this fruitful, perhaps delicate topic.

Sketching in the type of establishment required to support such a force, he did not overlook the need for timber reserves of live oak, the development of other domestic naval materials, and the construction of repair docks and building yards.

Realizing that his proposed expansion would raise the naval budget from \$2,400,000 to \$5,300,000, he anticipated Congressional reaction on that score by citing the reduction in war risk insurance rates since the new Navy had been ready for action. He estimated that this item alone was saving some \$9,500,000 a year. The continuation of his decentralized procurement and the scattering of navy yards along the coast naturally indicated local benefits to Congressmen, while the proposed utilization of the domestic supply of hemp, canvas, and copper implied the spread of such advantages even to the interior. Stoddert even had the temerity to suggest that with naval affairs in a formative stage, "it may be best for the public interest that the Congress, at their present session, should rely a little more on Executive direction than may hereafter be necessary."

Accomplishments on "the Hill" being one of the criteria of a good Secretary, Stoddert would merit a place among the best by that token alone. On February 25, 1799, three of his basic recommendations became law. Congress authorized six capital ships of not less than 74 guns each; two repair docks; and a sum "to be laid out in the purchase of growing or other timber, or of lands on which timber is growing. . ." That legislation was more important in its long-range implications

than in its immediate results. Actually, the 74's did not materialize until the end of the War of 1812, nor the dry docks until 1830, but Stoddert's efforts had been the leading force in causing the nation to espouse a substantial naval policy while there was still a President and a Congress favorable to the Navy. He was also able to acquire, without further legislation and by means of a "loose construction" of the building program, six permanent navy yards while pro-Navy Adams was still in office.

Altogether, he raised the naval strength at sea from one ship to 54; guided the Navy through its successful action against the French; established efficient working methods in the Department which his young clerk Goldsborough was to transmit to many later Secretaries; and above all not only gave the nation a substantially founded Naval Establishment but committed it to a strong naval policy. It has truly been said of him: "A more fortunate selection could not well have been made. To the most ardent patriotism, he united an inflexible integrity, a discriminating mind, great capacity for business, and the most persevering industry."

Stoddert left the Secretaryship a few weeks after Jefferson assumed the presidency in 1801. Thus ended the Navy Department's early prosperous era. Everyone realized that the new President intended to minimize the Navy; Congress had already shown how the wind was blowing by voting to reduce the Naval Establishment drastically. Perhaps it was not surprising that once again no one was eager to hold this Cabinet post and that on May 8, 1801, Jefferson should write, "I believe I shall have to advertise for a Secretary of the Navy." However, Stoddert went out of office leaving the Naval Establishment well-braced to withstand the lean years to come. And the results of his efficient administration and foresight were to carry the Navy not only safely through the Jeffersonian recession, but on to greater days ahead.

THE ARMISTICE OF CASSIBILE*

By HOWARD MCGAW SMYTH

INTRODUCTION

Brig. Gen. Guiseppe Castellano, assistant to the Chief of the Italian General Staff, left Rome on August 12, 1943, and on the 19th at Lisbon secretly met Major General Walter B. Smith and Brigadier Kenneth W. D. Strong. They refused to discuss his plan for Italy to switch sides; they gave him the text of the "short terms" of armistice which the Italian Government might either accept or reject; and in accordance with the Quebec memorandum composed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, promised merely that the terms might be modified in the future in proportion to the active aid which Italy would render against the Germans. General Eisenhower's representatives refused to discuss where or when the Allies would land on the Italian Peninsula, and insisted that the armistice, if signed, would be announced by both parties to it at the wishes of Allied Force Headquarters.

Because of Castellano's delay in returning to Rome, Badoglio sent Brig. Gen. Giacomo Zanussi as a second emissary. He was detained for a time by AFHQ in North Africa

and then flown to Sicily before being permitted to report to his government. Meanwhile Castellano got back to Rome and was there instructed to return to the Allies and explain that because of the German occupation, the Italian Government dared not accept the armistice unless the Allies would land fifteen divisions within striking distance of the capital.

Texts of the "short terms" and "long terms" were published in the Department of State *Bulletin* (November 11, 1945) vol. XIII, No. 333.

* * * *

On a plane piloted by Major Mancini, Castellano and Montanari (civilian interpreter) reached *Termini Imerese* field (near Palermo) a little before 0900 of August 31. There they were met by Brigadier Strong and the whole party then transferred to an American plane which took them to Headquarters, 15th Army Group at Cassibile, Sicily. General Zanussi was already there, having flown from Africa with Major General Smith. Zanussi informed Castellano in a general and rather superficial manner of the Long Terms.¹

At Cassibile there was a general conference of the two Italian generals and their interpreter with General Smith, Chief of Staff; Brigadier Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Commodore Royer Dick, Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Mediter-

*This article by Dr. Smyth will constitute the first four sections of a chapter with the same title which will appear as chapter IV of Part II, Volume II of the series, the *History of the War in the Mediterranean Theater*, a six volume series being written as part of the *Official History of the U. S. Army in World War II*.

Earlier chapters of Part II, Volume II (*The Campaign in Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*) will have discussed Allied strategy toward Italy, the German occupation of that country following the overthrow of Mussolini, and the first contacts of the Badoglio regime with the Allies through its emissaries General Castellano and General Zanussi.

¹Giuseppe Castellano, *Come firmai l'armistizio di Cassibile* (Milan, 1945), pp. 133-134 (hereafter cited as Castellano, *Come firmai*); Giacomo Zanussi, *Guerra e catastrofe d'Italia*, Vol. II (Rome, 1945), pp. 116-117 (hereafter cited as Zanussi, *Guerra e catastrofe II*).

reanean; General Alexander, Commander of the 15th Army Group; Brigadier General Cannon, Deputy Commanding General of the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force; and Captain Deann of the British Army (who spoke Italian). General Smith presided and opened the discussion by asking Castellano if he had full powers to sign the military terms of armistice. Castellano replied "No," but stated that he had precise instructions, whereupon he read the memorandum furnished him by his Government: if the Italian Government were free it would accept and announce the armistice as demanded by the Allies; the Italian Government, however, was not free but under German control because of the German forces which had been considerably increased since the Lisbon meeting. Because of this situation, Castellano continued, Italy could not accept the condition that the armistice be announced before the main Allied landing: the Italian Government must be sure that Allied landings were in sufficient strength to guarantee the security of Rome, where the King and Government intended to remain, before it could hazard announcement of the armistice. Because of their inferiority in equipment the Italians would rapidly be eliminated if they faced the Germans alone. The German armies would next turn an undivided attention to the Allied invaders which would be, said Castellano, greatly to the disadvantage of the Allies. Castellano declared that his Government insisted that the main Allied landing be made north of Rome, and with a force of at least fifteen divisions.

General Smith bluntly declared that Castellano's proposal was unacceptable; the Italian Government should either accept the conditions as a whole, including the announcement of cessation of hostilities at the time of the Allied main landing; or, it had the alternative of refusing an armistice. He declared that it was only with great difficulty

that General Eisenhower had been able to secure authorization from the Allied Governments to undertake discussions with the Italians, discussions limited to military matters and not regarding methods of proclaiming the armistice. Italy, he said, had been offered an anchor of salvation in the Quebec Memorandum, and General Eisenhower had full powers to modify the conditions in accordance with the degree of support which Italy would render in the war. If the Italian Government refused the present offer of armistice, with its proclamation on the day of the Allied landing in force as was planned by General Eisenhower with the approval of the American and British Governments, then, said General Smith, General Eisenhower would have no powers in the future to treat with Italian military leaders or to conclude an armistice. In such a case, General Smith remarked, negotiations would be taken up by the diplomats of the Allied nations who would necessarily impose much harsher conditions than those demanded by General Eisenhower. If, through refusal to proclaim the armistice at the time of the Allied debarkation, this opportunity for a military armistice were lost, there would be in the future, said General Smith, no further occasion for military discussions. This remark was directed at Castellano's essential program of a military collaboration of Italy with the Allies by which the dynasty and the Government might yet maintain itself and save something from the disastrous wreck into which Italy had been plunged by the Fascist regime. If military discussions were ruled out in the future it would mean the non-participation of Italy in the war, the exclusion of any mitigation of terms in proportion to Italian aid to the Allies. These remarks of General Smith most clearly implied that unless the Italian Government now accepted the whole of Eisenhower's conditions, Italy would be simply a passive element during

the rest of the war and her ultimate fate at the peace table would be determined purely on the basis of Allied wishes. As to the figure of fifteen divisions which Marshal Badoglio regarded as essential, General Smith said that if the Allies were in a position to effect a landing with such a force, they would not offer an armistice.²

At this last remark General Castellano perceived that Allied plans called for a total of fifteen divisions to be committed in Italy, and not fifteen divisions in the main landing. General Smith declared, however, that the invasion of the Italian Peninsula would take place with or without Italian aid, implying that it devolved upon the Italians themselves whether the struggle would be long and devastating or relatively brief.

General Castellano failed completely to secure any modification in the Allied program of announcement of the armistice simultaneous with the main landing. Both Castellano and General Zanussi tried repeatedly to gain some indication of the place and approximate time of the chief Allied debarkation, but here too General Smith refused any information.

General Castellano then declared that he could say nothing further, but would have to refer the decision to his Government. He was obliged to follow his instructions strictly. He raised the question of the Italian fleet: could it not go to Maddalena in Sardinia rather than to an Allied port, for this would soften the blow to the Italian people. He was informed that there could be no modifi-

cation of the Allies' terms here: in any case the units of the Italian fleet in Taranto would not be able to reach Maddalena.

Castellano again tried to find out when and where the Allies would land. He asked with what measures they planned to protect the Vatican, and when they hoped to reach Rome. In response to his threat that the Italian fleet was intact, and, in the absence of agreement with the Allies, would not remain idle as it had done during the Sicilian invasion, but would attack the Allied convoys, General Smith replied with greater threats: whatever the German strength or Italian attitude it was the intention of the Allies to drive the Germans out of Italy regardless of any suffering that might thereby be brought upon the Italian people. Nothing, he said, could prevent Italy from becoming a battlefield, but the Government might shorten her sufferings by completely accepting the Allied proposals.

The Italian generals were faced with a cruel dilemma. Failure to accept the armistice offered by General Eisenhower, with the possibility of military collaboration which in turn could bring modification of the terms, would inevitably mean overthrow of the dynasty and disappearance of the regime. But an even more immediate threat was that the Germans would occupy Rome and seize the Government unless the main Allied landings were close to the capital. And the course of the discussion revealed to General Smith that Badoglio and his emissaries were more afraid of the Germans than of the Allies. At Lisbon General Castellano had given full information regarding German troop dispositions in Italy: he now refused to do so stating that it was impossible in view of the trend of the discussion. The conference was inconclusive, but General Smith gained the very definite impression that the Italian Government would not pluck up its courage to sign and announce the armistice unless there were

²These particulars are drawn from Castellano's account, *Come firmai*, pp. 135-137, and the minutes of the conference which he prints as appendix No. 2, pp. 219-222. They agree in general with the summary of the conference given in Telg. (S) Eisenhower to AGWAR for CCS, No. W-8854/8954 (NAF 346) Sept. 1, 1943, *Capitulation of Italy*, pp. 198-202. *Capitulation of Italy* is a compilation of telegrams, memoranda, and other documents in the personal files of General (now Ambassador) Walter Bedell Smith. See also Zanussi, *Guerra e catastrofe*, II, 117-120.

assurances that Allied troops would be landed in the Rome area to give the Government some measure of protection against the Germans.

General Smith was adamant in conference, but courteous in minor matters. He invited the Italian representatives, General Castellano, General Zanussi and Signor Montanari to lunch, where, after an initial embarrassing silence, discussions were resumed. General Smith remarked that if Italy lost this opportunity, her situation in the future would be much more difficult. Castellano reiterated his Government's contention: it would accept the armistice, no matter how harsh the terms, but asked only for postponement of its proclamation. The Italian Government, he said, would gladly offer military cooperation to the Allies, but Italy could not do this unless the Allies offered conditions making it possible. Castellano had divined from the conference that the Allied main landing would be south of Rome. He remarked to his host that Italian forces alone could not save the capital, nerve center of the nation, and he urged that the Allies in their own interest, should furnish help because if it fell into German hands it would take a costly battle to regain it.

General Smith then mentioned that there were several Italian divisions disposed around the city which should be able to sustain a German attack. Castellano referred to the discussion at Lisbon saying that the arming of these divisions was so inferior to that of the Germans that they needed an Allied landing near Rome in addition to the main landing if the capital were to be saved. The American General then asked that Castellano make a specific request,—bearing in mind, of course, that the general plan of operations of the Allies could not be changed because of the long and minute preparations requisite for amphibious operations. Castellano then requested: one armored division to

debark at Ostia; and one airborne division to land in the vicinity of Rome.

After the luncheon General Smith conferred at length with the other Allied generals. He then returned to Castellano and said that it would be very difficult to get the immediate concession of an armored division, but that it would be possible to obtain a paratroop division if the Italians would provide a couple of airfields. Castellano foresaw no difficulty about the airfields but insisted on the necessity of armored units to give the whole operation consistency; if an entire division could not be sent he stated it was indispensable that the Allies land some anti-tank batteries at the mouth of the Tiber on the day of the operation. General Smith assured Castellano that he would study the possibilities of such a project and would consider the landing of an entire armored division at a somewhat later time.

In the afternoon the results of the conference were summarized:

1. The Italian Government may accept or may refuse the conditions of armistice, but if it accepts it must accede to the methods desired by the Allies for the official declaration;

2. The Allies will effect the secondary landing with five or six divisions; during this landing the Italian troops cannot avoid offering resistance;

3. After a certain period of time (one or two weeks?) there will be the main landing south of Rome. The total force employed in both landings will equal, if not exceed the fifteen divisions regarded as necessary by Badoglio. Simultaneously there will be effected the landing of the paratroop division in the vicinity of the capital and that of 100 antitank guns at the mouth of the Tiber;

4. Acceptance on the part of the Italian Government shall be made by radio within the twenty-four hours of September 2. In the negative case no communication will be made.⁸

Castellano, Zanussi, and Montanari left Cassibile airfield at 1600 in an American

⁸Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 138-144, and appendix No. 2, pp. 219-223; NAF 346, Sept. 1, 1943, *Capitulation of Italy*, pp. 198-202.

plane, transferred to the Italian plane at *Termini Imerese* and reached *Centocelle* airfield near Rome at about 1900. During the conference at Cassibile, Zanussi had supported the arguments of Castellano. The two talked over the whole problem during the return flight, and Zanussi apparently shared Castellano's conviction that the only course open to the Italian Government was to accept the armistice on the conditions offered by General Smith. Zanussi, however, expressed his fears that Castellano would not be able to persuade Badoglio, and offered to support Castellano's arguments. He mentioned also that he would try to persuade Carboni, whose relations with Castellano were not amicable. This was the first intimation to Castellano that Carboni bore him any hostility.⁴

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDES TO ACCEPT

Castellano had quite failed to carry out his instructions: to secure agreement that the armistice would be announced only after the Allied landing in force; to gain the promise of an Allied landing of fifteen divisions north of Rome; to learn the time of the Allied main attack; or to have the fleet transferred to Maddalena rather than to Allied ports. It was clear, as a result of the conference of August 31, that the Allies planned a secondary attack far to the south, and a primary landing closer toward the capital but still south of it and not within striking distance. To aid the defense of the capital the Allies offered an airborne division and 100 anti-tank guns, provided the Italians would guarantee airfields and assistance. General Smith had given some rather clear indications that the Allies would land "as far north as possible, within the possibility of protection by fighter planes."⁵ The total of all the forces employed by the Allies would be approxi-

mately fifteen divisions. As the decision was now placed before the Badoglio Government it could only be in these terms. The Allies refused to make the invasion of Italy an attack in the middle of the peninsula to rescue the Italian Government: they were willing, however, to offer that Government auxiliary support in defending itself. The Allied conditions had been carefully explained not only to Castellano, accredited representative of Marshal Badoglio, but also to General Zanussi, Chief of Staff to Roatta. The Long Terms had not been formally given to the Italian Government, but they had been shown to Zanussi, and the Allied chieftains presumed that the Italian Government leaders would have received a general idea of their content.

Immediately after landing at *Centocelle* airfield General Castellano hastened to the *Comando Supremo* where he found General Ambrosio to whom he reported the results of his discussions at Cassibile. Badoglio had retired for the night but an appointment was made for the next morning. Ambrosio, Foreign Minister Guariglia, Acquarone, Minister of the Royal Household, and General Carboni then met, with Marshal Badoglio presiding, to hear Castellano's report. Castellano presented his copy of the minutes of the conference at Cassibile and gave a detailed explanation of all that was said. He admitted frankly that he had been unable to obtain what the Italian Government desired—the postponement of the request of armistice until after the Anglo-American landing in force. The Allies, he stated, would not modify their plan of operations for a landing in southern Italy. The Allied chieftains, he explained, considered the Italian formations around Rome sufficient to defend the city. When he had insisted on the absolute inferiority of the Italian units in comparison with the adjacent German troops, he obtained from the Allies the promise of an American

⁴Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 145-146.

⁵Castellano, *Come firmai*, p. 222.

airborne division, of 100 pieces of artillery and of an armored division to be sent subsequently. Furthermore, he explained, the sending of these Allied troops would automatically entail the powerful support of Allied aviation.

Badoglio listened in silence, said nothing, and made no objection when Castellano had finished. He then asked Ambrosio's opinion and the Chief of the Supreme Staff agreed that there was no other course than to accept the conditions offered. Thereupon General Carboni spoke up in decided opposition. It would be Carboni, as Commander of the motorized army corps consisting of the four divisions (10th *Piave*, motorized division; 131st *Centauro*, armored division; 132d *Ariete*, armored division, and the *Granatieri di Sardegna*, 21st Infantry Division) on whom would devolve the task of defending Rome against German attack. General Carboni declared that the assurances of the Anglo-Americans were not to be trusted: they were oral promises, not a written agreement. Furthermore his army corps could not withstand a German attack because of lack of gasoline and munitions.

These remarks came as a very disagreeable surprise to Castellano inasmuch as Carboni had favored Castellano's mission to Cassibile. Hitherto Carboni had not mentioned a complete lack of munitions and gasoline. Acquarone seemed uncertain and said nothing. Guariglio's attitude is not certain. Badoglio expressed no judgement and dismissed the meeting saying he would refer the problem to the King.⁶

In the afternoon (September 1) Badoglio

received the assent of the King, and gave the order to General Ambrosio to notify the Allies by radio that the armistice terms were accepted. The telegram was sent in these words:

The reply is affirmative repeat affirmative period In consequence known person will arrive tomorrow two September hour and place established period Please confirm.

The reply was received not long before 2300 at AFHQ September 1.⁷

According to General Carboni, it was at the meeting of September 1 that the suggestion was first made that the King, the Supreme Command and some of the ministers depart from the capital when the armistice was announced.⁸ This is not strictly accurate: some members of the Italian Government had been thinking of this as early as August 12 when Castellano left for Madrid. Castellano had mentioned the matter to General Smith and Brigadier Strong on August 19 at Lisbon. During the night of September 1-2, General Smith sent two radiograms to Rome: the one requested that Castellano return to Sicily the next day; the other assured Marshal Badoglio that plans were being studied for sending antitank guns to Rome and for the airborne operation. The Italian High Command was asked to indicate the air fields which could be used.⁹

SIGNATURE OF THE SHORT TERMS: PLANNING GIANT TWO

General Castellano returned from Rome to Cassibile in the morning of September 2. On this trip he was accompanied by Montanari, in his accustomed role of interpreter; by Major Vassallo, pilot; and by Major

⁶The records of this meeting consist merely of the autobiographical accounts composed much later by some of the participants: Pietro Badoglio, *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale* (Milan, 1945) p. 102, brief and next, (hereafter cited as Badoglio, *Guerra mondiale*); Giacomo Carboni, *L'armistizio e la difesa di Roma* (Rome, 1945), p. 26, brief and suspect, (hereafter cited as Carboni, *Difesa*); Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 146-149, a full account but prejudiced in his own behalf.

⁷Badoglio, *Guerra mondiale*, p. 102; Castellano, *Come firmai*, p. 149; Telg. (S) AFHQ to AGWAR, No. W-8899/9175 (NAF 348) Sept. 1, 1943, *Capitulation of Italy*, p. 205.

⁸Carboni, *Difesa*, p. 26.

⁹Castellano, *Come firmai*, p. 152.

Marchesi, who was attached to the Supreme General Staff.

Soon after the arrival of the Italian delegation a new misunderstanding developed. The staff officers of AFHQ, increasingly aware of the indecision and fears at Rome, demanded formal signature of the armistice by General Castellano. This was the meaning of their request for his return. At Lisbon, however, it had been agreed that acceptance would be made by secret radio message on the instrument which had been given to General Castellano. When General Smith asked General Castellano if he had full powers to sign, the Italian emissary said, "No." Despite the Sicilian summer heat there was a sudden drop in temperature. The Italians were completely ignored. They spent most of the day quite to themselves, not without some feelings of embarrassment as their tent was in the midst of the Allied camp. General Smith, however, permitted General Castellano to radio Rome asking for full powers to sign, and suggesting that his full powers be authenticated by message to Sir D'Arcy Osborne, British Ambassador at the Vatican. At 0400 of September 3, General Castellano repeated the request to his Government for authorization to sign the armistice.

The reply of Marshal Badoglio, empowering Castellano to sign on his behalf, did not reach Cassibile until the afternoon of September 3. Late in the evening of September 2, however, a message from the *Comando Supremo* reached General Smith, indicating acceptance of the airborne operation and suggesting use of the airfields of *Centocelle*, *Urbe* (*Littorio*), and *Guidonia*.¹⁰

Discussion and planning of the airborne operation given the code name *GIANT TWO* began at 1430 of September 3, which was even before the formal signature of the armistice terms, but after the Italian Govern-

ment had indicated by radio its agreement to surrender. After a preliminary meeting in the early afternoon of September 3 of the Italian delegation with Allied officers, and an all night session of the Allied planners, an outline plan for operation *GIANT TWO* was completed by early morning of September 4.¹¹

The afternoon meeting was largely exploratory. Major General L. W. Rooks, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, presided and opened with the statement that "as time is short it is important to begin discussion on the operation without delay." As soon as conclusions could be reached they would be issued in the form of an aide-memoire.

The mission of the airborne division was defined: to cooperate with Italian units in the defense of Rome. General Castellano explained how the Germans would probably attack as soon as the Allied airborne division began landing. The *3d Panzer Division*, stationed between Viterbo and Lake Bolsena, could advance on Rome by three parallel roads, as the main German drive. Opposed to this force were two Italian units: the *Piave Division* immediately north of the city and the *Ariete Division* some fifteen miles out. Castellano believed that the commanders of these divisions would be able to choose a forward line of defense east and west in about the latitude of Lake di Braccia, and make the main defense just south of the lakes (di Braccia and Martignano). In the city was the *Sassari Division*, and to the south was the *Centauro* which, it was implied would be able to oppose the German

¹¹The Allied records are: (1) "Minutes of a meeting held at Cassibile on Friday, Sept. 3, 1943 to discuss a certain projected airborne operation," AFHQ Microfilm Records, R-62-1, Item *Giant Two*; (2) "*Giant Two* Outline Plan," Sept. 3, 1943, Copy No. 5, *Ibid.*; (3) *Giant Two* Outline Plan, Copy No. 3, Sept. 3, 1943, typewritten copy with ink corrections and insertions, G-3 Journal, *82d Airborne Division*, Sept. 1-15, 1943, Message File 110-264 (382-3.4, 23178 Historical Records Section, WDAGO).

¹⁰Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 153-155.

The Allied officers were chiefly concerned with the protection of the airfields where the landings would take place, and to secure complete assurance that no Italian anti-aircraft batteries would fire upon the planes when they came in low for landing. General Castellano gave a number of specific guarantees:

- (1) that the Italian command would secure the dropping fields;
- (2) that the anti-aircraft defenses would not open fire;
- (3) that a route, north of the Tiber, could be chosen which would pass over minimum A.A. defenses.

It was pointed out, and agreed to by General Castellano, that sufficient time would have to be allowed to enable a specific order to get down to every gun. The Italian General also promised:

- (4) that Italian officers of high rank would meet the commander of the 82d Airborne Division on some field to be indicated;
- (5) that all available intelligence would be furnished regarding both German and Italian units in the Rome area; and
- (6) that navigational aids would be provided. The Italian broadcasting station announcing the armistice would serve as an aid to navigation, and the landing fields themselves would be illuminated: the outlines of the fields in orange-red lights; the outlines of the runways; and any obstacles within 500 yards of the fields by means of red lights.

General Castellano furthermore gave his assurances that the Italians would provide motor transportation for concentrating the airborne troops and supplies.

In the afternoon meeting General Castellano mentioned and briefly described the available fields:

Littorio (Urbe)—in the northern suburbs, good for aircraft but only fair for dropping because of its position in a loop of the Tiber;

Centocelle—Southeast of the city, a very good field, but with limited night facilities;

The Race Course—opposite *Littorio*;

Magliana—on the river west of Rome, not yet fit for aircraft;

Guidonia—twenty-five kilometers north-east of Rome, the best and largest field;

Ciampino—southeast of the city, and not to be thought of since it was in the midst of German troops.

Castellano stated that the Germans, however, did not occupy any of the airfields. He suggested that the troops be landed at *Centocelle* and *Littorio* fields, and the heavy equipment at *Guidonia*. *Littorio*, just north of the city, seemed indicated as the point of concentration of the division, and motor transport furnished by the Italians would enable the men and equipment landed at *Guidonia* to be brought in rapidly. An Italian senior staff officer would meet General Ridgway at *Guidonia*. To reach these fields, which formed together a triangle with its base along the eastern outskirts of the Italian capital and its apex at *Guidonia*, it was suggested that the planes fly in from W.N.W.

During the afternoon meeting certain other things were briefly mentioned. General Castellano produced his maps showing the location of German and Italian units near Rome. General Rooks mentioned that consideration was being given to running two or three ships up the Tiber with ammunition and supplies, and Commodore Dick, Chief of Staff to Admiral Cunningham, asked if the swing bridges could be opened. Castellano stated that the bridge at Fiumicino could be kept open, and this would permit the ships to go as far as the *Magliano* airport where supplies could be landed along the banks. As far as *Littorio* field the Tiber was thirty feet deep. But he added that the area south of the Tiber was occupied by German troops who had AA batteries, and he felt that the flight line of approach should be about eight miles north of the river. Brigadier General Taylor, Ar-

tillery Commander, 82d Airborne Division, felt that such a route would be more difficult to find at night than directly up the Tiber, and urged that the German units south of the river be mopped up by the Italians as an initial move. General Rooks asked if a small planning staff of the 82d Airborne Division could be sent on to Rome in advance in order to complete details, a suggestion in which Castellano concurred, offering to take two or three American officers with him on a return trip to Rome on the morrow.

Toward the end of the discussion Brigadier General Timberlake, Assistant Chief of Staff, A-3, Mediterranean Air Command, asked whether, if the Allies brought a fighter group to the area, any 100 octane gasoline could be supplied to them. Major Vassallo replied that there was not much near Rome, but he believed it could be brought in, or obtained at some other agreed airfield, and asked when the fighters would arrive. General Timberlake stated that as soon as maintenance for some time was assured, there would be one hundred Allied fighter aircraft which would require approximately twenty-five tons a day. Major Vassallo stated that no airfields nearer than thirty or forty miles to the city could be used by the fighters, and suggested *Cerveteri* (near the coast and on the road to Civitavecchia) and *Tarquinia*. General Ridgway then declared that he had sufficient information to draft his outline plan and the meeting adjourned.

At about 1400 hours of September 3, the expected radiogram from Badoglio himself arrived:

Present telegram is sent from Head Italian Government to Supreme Commander Allied Force. Number eight. Reply affirmative given with our number five contains implicit acceptance armistice conditions.

This was not, however, an authorization for Castellano to sign. At about 1700 hours Captain Deann brought Castellano the tele-

gram empowering him to sign, also signed by Badoglio:

Our number eight is cancelled. General Castellano is authorized by the Italian Government to sign the acceptance of the conditions of armistice. The declaration which you requested with your No. 19 will be delivered today.

At 1715 hours General Castellano signed the text of the Short Terms on behalf of Badoglio, and General Smith signed on behalf of General Eisenhower who flew from North Africa to witness the ceremony.¹²

General Eisenhower and his staff were intent on securing the maximum possible aid from the Italians, and on completing plans for the cooperation of the 82d Airborne Division with the Italian Motorized Corps near Rome. In reporting the conclusion of the surrender of Italy on the basis of the Short Terms, he wired the Combined Chiefs of Staff that formal signature of the Long Terms would take place later and would be timed to fit Allied operational plans, but the signature of the Short Terms was absolutely necessary as a basis for making specific military plans with the representatives of the Italian Government and High Command.

After the signing of the armistice the four Italians withdrew into their own tent, and Castellano sent a message to Rome reporting his action. Shortly thereafter General Alexander appeared and invited Castellano to dinner after which the Italian emissary was introduced to the American and British political advisers, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan.¹³

At 2030 hours another meeting was held to discuss the general action to be taken by the Italian Government in consequence of

¹²Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 156-157; Telg. (S) Eisenhower to AGWAR for CCS, Sept. 2, 1943 (NAF 351), *Capitulation of Italy*, p. 212; Telg. (S) AFHQ Adv. to AFHQ, No. 121, Sept. 3, 1943, *Capitulation of Italy*, p. 252; relayed by AFHQ to AGWAR for CCS (NAF 354), *Capitulation of Italy*, p. 257.

¹³Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 156-158.

the armistice. General Alexander presided, Colonel Archbald acted as secretary and the other Allied officers taking part were: General Smith, General Rooks, General Cannon, Brigadier Strong, General Timberlake and Brig. Gen. L. L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff, 15th Army Group.¹⁴ An *aide-memoire* enumerating the general actions to be taken by the Italian Government prior to the announcement of the armistice, embodying the conclusions reached at the meeting, was handed to General Castellano that same day.¹⁵

Just before this meeting General Smith handed Castellano a copy of the original Long Terms entitled "Instrument of Surrender of Italy" with a brief note stating that the attached document:

Contains the political, financial and economic conditions which will be imposed by the United Nations in accordance with paragraph 12 of the Armistice terms. The military conditions of the Armistice are contained in the document which we have just signed. The attached paper is identical with the one handed to General Zanussi by H. M. Ambassador in Lisbon.¹⁶

General Castellano, who had managed to avoid the phrase "unconditional surrender" in the Short Terms, and who had initiated the planning of a joint Allied-Italian operation for the defense of Rome, was painfully surprised by the Long Terms which contained the harsh initial clause:

The Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces wherever located, hereby surrender unconditionally.

He protested against this manner of procedure on the part of the Allies to which Gen-

eral Smith replied that a copy of the document had already been given to General Zanussi in Lisbon and was therefore known to the Italian Government. Castellano, however, expressed a doubt that his Government would ever accept the additional clauses. It seems clear between the lines that neither General Eisenhower nor General Smith was ever very happy about the Long Terms and the order from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to secure their acceptance by the Badoglio Government. In any case, General Smith reminded Castellano once more about the Quebec Telegram to which Castellano replied that that message contained only general promises: he saw no basis for recourse by his Government in case these promises were not maintained. Thereupon General Smith with his own hand wrote out a note to Marshal Badoglio stating that:

The additional clauses have only a relative value insofar as Italy collaborates in the war against the Germans.¹⁷

Some time that same evening of September 3 Commodore Dick handed Castellano a memorandum containing the instructions for the movement of Italian warships and merchant shipping.¹⁸

Meanwhile General Ridgway and his planning group had been working out an outline plan for Giant Two on the basis of the discussion with Castellano during the afternoon. Their primary worry was that the Italian authorities might not be able to silence every gun in Rome's belt of antiaircraft defenses. In such a case the unescorted C-47's would be shot like clay pigeons as they came in low for the dropping of paratroopers or for landing supplies. They remembered April 18th of that year when Allied fighters had intercepted and shot down

¹⁴Minutes of a meeting held at Cassibile on Friday, Sept. 3, 1943 at 2030 hours, to discuss action to be taken in consequence of the armistice," *Capitulation of Italy*, pp. 241-246. Cf. Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 158-159.

¹⁵*Capitulation of Italy*, pp. 221-223. The copy in AFHQ Microfilm Records, R-62-I, Item *Giant Two*, indicates that copy No. 1 was given to the visiting party, i.e., General Castellano.

¹⁶*Capitulation of Italy*, p. 224.

¹⁷Castellano, *Come firmai*, p. 161.

¹⁸Text entitled, "Instructions for the movement of Italian Warships and Shipping," (MS), *Capitulation of Italy*, pp. 238-240; Castellano, *Come firmai*, p. 169.

seventy-three Junker 52's which were attempting to bring supplies into Tunisia. They remembered even more vividly the unfortunate experience in the attack on Sicily when twenty-three of their own transport aircraft had been shot down by Allied fire.

The original outline plan, based on the use of *Guidonia*, *Littorio* and *Centocelle* airfields, seemed very risky indeed to General Ridgway and General Taylor who expressed through General Lemnitzer to General Smith and to General Alexander their belief:

that no reliance could be placed upon that degree of cooperation from Italian Military Forces which was considered essential to success of the airborne mission as outlined.¹⁹

General Castellano was called in for consultation and he was less certain than he had been during the afternoon of the ability of the Italian Supreme Command to guarantee that no Italian guns would fire upon the Allied planes. In the earlier meeting he had followed the instructions of his Government and suggested the *Guidonia*, *Littorio*, and *Centocelle* airfields for the airborne landings. Under pressure of Allied questioning Castellano was forced to admit the enormous difficulty of silencing every gun in Rome's anti-aircraft defences, and the *Centocelle* and *Littorio* fields lay right in the midst of extensive flak batteries. He proposed therefore that the initial drop be made at *Furbara* and *Cerveteri*, two fields which were slightly to the north of the capital, but right on the coast, about twenty-five miles to the west and along the Via Aurelia on Highway No. 1. These fields lay quite outside the belt of Rome's air defense batteries, they were completely in Italian hands and the Italian 7th Infantry Division (*Lupi di Toscana*) was scheduled to effect its concentration on September 8 between the two fields. Believing

these fields to be unknown to American aviators, he supplied the Allied planners with considerable precise information about them, something he was easily able to do.²⁰

The Outline Plan, as completed during the night of September 3-4, differed considerably from what had been contemplated during the afternoon discussions. It was now planned to make the initial landings at *Cerveteri* and *Furbara*, and only on the second night (second lift) to drop parachutists on the zones of *Daisy* (*Guidonia*), *Maple* (*Littorio*), and *Oak* (*Centocelle*). The airborne division was to assemble and reorganize in the western exits of Rome, not at *Littorio* field.

The Outline Plan carefully defined the responsibilities of the Italian forces. First, *provision and protection of the airfields of Guidonia, Littorio, Centocelle, Cerveteri and Furbara*. All the anti-aircraft defenses of these fields were to be manned exclusively by Italian forces who were to be given explicit orders against firing on any aircraft throughout the night of X day and throughout the nights of the subsequent lifts. General security of the area of the fields was to be provided by the Italian troops who were to block the avenues of approach of the Germans, furnish ground forces for local protection of the various airfields and drop zones, and guarantee unmolested passage of naval craft up the Tiber to Rome.

Second, a *number of navigational aids* to the airborne flight were specified: a horizontal searchlight beam pointing due west at *Furbara* field, and two Rome radio stations broadcasting throughout the night. On each field the perimeter was to be outlined with amber lights, the airdrome runway to be marked with white lights.

¹⁹Report of General M. B. Ridgway to C in C. A.F., October 25, 1943, "Lessons of Airborne Operations in Italy," U.S.A.A.F., *A Report of TCC Activities including the Italian Invasion* (Aug. 1-Sept. 30, 1943), Vol. II, p. 120 (411- 7649- 20).

²⁰Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 165-166. Castellano's statement that Allied aviators were ignorant of these fields before September 3 is not correct. They were listed and described in detail in "List of Airdromes of Southern Italy south of latitude 43", amended to August 13, 1943," Intelligence Service Unit, A-2 Section, Hq. NAAF.

Third, the protection of the formations in flight. The Italians guaranteed to remove or silence all AA for a corridor ten miles on each side of the Tiber, and for a short secondary corridor of the same breadth from the sea to the fields of Cerveteri and Farsura.

Fourth, specific arrangements for the reception of the American forces at the arrival airfields. A senior staff officer of the Italian Motorized Army Corps was to meet General Ridgway on his arrival at Cerveteri airfield on the night of N day. On each of the fields there was to be a senior officer charged with reception of U. S. troops, and one interpreter-guide per company (about fifty in all for the night of N day).²³

According to Castellano's memoirs, he obtained during the course of the discussion, an agreement that "the American division would be placed at the orders of General Carboni."²⁴ This assertion is not altogether accurate. The mission of the 82d Division was to "secure the city of Rome and adjacent airfields and prevent their occupation by German forces," and this was to be achieved "in cooperation with Italian forces." But it was stipulated that "English is accepted as the language for communication between Italian and U. S. forces."²⁵ Before leaving for Rome on his secret mission to complete the details of the joint action, General Taylor used these words to describe the relationship of the 82d Division to the Italian forces:

The Airborne troops upon arrival will cooperate with the Italians in the defense of Rome and comply with the recommendations of the Italian High Command without relinquishing their liberty of action or undertaking any operation or making any disposition considered unsound.²⁶

²³ "Giant Two Outline Plan."

²⁴ Castellano, *Come formai*, pp. 167-168.

²⁵ "Giant Two Outline Plan."

²⁶ Program for Giant II, Sept. 6, 1943, signed by Brigadier General Maxwell D. Taylor, *G-2 Journal*, 82d A. S. Div., Sept. 1-15, 1943, War Records Branch, WDAGO, 382-3-4 23817.

The Outline Plan stipulated also the Italian logistical aid to the Airborne Division, a total at the various fields of: 11,000 rations, 355 trucks, and 12 ambulances.

In the assembly area of the division (the western outskirts of Rome) there was to be supplied: 120 tons gasoline and oil, 12,000 rations, 50 miles of field wire, 12 switch boards, 150 field telephones, 100 picks, 200 shovels, 5,000 wire pickets, and 100 miles of barbed wire, if possible. In addition a labor pool of 500 men was to be provided in the division assembly area by the second day. The Americans undertook to bring in rations for two days, gasoline for a day, medical supplies for the initial period, and ammunition for the whole operation.

After completion of the Outline Plan for GIANT TWO, about 0800 hours of September 4, detailed orders were prepared for its execution. The first lift, on the night of the armistice announcement, was to transport the 504th Regimental Combat Team to the Cerveteri and Farsura airfields with an engineer company, a signal company, ammunition, and an antiaircraft battery. The second lift, on the second night, was to airdrop the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment on the Guidonia, Littorio, and Centocelle airfields. It was planned to work out details for three subsequent lifts after execution of the first two.

By the afternoon of September 8, everything had been prepared and the planes of the first lift were ready to take off. But the Americans were still doubtful of the ability of the Italians to fulfill the promises made by General Castellano. Accordingly two officers were secretly sent to Rome to verify the situation and make final arrangements for cooperation with the Italian High Command.

General Taylor and Colonel William T. Gardiner composed the mission, carrying verbal orders from AFHQ and the 15th Army Group to complete in Italy the arrangements for GIANT TWO. They left Pa-

termo at 0200 hours September 7 and were brought to a rendezvous off Ustica Island by a British PT boat and transferred to an Italian corvette. Under the escort of Rear Admiral Maugeri they were taken to Gaeta, put into an Italian navy sedan and at the outskirts of town were transferred to a Red Cross ambulance which drove them to Rome without incident although they passed some German patrols along the Appian Way. The American officers wore their uniforms which had been intentionally splattered with water in order that they might appear to be aviators shot down and rescued from the sea. Just at night fall they entered Rome where they were received at the Palazzo Caprara (opposite the War Office) by Colonel Giorgio Salvi, Chief of Staff to Carboni, Lt. Lanza, and Major Marchesi. At the insistence of the American officers, a conference was hastily arranged with General Carboni. When he arrived at 2130 the American officers received a great shock, for he wanted to call the whole thing off.

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDES TO RENEGE

At Cassibile, after working with the Allied officers on the Outline Plan for GIANT TWO, General Castellano was informed by General Smith that General Eisenhower wished to have an Italian Military Mission attached to AFHQ, a mission with representatives of the Italian ground forces, air, and navy and which Castellano would head. Castellano on September 4 wired a request to Rome for authorization and constitution of such a mission. At the same time Castellano was informed that the Allies wished to send a special mission to Rome—the mission undertaken on September 7 by General Taylor and Colonel Gardiner. After lunch on September 4 General Smith once again saw Castellano briefly, and once again he raised the question: when would the Allied invasion

take place. According to Castellano, General Smith replied through Interpreter Montanari:

I understand very well the great anxiety which you have to know these dates, but unfortunately I can tell you nothing: it is a military secret which I must keep. Then in a lower voice: "I can say only that the landing will take place within two weeks."²⁵

General Smith then shook General Castellano's hand and flew back to Algiers. After seeing several other Allied officers during the afternoon, in regard to various aspects of the announcement of the armistice, General Castellano prepared his reports to his Government. These included:

- (1) A copy of the Short Terms of armistice which Castellano had signed;
- (2) A copy of the Long Terms and the attached note addressed by General Smith to Marshal Badoglio;
- (3) Instructions for the movement of Italian warships and shipping;
- (4) Instructions for Italian aircraft;
- (5) General Alexander's instructions regarding sabotage;
- (6) An aide-memoire regarding the information service (methods for announcing the armistice);
- (7) The outline plan for GIANT TWO, and
- (8) A personal letter of Castellano to General Ambrosio.

Save for the letter, the documents were all in English but before they were flown to Rome Montanari had made translations of some of them.²⁶ In the letter to General Ambrosio, Castellano wrote:

Despite every possible effort to succeed, I have not been able to get any information on the precise locality of the landing. Regarding the date I can say nothing precise; but from confidential information I presume that the landing will be able to take place between the 10th and 15th of September, possibly the 12th.

²⁵Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 170-171.

²⁶Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 172-177.

Castellano explains that he made this prediction on the basis of the indications in the meeting of August 31, which indicated that the main landing would be a brief period (one or two weeks?) after the secondary landing,²⁷ and on the basis of General Smith's remark that the landing would be *within two weeks*. Castellano reasoned that if the attack were to come within one week, General Smith would not have spoken of two but only of one week. Hence, it was to be deduced that at least one week would elapse between the initial landing in Southern Italy and the main attack. As it was already September 4, the attack would not take place before the 11th but might be any time about the second week—September 10 to 15. Castellano reasoned that it would probably be the 12th because 4 and 8 make 12. This, he states, was precise reasoning because it was arithmetical. He records, however, that General Smith was artfully inexact in his confidential utterance.²⁸

Castellano's documents and the letter to General Ambrosio were flown back to Rome by Major Marchesi and Major Vassallo early on the morning of September 5.²⁹ The documents, including the Outline Plan, were delivered to General Ambrosio, Chief of the Supreme General Staff, who in turn submitted them to Marshal Badoglio. Castellano had made his forecast of the date September 12 with some doubt. According to Badoglio, however, Ambrosio stated to him that the date September 12 could be regarded as certain.³⁰

With the armistice signed, and with the Outline Plan delivered to the Italian Supreme General Staff, it was to be expected

that the Italian High Command would make vigorous efforts to insure its success. Certain developments took place, however, which indicate that very slipshod methods of procedure, a very weak control by Marshal Badoglio over the Government and the armed forces, and an undeveloped sense of responsibility among the key men serving the Marshal prevailed. Back of this hesitation and confusion was the terror of the Germans—the supreme fear of what would happen if the Germans were to discover that negotiations were going on with the Allies. Thus, even after the Armistice had been signed, the tug of war continued among those immediately under Marshal Badoglio—between those who, like Castellano, hoped to save the House of Savoy and the future of Italy by unreserved adherence to the Allies, throwing the Italian army to the Allied side, and others, the older and more cautious men, who wished a purely passive attitude, who would accept the Armistice only if it were a certainty that the Allies would rescue the Italian Government. Neither group showed much comprehension of how the Italians were regarded by British and American public opinion; certainly there was nothing to justify a belief that the Italian soldiers would be welcomed as comrades in arms of the Allies; there was even less reason to believe that the Allied generals would make their supreme objective the rescue of the Italian Government from the threat of a German *coup d'état*. In the tug of war between advocates of diametrically opposed points of view, Marshal Badoglio, Head of the Government, managed to side with both: General Ambrosio, Chief of the Supreme General Staff, managed, even more cleverly, to side with neither.

About the last day of August or September 1 the Italian Army General Staff prepared a memorandum, OP 44, containing a general directive for all the commands de-

²⁷Castellano, *Come firmai*, p. 223.

²⁸Castellano, *Come firmai*, p. 173.

²⁹Francesco Rossi, *Come arrivammo all'armistizio* (Cernusco sul Naviglio, 1946) pp. 133-134 (hereafter cited as Rossi, *Armistizio*). Castellano, *Come firmai*, p. 177; Badoglio, *Guerra mondiale*, pp. 102-103.

³⁰Badoglio, *guerra mondiale*, p. 103; Rossi, *Armistizio*, p. 134.

pendent upon it, that in case of any action by the Germans they were "to react with decisive conduct." Then on September 3, when Castellano with authenticated full powers, had signed the armistice, Marshal Badoglio called together the three heads of the armed forces (Roatta, Chief of the Army General Staff; Sandalli, Minister of Aviation, and Admiral de Courten, Minister of the Navy) and announced that, "His Majesty has decided to begin negotiations for an armistice." The Marshal gave the order to each to make appropriate dispositions, but declined to put the order in writing for fear of its becoming known by too many persons.⁸¹

On September 4 General Ambrosio delivered to each of the heads of the three armed services a written document, Memorandum No. I embodying a directive on the conduct to be observed in case of aggressive action by the Germans. General Roatta thereupon sent a memorandum to the commands dependent upon him, a memorandum which summarized and complemented OP 44. The original of this document was destroyed: each person to whom it was ad-

dressed was ordered to burn his copy. It prescribed, however, that the Germans were to be considered as enemies at the least hostile action and in such a case German units were to be attacked, and isolated and their supplies were to be destroyed. The primary commands receiving this order were directed to pass it on to their respective units with appropriate instructions in detail for its execution.⁸²

General Roatta had by September 3 made certain dispositions for the defense of Rome against a surprise German attack. There were three army corps, dependent on the Army General Staff, for the defense of the capital:

1. The *Corpo d'armata di Roma*, consisting of the 12th Infantry (*Sassari*) Division, the *carabinieri*, service and school troops within Rome. The task of this corps was to oppose the S.S. and other special German troops stationed in Rome.
2. The *XVII Army Corps*, commanded by General Zanghieri. This consisted of the 220th and 221st coastal divisions which were distributed in small detachments along the coast all the way from Tarquinia to the Volturno, a distance of 310 kilometers, and the 103d Infantry (*Piacenza*) Division. Its battalions, stationed at Lanuvium, Velletri, Genzano, and along the Rome-Ostia highway, were interspersed among units of the German 2d Parachute Division.
3. The *motorized corps*, commanded by General Giacomo Carboni, which consisted of:
 - (1) The 21st Infantry (*Granatieri*) Division, stationed immediately south of Rome.
 - (2) The 132d Armored (*Ariete*) Division, near Lake Bracciano, and guarding the Via Claudia and Via Cassia.
 - (3) The 10th Infantry (*Piave*) Division, in an arc to the north of Rome between the Via Cassia and the Via Tiburtina.

⁸¹Paolo Monelli, *Roma 1943* (3rd ed., September 1945, Rome) pp. 303-304. Mario Roatta, *Otto milioni di baionette: L'esercito italiano in guerra dal 1940 al 1944* (Milan, 1946) pp. 301-302, states that on September 3 he received a notification from the *Comando Supremo* (Ambrosio) informing him: (1) that the armistice with the Allies was concluded; (2) that the time of the announcement of the armistice was undetermined, but it would not be before September 12; (3) that in accordance with the Italian request, the Allies would land a force of six divisions in Central Italy within striking distance of Rome, and an undetermined number of troops by air; (4) that in accordance with the Italian request, there would be a subsequent landing of nine Allied divisions, either farther north, or at least as far north along the coast as the first landing; (5) that the Italian Government was awaiting precise information regarding Allied plans.

This statement is not correct for the date of 3 September although it may be correct for September 5. The basis for the expectation by Marshal Badoglio and General Ambrosio that the armistice would be announced only on September 12 was the letter of Castellano to Ambrosio, written on the 4th and reaching Rome on the 5th. Roatta could not have been informed of the contents of this letter on September 3, the day before it was written.

⁸²Roatta, *Otto milioni*, pp. 287-288; Carboni, *Difesa*, pp. 35, 43, 109-110; Monelli, *Roma 1943*, p. 304. It is not clear whether OP 44 was composed in regard to the armistice or merely as a precaution against a German *coup d'état*.

- (4) The 131st Armored (*Centauro*) Division, in the area near Tivoli and Guidonia airport.

Upon receiving the information from the Supreme General Staff that the armistice had been concluded, and that it would be announced on September 12,³³ General Roatta issued orders for a regrouping of the units near Rome, to be completed by the morning of September 12, presumed date of the armistice announcement. The 13th Infantry (Re) Division and the 7th Infantry (*Lupi di Toscana*) Division would arrive from the Balkans and France in accordance with the agreement reached with *O.B. Süd* on August 15th. These divisions were to arrive on September 8 and reinforce the defense of the capital. The motorized corps (*Piave, Ariete, and Centauro* Divisions) to which would be added the 18th Bersaglieri Regiment were to constitute a mass for maneuver, to undertake counterattacks against the Germans or to join up with the main Allied landing on the coast of Lazio.³⁴

The Italian Army General Staff was still making its preparations to aid the Allies against the Germans when the armistice was announced, but were acting in expectation that the Allies would land a large force near Rome, and that the armistice would not be announced before September 12. Neither of these expectations was justified in any way by what had been communicated to Castellano.

On the morning of September 5, as we have seen, Major Marchesi and Major Vassallo arrived in Rome with the documents and reports from General Castellano, including the Outline Plan, and these were submitted to Marshal Badoglio by General Am-

broasio.³⁵ According to Monelli, Ambrosio on that same day informed both Roatta and the Minister of Aviation (Sandalli) of the plan, instructing them to prepare the *Cerveteri* and *Furbara* fields for the arrival of the American airborne division.³⁶ Roatta, however, asserts that it was only on the morning of September 6 that the *Comando Supremo* furnished him with a copy of the Plan.³⁷ Sometime during that day secret messages were sent by the Allied Headquarters making arrangements for General Taylor and Colonel Gardiner to come to Rome in order to make final arrangements for GIANT TWO. General Ambrosio left town for his home in the north—although he knew of the impending mission—and the next day, September 7 declined the suggestion that he fly back to Rome when advised of the rank of the officers on the mission.³⁸ Having encouraged and supported Castellano in his negotiations with the Allies, Ambrosio ducked out at the critical time when it was necessary to convert the plan of immediate armed cooperation with the Allies into reality. Ambrosio's absence permitted the *Comando Supremo* to repudiate Castellano's project for GIANT TWO, and to attempt something which had to the Allies every appearance of a double-cross. During the two days that Ambrosio was away (September 6-8), Roatta, Carboni, and General Francesco Rossi, Deputy Chief of the *Comando Supremo*, had free rein to promote the passive policy, and undo almost all that Castellano had achieved. Ultimate responsibility rested with the King without whose assent no fundamental decision could be taken. He had given the word for Musso-

³³Badoglio, *Guerra mondiale*, pp. 102-103.

³⁶Monelli, *Roma 1943*, p. 305. This book is very favorable to Ambrosio and it has been alleged that it was really inspired by him as an apology (Carboni, *Difesa*, p. 81).

³⁷Roatta, *Otto milioni*, p. 304.

³⁸Badoglio, *Guerra mondiale*, p. 103; Carboni, *Difesa*, p. 27; Monelli, *Roma 1943*, pp. 307-308.

³³As noted above (note 31), Roatta states that he received this notification on September 3. It must, however, have been only after receipt of Castellano's letter in Rome which was September 5.

³⁴Roatta, *Otto milioni*, p. 300.

lini's arrest, he picked Badoglio and the ministers, he promoted the attempt to secure a separate peace. Castellano's great efforts were made primarily to save the monarchy—to bring such a force and active aid to the Allies as would put them under obligation to the Royal Government. The situation called for vigor, consistent action, and the acceptance of some risks to avoid greater ones. The King's role, however, was cautious and negative. Nothing could be done without his consent, but only with difficulty could Badoglio learn what Victor Emmanuel III desired. He proposed nothing directly: he hid behind the shadow of a constitution that had been destroyed, insisting that Badoglio present fully formulated proposals which he would accept or reject. Marshal Badoglio who in a spirit of military obedience to his King accepted office and responsibility, was bewildered by receiving no orders and was pushed by his subordinates from one direction to its opposite.

General Roatta, upon receiving the Outline Plan on the morning of September 6, was flabbergasted. To him it appeared to assign missions to the motorized army corps far beyond its capacities. Four hundred trucks were not to be had, except by putting *Piave* and *Ariete* divisions on foot. He seems never to have considered trying to collect auto busses and trucks from the municipality of Rome—something Castellano thought quite possible. The General Staff of the Air Force stated that it would need at least seven days to complete the technical arrangements for the airfields. Roatta considered that the plan for the airborne operation was not really a plan for the defense of Rome, but a step toward further operations from Rome as a base. He felt that if his forces had been strong enough to carry out all the actions assigned to them in the plan for GIANT TWO, they would have been strong enough to defend Rome from the Germans by themselves. It was not, in

other words, an adequate and complete plan of rescue: rather it was a plan, embodying Castellano's policy, of cooperation by the Italian forces with the Allies. He was most disappointed to find no indication of the Allied plans for the landing of six divisions within striking distance of Rome—such as (he says) the *Comando Supremo* had informed him were to be expected.³⁹

What was even more disconcerting was the report, on the morning of September 6, of Allied convoys assembling in the open sea north of Palermo. In the afternoon this intelligence was confirmed. This meant to him either that there was a secondary attack independent of and before the armistice announcement expected on the 12th, or else that the Allies would not strike near Rome but far south of it, or possibly in Sardinia.⁴⁰ In discussing plans with the *O.B. Süd* (Kesselring) that same day Roatta stated that they (the Italians) expected the Allied attack in the region of Naples or in Apulia.⁴¹ In other words, Roatta on September 6 discovered that the main Allied attack would not be near Rome but in the region Naples—Salerno. He realized that the Allies would not be in a position to march directly on Rome, and that the Italians themselves would have to defend Rome. This is the essential fact which explains the contradictory and ambiguous conduct of the Italian Government during the next two days. All along the King and the group associated with him had been unwilling to run any risks but insisted on being rescued by the Allies. This wish to have the Allies close enough to strike at the mainland was back of the constant delays in bringing the plan to arrest Mussolini to a conclusion. In the spring of 1943 the King and his group

³⁹Roatta, *Otto milioni*, pp. 305-306.

⁴⁰Roatta, *Otto milioni*, p. 306. Rossi, *Armistizio*, pp. 144-146, contradicts Roatta on this point, but essentially by argument by extrapolation.

⁴¹*Lagebericht, Wehrmachtsführungsstab*, Sept. 6, 1943, Anlage 8.

decided to wait until the Allies conquered Tunis. Then after the fall of Tunis it was still not clear if the Allies intended to land in Italy—so there was more delay until the Allies undertook the Sicilian campaign. Then, after contact with the Allies was established, both Zanussi and Castellano repeatedly pressed the Allies to land near Rome—to rescue the Italian Government from the Germans. Now at the last minute, the painful discovery was made that the Allied convoys were heading for the Naples—Salerno area.

In the afternoon of September 6, General Roatta presented his analysis of the situation to the Supreme Command: that because of the location of the Allied convoys there could be only two possible explanations of Allied intentions; either they were about to make a landing independent of the armistice like that of the British 8th Army in Calabria on September 3; or it was the main attack which would come before September 12 and would be directed against Southern Italy or Sardinia. Roatta therefore urged that the plan for the joint action with the Allied airborne division be "adjusted" to the Italian army's real possibilities.⁴² The Supreme Command, so he says, agreed on the necessity of modifying the plan for GIANT TWO.

Shortly thereafter Roatta conferred with General Carboni who agreed that his corps would not be able to put up a protracted resistance against the Germans without the reinforcements which were later expected, and without several more days of preparation. Without these reinforcements and without several more days it would also be impossible to provide effective protection of the American airborne division. Roatta drew up a memorandum embodying these objections to the plan for GIANT TWO, and emphasizing that the armistice should not be announced before September 12, and that the

Allied landing would have to be made in accordance with Italian expectations, i.e., the main landing within striking distance of Rome. General Carboni transmitted the memorandum to Marshal Badoglio that same night, September 6.⁴³

In their expectation of active Italian co-operation against the Germans, the Allied generals had suggested to Castellano, as we have seen, that an Italian military mission be constituted at AFHQ. The secret message inviting the Italian Government to send such a mission had been sent to Rome on September 4. Generals Roatta and Carboni seized upon this opportunity of contact with the Allies to use the mission for the opposite purpose from that for which it was intended: they sought to convey new instructions to the Allies requesting fundamental changes in Allied plans.

Members of the Italian military mission were hastily selected and included twelve men in all. For the most part, these men do not seem to have been informed of the armistice which had been signed or of the other commitments made by the Italian Government through General Castellano.⁴⁴ Major Alberto Briatore, however, was selected by General Carboni, who seems to have expected him rather than Castellano to act as head of the mission. He was furnished with a memorandum embodying new instructions for Castellano—instructions representing the opposite point of view from that which he had hitherto advocated.⁴⁵

The memorandum, prepared by the *Comando Supremo*, reads as follows:

September 6, 1943.

1. The attack of six divisions in the zone Sa-

⁴³Roatta, *Otto milioni*, p. 307; Rossi, *Armistizio*, pp. 140-141.

⁴⁴Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 180-181, states that when the members of the mission arrived at Tunis, they were surprised to find themselves in Africa; they had received no instructions; and knew nothing of the armistice.

⁴⁵Carboni, *Difesa*, pp. 27, 107-108.

⁴²Roatta, *Otto milioni*, pp. 306-307; Zanussi, *Guerra e catastrofe*, II, 171.

lerno-Naples can be repulsed by the German troops, or at least contained.

For this reason, therefore, even in case that it succeeds, it takes place too far distant from Rome, it does not materially legitimize the request of armistice (a fact important either from the international or the internal point of view).

2. It is for this reason desirable that such a request (for armistice) take place some days later, when the troops debarked approach the capital, and—above all—when the larger debarkation (of nine divisions) impends.

3. Likewise it is extremely dangerous to make the request of armistice coincide (especially if it is concomitant or follows immediately the first landing) with the initiation of hostilities on our part against the Germans.

By doing this, even in the case that the Germans do not take the initiative, it would provoke the conflict while the six divisions (referred to in point 1 above) are still distant, and while the other nine are still at the points of embarkation.

In this case the Italian troops available for the defense of the Capital (less well armed than the German troops and short of munitions and oil) will be caught alone, for several days, certainly against two very efficient German divisions (the 2d Parachute, 3d Panzer Grenadier), probably against the German divisions in the Campania (or a part of them), and—perhaps—after two or three days against those coming from the North (*Hitler Division*, and 24th Panzer). Our forces would not be able to resist and the capital would be lost.

4. If, for unavoidable reasons, the request for armistice cannot be postponed until the moment that the second larger debarkation impends (it would be better to make the request at the moment this attack is initiated) it is necessary at least not to initiate hostilities (against the Germans).

Therefore the intervention of the airborne division should not take place, for while it would not give any great support to the defense of the Capital, it would, however, compel immediately an armed collaboration, and it would bring about immediate conflict with the Germans in such conditions as to render failure almost certain.

In brief:

(a) Request the armistice only when there are landed, or on the point of landing, troops sufficiently strong as to avoid a battle around the Capital, or—at least—to reduce it to brief duration and to cause it to take place in favorable conditions.

(b) If this is excluded, delay the request as long as possible in relation to the first debarkation, and avoid taking an immediate attitude of armed hostility against the Germans.

Decline therefore the landing of parachute troops or of seaborne elements in the zone of Rome in the interval between the first and second larger debarkations.

(c) If, in spite of our attitude, the Germans take the initiative against us, then [there should be] immediate intervention of paratroop units and of seaborne units on the part of the Anglo-Americans, in the greatest strength possible.

(d) The most secure thing, and perhaps the only secure thing, is however, always that of requesting the armistice only at the time of the second debarkation or when it is imminent.

Thus will be avoided a struggle in the zone of the Capital whose outcome would certainly be unfavorable; and since it is necessary to bear in mind the possibility that the Germans may take the initiative in hostilities, even in consequence of the simple request of armistice, in order to prescind from our non-aggressive conduct.

(e) Furthermore, there has come about a fact which fully legitimizes our proposal: the fact that originally the first English [*sic*] debarkation was foreseen in the immediate vicinity of Rome, while now it is foreseen as at a distance; this changes completely the military and political situation.

Finally, we do not consider that it would be in the interests of the Anglo-Americans to find in Italy the Germans installed in Rome at the side of a new government created by them.⁴⁶

The members of the Italian Military Mission left Rome on the night of September 6, and were taken aboard the Italian corvette which made the rendezvous off Ustica Island. There they transferred to the British PT boat while General Taylor and Colonel Gardiner were taken to Gaeta and thence to Rome.⁴⁷ Early the next day, September 7, General Francesco Rossi assured General Roatta that a radio message was being sent to Castellano charging him to inform the Allies that the Italian Government was sending certain com-

⁴⁶Carboni, *Difesa*, pp. 59-60. Roatta, *Otto milioni*, p. 315, doubts the authenticity of the document and considers it a fabrication of a later date. It needs further verification, but I am inclined to accept it as genuine.

⁴⁷Journal 82d A/B Division, Sept. 1-15, 1943.

munications of "fundamental importance." Roatta understood this to mean a plea to the Allied Commander-in-Chief not to make his final dispositions until he had a chance to consider these new communications from the Italian Government.⁴⁸ Apparently Generals Rossi, Roatta, and Carboni believed that—although they themselves could not perform the specific tasks enumerated in the Outline Plan—the Allies were capable of anything, and could change plans completely even when the convoys were at sea.

That evening General Taylor and Colonel Gardiner arrived in Rome. They were taken to the Palazzo Caprara where accommodations had been prepared for them, and where they were met by Colonel Giorgio Salvi, Chief of Staff of the Motorized Corps, Lieutenant Galvano Lanza, aide-de-camp to General Carboni, and Major Luigi Marchesi. An elaborate meal had been prepared for the guests but no arrangements had been made for transacting any business that evening. With some impatience the American officers got through the meal, so elaborate as to be in bad taste considering the straightened circumstances of large parts of the Italian population.⁴⁹ They insisted, however, on seeing General Carboni and General Rossi that same evening.

General Carboni arrived at 2130 hours and gave the Americans his views of the military situation. The Germans, he declared had been building up their force in Italy ever since the overthrow of Mussolini, July 25, so that they now had greatly increased forces near Rome: about 12,000 paratroopers with heavy equipment including 100 pieces of artillery, chiefly 88-mm. The *Panzer Grenadier* Division, Carboni stated, had been raised to

an effective strength of 24,000 men with 150 heavy and 50 light tanks. The Germans had ceased to supply the Italians with gasoline and munitions so that the *Motorized Corps* was virtually immobilized and had enough ammunition for only a few hours combat. He proceeded to give this estimate of the situation:

If the Italians declare an armistice, the Germans will occupy Rome, and the Italians can do little to prevent it. The simultaneous arrival of U. S. airborne troops would only provoke the Germans to more drastic action. Furthermore, the Italians would be unable to secure the airfields, cover the assembly and provide the desired logistical aid to the airborne troops. If it must be assumed that an Allied seaborne landing is impossible north of Rome, then *the only hope of saving the Capital is to avoid overt acts against the Germans and await the effect of the Allied attacks in the South.* [italics mine.] He stated that he knew that the Allied landings would be at Salerno, which was too far away to aid directly in the defence of Rome. He stated that General Roatta shared his views.⁵⁰

The American officers considered that regardless of the soundness of General Carboni's views, "he displayed an alarming pessimism certain to affect his conduct of operation in connection with GIANT TWO." They therefore omitted the interview which they had originally requested with General Rossi, and asked to see Marshal Badoglio at once. General Carboni escorted them to the Marshal's villa where the household was awake as a result of an air raid alarm, about midnight.

General Carboni was received at once by the Marshal while the American officers waited in the ante-chamber. After about fifteen minutes they were admitted and greeted cordially by the Marshal.

⁴⁸Roatta, *Otto milioni*, pp. 307-308; Rossi, *Armistizio*, pp. 142-143.

⁴⁹David Brown, "The Inside Story of Italy's Surrender," *Saturday Evening Post* (Sept. 16, 1944) p. 65; Richard Thruelsen and Elliott Arnold, "Secret Mission to Rome," *Harper's Magazine* (October, 1944), p. 466.

⁵⁰Quoted directly from General Taylor's report entitled, "Mission to Rome," Memo for A.C. of S., G-3, Sept. 9, 1943, G-3, AFHQ, File 46/5.1. Note that this line of reasoning is in full accord with that of the memorandum consigned to Major Briatore on September 6.

General Carboni apparently used the fifteen minutes in order to bring Marshal Badoglio completely around to his point of view, that is, a full acceptance of the "wait till they rescue us" school of thought. The interview with the Chief of State was in French, spoken both by Marshal Badoglio and General Taylor, supplemented by English—Italian as conveyed by Lieutenant Lanza. Marshal Badoglio repeated the figures on German troops exactly as they had been stated by General Carboni and advanced the same proposals: The armistice would have to be postponed; Operation GIANT TWO would have to be cancelled.

This bland ignoring of the terms signed by Castellano, the accredited representative, and refusal to actively oppose the Germans was quite disconcerting to the Americans. General Taylor asked Marshal Badoglio if he realized how deeply his Government was committed by the agreements already signed. He replied that the situation had changed; Castellano had not known all the facts. Italian troops could not possibly defend Rome and the only result of immediate announcement of the armistice would be a German occupation of the capital and the setting up of a neo-Fascist regime. General Taylor then asked if the Italians feared a German occupation more than the possibility of full scale bombing attacks by the Allies. With considerable emotion Badoglio replied that he hoped the Allies would attack the Germans and concentrate on the northern rail centers rather than bomb Italians who were friends of the Allies and were only waiting for the appropriate moment to join them.

When General Taylor asked Marshal Badoglio—who made repeated professions of sympathy for the Allies—how he expected the Allied chiefs to react to this change of attitude, he expressed the hope that General Taylor would return and explain the new situation and the Italian point of view to

General Eisenhower. This General Taylor refused to do: but if so instructed by the Allied command he would consent to serve as a messenger for whatever Marshal Badoglio wished to communicate. What was necessary, said General Taylor, was to send to Allied Headquarters a definite statement of Italian views over Badoglio's own signature. In face of the refusal of the American officers to become advocates of Badoglio's new point of view, he accepted the responsibility himself and drafted a message for General Eisenhower—a message cancelling all his earlier commitments:

Due to changes in the situation brought about by the disposition and strength of the German forces in the Rome area, it is no longer possible to accept an immediate armistice as this could provoke the occupation of the Capital and the violent assumption of the government by the Germans. Operation Giant Two is no longer possible because of lack of forces to guarantee the airfields. General Taylor is available to return to Sicily to present the views of the government and await orders.

Badoglio.

At the same time General Taylor drafted a message of his own:

In view of the statement of Marshal Badoglio as to inability to declare armistice and to guarantee fields Giant Two is impossible. Reasons given for change are irreplaceable lack of gasoline and munitions and new German dispositions. Badoglio requests Taylor return to present government views. Taylor and Gardiner awaiting instructions. Acknowledge.

Taylor.

The messages were drafted shortly after 0100 hours of September 8. Marshal Badoglio implored the American officers to trust him, swore that there was no trickery involved in his change of front, and spoke at some length of his honor as a soldier and officer. It was late that night when General Taylor and Colonel Gardiner returned to the Palazzo Caprara and the messages were turned over

to General Carboni for encoding and secret transmission to AFHQ.

In order to make sure that the Allied Command understood the situation in Rome, a third message was drafted by General Taylor at 0820 hours that morning:

Summary of situation as stated by Italian authorities. Germans have 12,000 troops in Tiber valley. Panzer Grenadier Division increased by attachments to 24,000. Germans have stopped supply gasoline and munitions so that Italian divisions virtually immobilized and have munitions only for a few hours of combat. Shortages make impossible the successful defense of Rome and the provision of logistical aid promised airborne troops. Latter not wanted at present as their arrival would bring an immediate attack on Rome. Source of these views Marshall Badoglio and General Carboni.

Taylor.

Word had come back at about 0800 hours of the receipt at AFHQ of Marshal Badoglio's message, but General Taylor was not certain that his message cancelling GIANT Two had been received. At 1135 he sent off the simple code word "situation innocuous" which by prearrangement was the signal for cancelling the airborne operation. Longer messages were requiring as much as three hours for encoding, and the first lift, General Taylor knew, was scheduled for 1830 that same day.

The Italians were greatly concerned over the possible reaction of the Allied chiefs to their reversal of position on the armistice—and General Taylor and Colonel Gardiner augmented their worries by emphasizing the gravity of the situation into which the Badoglio Government had drifted. General Carboni repeatedly urged them to return and plead the Italian cause at AFHQ, but they refused to do more than relay Italian messages. Marshal Badoglio then decided—in order to make sure that his new viewpoint was understood by General Eisenhower—to send a high staff officer with "communica-

tions of fundamental importance" similar to those entrusted to Major Briatore on the 6th. General Roatta drew up a memorandum almost identical to that which he had had composed two days earlier. The *Comando Supremo* at first thought of sending Roatta to explain his memorandum. His name was withdrawn, however, "as he was considered indispensable in dealing with the Germans." General Francesco Rossi, Deputy Chief of the Supreme Command was chosen instead. His assignment was to persuade General Eisenhower to make no mention of the armistice while the Salerno landing took place: meanwhile the Italian Government would wait and see how it came out, and when the Allies were in a position to seize Rome the Italians would join them.

The Italians, however, were worried lest the Allied chiefs prove obdurate and act on the basis of the commitments signed by Castellano. On September 6 the secret Allied radio had issued a stand-by message to the Italian station indicating that the important message designating X day would be sent between 0900 and 1000 hours on or after September 7. Subsequent messages on the 8th indicated the Allied intention to proclaim the armistice that day.⁵¹ General Rossi was therefore to be ready to concert new plans for the intervention of the Allied air forces in case of a German attack.⁵²

General Ambrosio returned to Rome on the afternoon of September 8, and an interview with General Taylor and Colonel Gardiner was arranged for 1830 hours. About 1500 hours, however, a message was received from AFHQ ordering the American officers to fly directly to Tunis. Although the Allied authorization for General Rossi's visit had not been received, the Americans took him and his interpreter in the three-motor Savoia-

⁵¹*Capitulation of Italy*, pp. 281-282, 330-331.

⁵²Roatta, *Otto milioni*, p. 311; Rossi, *Armistizio*, pp. 159-160.

Marchetti bomber which was placed at their disposal. They took off from Centocelle airfield at 1705 and flew straight to El Aouina where they arrived at 1905. From there they were driven to "Fairfield" to report to the Allied Commander-in-Chief.⁵³

* * * *

Marshal Badoglio's change of mind and

⁵³The principal source for the Taylor-Gardiner mission is the report of Brigadier General Taylor, "Mission to Rome," September 9, 1943, written on the day following his return from Rome. There are brief accounts in Carboni, *Difesa*, pp. 28-30; Badoglio, *Guerra mondiale*, pp. 103-104; Roatta, *Otto milioni*, pp. 308-311; Rossi, *Armistizio*, pp. 151-154; Zanussi, *Guerra e catastrofe*, II, 172-176. The story was first told in English by Alfred Wagg and David Brown, *No Spaghetti for Breakfast* (London, 1943), and repeated by David Brown "The Inside Story of Italy's Surrender," *Saturday Evening Post*, September 9 and 16, 1944. The account by Richard Thruelsen and Elliott Arnold, "Secret Mission to Rome," *Harper's Magazine* (October 1944) pp. 462-469, is quite accurate. Major General James M. Gavin discusses the planning of Giant Two in his article, "Airborne Plans and Operations in the Mediterranean Theater," *Infantry Journal* (August 1946) pp. 22-29. The author is indebted to Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith for information furnished in an interview on May 13, 1947; to General Lyman L. Lemnitzer for criticisms and suggestions in an interview on March 4, 1947; and to Brigadier Kenneth W. D. Strong for information furnished on October 29, 1947.

message that the armistice could not be "accepted" were a shock to AFHQ, but General Eisenhower was not deterred from announcing the armistice. He informed Marshal Badoglio that he would broadcast the news that same evening, and that if the Marshal failed to follow suit as had been agreed, it would mean the dissolution of his Government. Rather tardily the Marshal complied. Announcement of the armistice cleared the way for the impending attack by the Fifth Army at Salerno. It assured the Allies that Italian units would not support the Germans in opposing the first major Allied landing on the Continent. Salerno was touch and go: had Italian troops aided the Germans the balance might have favored the defenders. After GIANT Two was cancelled the Italian Government was left with only its own troops to defend the capital and early on the morning of September 9, the King, Marshal Badoglio, and the military members of his cabinet left Rome. What might have happened had GIANT Two been executed is one of the "ifs" of World War II.

THE MILITARY MUSEUM IN EUROPE*

BY FREDERICK P. TODD

The museums devoted to general history are today probably the most backward of all museums. Their uninspired position seems due in part to their tendency to defy the modern trend toward specialization. Other sorts of museum have learned to specialize, until the modern art collection is as different from the modern industrial museum as it is from the omnibus "cabinet of curiosities" of grandfather's time. But not so with the average historical museum; it still cuts across lines. Too often its cases include art objects, technological exhibits, anthropological and ethnographic items, and a sample of just about anything man can collect. Too often its curator has reasoned that everything not modern belongs in his galleries. He tries to cover too much ground and succeeds only in assembling a pot-pourri of curiosities:

Where the historical museum can rigorously restrict its coverage to a specific locality—a city, for example, or an historic site—or a specific period of time small enough to permit of specialized research, the broad sort of collection is justified. But where the historical museum exists on a national level it must select certain aspects of history and consciously neglect all others if it is to be a useful vehicle of education and make any pretense to scientific attainment.

One such aspect of history is warfare. Warfare—particularly modern warfare—also cuts across lines, and small military museums must confine themselves to historic sites or historic periods as rigidly as museums devoted to general history. Yet it seems possible for


a large enough national institution to contain within its walls a collection sufficiently comprehensive to illustrate the many facets of the military field: the techniques, materiel, panoply, and institutions of warfare, the personalities and events which have influenced military history, and the commonplaces of soldier life. No such museum exists today; yet it is with an eye to current moves in this direction and to the difficulties along the road that this brief review of European military collections is made.

* * *

The earliest military collections in Europe were those assembled in the castles and palaces of reigning princes. Almost without exception they were confined to the arms and armor of knighthood and usually restricted to harness worn by one of the family. Yet that period knew its collectors as well as this, and certain noblemen made a business of purchasing items to add to their exhibit. Weapons and suits of armor came as gifts from foreign potentates and still others were captured in foreign lands and brought home. Naturally, effort was made to secure the finest examples of the armorer's craft, and it is doubtful if serious collecting began before the latter half of the 15th century. For not until then did the arrival of full plate permit the skillful embellishment that made armor the works of art worth preserving. For these reasons the old princely collections contained few of the earlier forms, and almost no examples of the weapons and harness of the common soldier unless he came from one of the ornate household bodyguards.

These great princely collections formed the nucleus of fully half the military museums

*The JOURNAL has long officially campaigned for the establishment of a national military museum in the United States. "Proposal for a National War Museum," *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, 42-45, 1947.



A display of trophies that later became a military museum: The entrance to the Royal United Service Institution of London in 1860. (Woodcut reproduced in *The Illustrated London News*, June 16, 1860.)

of modern Europe. The Armouries, Tower of London, containing over 10,000 items of medieval and Renaissance arms and armor, was a collection begun by Henry VIII.¹ The Armeria Real in Madrid was created by generations of collector-monarchs including Maximilian, Charles V, and Philip II. And what was in 1939 the world's greatest gallery of arms, that in the Vienna Kunsthistorische

Museum, had as its beginnings the old imperial collections founded by Ferdinand, Archduke of the Tyrol, and enlarged by successive emperors through Franz Josef.² Famous as many of these collections were in their day, they were not museums. Lodged in palaces and castles, they were completely inaccessible to the public. Long after armor became obsolete the collections remained entirely private.

With the 17th century a new sort of arms

¹*Inventory and Survey of the Armouries* (2 vols.); Francis H. Cripps-Day, *A Record of Armour Sales, 1881-1924* (London, 1925), *passim*.

²Cripps-Day, *Armour Sales*, *op. cit.*, pp. xxvi—xxviii.

collection came into being, housed in the recently established state arsenals. It too is an ancestor of the present day military museum. In these arsenals were stored surplus materiel for use in an emergency. As with arsenals of all times, they gradually accumulated stores of obsolete weapons and gear, and of trophies captured from an enemy, until many outgrew their usefulness as depots of warfare. To some were transferred the contents of a palace armory—in fact, there always seems to have been a considerable movement within the larger armor collections—but this was not too common. It is still possible in most European capitals to detect two distinct types of military museum: the "armory" museum which originated in the palace, and the "artillery" museum which began as an arsenal. The distinction is important for it contrasts the esthetic with the historic motivation behind each collection. When both types were opened to public view in the late 19th century, the former contained objects of great artistic value, commonly associated with some famous warrior of high degree, while the latter housed the more prosaic materiel of the age of firearms. By that time armor sales in Europe were commanding respectable attention and prices. A single suit might bring \$15,000 or better; so lucrative had the collecting game become that forgery of armor was widely practiced. Naturally the armories got the bulk of the attention and the funds. Collections were minutely cataloged and specimens were kept in the finest of condition. All this while the poorer artillery museum had to exist under the care, perhaps, of a retired officer and a handful of pensioners.

These older military collections have retained much of their original character.³ It

is at once their great charm and great drawback. The arms galleries found by tourists in so many of the European castles were much as they looked two centuries ago. The Danish Royal Museum of Arms and Armor in Copenhagen resembles inside and out just what it was, an ancient arsenal of great size. At Graz, until very recently, there stood an arsenal housing a stock of weapons and armor ready instantly to be issued to 17th century troops; three hundred years had wrought little change in the building or its contents. This preservation of the original structure and fittings adds greatly to the interest of these older collections but it imposes severe physical limitations and usually restrains the institution from becoming much more than a historic house museum. It is worthwhile to contrast the freedom of a collection brought together in modern surroundings by lovers of fine armor, such as one sees at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, with the melange found in an armory like the Tower of London or the Royal Armory in Madrid.

The military museum as we know it today, a reasonably systematic collection of labelled exhibits arranged for display and opened to the public, is a product of the late 19th century. Among the nine most important German military museums the first three were opened to the public between 1881 and 1894 and two more shortly before the First World War. The Austrian army museum in Vienna opened 1891, the Royal United Service Institution museum in 1895, and in 1905 the improved Musée de l'Armée was created in Paris through the combination of two existing military collections. Military museums, in common with public museums in general, are thus products of the last two or three generations, a comparatively recent development among the institutions of mankind.

Until 1918 the European military museums were what we would now call "traditional"

³Werner Hahlweg, "Die Heeresmuseen, Wesen und Aufgaben," in *Museumskunde* N F (Berlin and Leipzig, 1935); "Heeresmuseen," in *Handbuch der Neugeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1937), II, 271 ff.

in character. They displayed cases of objects associated with the great or near-great, rows of armor for horse and man, dusty uniforms mounted on grotesque manikins, clusters of weapons on their walls, and ceilings of fading banners. Many, as we have said, occupied former arsenals or palaces, others ancient fortresses and castles. A few had been installed in converted structures: an old soldiers home, a royal banquet hall, or a former naval school. At the risk of redundancy—for it will be mentioned again—the problem of housing should be stressed. It is the nightmare of curators in general, but of the military curator in particular. The utter unsuitability of European military museum buildings was obvious to visitors in 1914, and that same unsuitability was as evident in 1939. Not only was exhibit and storage space insufficient by far, causing crowded galleries and the display of unimportant items better left in study collections, but it was impossible to adjust room space, to plan coordinated galleries, or to install suitable lighting. I submit that in the case of 95 percent of the military museums of Europe in 1939 it was virtually impossible to introduce what are considered modern museum techniques. Despite a store of exhibitable material and a wealth of technicians, trained both in military research and display methods, the bulk of these collections presented the same "dust-collecting halls of faded trophies, cases of outdated firearms, cabinets of medals, quaint uniforms and dismal portraits" that they had fifty years before. The fault is far from being the curators'; the moribund condition of Europe's war collections can, I believe, be attributed in the main to the failure of governments to supply them with modern buildings. The exceptions will be duly noted hereafter.

The social cataclysm of the First World War led naturally to an interest in institutions which could explain the catastrophe, or

which could perpetuate the memory of loved ones lost therein. Museums can in some measure do both, but the existing military museums of Europe fell far short of filling the need. Military memorials were certainly not new—there were statues and tombs apace, and most of the military museums were in fact memorials to the great captains and their armies—but the common soldier had an insignificant share of the memory. Novel methods had to be devised and it was then we entered into the period of Unknown Soldiers and the war memorial museums.

The desire to explain the great war, both in scientific and social terms, led to an even greater departure from tradition. Museum planners grew serious; for the first time, perhaps, they felt they had a story to tell. They found themselves less interested in General Bang's sword than in the standard rifle used by millions of their fellow countrymen. They began to break away from the collection of military items as objects of art or of antiquarian interest; they began to discover they had a respectably serious field of their own in the techniques of warfare. They were impressed by the immense strides made in medicine, in aeronautics, in communication—and the flintlock seemed too remote a topic in comparison. They saw the need of telling of the great war graphically in terms of its horrors and its sacrifices, and some felt that here was as potent an advertisement for peace as could be devised.⁴

Foremost among the institutions created as a result of the First World War was the Imperial War Museum of London. Founded as early as 1917 by the War Cabinet, it was formally established by Act of Parliament and opened to the public in 1920.⁵ It was

⁴The "revolution" among military museums is championed by Camille Bloch in his "Bibliothèques et Musées de la Guerre," in *La revue de Paris* (Paris, 1 February 1920), 27th year, pp. 608-33.

⁵Great Britain, Imperial War Museum, *Annual Reports*. 1917-18, etc., through 1938-39 (London, 1918-39).

not to be a hall of relics, nor a gallery of captured trophies. It was "to provide a record and place for the study of [the Great War of 1914-18]." Specifically and a trifle self consciously its prospectus claimed that "no attempt is made to glorify war or to emphasize victory over the enemy."

Since its establishment the Imperial War Museum has been able to collect an important library of over 60,000 volumes dealing with all aspects of the war, files of newspapers and periodicals, over 250,000 photographic negatives, and a considerable collection of other non-exhibitable material. Not only is the museum designed to facilitate research but it has the wherewithal to do so. No other military museum similarly equipped comes to mind, and only such institutions as the Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace or the Musée de la Guerre can equal its study facilities. The creation of a military museum as a vehicle for scholarly research was a step as radical as it was significant. Yet it was possible to go only part of the way in face of the illusory thinking about military affairs which characterized the years between 1920 and 1940. By many the Imperial War Museum was deemed more a museum of peace than of war and its collections were arranged accordingly. Just how far the hatred of war curtailed research into the techniques of military science, or into the organization and panoply of military forces, is hard to say, but personal experience suggests it played no small part. Nonetheless, the trail was blazed toward a higher and more useful type of public institution. It is only fair to state that the limited imagination of older military museum curators also hindered fuller realization of the ideals of the new war museum. Throughout the planning of the Imperial War Museum there runs a continuous thread of reactionary interest in the curio

class of exhibit—the association item and the "firsts" and "lasts" of military history.⁶

Looking at the museum proper, it is apparent that even this new establishment suffered from the familiar problem of housing. The collection was opened at the Crystal Palace; three years later it moved to the old Western Galleries of the Science Museum. Both locations were inadequate in almost every way. Then, in 1936, it moved to a former hospital building on Lambeth Road in the southern part of London. In 1939 a personal visit to the museum clearly revealed that a hospital, no matter how cleverly reconditioned (and very little was done to the old Bethlem in 1936), was not a fortunate structure for the display of artifacts. The rooms were crowded and poorly arranged; too many photographs and paintings had to be exhibited, since storage space was inadequate; and the staff apparently had been reduced almost to the closing point. The exhibits were interesting and represented a huge advance over earlier techniques, but it was obvious that the Imperial War Museum was not the ultimate in military collections.

A second museum devoted exclusively to World War I, the Musée de la Guerre at Vincennes, opened early in 1918.⁷ The contents of its collections, even more than those of the Imperial War Museum, suggest the twilight zone between the museum and the library as well as the breadth of interpretation possible of the term "history of war." Originating with a collection of war literature and art assembled by a private individual, the Musée de la Guerre opened its doors "with all the character of a national institution . . ." but without, apparently, quite being one. After the normal number

⁶Claude F. Luke, "The Early Days of the Imperial War Museum," in *The Strand Magazine* (London, November 1933), vol. 82, pp. 534-41.

⁷Camille Bloch and André Hurtret, *Visite au château Vincennes et au Musée de la guerre* (Paris, 1931); Société de l'histoire de la guerre, *Guide to the Museum of the Great War* (Vincennes, 1928).

of temporary homes the collection was moved to the Pavillon de la Reine in the Castle of Vincennes in 1925.

Being housed in a former palace offers the same limitations as being housed in a former hospital, only they are more exciting. At Vincennes the rooms are not simply inconvenient, they are also anachronistic. One wanders through Mazarin's guard chamber, the library of the Duc de Montpensier, and Anne of Austria's bedroom in search of data on World War I. Obviously the rearrangement and redecoration possible in rooms such as these is severely restricted.

The Musée calls itself a museum of documentation (*un musée documentaire*). Its exhibits consist largely of paintings, prints, photographs and posters. There are some medals, sculpture and objects best described as souvenirs. There is a sizeable library and document collection equipped with reference service. But there is hardly an instrument of warfare in the building and very few items of any kind related to military science, materiel or institutions. The museum at Vincennes is, in short, a museum of war but not a museum of warfare. It poses an interesting problem in military museum planning. Does a museum which houses materials of one war only, and which focusses its exhibit policy on the broader social aspects of war, give a distorted picture of that phenomenon? Is the mission of visual education—and an institution like Vincennes is quite aware of having a mission—approached in a sufficiently objective and critical sense to serve the best interests of its visitors?

The Badische Armeemuseum at Karlsruhe was opened to the public in 1934. It was by all odds the most advanced of its kind in Europe.⁸ Established by Robert Wagner, the Reichstatthalter of Baden, it naturally assumed strong militaristic and Nazi coloration, and by its exhibit techniques soon

demonstrated the force—for better or for worse—of a well planned and equipped collection. The Baden museum set out to show what military security meant to the citizens of Baden and how security could be achieved. It attempted to give them a general survey of the military and political development of their state, demonstrating the close connection between its geography, its history, and its political systems. This it did by means of vivid relief maps which traced the course of the fourteen wars fought by Baden to preserve its territories, by diagrams, and by a clever use of symbolism.

The collection traced in detail the development and organization of the Badensian army through charts (*stammtafeln*) which illustrated the histories of the various corps since 1770 and tied in with a chronological series of uniforms and insignias, and other graphic material. There were elaborate displays of orders and decorations, of weapons and materiel of many kinds, and of memorabilia, but the important fact was that "the museum placed emphasis not so much on the quantity of its military objects as upon the principles of military and historical science applied in the description and presentation of the material." The Badensian army library of over 10,000 books was incorporated into the museum, and extensive collections of manuscripts, pictures and photographs were added to make its reference collection one of the best in Germany. Finally, the museum undertook the publication of a series of well illustrated studies on Badensian military antiquities and history; the first volume appeared shortly before the outbreak of the last war.

By the end of the First World War it was possible to divide the military collections of Europe roughly into four classes:

a. The military museums as such: relatively large public collections devoted exclusively to war and military service, some gen-

⁸Hahlweg, *op. cit.*; "Heeresmuseen," *op. cit.*

eral in coverage and others confined to specific periods.

b. The collections of medieval and Renaissance arms and armor, at times housed in larger museums but more often in castles and armories, with almost universal emphasis upon the exhibits as works of art.

c. The smaller, ephemeral post, arsenal or regimental museums, some not opened to the public and all usually difficult of access.

d. Military galleries or divisions of general or local museums, varying from a few items to sizeable collections.

The two last classes fluctuated so greatly in size, scope and attention to detail that it is impossible to draw from them any general conclusions. The more important military divisions of general museums have been treated here as independent museums. It should be said in passing, however, that the regimental museum is one of the more significant recent developments in military collecting. Considerable official encouragement was extended toward their creation in Germany, England, France and elsewhere following the First World War. They were recognized as an aid to the creation of *esprit de corps* and in maintaining unit traditions. In Germany, particularly, when the traditions of the regiments of the former Imperial army were being continued in specifically designated companies of the hundred-thousand-man Reichwehr, a museum devoted to the old regiment served as both storage place for its trophies and inspiration to the men who were the official legatees of its traditions.⁹

There were in Europe, in 1939, some sixty-four important institutions of the first two classes. The geographic distribution was about what one might expect. Every country had one or more, Germany had sixteen—one at least in each of the larger former federal

states of the Reich. Russia appears to have had about the same number. Knowledge of Russian military museums is at the same limited state as other Russian intelligence but we know the former imperial collections in Leningrad's Hermitage and Artillery Museum, and in Moscow's Kremlin, were retained and enlarged. Some ten or twelve technical military collections were introduced, as much for army training as for public information and amusement, but hereon scant information exists.

Great Britain possessed five important military collections, including one devoted exclusively to the Royal Navy and maritime matters, while France had two institutions of size plus numerous smaller ones. The three richest collections were in Spain, Austria, and Russia; the three most progressive collections were in Great Britain, Germany, and again Austria.

These major military museums in Europe, as can be imagined, varied widely in contents and objectives. Ten concentrated upon the display of ancient arms and armor as objects of art, although very few reached the detached esthetic approach of our own Metropolitan Museum. Only three of the museums were dedicated exclusively to naval history; they were in Greenwich, Venice and Madrid. The two last celebrated rather ancient naval glories. Almost all were nationalistic, although the attitude was more accidental than intended. Theoretically, a museum of warfare should show military materiel and methods on a world-wide scale in the same spirit that a museum of ethnology or zoology shows mankind and animals of different periods and places. Yet I know of no military museum which attempted such coverage. A few did exhibit objects relating to other countries but almost without exception the objects were of classical or medieval origin, or they represented materiel and trophies captured from a one-time enemy. The Imperial War Mu-

⁹Friedrich Bertkau, "Tradition," in *Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften*, op. cit., II, 702-705; see also articles on regimental museums in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, *passim*.

seum showed its German and Austrian equipment as items of scientific interest rather than battlefield relics, but here the emphasis was on a single conflict.¹⁰ The Musée de la Guerre displayed German posters and propaganda media as important to the study of war, but even so the Teutonic character was not overlooked. Most military museums showed simply the relics and equipments of the forces of their own people and let it go at that.

A commonplace of the European army and navy museums was the memorial hall. Indeed, most of them were memorials in their entirety, glorifying past deeds of the armed forces in every exhibit. On the walls of the Zeughaus in Berlin hung huge murals celebrating the victories of Frederick William. The vestibules of Vienna's Army Museum were lined with marble statues of Austrian generals, while another room, advertised as a "Hall of Fame," contained memorial tablets to all army officers of high rank who had fallen in battle since 1618. The museums of the Red Army were out and out vehicles of this sort of memorialization. Yet I know of no case where a museum was used to perpetuate the memory of war dead in general—a function reserved for the Tombs of the Unknown Soldiers—or to stress the exploits or sacrifices of the common soldier. Some tended in that direction, to be sure, but constant pressure on the curator to pack his cases and crowd his walls with memorials of the great and near great proved too strong. Too many military museums can with justification be called mausoleums. The field is still open for the institution that will memorialize the work of the serious soldier over the deeds of the glory hunter, and of the enlisted man over that of the commander.

One should be able to gauge the breadth of view of military museums by their willingness to picture the unfortunate events of war-

fare along with the fortunate—the mistakes as well as the victories. Do German museums show the rout at Jena? Or the British, the defeat at New Orleans? Or, for that matter, can you find a painting of the action at Bladensburg or Hull's surrender at Detroit in an American gallery? The answer is "no." Yet a study of our defeats is certainly as productive as a study of our successes and loses nothing in popular appeal.

Surprisingly few of the foreign military museums were modern in any sense of the word. They rarely attempted to tell a story by arrangement of rooms and exhibits, and in most cases the rooms would have prevented doing so if they had tried. Rarely were objects dramatically displayed. Dioramas—fairly common in American museums—were almost non-existent. Uniforms and equipment were displayed on hangers, or, at best, on cheap department store manikins. Curiously, one of the most effective displays of life-sized soldiers in natural poses was offered by an armor collection, the Museo Stibbert in Florence. To the armor specialist this is sacrilege, for it suggests the function of a suit rather than its esthetic appeal, but for the layman it adds realism and drama. Finally, only a handful appeared to be concerned directly with what can be called the institutions of war: employment of native troops, conscription, discipline, military justice, and the like—by attempting to explain these matters to their visitors. Much of this backwardness is due to the control of these museums by out and out antiquarians or retired officers who saw no place for their collections in the field of public education, or who were afraid to attempt it.¹¹ Only Nazi Germany, adept in psychological warfare, had by 1939 begun seriously to utilize its military museums to educate its people in the problems

¹⁰A condition long appreciated; see Maurice Maindrou, "Les musées militaires," in *La revue blanche* (Paris, 15 February, and 15 April 1900), XXI, 259-63, 601-04.

¹¹Report, *op. cit.*, 1938-39.

of national defense, and Russia, it seems, has long made this a practice.

To a large slice of a population the museum is of greater educational significance than the library. Only the movies and radio are competitors. The orientation of museums has, for the past generation, been consistently if slowly moving in the direction of popular education. Competition with the motion picture has been met by increasing the dramatic, the story-telling quality of the museum gallery. Attendance is promoted by popularized presentations, by traveling exhibits, by well advertised, temporary shows. If such military museum techniques have been at times bent to the propaganda needs of fascist countries it indicates only their potentialities. In a democratic state the techniques need be no less effective in stressing our own military ways of life.

Enterprise and effectiveness of institutions of this sort can also be gauged by the publications they offer the public. Ideas suggested in a museum can easily be supplemented by well designed, illustrated booklets. In this country we are familiar with the outstanding list of art books and prints published by the Metropolitan Museum and the National Gallery. In Europe before the First World War the Austrian Army Museum led the military museum field in this activity with a series of scientific studies of army history, organization and panoply, commenced in 1902. No military museum has ever equalled this mark, although the Baden Army Museum showed signs of doing so in the late 1930's. Here again it was a case of effective leadership and adequate funds, attributes too often lacking in the continental historical galleries.

The control of the various military museums mentioned above is an all important factor, but one usually difficult to determine. Virtually all were governmental operations; apparently only two were managed by unoffi-

cial agencies. One of these was a German *schlossmuseum*, and there may have been a few others of the sort still controlled by titled families. By and large, military museum management was a function of the central government and this management was applied in one of three ways: (1) directly by a war or naval ministry; (2) directly by a civil department, usually a general museum agency; or (3) by the military museum itself as a separate government establishment.

In cases where the first type of control is apparent there is also likely to be a high degree of conservatism and lethargy. A War Office, concerned primarily with the management of military forces, can give only secondary attention to its museum. Funds, curatorial personnel and development plans which gravitate through the bureaus down to the museum level, arrive sadly watered and ineffective. The natural choice for curators falls upon retired officers who have displayed some interest in antiquities, not upon younger men who could introduce active leadership. Then there is the ever present danger of the museum being scrapped entirely in the event of a war.

The second type of control seems to have been equally unfruitful except in the case of the larger military divisions of general museums, which became, in effect, separate agencies. The usual civil curator or administrator is fitted neither by temperament or training to manage a military collection. Almost without exception the important war and arms museums were those staffed by technically qualified persons and run as separate agencies of the government.

A few other statistics will suffice. Excepting the historic-house museums—those in castles and forts—the military collections of Europe were located in easily accessible parts of large and normally capital cities. The central position was for the most part accidental, but it did insure maximum tourist at-

tendance. Painfully few boasted library and research facilities. Some, like the Musée de l'Armée in Paris, carried seventy or more persons on their payroll, but for the most part two or three professionals and a dozen laborers and guards formed the staff. Again, while one collection occupied over 150,000 square feet of exhibit space, the average was considerably smaller, perhaps as small as fifty thousand square feet.

Mention has been made above of the utter unsuitability of the European military museum building. This is, of course, a common enough condition with all museums, but it seems essentially the plight of war collections. Of the sixty odd museums considered, only three were in buildings originally constructed for the purpose. Probably only two or three more were housed in structures susceptible to the thorough remodelling required to introduce adequate lighting, display galleries, work shops, storage facilities, and other modern requirements. One only is a modern museum structure, and so is worth telling about. As one might guess, it was built in Sweden. About 1936 the Naval Museum was opened in Stockholm; its architect was the celebrated Ragnar Östberg who built the Town Hall and other civic structures in that city. The museum consists of a rotunda, backed by a high trophy hall and flanked by

three-story, slightly curving wings. The walls are of solid brick finished with plaster; the rotunda is done in Swedish marble, the trophy hall in limestone. The effect is one of simplicity and directness, altogether refreshing and stimulating.¹² In common with other naval collections, it includes general maritime material.

For the most part this review has been written in the past tense. Since 1939 many of the military museums of Europe have been destroyed or seriously damaged, their exhibits lost and scattered. Those in Axis countries which survived will not be reopened for many years, and it is still too early to define the policies of military museums elsewhere. We know of their growth in Russia, and it is safe to assume that the Russian collections will climb from the shoulders of the ones that have gone before. So must a military museum founded in this country use the experience of the past. A study of European institutions of this sort may show few features worth copying, but it most assuredly shows a mass of mistakes worth avoiding. So is the way marked to the creation of a broad, progressive military collection on the national scale in the United States.

¹²Howard Robertson, "The Naval Museum, Stockholm" in *The Architect & Building News* (London, January 17, 1936), CXLV, 101-103.

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NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES*

BY HENRY J. WEBB

According to a number of authors in the Middle Ages, prisoners of war were supposed to be treated humanely. Writers from various walks of life, such as Giovanni da Legnano, the 14th century Milanese lawyer, Christine de Pisan, the brilliant wife of Etienne de Castel, Eustache Deschamps, the French poet and contemporary of Chaucer, Honoré Bonet, a French monk, and Gilbert of the Haye, a Scots priest, insisted that captured men-of-war should be dealt with honorably by victorious knights.

In one of the most ancient books dealing with the law of nations, the *Tractatus de Bello, de Represaliis et de Duello* (c.1360), Legnano wrote that mercy should "be shown to persons captured in a lawful war . . . unless by sparing them there is fear of a disturbance of the peace."¹ Legnano's authority for this statement was a sentence in the 12th century work of Gratian entitled *Concordia canonum discordantium or Decretum*, a treatise written for the teaching of canon law. In Book II of the *Decretum* (Causa XXIII, Quaestio I) may be found this brief dictum on mercy toward prisoners:

Sicut rebellanti et resistenti violentia redditur, ita victo vel capto misericordia jam debetur, maxime in quo pacis perturbatio non timetur.² (Just as violence comes to those who rebel and

resist, pity is due to the vanquished or captured, especially if no disturbance of the peace is feared of him.)

Christine de Pisan, writing in France about fifty years after the appearance of Legnano's work, stated that a knight should not be "cruell" to his prisoners "or tormente or make hys prissonners to langwysshe in prys-on," but he should treat them "goodly and humaynly" and not "gyve them cause for to dyspeyre hem selfe."³ In a paraphrase of Honoré Bonet's *Arbre des Batailles*, a Scots priest named Gilbert of the Haye echoed de Pisan's opinion:

quhen a prisonare is tane, merci is aucht him and that his maister aw to do him grace, that is to say that his maister aw to kepe him hale, and fere of his persone, that nane do him wrang, na uncourtasy of his persone, na in his honour, na to defoule him in his persone, sen he has him in keping, and at his merci, and suld mynester him lyging sufficiently after his estate, at his power, and make him gude and free chere quhill he is with him, and gude company. . . .⁴

Eustache Deschamps succinctly sums up this point of view in two lines:

Tout homme armé doit estre par effort
Crueulx devant, piteux après victoire.⁵

(Every man under arms should seek to be cruel before victory, but generous after victory.)

*See Hare, "Military Punishments in the War of 1812," 225-239 *Military Affairs* 1940.

¹Giovanni da Legnano, *Tractatus de Bello, de Represaliis et de Duello*, (Washington: Carnegie Institute, 1917), p. 128.

²*Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Decretum Gratiani*, (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1891), CLXXXVII, 1163.

³Her work was entitled *Le Livre des Faits d'Armes et de Chevalerie* and was translated by William Caxton in 1489 as *The Book of Fayttes of Armes and of Chyualrye*. I have quoted from Caxton, (London: EETS, 1937), p. 237.

⁴Gilbert of the Haye's *Prose Manuscript*, "The Buke of the Law of Armys," (STS, 1901), I, 159.

⁵*Oeuvres Complètes de Eustache Deschamps*, (Paris: Société des Anciens Textes Français, 1882), III, 37.



Hand-to-hand combat in the 15th century. (Woodcut in the Lubeck Bible, published 1494.)

It is important to note, however, that in spite of the exhortations of these writers, a man's station in society and his ability to procure ransom almost always governed his treatment as a prisoner of war. Knights and squires were inclined to show every courtesy to their own kind, although their conduct toward non-knightly and impecunious combatants was sometimes extremely cruel. John of Valois, taken by the Black Prince at Poitiers, was treated royally by his captor because he was a king and could produce the 600,000 francs set as his ransom;⁶ and Froissart, the fourteenth century chronicler, has recorded many other, though less famous, instances where a knightly victor was magnanimous to his socially equal prisoner.⁷

But prisoners, even though knights, were not always dealt with courteously. Froissart notes that Germans were accustomed to place captured knights in chains and fetters in order to extort the maximum amount of ransom from them:

la coustume des Alemans ne la courtoisie n'est mies tèle; car il n'ont pité ne merci de nul gentil homme, se il eschiet entre leurs mains prisonniers; mès le rançonneront de toute sa finance et oultre, et metteront en ceps, en buies et en fers et plus destroites prisons que it poront, pour estordre plus grant raençon.⁸ (The customs and manners of the Germans are not at all such; because they have no pity or mercy for any gentle man if he falls into their hands as a prisoner; but, they will demand as ransom all his possessions and more; they will place him in chains of iron and throw him into the smallest prison cell they have to extort a greater ransom.)

⁶*Oeuvres de Froissart*, (Bruxelles: Victor Devaux et Cie., 1868), V, 460-64; VI, 14.

⁷For example, see *Ibid.*, V, 246ff.

⁸*Ibid.*, V, 464.

According to the *Chronique Normande du XIV^e Siècle*, the Flemmings did not take prisoners at all, but cruelly "faisoient guerre mortelle sans rançon." The Swiss were probably the worst sinners in this respect. Sir Charles Oman remarks that in "the Swiss [of the 14th and 15th centuries] we find . . . a complete lack of chivalrous feeling or magnanimity . . . [They] were distinguished for their deliberate and cold-blooded cruelty."¹⁰

German, Flemmings, and Swiss were not alone unknighly in their behavior. At times, the French, English and Spanish also showed qualities of great savagery. Don Pedro, King of Castile, wished to slay all the rebellious Spanish prisoners captured at the battle of Navarretta (1365), but the Black Prince persuaded him to spare them, not because he was by nature a merciful man but because, according to Froissart, he believed that kindness and generosity would go far in gaining him a friendly reception in his kingdom. Don Pedro took the prince's advice and pardoned all men except Gomez Carillo whose throat he had cut.

Là li fu délivrés messires Gomme Garils, douquel il n'eüst pris nulle rançon, tant fort le haoit: si le fist décolor devant ses yex au dehors des logeis.¹¹ (There was delivered Sir Gomme Garils from whom he had not taken any ransom,

¹⁰*Chronique Normande du XIV^e Siècle*, (Paris: Société de l'Histoire de France, 1882), p. 27. An example of cruelty toward prisoners by Venetians may be found in *Memoires de Guillaume de Villeneuve*, (Paris: Librairie Ch. Delagrave, 1886), 276.

¹¹Sir Charles Oman, *History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., n.d.), II, 253.

¹²Froissart, VII, 220-23. Of this episode, Chandos Herald wrote:

Et lors se retourna arere
Tout droit ou is estoit logiez,
Et illoc fut appareillez
Gome; trayner le fist-hom
Et trencher la goule.soubz le menton
Adonc devant toute la gent.

(And when he looked back, straight from where he lodged, there Gome was brought in; and then he was dragged out and had his throat cut under the chin before all the people.)

Le Prince Noir. (London & Paris: J. G. Fotheringham, 1883), lines 3574-79. Sancho Sanchez Moscoso,



Caricature of a Landsknecht and boy of the 16th century. (Reproduced from a woodcut by an unknown artist, in Georg Lieke, *Der Soldat*.)

he hated him so much: he had him beheaded in his presence outside the lodgings.)

At Agincourt (1415), Henry V of England ordered all prisoners killed so that their guards might be released for combat duty. In describing this cruel episode, Holinshed, writing in the 16th century, said:

When this dolorous decree, and pitiful proclamation was pronounced, pitie it was to see how some Frenchmen were suddenlie sticked with daggers, some were brained with pollaxes, some slaine with malls, other had their throats cut, and some their bellies panched, so that in effect, hauing respect to their great number, few prisoners were saued.¹²

comendador de Santiago, was beheaded at the same time, *Ibid.*, 370.

¹²Holinshed's *Chronicles*, (London: 1808), III, 81-2. Compare with Monstrelet's brief mention of this episode, *Chroniques d'Enguerrand de Monstrelet*, (Paris: 1826), III, 344. See Oman also, II, 385.

Non-knightly combatants and ordinary citizens aiding in the defense of a besieged town could expect even less courtesy at the hands of their captors. They were outside the code of chivalry, being low-born, and generally had no means of raising money to ransom themselves. As prisoners, therefore, they were liabilities and often suffered from the rage and passion of a noble whose "honor" and pocketbook made him treat conquered knights with circumspection. In 1347, for instance, the French and Bretons "tuerent premierement, sanz difference, les hommes et les femmes qui estoient en la ville habitans, de quelconque aage qu'ilz feussent, et mesmement les enfans qui alaictoient."¹³ After the siege of Calais, the victorious English King would have put the citizens to death had not some of his captains and the queen interceded on their behalf.¹⁴ And Edward's son, the great and noble Black Prince who had kept Don Pedro from massacring his prisoners, some years later at the siege of Limoges put inhabitants of all ranks, ages, and sexes to the sword.¹⁵

¹³*Les Grandes Chroniques de France, Philippe VI de Valois*, (Paris: Société de l'Histoire de France, 1937), p. 308.

¹⁴Froissart, V, 198ff.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, VIII, 38ff.

Easily understandable, therefore, is that non-knightly combattants—yeoman archers, pikemen, and arquebusiers—should show little mercy toward their captives. In the first place, they were bound by no chivalric ideals; secondly, they were seldom equipped to keep prisoners; third, not being able to expect mercy from conquerors who dealt out humanity on the basis of ransom, they were naturally inclined to be ruthless. Numerous examples of this ruthlessness may be found in the chronicles, although I think it is sufficient to mention an incident at Poitiers where the English archers, scarcely emulating their master's conduct toward King John, put many of their captives to death.¹⁶

It is obvious that the dictum concerning prisoners set down by Gratian and Legnano and developed by later medieval writers was so often disregarded by combattants of all ranks that their words seem like cries in the wilderness. Yet these writers cannot be ignored nor their words brushed aside, for, ineffectual though they may have been when composed, they were the foundation stones for the modern treatment of prisoners of war.

¹⁶Froissart, V, 442.

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FALL, 1947 MILITARY AFFAIRS

The supply of this number, Volume XI, Number 3, has been entirely exhausted. The Institute will greatly appreciate receiving copies of this issue from members or subscribers who do not wish to keep them permanently.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

ARMY HISTORICAL CONVENTION

A meeting of military historians held in the Historical Division, Department of the Army, February 3-6, 1948, brought together for the first time representatives of the armed services history sections of the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Members of the foreign historical agencies were greeted by Major General Harry J. Malony, Chief, Historical Division, at a preliminary meeting the first day, after which they were briefed on the organization and background of the Army program.

The second day's activities began with an address by the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Kenneth C. Royall, and was followed by reports from the chiefs of the different Army historical sections. A summary of the Army planning and preparation of histories, its editorial and publication progress, and status of funds and personnel, was outlined by Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian. Dr. Hugh M. Cole, Chief of the European section, explained the work of his department, as did the heads of the other sections, and Dr. Howard Smyth, for the Mediterranean section. At the afternoon session reports were heard from Riley Sunderland, China-Burma-India; Dr. Thomas Motter, Africa-Middle East; Dr. Rudolph Winacker, Office of Secretary of War; Mark Watson, War Department General Staff; Ray S. Cline, Operations Division; Miss Mattie Treadwell, Women's Army Corps; Major Ulysses G. Lee, Jr., Negro Affairs; Ted Whiting, Statistics, and Mrs. Mary E. Williams, Chronology.

A discussion of the Technical Services and

a tour of the Army's historical archives highlighted the events of the third day. The general problems of preparing the history of the Zone of Interior installations was presented by Dr. Greenfield. Details relative to the writing of official histories for the Technical Services were then outlined by historians of the various services: Chester Wardlow, Transportation Corps; Dr. Dulany Terrett, Signal Corps; Colonel L. E. Mielenz, Corps of Engineers; Dr. Daniel Chase, Ordnance Department; Dr. Thomas M. Pitkin, Quartermaster Corps; Dr. Benjamin Baldwin, Chemical Corps, and Dr. Donald Wagner, Medical Corps. In the afternoon representatives of the foreign governments were conducted through the editorial offices and archives of the Historical Division, including an inspection of captured German documents, files of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, and a photographic exhibit.

A cocktail party and buffet supper on the night of the above mentioned afternoon's activities, given at the Army-Navy Town Club, reminded several of the older AMI members present of an event that took place in the same rooms ten years before. The occasion was an informal meeting of those members of the Institute who were resident at or near Washington, the first of its kind, held on June 21, 1939.

Events of the final day of the convention, February 6, consisted of discussions by historians and representatives of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, being followed by similar talks by members of the historical departments of England, Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand, on their respective programs. General Malony presided

and introduced the first speaker, Captain John B. Heffernan, USN, Director of Naval History, who spoke on the origin and program of the Office of Naval History. Next was Dr. Harry M. Dater, head of the Aviation History Unit, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and he was followed by Lt. Col. Robert D. Heintz, Historian, U. S. Marine Corps, and Colonel Wilfred J. Paul, Chief of the Air Historical Office, who presented similar outlines of their departments.

The remainder of the final day of the convention was taken up by reports from the historians of the Allied countries. This was especially revealing to the American group for it offered the initial opportunity to closely compare the programs of the six different nations, from which more extensive plans of mutual assistance could be formulated. Extensive questioning generally followed after each representative presented his resumé. The speakers were: Brigadier H. B. Latham, Chief of the British Historical Section, Cabinet-Office; Dr. J. R. M. Butler, Chief Civilian Historian of the Cabinet-Office; Dr. J. C. Nerney, Chief Historian of the Royal Air Force; Colonel C. P. Stacey, Chief, Historical Section, Canadian Army; Dr. F. H. Hitchins, Historian, Royal Canadian Air Force; Mr. John Balfour, Office of the Official War Historian, Australia; Lt. Col. J. A. I. Agar-Hamilton, Editor in Chief, Union War History, Union of South Africa, and Major General Karl Kippenberger, Editor in Chief, New Zealand War Histories. Colonel C. C. Benson, Chief, World War I Branch, Historical Division, SSUSA, also spoke at this session. A general discussion period concluded the convention.

ORDER OF INDIAN WARS

Four members of the Order, two retired Army officers and two civilians, who have been active affiliates for many years, died during recent months.

MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES D. RHODES, U. S. Army, Retired, died in Washington January 24, 1948, after a long illness and was buried in Arlington Cemetery. A former Commander of the Order, General Rhodes was born in Ohio in 1865. He received an A.B. degree at Columbia University in 1885 and was graduated from West Point in 1889. He participated in the Sioux Campaign of 1890-1891, serving in the Cavalry, and attained the rank of major general during World War I while on duty in France. A brigadier general and major general, 1925-1929, he was awarded the D.S.C., D.S.M. and S.S. He was retired for age in 1929.

COLONEL GEORGE H. MORGAN, U. S. Army, Retired, also a former Commander of the Order, died at Walter Reed Hospital February 14, 1948, being the oldest living graduate of West Point up to that time. He was buried in Arlington Cemetery with full military honors. Born in Canada, January 1, 1855, he was graduated from the Academy in the class of 1880. He served in the 3d Cavalry in the Ute and Apache Indian Wars, distinguishing himself in the action at the Big Dry Wash, Arizona, July 17, 1882, for which he received the Congressional Medal of Honor. He was severely wounded in this battle, but recovered and remained on active duty until 1926. He was retired for age as Colonel, January 1, 1919.

ARTHUR J. PIERCE, hereditary member of the Order since 1934 died recently at his home in Bennington, New Hampshire, at the age of 72. He had been engaged in the paper manufacturing business for a number of years. Although he had no military experience, he displayed a continuing interest in Indian War history due to the active part taken by his forefathers in the early campaigns. He was descended from Captain Thomas Vose who fought in a number of

battles with the Indians during the latter half of the 17th century in New England and Canada.

HERBERT J. SLOCUM, also a hereditary member of the Order, died recently, according to word received from his home in Charleston, S. C. No details were given. He had been a member of the Order for the past twenty-four years and was a brother of another member, Miles S. Slocum.

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At the time of the affiliation of the Order with the American Military Institute, no details were announced concerning the status in the Institute of those who had been life members in the Order. The answer to several inquiries received in this connection is that life members in the Order will likewise be life members in the Institute. Others are enrolled as annual members but will receive the JOURNAL without charge in 1948, after which they will be subject to the usual dues.

When the affiliation became effective the rolls of the Order contained the names of 236 members, ten of whom were also members of the Institute, and forty-eight were life members. Of the entire number there were fifty-four whose addresses were unknown. The Secretary has been able to ascertain the addresses of thirteen of these, leaving thirty-five unaccounted for. They are listed herewith, and it is earnestly hoped that anyone knowing of their whereabouts will forward such information immediately to the Secretary:

Andrews, James M., IV; Banning, William Calvin; Barlow, J. Woodman Bryan; Barlow, Raymond Clay, Jr.; Bryan, Lt. Col. John K. O-17728 (Demobilized); Bryan, John K., Jr.; Chase, George F. McM.; Chase, William B. McM.; Coyle, John P.; Davis, William G.; Foster, Volney W.; Gandy, Charles L., Jr.; Garlington, Creswell, Jr.; Griswold, George M.; Halloran, James P. S.; Hunter, Russel H.; Kauffman, Andrew H., Jr.; Kauffman, Sewel T.; King, Charles, III; McGarry, William R.; Merchant, Lieut. Marvin H.; Mo-

disette, Welton M., Jr.; Nichols, Frank B.; Nichols, George R., III; Nicholson, Edward C.; Parkhurst, George C.; Ross, Dr. Simon P.; Safford, Ralph K.; Taylor, Col. Herbert E.; Von Kummer, Samuel M.; Whitaker, Joseph T.; Whiting, Donald McP.; Taylor, Reuben C., Jr. (no street address), Cincinnati, Ohio; Herrick, Dr. Samuel; Trippe, Richard E., Jr.

ARMY HISTORY

Anzio Beachhead, thirteenth volume of the AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION series, was published in March and is now available for sale at the Government Printing Office, price \$1.50. This is the story of how the VI Corps of the Fifth Army seized and held a strategic position far to the rear of the enemy's main fighting front, in the Italian campaign of 1944. The narrative concentrates on the first six weeks of bitter struggle to hold the beachhead against German attacks designed to drive the Allied forces from their precarious foothold, a period that ended March 3d. This study is based on a preliminary narrative by Captain John Bowditch, III, prepared in the field from military records and from notes and interviews recorded during and after the operation. He was assisted by Lt. Robert W. Komer. The manuscript was revised and extended with the help of additional information, including that obtained from enemy records, in the Historical Division, Department of the Army.

AIR FORCE HISTORY

Volume I of the history of the Army Air Forces in World War II is now being printed at the University of Chicago Press, with publication scheduled for late in June. The volume describes the development of the Army air arm from 1918 to 1941, and relates the story of air operations from Pearl Harbor to mid-summer 1942. Volume II of the seven-volume history is in the process of being edited, and is expected to appear this fall.

It will cover the organization and activities of the USAAF in ETO, MTO, and the Middle East from the summer of 1942 through December 1943. The five remaining volumes of the series are scheduled to be published at intervals of approximately six months.

Volume I will sell for \$5.00 at the book stores. It contains approximately 700 pages, with 70 maps, charts and photographs.

MARINE CORPS HISTORY

Two Marine Corps historical monographs, *The Defense of Wake*, by Lt. Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC, Chief of the Marine Corps Historical Section, and *The Battle for Tarawa*, by Captain James R. Stockman, USMC, have recently been published and are available through the Government Printing Office. These are the first in a projected series of publications designed to cover Marine Corps operations in World War II. A third, *Marines at Midway*, is now in the hands of the printers and should be available in the near future. *The Defense of Wake* (75 pp., seven colored maps, 23 photographs) is priced at \$1.25, and *The Battle for Tarawa* (86 pp., eight colored maps, six line maps, 31 photographs) \$1.50.

NAVAL HISTORY

The second part of the two-volume *Building the Navy's Bases in World War II; History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940-1946*, is scheduled to appear in May. This official history prepared by the Bureau of Yards and Docks is a part of the Naval Historical Program and is printed by the Government Printing Office. Each of these volumes is approximately 400 pages in length, and together they contain 500 photographs, 50 maps and charts, and complete indexes. Volume I is priced at \$3.25; volume II at \$3.75.

NEW ZEALAND HISTORICAL PROGRAM

Technical and organizational plans concerning research and writing of the official World War II history for New Zealand have been outlined in a letter to the Institute from Major General H. K. Kippenberger, Editor-in-Chief of the War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs.

According to General Kippenberger the Branch is charged with the preparation of a comprehensive history of New Zealand's participation in the war 1939-1945. This it plans to do in a series of volumes as follows:

Documents and Correspondence	3 vols.
Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force in Middle East and Italy	6 vols.
Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Pacific	1 vol.
The New Zealand Army—1840-1945	1 vol.
The Royal New Zealand Air Force	3 vols.
The Royal New Zealand Navy	1 vol.
Medical and Dental Histories	4 vols.
Prisoners of War and Escapes	1 vol.
Unit Histories	26 vols. (about)
Civilian Affairs	3 vols.
Popular History (48 parts)	4 vols.

TOTAL	53 vols.
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The War History Branch, which also controls the War Archives, is responsible for assembly of material and preparation of detailed narratives, also, supervision of special sections for maps, statistics, photographs, indices and publishing. Work is proceeding on the majority of volumes projected, and it is expected that the first ones will appear in 1948. Target date for completion of the series has been placed at July 1, 1953.

Unit Histories of the principal combatant organizations will be published under central contract and in a uniform series, each being prepared in close coordination with committees representative of units concerned.

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

A Program for National Security. May 29, 1947. Report of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office. 1947. Pp. 448. \$75.)

Throughout the discussion of national defense a number of questions have remained unanswered, questions which the advocates of universal military service were called on to answer before their arguments could be accepted as soundly based and logically consistent. It is disappointing to find that the report of the President's Advisory Commission does not answer these questions. At least I was disappointed, but before jumping to the conclusions that the answers do not exist and that the case for universal military service is therefore unsound and illogical, it is wise to recall the weaknesses likely to be inherent in any committee report. Anyone who has sat on committees will expect to find one point of view expressed in one place and a different view—to some it will seem a contradictory view—expressed elsewhere. For this *Report*, individual members prepared specific sections which were made into a single document by Judge Samuel I. Rosenman and Dr. Karl T. Compton acting as a drafting committee with the aid of Mr. A. H. Raskin of the *New York Times*. "This draft was then studied, revised, annotated, and finally approved by each member of the Commission" (p. 103). There are also 353 pages of appendices, not endorsed by the Commission, which explore special interests such as full employment for women in war and peace, child care, and so on. There is a long appendix concerning foreign systems of military service, which deserves by itself an expert reviewer. The fact that it is a committee report may account for some passage, which seems to straddle although they are too carefully worded to present pointblank inconsistencies. For example, on p. 43 we are told that their program is for an "essentially civilian effort," but almost in the next paragraph we are informed that the training "should be of a predominantly military character."

On p. 29 it is vigorously and categorically asserted that universal military service should not be adopted if it is to have the effect, even indirectly, of weakening other elements in national security, such as curtailment of the amount expended on the regular Army. But the politically appealing argument that universal military training will cost less is trotted out on p. 37 and on p. 31 we are assured: "The more men with military training we have in our civilian population, the more we can reduce the size of our standing armed forces."

This failure to state a clear and definite position in regard to the size of the standing armed forces illustrates also another characteristic of the *Report*, its failure at some crucial points to reinforce its arguments with facts and figures. There is a plentiful citation of the judgments of the men in important positions. This is, after all, a report to the President, and no administrator could ask for clearer demonstration that the persons in positions of authority had been consulted and are agreed. What more could any administrator ask? He can not expect to figure things out for himself in disregard of those in authority under him. I wonder whether the committee felt that the public would or should take the same attitude towards those in authority over them. The *Report* expounds and exhorts but does not demonstrate. In the body of the argument there are no comparisons of the number of men planned in the various elements of national defense under alternate schemes. To be sure, in the explanation of the details of the kind of universal military training advocated we are told that the personnel needed to do the training is estimated as 230,000. But there are no other estimates of the number of standing armed forces considered desirable under various conditions. Consequently a civilian finds himself inadequately supplied with the basic facts which only experts can give. Out of this situation may come the feeling that somebody is trying to "put something over."

One other weakness extrinsic to its main thesis characterizes the report. It holds up a ridiculous standard of security when it says, as on p. 17:

"No plan for national security can be adequate which leaves loopholes or uncertainties in the conduct of our military effort." Who ever heard of a war without uncertainties!

Leaving aside the manner and turning to the essentials in the substance of the argument, we necessarily begin with a guess about the character of the next war. The picture presented (pp. 8-9, 13-14) is much like that painted more fully by Bernard Brodie in his chapters in *The Absolute Weapon*. A sudden attack will disrupt the main centers of population, industry, and communication, leaving the country badly disorganized and demoralized so that to a very large extent each locality will have to reorganize itself and be ready to defend itself against sabotage and airborne attack. The report puts much emphasis on the dangers of subversive activities while the country is reeling under the opening blow. It is assumed that our country will have succeeded in preserving through the opening attack of the enemy our striking force which will be able to inflict very severe damage on the enemy also. We and our enemy are pictured as both striking directly at the civilian population, at their lives, their industrial organization, their communication system, and the mutual confidence which holds them together as a society. Only through universal training, it is argued, can the civilian population be trained so as to respond adequately to this assault, suppress subversive movements, control panic, fight disease, fires, and other forms of devastation, reestablish communications, beat off airborne attacks, and keep some production coming from essential industries. This seems to be the most convincing part of the argument for national universal training.

What next? General Eisenhower is quoted (p. 16) as saying the outcome will be determined by our ability to act and react in the first 60 days. If so, it seems to me, the issue will be settled almost entirely by the two forces already mentioned: the offensive power in the striking forces and the defensive, resilient power in the civilian population. The striking forces must be of course a standing force fully armed and trained to act at a moment's notice when an enemy attacks. Its efficiency seems more important in our military defense than any other one single element. If a potential enemy refrains from attacking us because of fear of retaliation, he will be deterred by knowing that we have a striking force with its bombs, poison, and bacteria. The importance of this striking force will certainly be granted by

anyone who believes in any kind of military preparation at all.

But the striking force will need reinforcement, we are told. There will immediately begin a sending forth of fleets and armies as of old to seize bases for the more thorough blasting of the population of the enemy. Where are these fleets and armies to come from? The Commission's report pictures them as being in large part called out from among those who were at the beginning of the war in civilian life but members of the National Guard and the Organized Reserves (pp. 27-8). Could these reserves be brought together while the country was disorganized by the enemy's opening blow, be welded into effective forces for offensive operations and sent out to seize advance bases, all within 60 days? At this point the imagination falters.

The two elements which seem least uncertain in the necessarily very uncertain picture of future military power are the striking force and the civilian defense. Yet the program of universal military training proposed is likely to weaken both of these for the sake of preparing Organized Reserves for use in seizing and defending strategic bases. Presumably the Commission does not wish this result and yet the measures they propose are extremely likely to have that effect. They refuse to face the problems of bureaucratic pressure and military conservatism, although those are social forces quite as real as subversive activities, and possibly as deadly, although not to be considered as reprehensible. By military conservatism I mean merely the existence in Army and Navy officers of the same kind of inertia which is found in other men and which causes them to plan action of the kind in which they have been successful.

The details of the Commission's program for universal training and the options to be offered the trainee at the end of six months illustrate most discouragingly the force of conservatism. From the kind of war which is posited as the basis for the argument, the prime need in universal training would seem to be the inculcation, in women as well as men, of those attitudes and skills which would enable the civilian population to overcome whatever kind of blasting they receive by the striking force of the enemy. Those who have been trained should then, one might logically suppose, be organized so as to act among the civilian population in keeping order, re-establishing communications, limiting the devastation, defeating airborne attacks, and enabling essential

production and transport to continue. But the Commission sets (p. 78) as the "goal of the basic training period" the recruitment of a National Guard and Organized Reserve which will be "capable of rapid absorption into the professional military establishment in time of war" (p. 92). The training considered (except that for the conscientious objectors and those with physical disabilities!) are for the military specialties connected with seizing, holding, and supplying bases. The program and the length of the training period are all argued on the basis of preparing men for combat missions such as those of the last war.

The forces which have shaped the Commission's deliberations may be expected to operate even more powerfully and permanently on any training system established under the Army and Navy. A corps of 230,000 professionals devoting all their time to training about 800,000 men a year would constitute a group exercising powerful pressures in politics and within the bureaucracy in the Department of National Defense. What is to move them—or the National Guard and Organized Reserves, assuming their military position is that here assigned them—to think in any other terms except refighting the last war? They would be the portions of the armed forces in which conservatism would be strongest, those most difficult to keep up to date. If they operated universal training as primarily a means of recruiting for their organizations and adding to the social prestige of their leaders, they could quickly make it an archaic ritual.

Would the striking force fare any better? Probably it would escape complete subjection to the forces of conservatism. But would it be able to secure full financial support and access to the very top in the Military Command if it is only a few hundred thousand men competing against the claims for money and prestige of those who command the millions in training and in the reserves? The Commission's report does nothing to allay these fears, but it makes clearer than ever the need that they should be allayed before universal military training is adopted.

So the Report leads towards the quite unexpected conclusion that we should have universal military service but that neither the Army, nor the Navy, nor the Air Force should be permitted to have anything to do with it. They would ruin it, and it them.

That is an extreme statement, perhaps a *reductio ad absurdum*, but it points up the unconvincing

and illogical elements which make the Commission's report a disappointment.

FREDERIC C. LANE*
Baltimore, Maryland

Men Against Fire, by S. L. A. Marshall. (New York: William Morrow & Co. 1947. Pp. 215. \$2.75.)

This meaty volume has been written by an exceptionally qualified author after careful study of the operations of several hundred units in World War II engagements. In the course of his investigation he visited theaters in the Pacific and in Europe and questioned participants, both officers and enlisted men, during and after engagements. The considered results of these visits furnish the conclusions set forth in this volume.

In spite of the breadth of his subjects he covers with great validity the relationship of men to the battlefield. His observations extend from the psychology of the soldier at his first encounter and his reactions to the shock of initial combat, through to the reactions of seasoned leaders of both small and large units, the agencies they use and the influence which they bring to bear on the action.

He writes on a subject which has been almost completely obscured by the enormity of the productive effort of the country and the emphasis placed upon logistics and upper echelon planning. He definitely establishes that the difference between defeat and victory lies in the hands of a comparatively few men whose innate qualities are of such a nature that paralysis and fear of battle, wounds or death do not affect their power to act.

The age-old fallacy that machines make it possible to avoid the employment of men in close combat has not escaped him and he projects that fallacy forward into the war of the future as he visualizes it. His opinions on "push button" warfare and the popular conception of the decline of the human element in close combat are of great interest. Especially worthwhile are his remarks on training and discipline in the change-over from civilian to effective combat unit.

The reader will probably find many minor points upon which he may disagree with the author but, disagree or not, this volume is a thought-provoking one and a professional soldier can hardly avoid reading it with profit.

*Dr. Lane is Professor of History, The Johns Hopkins University, and Historian of the Maritime Commission.

In my opinion this is one of the great volumes on fighting published since World War II and should be required reading for every staff officer as well as every combat officer of the arms which fight on the ground.

It deserves a place among the really great volumes on combat and command.

HARRY J. MALONY,*
Washington, D. C.

Lucky Forward, by Col. Robert S. Allen. (New York: Vanguard Press. 1947. Pp. 424. \$5.)

A favorite indoor sport of soldiers during World War II was the contemplation of the book they intended to write when they got out of the Army. They were going to tell the "inside story," and reveal the mistakes of the "Big Brass." Now that the war has ended, few of the GIs have taken pen in hand. But some of the colonels and generals have hastened to pens and typewriters to blast the reputations of the "Bigger Brass." Colonel Allen's *Lucky Forward* is in this tradition.

Lucky Forward has gained praise from some reviewers because it has more "facts" than many other war books proposing "to tell all." This appears to be warranted since Colonel Allen has drawn on G-2 and G-3 reports and other material which has been published in Third Army's history. From the many similarities between *Lucky Forward* and General Patton's recent book, *War As I Knew It*, it seems that Colonel Allen saw that book before it was published. Because of his use of Third Army reports, Colonel Allen's statements as to tons of bombs dropped, miles covered, ammunition expended, prisoners captured are *correct so far as his sources themselves were final and complete*. Since these records were not compared with the reports of other armies, they are subject to error. On matters relating purely to Third Army activities, the presumption of accuracy is in favor of the Third Army writer. When, however, he undertakes to make invidious comparisons with First, Seventh or Ninth Army without records of those armies, the book reflects bias and yields conclusions which can not be substantiated.

Many admirers of General Patton will forgive Colonel Allen his exaggerations because they are pleased to see high praise extended to the great

work of the Third Army Commander. Colonel Allen has not been content to say that General Patton was a superb army commander, perhaps the greatest of the war; he has felt it necessary to decry the work of all other commanders and headquarters who had dealings with Third Army. One does not need to go into the full story of the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, SHAEF, 12th Army Group, and 21 Army Group to defend them against the charges of Colonel Allen. By heeding General Patton's admonition to critics—"Why not count the prisoners?"—we can get an idea of the leadership at top level without entering into all the military and political ramifications which entered naturally into a war of coalition. Comparison of Colonel Allen's charges against the top level commanders shows that he is far more bitter than his own commanding general. In the most serious charge of the book, that SHAEF's failure to give General Patton sufficient gasoline in the summer of 1944 prolonged the war, Colonel Allen imputes the action of higher headquarters to a conspiracy against the Third Army commander. General Patton, while admitting that he originally shared this view, declares that he was mistaken in the assumption that SHAEF's action "was a back-handed way of slowing up Third Army."

The mania of destroying reputations of others in order to give more credit to Third Army is evidenced in many passages of *Lucky Forward*. In describing the background of the Ardennes breakthrough, Colonel Allen declares that the top-level G-2's were "no more fit in training, experience, and ability to hold their critical posts than a milk-wagon plug is to race in the Derby." Without arguing the point as to the accuracy of predictions on the eve of the Breakthrough, it is possible to refute this sweeping statement by pointing out that the SHAEF G-2 had been the chief expert on the German army in the British Intelligence Service (a service which Colonel Allen is an unguarded moment singled out for praise), and had been with SHAEF through much of the Mediterranean campaign and the campaign in Europe. The 21 Army Group G-2, an Oxford don, had been engaged in battlefield intelligence since February 1942, and had been chief of Intelligence of Eighth Army, and later of 21 Army Group, since the fall of 1942. This gave him longer service as Intelligence director in a higher headquarters than any other officer in either American or British headquarters in Europe.

Lucky Forward indulges in numerous gratuitous

*Brig. Gen. Malony, Chief of the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff, commanded the 94th Division in action in the Locient, St. Nazaire and Saar-Moselle sectors.

insults to other Army Headquarters, such as: "Headquarters Ninth Army generally was a mediocre staff and was not held in high regard by other U. S. Headquarters." It is interesting to contrast this view with the judgment of another master of invective—Colonel Ralph Ingersoll. The author of *Top Secret* declares: "Simpson's new Ninth Army seemed to us to combine the best features of both the First and Third. It was as steady and reliable as the First and after *Grenade* (the drive from the Roer to the Rhine) we knew it could run and pass as brilliantly as the Third."

The desire to build up the reputation of the Third Army in the Battle of the Bulge—and certainly no one should attempt to deprive Third Army of credit for its splendid performances there—leads Colonel Allen to sneer at everybody in sight when he says that during the critical period, the British Second, Canadian First, and the American First and Ninth Armies "all sat on their haunches doing nothing." While Colonel Allen has made brief mention of the gallant stand by First Army units on the north flank of the Bulge, he overlooks the heavy losses which First Army took in that fight, and he ignores the costly counterattacks which it made throughout the critical period to make sure that the fruits of the battle in the South would not be lost. If the enemy had broken through in the North on the First Army front, the road to Liege and Antwerp was open, and the brilliant fight at Bastogne would have been in vain. It is a matter of record that the Ninth Army sent eight divisions during the first two weeks of battle southward to aid First Army, and then joined with the British forces in guarding against possible German thrusts near Aachen, and north of that area. The British for their part relieved some American units in order that they could move into more active sectors. Colonel Allen's refusal to recognize the importance of the work in the North can be explained perhaps on the ground that in his desire to take away credit from General Montgomery who was commanding the First and Ninth U. S. Armies at this juncture, he is willing to sweep aside the heroic efforts of fellow-Americans.

One may list dozens of violent charges of jealousy, suspicion, and stupidity levelled at higher headquarters in *Lucky Forward*. When something good is done by another army, Colonel Allen intimates that it happened because the successful unit was once under Third Army. While one may agree that VIII Corps, which began its

work under First Army, had been trained by General Patton, it is somewhat difficult to accept the suggestion that III Corps took the Remagen Bridge, while under First Army, because it "was Third Army tainted."

The tendency to overlook claims of other armies opens *Lucky Forward* to a number of raucous catcalls from other partisans. One First Army officer recently wrote *Time* magazine that despite all the statements of Colonel Allen, it was First Army which made the landings in Normandy, led the way out of the Cotentin Peninsula, first entered Paris, first entered Belgium, first entered Germany, first penetrated the Siegfried Line, first crossed the Rhine, and first met the Russians. While it is likely that Third Army would have done all these things had it been given the task, it is nevertheless true that some other army did do them. To engage in a contest of counting prisoners, total miles covered, total square miles occupied is asking for trouble. If for no other reason than that First Army was in action nearly sixty days before Third Army entered the fight, General Hodges' Army will lead on nearly any statistical count Colonel Allen cares to make.

The charges made against higher headquarters by *Lucky Forward* are so strong and so numerous that they can be dealt with adequately only by a thorough examination of all the official records. Back of all Combined Chiefs of Staff planning there were considerations of a strategic nature, of allocation of supplies, of problems of manpower which demanded decisions not easily understood at Army level. SHAEF, acting as the representative of both the British and American Chiefs of Staff, had to deal with five American, two British, and one French army. The three Army Groups, in turn, had to deal with two or more armies. It was inevitable that all these staffs made decisions displeasing to someone. But in order to understand the action of the higher headquarters, it is essential to go beyond the army level. According to a recent statement by Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, historian of the European Theater in World War II, the full records of the ETO have been opened to historians now preparing the official operational story of the campaigns in Europe. Anticipating the charge that the account would be biased, he added that three of the historians working on this project were combat historians assigned to Third Army during the war.

The official history of the campaigns in Europe will put into proper perspective the work of all the armies, making clear the over-all plan for the war

in Northwest Europe, the forces and resources available for the execution of plans, and the reasons for various decisions. Such a history will pay tribute to the work of the men who fought in the bloody battle of the hedgerows, the breakout from the Cherbourg Peninsula, the drop at Nijmegen, the fight in the Hurtgen Forest, the crossing of the Roer, the battle of the Colmar Pocket, the seizure of the Remagen Bridge, the stand on the north flank of the Bulge, the encirclement of the Ruhr Pocket, and many other heroic fights in which Third Army did not have an opportunity to participate. No one would require that a Third Army yearbook give these stories in detail, nor is it expected that any of them would appear as important as the work of Third Army in a book dedicated to that fighting force. It is expected that a book which is advertised as "authoritative" and "first-hand," and which makes sweeping charges regarding the broad plans of the war, and the incompetence of top level headquarters should not arrogate to one army the chief victories of the war, and sweep aside as unimportant the great sacrifices of the men who fought beside it.

HUGH M. COLE*
FORREST C. POGUE*
Washington, D. C.

American Sea Power Since 1775, by members of the Department of English, History, and Government, United States Naval Academy. Edited by Allan Westcott, Senior Professor, United States Naval Academy. (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Company. 1947. Pp. viii, 609. \$5.00.)

The Navy and the country need an up-to-date one volume history of the United States Navy and, despite the publication of *American Sea Power Since 1775*, there is still need for such a book. The outstanding part played by the Navy in World War II has created a greater general interest in naval affairs than has ever before existed in this country and it is true, as the authors state, that "all Americans should have an understanding of the part played by sea power throughout our history, its relation to our foreign policies, and its continued importance in any scheme of national defense." This statement and the inclusion of the term sea power in the title

imply a well-proportioned coverage not only of operational history but of various ramifications of naval history: strategy, administration, technology, and national policy. But, unfortunately, *American Sea Power since 1775* is primarily operational history; therefore the title is misleading because, in their enthusiasm for the shooting, the authors underemphasize or lose sight of other factors influencing sea power.

The first half of the book covers the period from 1775 to 1941. Little that is new has been added to the usual textbook information. Perforce there must be the same men, the same ships, the same battle, but there is no fresh approach—the material at hand has only been rewritten. The style is sometimes awkward and the story is often disjointed because, although the seven authors worked in collaboration, each in his own field, they did not think it "necessary to avoid some individuality in treatment of style."

The only outstanding attempt to develop the sea power theme is in three chapters on "Geography and War Strategy," "Geography and Logistics," and "Sea Power, Life Lines, and Bases." These chapters are inserted in that order after the Spanish-American War period. An editorial note explains that they were placed there because the general elements of naval strategy and logistics apply with special emphasis to problems of twentieth century warfare. This is not a correct statement because the Seven Years' War, the American Revolution, and the Napoleonic Wars, all of which involved America, were world-wide in their scope. Rightly, these chapters belong at the beginning of the book so that the basic concepts of sea power can be illustrated and the importance of geography on the planning and conduct of naval affairs can be traced through all of American history.

The latter half of the book, dealing with World War II, is better written. However, the quite detailed story of the Pacific War is out of proportion to the rest of the book. Assuming that the naval aspects of World War II were of a magnitude never before attained in any other war in history, the events of those four years are not equal historically to those of the one hundred sixty-six years which preceded. There are occasional errors in the reports of certain actions, understandable because of the security which still makes many sources unavailable. These misstatements can be corrected in time. However, the bibliography should note the wealth of source material in the National Archives, the Office of

*Drs. Cole and Pogue were combat historians with the Third and First Armies, respectively.

Naval Records and Library, and the Office of Naval History, which eventually will be available for a study of World War II.

Let us hope that *American Sea Power Since 1775* was prepared in haste to fill an immediate need for a naval history textbook and that soon the members of the English, History, and Government Department of the Naval Academy can, with more leisure, write a book which will clearly set forth the principles of sea power and trace their fulfillment through the course of American history. Then the American people can appreciate what the Navy has meant to the development of our national policy and what it still means to a continuance of the position of world leadership which we must retain.

DOROTHY E. RICHARD,*
Washington, D. C.

The Beginning of the U. S. Army, 1783-1812, by James Ripley Jacobs. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1947. Pp. 419. \$5.00.)

We have long needed a more detailed history of the Army than the one-volume accounts by Colonel William A. Ganoe and the late Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding. Major Jacobs, author of *Tarnished Warrior: Major-General James Wilkinson* (1938) and head of the Social Studies Department at The Manlius School, has recognized that need and undertaken to give us a substantial part of a greatly enlarged story. The present volume is the first of a series in which he proposes to continue the narrative to 1846, a task which, judging by the treatment given the first thirty years, will require at least two more volumes, probably more. One hesitates to estimate how many it would take to cover the field on the same scale to the start of World War II or to venture an opinion as to whether or not such an undertaking is within the realm of possibility. If an Army history in, say, a hundred volumes, with another hundred for World War II, is an awe-inspiring thought, it at least indicates how much research is needed before a satisfactory brief analysis can be expected. Major Jacobs' kind of history is too detailed to expect many to read much of it, but it will go far to-

ward filling the gaps and correcting some of the errors in the existing sketches.

This is not to say that the present volume is uninteresting. The material covered is fascinating, and, with the exception of a few minor lapses, the author tells his story clearly, colorfully, and with touches of humor. He is primarily concerned with what the Army did in the West and with the conditions of Army life, in which he is at his best. He devotes much space to Wilkinson, but he does not neglect lesser figures, least of all the common soldier. There are some particularly illuminating passages on camp-followers, a subject that has needed study. His descriptions of St. Clair's defeat, Wayne's success at Fallen Timbers, the building of new posts on the frontier, and explorations beyond are all good. In short, the reader gets a fine account of the Army in the field. To this have been added an interesting chapter on the early development of the Military Academy at West Point and a running commentary on military legislation from 1783 to 1812. All of this is based on wide, though not exhaustive, use of both published and manuscript sources and is documented in a reasonably thorough manner.

The one serious weakness in the book is that it does not make clear what the higher organization of the Army was. There is a good deal of incidental information furnished about the Office of the Secretary of War, the Purveyor of Public Supplies, adjutants, inspectors, and paymasters, but there is no clear exposition of how they functioned or of their relationship to the Army in the field. Although the system which existed before 1812 was rudimentary and unsatisfactory, it still requires study and description, partly to explain some of the difficulties of the time and partly to show the background of the development of the great bureaus of the War Department after 1812. Since Major Jacobs will undoubtedly be dealing with the organization of the War Department in his following volumes, it is hoped that he will there describe adequately its organization in the earlier period also.

JESSE S. DOUGLAS,
Washington, D. C.

The Farmer in the Second World War, by Walter W. Wilcox. (Ames: Iowa State College Press. 1947. Pp. 410. \$4.00.)

This is the first volume in an unofficial "official" account of American wartime experience

*Miss Richard, Office of Naval History, is assisting in writing the official history of the Navy in World War II.

sponsored by the Committee on War Studies of the Social Science Research Council. The Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the Department of Agriculture made all the files and other materials of its war records project available to Walter W. Wilcox, professor of agricultural economics at the University of Wisconsin. Aided by interviews with government officials and by information from other sources, Professor Wilcox proceeded to set down his interpretation of the farmers' role in World War II.

It is a singularly broad and comprehensive account which the author has provided us. It will be useful to many different persons, students alike of war and peace. For even in wartime there was no escaping the peacetime preoccupation of farmers, farm groups, and government officials. Professor Wilcox says frankly that it was not easy for administrative thinking to shift from the condition of an agriculture plagued with unmarketable surpluses to a wartime demand which exceeded an output twenty-five per cent greater in 1944 than in 1940. Our agricultural potential provided the nation with ten per cent more food per capita in World War II than in World War I, and we still were able to ship ten per cent of the total production to our Allies. This record was achieved without any substantial increase in acreage or in farm population.

In reviewing farm developments during the war Professor Wilcox points to failures as well as to achievements. "The outstanding example of misused human and other resources in agriculture during the war occurred in the Cotton Belt. Although the acreage of cotton dropped some seventeen per cent during the war, production was maintained at far higher levels than was required for the war effort," (P. 64). But the author does not clearly fix the blame where it belongs in this case—upon the Federal Farm Bureau Federation and the southern senators and congressmen who opposed any fundamental shift in the agricultural base of the region. Professor Wilcox also mentions faulty planning of livestock production, especially evidenced in the price relationship fixed between feed and livestock. And he says that the greatest single failure in agriculture administration during the war was in distribution control.

More than one-third of the book is devoted to a commodity by commodity review of production and price developments, with the emphasis heavily

upon the price aspects. Probably no discussion of agriculture can avoid the price issue, but one wishes some of the production planning and marketing controls were more fully discussed. The other three-fifths of the book covers such varied topics as land use, farm manpower, technological improvements, the place of the family farm, the influence of farm organizations upon public policy, and the shift in major administrative emphasis from production control to human nutrition and food distribution.

Agriculture has long been a unique segment of the American economy. Its welfare has become a major political issue; a vast administrative mechanism had grown up before 1941 to aid the farmer in his effort to obtain his "fair share" of the national income. These peacetime techniques—production planning, soil conservation payments, commodity loans—were shifted in wartime to help obtain all-out farm production. And yet all the time heavy was the fear among farmers and administrators that farm prices would collapse once victory was achieved. How baseless were those fears now we all know! But the farmer, like others, is still depression-minded; it's only a question of time.

There surely is a simple lesson for the future of American security which rises above the dust of our agricultural struggles in World War II. Neither this nor any nation is secure in its defense when its economic resources are only partially utilized. To be sure, war demands were met this last time by calling upon the unused potential of our economy. But what happened? Unfulfilled peacetime wants emerged to compete with wartime needs. And a peacetime acclimatization to a 50 per cent effective economy could not be readily shelved when a 100 per cent performance was demanded by war.

Professor Wilcox hasn't answered all the questions about our wartime experience in agriculture. But he has given us probably the best summary we shall have, and an indispensable background for any more detailed studies.

JOHN D. MILLETT*
Columbia University

*Dr. Millett during the recent war was Chief of the Historical Section, Army Service Forces, and is now Professor of Public Law and Government, Columbia University.

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

Gallant Rebel, by Stanley F. Horn (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1947. Pp. 292. \$2.75). Historical narrative of the cruises of the Confederate converted merchant raider *Shenandoah*.

The War: Sixth Year, by Edgar McInnis (Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. 344. \$3.00). The concluding work in Professor McInnis' series, carrying the war down to the final surrender of Japan. Includes maps, documentary appendices, chronological tables and text of documents.

The Conquest of the West, by Walter E. McCaleb (New York: Prentice Hall. 1947. Pp. 336. \$3.75). The military, political and economic forces that shaped the course of western expansion between 1800-1848, from the Louisiana Purchase to the war with Mexico.

Sky Pioneer, by Robert M. Bartlett (New York: Charles Scribner's. 1947. Pp. 153. \$2.50). Biography of Igor I. Sikorsky.

Mariner of the North, by George Palmer Putnam (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce. 1947. Pp. 246. \$3.50). Biography of Captain Bob Bartlett who accompanied Peary to the North Pole and on other expeditions.

Alsos, by Samuel A. Goudsmit (New York: Henry Schuman, Inc. 1947. Pp. 259. \$3.50). Dr. Goudsmit, American physicist, headed the mission "Alsos" during the war to ascertain

the progress being made by German scientists in atomic fission work.

Star-Spangled Mikado, by Frank Kelley and Cornelius Ryan (New York: McBride. 1947. Pp. 282. \$3.50). General Douglas MacArthur and the American occupation of Japan.

Fundamentals of Naval Warfare, by Lee J. Levert (New York: Macmillan. 1947. Pp. 488. \$5.00). An outline of the principles and methods of naval warfare, with a brief history of naval warfare and its weapons and fighting ships.

Raw Materials in War and Peace, by the Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy (West Point: USMA Printing Office. 1947. Pp. 221). The problem of mineral supply in World War II.

Tito's Imperial Communism, by R. H. Markham (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1947. Pp. 292. \$4.00). The transformation of Yugoslavia into a Communist state under Tito.

Editions for the Armed Services, Published by the Editions for the Armed Services, Inc. (New York: H. Wolff. 1948. Pp. 139). A history and list of 1,324 books published for American armed forces overseas.

Texas, C. S. A., by James Farber (San Antonio: The Jackson Co. 1947. Pp. 265. \$2.75). Texas in the War Between the States.

SELECTED PERIODICAL LITERATURE

With this issue **MILITARY AFFAIRS** renews its coverage of periodical literature in the field of military history, coverage that began in 1938 and continued through 1945. At that time the volume of books and articles on military subjects had grown so vast and the staff of the magazine so small that the work on periodicals had to be suspended.

The arrangement of the articles will follow the system used in the past. For those classification-minded persons who desire to know the system in more detail we suggest reading **MILITARY AFFAIRS**, Fall 1941 (V, 189-92). Otherwise this brief review should suffice:

HISTORIOGRAPHY: Techniques and tools of military history; their background and significance.

INSTITUTIONS: General studies of war and military institutions; effect of war upon human culture and its effect upon war.

NATIONAL WARFARE: Articles on the techniques of war on the national level: total warfare, combined and joint operations, economic warfare, etc.

LAND WARFARE: Articles on the military arts and sciences.

SEA WARFARE: Articles on the naval arts and sciences.

AIR WARFARE: Articles on the arts and sciences of air warfare.

ESTABLISHMENTS: Accounts of the military forces, great and small, of the different states of the world.

OPERATIONS and BIOGRAPHY: Narratives of

battles, campaigns and wars, and of the men and women who participated.

CUSTOMS and ANTIQUITIES: Works on the by-products of warfare and military service: the panoply of armies, customs of the services, war art, army slang, humor and caricature, etc.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

"German Historiography during the Second World War: A Bibliographical Survey," by Felix Gilbert, in *The American Historical Review*, Oc-

tober 1947 (LIII, 50-58). Mentions some of the works on military history published during 1939-45.

NATIONAL WARFARE

"Oil for Spain: A Critical Episode of the War," by Herbert Feis, in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1948 (26, 377-89). Account of an incident in economic warfare during the summer of 1940.

"Turning Points of the War: The Great Military Decisions," by John F. McCloy, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947 (26, 52-72). Personal evaluation of major military decisions by former Assistant Secretary of War.

"Turning Points of the War: Our Economic Contribution to Victory," by Winfield W. Riefler, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947 (26, 90-103). A study of our economic mobilization during World War II.

"Turning Points of the War: Political Problems of a Coalition," by William L. Langer, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947 (26, 73-89). Analysis of important political decisions by official historian of American foreign policy during World War II.

"The Team of Decision," by Lt. Col. William R. Kintner, in *Infantry Journal*, March 1948

(LXII, 15-20). A plea for the integration of military effort in the face of current ideas on the dominant weapon of the future.

"Scientific Intelligence," by Prof. R. V. Jones, in *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, August 1947 (XCII, 352-369). General review of British experiences in technical intelligence in World War II, based largely upon personal experience.

"Manpower and the Services," by Sir Godfrey Ince, and "Economy of Manpower in the Services," by Brigadier F. A. S. Clarke, in *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, August 1947 (XCII, 390-402, 403-7). Two significant treatments of manpower procurement and allocation; Sir Godfrey Ince was Director-General of Manpower, 1942-44.

"The Myth of Security," by Hanson W. Baldwin, in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1948 (26, 253-63). An analysis of the post-war "defense" problems of the U.S.A.

LAND WARFARE

"The Railroads of Georgia in the Confederate War Effort," by Robert C. Black III, in *The Journal of Southern History*, November 1947 (XIII, 511-534.)

"The Building and Training of Infantry Division 2. Training," by Lt. Col. Bell I. Wiley, in *Infantry Journal*, March 1948 (LXII, 26-30). Continues the history of the Army Ground Forces, later to appear in the *Official History*.

"Logistical Bottleneck," by Colonel William Whipple, in *Infantry Journal*, March 1948 (LXII,

6-14). Describes briefly the major logistical problems met with in Overlord and how they were handled.

"The Principles of Military Government," by Major-General A. V. Anderson, in *The Army Quarterly*, October 1947 (LV, 123-134).

"Administrative Planning on the Theatre Level," by Lieut. Gen. Sir Wilfrid Lindsell, in *The Army Quarterly*, October 1947 (LV, 95-107). Discusses widest aspects of logistical planning as evolved in World War II.

AIR WARFARE

"Development of Air Doctrine, 1917-41," by James L. Cate, in *Air University Quarterly Review*, Winter 1947 (I, 11-22).

"Air Support in Terms of Air Superiority and the Influence of the One Upon the Other," by

Wing Commander J. H. Lapsley, in *Royal Air Force Quarterly Review*, October 1947 (205-9). Prize essay for 1947 of the *RAF Quarterly Review*.

ESTABLISHMENTS

"Coastal Command in the Victory in Europe," by Air Vice-Marshal A. B. Ellwood, in *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, August 1947 (XCII, 416-31). Lecture covering the work of this British joint command in the Normandy Invasion.

"The Development of the West African Forces in the Second World War," by Brigadier F. A. S. Clarke, in *The Army Quarterly*, October 1947 (LV, 58-73).

"Lord Haldane's Reorganization of the British Army 1905-1912," by Lieut.-Colonel P. D. Maud, in *The Army Quarterly*, October 1947 (LV, 47-57).

"Russian Defense Expenditures," by Abram Bergson, in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1948 (26, 373-76). Statistical analysis for the years 1933 to 1947.

"Activities of the 31st AA Brigade," by Colonel

Daniel C. Nutting, in the *Coast Artillery Journal*, January-February 1948 (LXXXXI, 2-8). Traces experiences of the unit through North Africa, Sardinia, Corsica and Southern France.

"History and Accomplishments of the Chemical Corps," by Major General Alden H. Waitt, in *Armored Cavalry Journal*, January-February 1948 (LVII, 40-45). Brief Account by the Chief, Chemical Corps.

"Task Force Butler," by Brigadier General Frederick B. Butler, in *Armored Cavalry Journal*, January-February 1948 (LVII, 12-18). Operations of a provisional armored and mechanized cavalry unit in Southern France.

"Armor in the Bulge. Part I: The German Offensive," by Lt. Col. E. A. Trahan, in *Armored Cavalry Journal*, January-February 1948 (LVII, 2-11). Account of the 2d Armored Division in the Ardennes counteroffensive.

OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

"Urban's Crusade—Success or Failure," by A. C. Krey, in *The American Historical Review*, January 1948 (LIII, 235-50). An analysis of the basic motives for the First Crusade, 1099.

"The First Great Professional," by Lieut.-Colonel R. L. Agnew, in *The Army Quarterly*, October 1947 (LV, 73-79). An account of Sir John Chandos, a 14th Century English professional soldier.

"The Royal Navy in the Pacific," by Captain E. M. Evans-Lombe, in *Journal of the Royal*

United Services Institution, August 1947 (XCII, 333-47). Lecture by Admiral Lord Fraser's Crief of Staff covering operations of the main British Fleet in the Pacific in 1944 and 1945.

"The German Navy in Defeat," by Captain J. Creswell, in *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, August 1947 (XCII, 383-89). Brief account covering 1943-45.

"Air Supply in Burma," by Lieut.-Colonel J. R. L. Ramsey, in *The Army Quarterly*, October 1947 (LV, 33-42).

FIRST VIGOROUS STEPS IN RE-ARMING, 1938-39*

BY MARK S. WATSON

A study of the processes by which the Army began its real rebuilding on the eve of World War II discloses steps which were puzzlingly at variance with normal procedure. New programs were suddenly replaced by newer programs in defiance of the Army's usual sober routine, providing something of a hint of what was to come in the wilder upsets of 1941. Responsibility for a large part of these sudden changes lay outside the Army—indeed, lay so far outside that the Army was not always aware of their imminence nor in full sympathy with them. For even when they contemplated large grants of funds for purposes the General Staff had long advocated, the new programs often were out of key with the Army's well-balanced plans for the future and to that extent prejudicial to the orderly and well-timed over-all development which is a first need in re-arming as in almost everything else of enduring usefulness.

While the War Department in its several functions had the responsibility for planning the preparations for war and then for executing them, between these operations there were two essential intermediate steps, (1) the authorizing of specific preparations and (2) providing of money for their performance. These intermediate steps were taken by Congress, but as a normal thing Congress neither provided nor authorized save after receiving recommendations of a fairly specific nature from the President. Thus while the military establishment could make its general plan and submit particular requests to the Secre-

tary of War for transmission to the President, it was the President who by normal procedure adopted the program as his own and forwarded it to Congress recommending action. It also was the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and as the superior of the Secretary of War, who could and on occasion did press upon the War Department a particular idea which the Department thereupon developed into an organized program which the President then urged upon Congress.

In the year preceding the outbreak of World War II this procedure of presidential initiative was employed by Mr. Roosevelt to meet a situation made worse by the Munich Pact. On November 14, 1938 he summoned his principal military and civilian advisors to the White House and laid his views before them,¹ and on that occasion the effective rearming of the Nation's ground and air forces took its start.² Despite the hasty and unshaped character of the President's proposal, which went through many changes, and despite the countless interruptions and alterations and delays which the nation's rearming as a whole was to encounter in the years to come, this Presidential proposal must be regarded as far transcending in importance, as an impulse to actual acquisition, the

¹Notes of this conference prepared by the Chief of the Air Corps with a covering memorandum dated November 15, 1938, filed in the front of the first volume of Minutes of the General Council, OPD files.

²President Roosevelt himself referred to his message of January 28, 1938 as the "beginning of a vast program of rearmament," but it should be noted that he was then chiefly concerned with naval armaments, and that he requested only about \$17,000,000 to correct a few of the numerous Army deficiencies.

*The accompanying article is taken from the manuscript prepared for the Historical Division, Department of the Army, as a chapter in the official history of the Chief of Staff's Office in World War II.

recommendations of the War Department officials, civilian and military, which antedated the November 1938 meeting. On this occasion President Roosevelt abruptly set aside for the time being the military establishment's carefully considered plans for the rearming of the ground forces. At the outset he concentrated his attention wholly upon the air forces which up to this time had been of secondary consideration in Army planning. Expansion of the air establishment had been re-initiated in 1936 when Congress approved the Baker Board recommendations to the extent of authorizing an increase from a nominal 1,800 planes to an equally nominal 2,320 planes and thereupon, in 1936-38, doubled the average Air Corps appropriations of 1933-35. But authorization does not produce airplanes immediately. By the autumn of 1938 the number of planes on hand was still only 1,600, which was well short of even the pre-Baker objective. This was because the airplane factories engaged on Army contracts still were not up to the necessary production capacity, their combined total being figured by the Chief of the Air Corps in October 1938 at 88.2 planes per month. And two years later, in the realm of combat planes acceptable for the new battle conditions, the chief of WPD was to report on hand only 49 bombers "suitable for daylight bombing" and 140 suitable pursuit planes.³

Prior to the November meeting there had been numerous formal plans and several well-calculated proposals for the improvement of the Army. These are conspicuous enough in

the records where they appear to rank as pioneers in rearming. There has been previous reference to the long-standing and long-ignored program of 1920 (for a lean, tightly organized and well balanced force capable of swift expansion) and the efforts of the Chief of Staff's Office in 1933 to move somewhat closer to that ideal. There was the 6-year plan of 1934, with its admirable consequences, for development of equipment even when there was no prospect of money for production itself. There was the 1937 General Staff program for an Initial Protective Force of 400,000 men (the Regular Army and the National Guard combined) as the first wave of a Protective Mobilization Plan force of 750,000, plus replacements, which Secretary of War H. H. Woodring described in his 1938 annual report. There were in that same year, both before and after Munich, several vigorous stimuli provided by the Assistant Secretary of War, Louis Johnson, whose particular responsibility was to procure the material authorized for the Army and who had the advantage of continuous advice from his professionally trained executive officer, Col. (later Major General) James H. Burns. One such stimulus affected Air Corps experimental work at the hands of the National Research Council.⁴ Another sought early implementing of the General Staff's \$579,500,000 re-arming plan. It took the form of getting from the Ordnance Department detailed estimates of the current munitions shortage and of the costs of meeting each separate phase, all of which was incorporated in a memorandum for the

³For a brief discussion of the prewar development of the Air Forces see *Legislation Relating to the A.A.F. Materiel Program, 1939-1944* (Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 22, Nov. 44). Archives of Air Historical Office. For a discussion of industrial capacity see especially memo of CofAC for CofS, 21 Oct 38, in AG 580 (10-19-38), "Increase of the Air Corps by Aircraft, Correspondence from 10-19-38 July 14, 1939 Relative to Two Year Program for the Development of an Army Air Corps of Airplanes." For the WPD appraisal of 1940 see memo of ACofS, WPD, for CofS, Sept 25, 1940. WPD 4321.11.

⁴This was a letter signed by Mr. Johnson, addressed to the Secretary of the National Research Council, April 2, 1938, asking for investigation and report on diesel engines, rocket and jet propulsion, de-icing, beryllium alloys, and static elimination. In response a preliminary report was made to the Chief of the Air Corps on December 27-28, 1938 by a group of eminent scientists and industrialists; it was a step toward large wartime achievements by this scientific collaboration.

President.⁵ All these recommendations were based upon prolonged and careful study within the General Staff, where there was a calculation of the armed strength required for carrying out any of the possible war plans, and within the supply branches, notably the Ordnance Department, where the cost and delivery time of the necessary weapons and other equipment was computed.⁶ Each such proposal was the result of the normal functioning of the Chief of Staff's Office, quickened in the 1938 cases by the Assistant Secretary's pressure for action.⁷ As proposals,

⁵The document referred to was sent to the White House on September 29, 1938, the very day on which began the fateful Munich Conference. Other information about munitions shortages and efforts to remedy the situation is in the budget estimate files for the period (AG 111), in various ordnance files, and in files relating to the Air Expansion Program. See especially: (1) Memo of CofO for DCofS, Oct. 20, 1938, sub: Deficiencies in Ordnance Equipment. (2) Followup memo of CofO for ACofS, G-4, Oct. 21, 38, Deficiencies in Ordnance for the Protective Mobilization Plan. (3) Supporting and related papers filed with copies of the previously mentioned two documents in Ordnance Study File No. 69, War Plans and Requirements office files. (4) Related papers in AG 580 (10-19-38) Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

⁶The development of the plans and the division of responsibility for action on various phases of them are illustrated by documents in AG 381.4 (5-14-37) . . . War Reserves, Critical Items . . . and in files relating to appropriation estimates made during 1938.

⁷Mr. Johnson's remarks on the aircraft procurement program in the *Report of the Secretary of War* . . . 1938 (pp. 26-27):

" . . . Our former technical superiority in aeronautical development is no longer clearly apparent. Recent advances in other countries have equalled if not exceeded our efforts. . . .

"It appears further . . . that our current construction program as well as our existing war-time procurement program for aircraft both fall short of providing even the minimum amount of this essential item which any realistic view of the problem will show as necessary. The same remark holds true to an even greater degree with respect to anti-aircraft materiel. . . ."

This was in contrast to the generally optimistic report of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff; the latter saying: ". . . The Air Corps is now being equipped with airplanes and materiel that are equal, if not superior, to any military planes in design, speed, endurance and suitability for the military use for which intended. . . . These airplanes with normal crews, equipment, and training gave a demonstration of speed, range, and navigation accuracy unexcelled by any military planes in the world."

formally laid before the President as Commander in Chief, they make an impressive appearance in the official record. They ended, however, as proposals, for the President, beyond expressing an interest, did nothing about them at the time, and when the major expansion of the Army and the upbuilding of war industries and the accumulation of strategic war materials actually came to pass, it was much later, and upon another basis. Despite the incidence of dates, these events have only an apparent significance. The actual drive toward re-arming, so far as immediate effectiveness was concerned, began on a different date, came from different causes, and took a different direction altogether. The date was the one mentioned—November 14, 1938. The causes lay in reports brought to Mr. Roosevelt of the special alarm of Great Britain and France over the now well-known expansion of the German Air Force; the direction was toward a rapid upbuilding of the U. S. Army Air Corps and of the Army's antiaircraft defenses for the protection of the Western Hemisphere. . . .

The fundamental importance of all this, so far as America's re-arming is concerned, lay in the fact that now for the first time the Commander-in-Chief, rather than the Army establishment, was pressing for national re-arming and was insistent upon starting with a minimum of delay; he, in contrast with the Army, had influence over Congress. There were important differences between his own idea of how it should be done and the professional soldier's methodically designed program for a balanced force whose stage-by-stage development would be determined largely by the time-factor of munitions production. These differences recurred in one form or another over the ensuing years. They called for frequent argument and often for patient adjustment to necessity, and un-

less one is aware that they existed it is difficult to understand some of the changes of plan which marked the course of the nation's rearming. Most of these changes of plan, however, were due to altered estimates of the situation. The vast extent and complexity of the project were such as to call for continuous re-appraisal and correction. Even firm requirements of one month were altered in the next month, whether so influenced by accident or by enemy action or by the changes in objective which sprang from hesitancy and doubts about the exact course to be followed. The sequence of 1938 events affords an example.

The General Staff's study of activities in Europe, plus the pressure of the Assistant Secretary for making the Protective Mobilization Force more than a paper concept, had already served the double purpose of bringing from the Ordnance Department and other branches a close calculation of the ground forces' needs in equipment⁸ and of encouraging a study of the air forces' whole organization.⁹ The summaries of Army needs, as noted, were placed in the President's hands, and later were to be of value, but they were without immediate result.

The first evidence of acute White House concern over the mounting powers of the Axis as a substantial threat to the United States' security (about which it will be recalled the Standing Liaison Committee of State-War-Navy officials had issued warning) reached the War Department after the return to Washington (October 14, 1938) of William C. Bullitt, then U.S. Ambassador

to France.¹⁰ Mr. Bullitt had a clear impression of French official thinking as to the significance of Hitler's overriding self-confidence at the time of his historic Munich meeting with Premiers Chamberlain and Daladier. The French military chiefs attributed Hitler's confidence to his possession of an air force already large and still capable of rapid expansion by means of the huge German airplane factories already in operation. What impressed the French most was the existence of a German bomber fleet much larger than that of France and Britain combined, and what the French military now wished ardently was a rapid increase of French air resources of every kind, for defense and for counter-offensive. They (and

¹⁰This statement is based upon the recollections of General Burns as stated to the writer in 1947. While it is impossible to pin down precisely the influences at work to change the tempo of rearming, it appears that they were multiple and that the return of Mr. Bullitt was the significant catalytic event. On October 14, after sitting up late the night before to hear the report from Ambassador Bullitt, the President told press interviewers that new world conditions had compelled him and his assistants to recheck defense preparedness carefully. When asked specifically for the "reasons which led to this decision to reorganize the whole national defense picture," he replied: "I should say, offhand, that it started about a year ago because of information that was coming in at that time. It has been in progress for about a year and it has, in a sense, been forced to a head by events, developments and information received within the past month." *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (Washington, 1941), 1938 Volume, pp. 546-548, and 601.

In a confidential letter of July 11, 1938 from the Ambassador in Berlin, Hugh Wilson, to the President, the Ambassador was specific and emphatic in his discussion of the German air potential, and he urgently requested that competent army men be sent over to see the situation for themselves. The letter was shown to the Secretary of War, but not until September 2, 1938.

On October 14, the day after Ambassador Bullitt reported to the President, the Assistant Secretary addressed to the Chief of Staff a detailed memorandum in which he (actually Col. Burns) discussed war requirements for aircraft under mobilization plans as contrasted with actual resources of aircraft. He was particularly concerned about the time lag between initiation of aircraft rearmament and full production. He estimated a 5,000 plane deficiency which might cost \$400,000,000 to remedy. It is probable that this memorandum or the information reached the White House.

⁸See N. 5.

⁹On 2 November 1937 the Chief of the Air Corps submitted a Five Year Airplane Replacement program which formed a basis for staff discussion and planning during the ensuing months. See papers filed in WPD 3807, especially memo of ACofS, G-4, for CofS, Jan. 22, 1938, sub: Five-Year Program for the Air Corps. WPD 3807-21. See also AGA 111 Woodring Program.

the British as well) knew that a rapid increase could come about only from American factories and they urged upon the United States a development of American airplane production for Anglo-French purchase. With this in prospect, the French promised they would have a better chance of resisting German air attack: they would "dig underground until relief should come."¹¹ Through Mr. Bullitt's recital of French fears and desires, duplicated to a degree by reports of similar anxieties in Great Britain,¹² President Roosevelt became convinced for the first time that American airplane production should be greatly stimulated with all possible speed. His private remarks to that effect led to conjectures in the press that he would shortly ask for 10,000 airplanes plus a large increase in factories.¹³ There is a firm belief on the part of a participant in later conferences, which is not conclusively supported by written records now available in the records of the War Department, that at that time the President had in mind the creation in the United States of airplane production facilities whose output would go to Britain and France, enabling them to build up aerial fleets which might overawe Hitler or which, if war should come, could even help to defeat Hitler without American armed intervention.¹⁴ However, it

was apparent that Government funds could not be employed for erection of plant facilities whose product was declared to be for immediate benefit to foreign countries; if any such facilities were to go up, through use of Government funds, it would surely be upon Congress' assumption that they were to be erected for the primary needs of the United States itself. Isolationist Congressmen were already critical of foreign powers' purchases of American munitions on the ground (1) that the purchases might involve the Nation in a European war, and (2) that they were taking out of the country materiel which was needed by the U. S. Army or Navy. In January 1939 this antagonism was kindled by an accident to a new light bomber, in whose trial flight the test pilot was killed and the passenger, at first identified as "Smithins, a company mechanic," was injured. "Smithins" proved to be Paul Chemidlin, observer for the French Air Ministry,¹⁵ and there was immediate inference that the French were being given access to military aviation secrets; a further implication in isolationist speeches was that this access, denied by Army and Navy officers, had been granted by the President through Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau in the latter's capacity as a civilian procurement authority. The President promptly announced that he had approved French purchase of an unstated number of modern battle planes¹⁶ and the following day General Craig was reported as saying that no secret devices were shown to the French agents.¹⁷ However (illustrating a belief expressed publicly about Presidential intentions) members of the Senate Military Affairs Committee were then reported as har-

¹¹Interview of the author with Gen. James H. Burns, 1947.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³The President did not directly commit himself to a specific program but he did not deny rumors and speculation of an expansion as great as four times the Baker Board objective of 2,320; and there is reason to assume the press speculation was based on advice from well-informed officials. For newspaper reporting and comment on the new emphasis on national defense see Associated Press Washington dispatch, Nov. 5, 1938; the *New York Times*, Oct. 14, 15, 27, 28 and 30, 1938, and Nov. 14, 15, 16, 20 and 23, 1938.

¹⁴This theory was expressed by Gen. James Burns in an interview with the writer in 1947. There is no doubt that at a later date it was a firm part of War Department Policy. The President and his advisers may have been influenced to some extent by the activities and ideas of military purchase missions from Great Britain,

France, and China in mid-1938. See Edward R. Stettinius, *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory* (New York, 1944), pp. 13-19.

¹⁵*New York Times* Jan. 27, 1939. Page 5, col. 8.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Jan. 18, 1939. Page 1, col. 8.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1939. Page 1, col. 6.

boring the fear that "the Administration might have in mind some sort of arrangement whereby the 565 airplanes for which the President had asked Congress . . . could be turned over to the French Air Mission at some later date during a crisis, by legislation which would be sought under the whip of emergency."¹⁸

Much of what the President had in mind in October, at the time of his White House conference with his advisers—that is, a marked increase in defense expenditures in some form or another—must have been communicated to the War Department, and presumably in fragments, for within a week of the Bullitt report to Mr. Roosevelt there was marked activity in planning. On October 19 the Deputy Chief of Staff conferred with the Chief of Ordnance, who within twenty-four hours submitted an estimate of \$125,000,000 to cover ordnance deficiencies.¹⁹ One day later, following a telephone conversation with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, he submitted another estimate, totaling \$349,000,000.²⁰ Both estimates were based upon staff plans of long standing; the first one presumably met the prevailing view of what the President and Congress might approve as a post-Munich expenditure; the second one took advantage of what now seemed to be an unexpected favoring wind springing up at the White House. The same expanding optimism guided the Air Corps whose Chief on October 19, responding to oral instructions, submitted to the Secretary of War a long-range program for expanding the Air Corps by 4,000 planes.²¹ Three days later,

again on instruction from the Secretary, he submitted a revision of the short-range program, for the fiscal year 1941, increasing the immediate purchases from 178 to 1,178 planes.²² One day later the Chief of Staff submitted to the Assistant Secretary yet another revision of budget estimates, to include 2,500 new planes instead of 1,000.²³

If this extraordinary flurry of upward revisions indicates a sudden confidence that the President now would support in the new Congress large increases for the ground and air forces, comparable to those granted the sea forces in the preceding session, it also indicates uncertainty and confusion. The language of the communications just cited shows a belief that \$500,000,000 would be asked for, a large increase over new equipment allotments for many years.²⁴ The uncertainty was upon the program's distribution over one, two, and three years²⁵ and upon the manner in which the total amount should be divided between the ground and air components of the Army. Nobody questioned that there was acute need for ordnance material to make up for existing shortages in the Army and to provide a reserve in those items which cannot be swiftly produced and hence must be accumulated far in advance of need. But among the advocates of air expansion, who felt sure that the President was in agreement with them, there was equal certainty that

crease of the Air Corps by 4,000 aircraft. AG 580 (10-19-38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

²²Memo of CofAC for SW, Oct. 22, 38, no sub: AG 580 (10-19-38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

²³Memo of CofS for ASW, Oct. 25, 38, sub: Modification of totals of the special budget figures to include 2,500 planes instead of 1,000 planes, Oct. 25, 1938. Copy in AG 580 (10-19-38), "increase of the Air Corps. . . Correspondence. . . ."

²⁴No document has been found that shows precisely when and how this limitation was set, but figures and phrases used in various documents, cited above (AG 580) show that it was a practical matter.

²⁵See particularly the documents cited in n. 19.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, Part IV, Page 4, col. 8.

¹⁹Memo of CofO for DCofS, G-4, October 20, 38, sub: Deficiencies in Ordnance Equipment. Ordnance Study Folder No. 69, War Plans and Requirements office files.

²⁰Memo of CofO for ACofS, G-4, Oct. 21, 38, sub: Deficiencies in Ordnance Equipment for the Protective Mobilization Plan. Ordnance Study Folder No. 69, War Plans and Requirements office files.

²¹Memo of CofAC for SW, Oct. 19, 38, sub: In-

there should be a large immediate increase in the number of airplanes on hand and in the provision for many more in the visible future. There was equally persuasive argument for the installation of grand-scale maintenance and training facilities, on the sound reasoning that it would take as long to train efficient crews and pilots as to build efficient planes. All these outlays would certainly use up more than \$500,000,000. Accordingly the task of the Chief of Staff was to reconcile these requirements in such a way as to attain a balanced force, as efficient as possible, with necessary adjustments to two controlling factors, (1) the funds which should become available and (2) the exactions of time requirements. His task was not merely to reach a sound judgment on how to gain that balanced force, but to convince the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, and the President's other advisers that the balanced force was a prime desideratum.²⁶ It was not easy. The October 24 communication to the Budget Office, which called for planes, was also an argument for ordnance, and when the October 25 program for still more planes was given to the Assistant Secretary there was a renewed argument with the President, as well as with his advisers, in favor of "balance."²⁷ The President had already, on that same day, named a committee to report steps necessary to increase military aircraft production, the members being Assistant Secretary Johnson, Charles Edison, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and Aubrey Williams,

Deputy Administrator of the Works Progress Administration. The committee reported with surprising celerity on October 28, presenting memoranda on questions yet to be studied but calling for expansion of the commercial aircraft industry within two years from a current capacity of 2,600 to one of 15,000 planes a year, and for the creation within three years of Government-built plants which would produce an additional 16,000 planes a year.²⁸ The observant Chief of the Air Corps became doubtful that even the 2,500-plane program which he had lately urged was sufficient to the new day. On November 10 he phrased a diplomatic memorandum to the Assistant Secretary on "our personal ideas of a method of establishing an air force objective and an indication of what such an objective might be." The outstanding items among his personal ideas were a new goal of 7,000 planes, and an outline of means whereby 5,000 of them could be acquired with fair speed.²⁹

Present at the White House Conference of November 14 were the President; Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau; Harry L. Hopkins, WPA Chief, who had already become the President's principal advisor; Robert H. Jackson, the Solicitor General, already marked for the Attorney-General's post; Louis Johnson, Assistant Secretary of War; Herman Oliphant, general counsel of the Treasury; General Malin Craig, the Chief of Staff; and his deputy, Brig. Gen. George C. Marshall; Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, the new Chief of the Air Corps; Colonel James H. Burns, Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of War and throughout this period

²⁶This point of view is stated emphatically in documents cited in n. 19, in a "memo for the Chief of Staff to use in conference with Secretary of Treasury and Mr. Bell of Budget," and an attached aide memoire, October 20, 1938, used in a conference with the Secretary of the Treasury. Copies of the last two documents, assembled with other papers by the Deputy Chief of Staff, are in AG 580 (10-19-38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

²⁷It was evidently in this period that there occurred the White House incident that William Frye recounts in *Marshall: Citizen Soldier* (Indianapolis, 1947), pp. 249-251.

²⁸Letter of the Assistant Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the Deputy Administrator of the Works Progress Administration to the President, Oct. 28, 38, sub: Strength of Army Air Forces, AG 580 (10-19-38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

²⁹Memo of CofAC for ASW, Nov. 10, 38, sub: Strength of Army Air Force. AG 580 (10-19-38). Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

probably the best informed authority on munitions requirements present and future (later as major general to become the administrative chief of Lend-Lease); and the President's military and naval aides.³⁰ The President did most of the speaking, as if his mind had been made up by earlier discussion and appraisal. He remarked that the United States' defenses were patently weak; that the first need was the rapid upbuilding of a heavy striking force of Army airplanes; that the Navy could then float only 2,000 planes and that it too needed more planes, so that any new plant construction program would have to allow a factory capacity of 350 to 500 planes per year for the Navy alone. The air situation in Europe he summarized with announcement that France had only 600 modern combat planes and an annual production capacity of 3,600; that Great Britain had 1,500 to 2,200 planes and an annual capacity of 4,800. On the other hand, of the Axis powers Germany then had 5,000 to 10,000 planes, with 12,000 annual capacity, and Italy had 3,000 planes with an annual capacity of 2,400. In view of those Axis figures, he continued, the United States must be prepared to resist assault on the Western hemisphere "from the North to the South Pole."

As to the means of resistance, the President said the weakest of all the United States' armed forces was the Army Air Corps, and this must be built up quickly. At the same time and of equal importance there must be a rapid upbuilding of anti-aircraft artillery units (at that time these units were a part of the Coast Artillery). The urgent need, he continued, was for increase of air strength, and the desired objective was an Army air force of 20,000 planes and an annual productive capacity of 24,000. However, if he asked Congress for any such

amount he would get about half the request. His view was that in order to get the support of Congress there should be present concentration not on the greater objective but on an "acceptable" program which he could present with confidence of Congressional support. He therefore wished the War Department to develop a program for 10,000 planes (the figure which already had been mentioned unofficially—but certainly with official encouragement—in the press) of which 2,500 would be training planes, 3,750 line combat, and 3,750 reserve combat planes. His stated broad objectives were: (1) production over a two-year period of 10,000 planes as described, of which 8,000 would come from existing commercial plants and 2,000 from new plants to be built with Government funds and (2) the creation of an unused plant capacity for producing 10,000 planes annually. The second objective, Mr. Roosevelt indicated, could be attained by a plant-construction program which he would leave to Mr. Hopkins whose WPA experience qualified him for that task; in general, the program called for the erection of seven Government-built plants of which two would go into operation (to produce the 2,000 planes referred to in Objective 1) and five would remain idle until needed, the intimation being that they would be needed for an air program later and larger than the 10,000-plane program he was now advancing.

The President's whole emphasis was upon airplanes. There was none whatever on an air force, a quite different thing which is made up of airplanes plus equipment plus pilots and crews and maintenance units, all organized methodically in commands, all supported by supply elements, all integrated with other elements of national defense, all operating in accordance with a prepared plan adjusted through years of experiment and precisely related to available funds and manpower and authority.

³⁰The discussion of this conference is based on the notes cited in n. 1.

In this circumstance is a suggestion of the purpose previously mentioned, which by one of the participants in the conference was believed to be Mr. Roosevelt's—to produce airplanes in great numbers without all these aspects of a balanced air force, for the sufficient reason that the airplanes were, in his mind, principally destined not for the U. S. Army Air Corps but for direct purchase by the air forces of Great Britain and France. However fully formed that Presidential purpose was in 1938, aspects of it reappeared as the war advanced. In 1938-39 the President called for airplanes above all other weapons, despite the grave shortages of ground force equipment.³¹ In 1940 he voiced his determination to make large use of American production facilities for aiding the Allies, even to the point of shipping out materiel which Secretary of War Woodring contended should be retained for the United States forces.³² In his May 16, 1940 Message to Congress the President made his wishes in this respect unmistakable: "I ask the Congress not to take any action which would in any way hamper or delay the delivery of American-made planes to foreign nations which have ordered them or seek to purchase more planes. That, from the point of view of our own national defense, would be ex-

tremely short-sighted. Our immediate problem is to superimpose on this productive capacity a greatly increased additional productive capacity."³³

But the President's apparent desire in November 1938 to concentrate almost wholly upon airplane construction ran counter to the judgment of his military advisers who favored airplanes in balance with supplies and training and ground force requirements. Accordingly on the day after the White House meeting of November 14 the Assistant Secretary (momentarily Acting Secretary) directed the Chief of Staff to prepare a detailed budget which, over a two-year period, would achieve the following objectives so far as the air was concerned:³⁴

1. An Army airplane strength of 10,000 planes balanced as to types, 50% of them to be maintained on an operating basis, including personnel, installations, materials, 50% to be kept in storage.

2. Provision for seven Government aircraft factories each with an average annual production of 1,200 planes, buildings to be constructed from relief funds but machinery and operation to be provided from Army funds.

3. Necessary supporting materials and services, i.e., Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal Corps, etc.

Significantly this same order went on to call for a further budget estimate on the cost of supplies to equip and maintain the

³¹This was the tenor of his conference of November 14, (discussed above), and of his speech of January 12 (*Public Papers and Addresses*, 1939, Volume, pp. 70-74). Writing in 1941 the President said of earlier rearmament efforts "First attention was paid to airplanes, because the war in Europe and in Asia had shown the primary importance of air equipment." (*Public Papers and Addresses*, 1940 Volume, p. 206).

³²For the policy of the President in early 1940 see *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 1940 Volume, pp. 104-108, and 202. For views of Secretary Woodring see: (1) His note on memo of ACofS, G-4, for CofS, Mar. 9, 40, sub: Sale of Surplus Ordnance Materiel to Foreign Governments, G-4/31684. (2) Notes of meeting held in CofS office, Mar. 19, 40, CofS file Emergency bndr 3. For the working out of a policy on release of airplanes and airplane equipment see: (1) The above (2) Notes of conferences held 20, 23, and 25 March 1940, CofS file Emergency, bndr. 3. (3) Papers in G-4/31687.

³³*Public Papers and Addresses*, 1940 Volume, p. 202. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau a month later, July 18, 1940, sought to make the President's directive applicable to airplane engines as well, despite Mr. Stimson's warning that unless the United States had access to engines originally ordered by France "there will be practically no deliveries of combat airplanes, beyond those now on order, to the Army prior to Oct. 1, 1941"; a few days later representatives of the various interests concerned met and arrived at an agreement on allocation of aircraft production, including engines. See: (1) original letter (marginal note: "Superseded by Conference Tuesday") of SW to Sec. Treasury, July 15, 40; (2) original letter of Sec. Treasury to SW, July 18, 1940; and (3) original memo of CofAC for CofS, July 23, 40, sub: Allocation of Aircraft Production. All in CofS file Emergency, bndr. 3.

³⁴Memo of Actg. SW for CofS, Nov. 15, 38, no sub. Increase of the Air Corps . . . AG 580 (10-19-38), Correspondence. . . .

Protective Mobilization Plan Army.³⁵ It sought further estimates which would cover the following:

1. Completion of the educational orders program.
2. Equipping the existing Government arsenals with modern machinery.
3. Completing plans for the factory output of critical supplies.
4. Acceleration of the industrial mobilization program by completing the current surveys and specifications.
5. Providing a reserve of special machinery for the making of essential munitions.
6. Providing stock piles of critical raw materials.

These were considerable additions to an "airplanes-only" program which the President had originally specified, and the Acting Secretary's ignoring of a \$500,000,000 limitation evidences a belief that the President might raise his financial sights a great deal. The objectives were not only 10,000 planes but immediate supplies for the Protective Mobilization Plan force and also industrial preparedness for a much larger eventual force.

Two days later the Deputy Chief of Staff provided all his assistant chiefs with copies of the Acting Secretary's memorandum and directed prompt assistance to General Arnold (of the Air Corps) in completing his own task, adding that "there is no time for normal General Staff procedure. Speed is essential and your efforts should be informal."³⁶ He gave specific directions to each of the Staff divisions for its part in the computation work and then, referring to the P.M.P. equipment plan which had been revived by the Acting Secretary's instructions, directed G-4 to recalculate the standing estimate of \$579,500,000: this called for deducting from it \$110,000,000 for airplane procurement and \$42,000,000 for aids to manufacture which,

it is seen, the Acting Secretary's memorandum had removed from P.M.P. responsibility. The celerity which was enjoined upon the several Staff sections by the Deputy Chief of Staff was occasioned by the short time in which the figures would have to be computed and processed through the Bureau of the Budget in order to be ready for the President's message to Congress at the New Year. In the meantime, orders were prepared for bringing to Washington certain Air Corps personnel expert in Ordnance, Signal Corps, and other supply branches whose problems would have to be mastered before there could be any creation of that balanced air force which was clearly the objective of the Chief of Staff's Office, as distinguished from the 10,000 airplanes which were the President's specific desire.³⁷

The balanced air force was not the only concern of the Chief of Staff's Office, any more than of the Assistant Secretary. Rather, the apparent decision at the Chief of Staff's level was to effect something of a balancing of the Army as a whole, such as had been sought for years.³⁸ In particular, the quest was for arms and equipment whose needs were already computed in the ordnance estimates referred to but, besides this materiel program, the War Plans Division on November 25 advanced a program for modest enlargement in personnel as well.³⁹ It was

³⁷AC Office Memo No. 10 38, Nov. 17, 38, sub: Additional Officers for Special Duty. AG 580 (10-19-38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

³⁸In addition to document cited in n. 19 and 23 see Memo of CofS for Colonel Watson (White House), Nov. 19, 38, sub: Status of certain critical arms and materiel. AG 580 (10-19-38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence . . . Pencil note indicates that this was delivered personally by the Chief of Staff.

³⁹Unused memo of ACofS, WPD, for CofS, Nov. 25, 38, sub: Augmentation of the Regular Army and the National Guard to Provide the Additional Forces Considered Essential, WPD 3674-10. This memorandum was revised as of October 28 and again October 30. WPD 3674-10. It is evident from notations that General Marshall gave these matters his personal at-

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶Statement of DCofS to AC's of S, Nov. 17, 38, sub: Supplementary Estimates, fiscal year 1940. AG 580 (10-19-38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . . .

occasioned by the growing uneasiness about Axis plans against Latin America which had been revealed at the Standing Liaison Committee meetings with the State and Navy Department representatives.⁴⁰ Even while the President was interested wholly in airplanes, WPD was pressing for three other objectives:

(1) Improvement of the Regular Army in continental United States, to include the creation of an expeditionary force, with approval of the Latin-American states involved, capable of taking and defending potential air bases; (2) improvement of American defenses in the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska (this showing a revived concern over possibilities of Japanese aggression); (3) improvement of the National Guard, through raising 27,000 additional men who would be formed into nine anti-aircraft artillery regiments plus lesser units of air corps and engineer troops.⁴¹ In the following month (timing the message for guidance in preparation of the new budget) the Chief of Staff addressed to the Assistant Secretary of War a considered memorandum summarizing all the varied needs now under consideration.⁴² It stated bluntly that the Nazis and Fascists were penetrating Central and South America, and that the American military obligation had lately become larger and more urgent, requiring preparation to defend against a growing threat not only the continental United States and the outlying possessions referred to, but also the Western

Hemisphere as a whole. These combined tasks, it was admitted, the Army was too weak to perform. Accordingly, in order to attain a balanced military force which could command respect, it needed not one but all of the following—increased aviation strength, a Regular Army sufficient to perform normal defense and also to provide an expeditionary force, a National Guard sufficient to complement the Regular establishment, numerous critical items of equipment, the placing of educational orders, and the planning of reserve industrial output. Specifically, the Chief of Staff recommended:

a. A total of 5,620 combat planes, 3,750 trainers, and 630 other planes (note the considerable shifting of components in the 10,000 total; the General Staff was in quest of a balanced force). Also 8,040 additional planes by the end of 1941 (not a 2-year but a 3-year program) attainable by the proposed erection of seven government-operated plants with 10,000 annual output. Also 7,900 officers, 1,200 cadets and 73,000 enlisted men (currently there were 20,000 enlisted men in the Air Corps, but the 73,000 mark was destined to be eclipsed by a larger objective in the next two years under a much augmented program).

b. An increase of 58,000 in the ground forces.

c. An increase of 36,000 in the National Guard.

d. Material for P.M.P. M-Day force of 730,000, plus 270,000 M-5-months reinforcements: this would take one year to produce.⁴³

Obviously this "balanced force" proposal was far different from the 10,000-planes program which alone had been the subject of the President's outline of mid-November, and even the Chief of Staff's memorandum is not all-inclusive for it deals only with Army items. The Navy Department was equally quickened, and from that service came arguments in favor of other large expenditures.⁴⁴

Intimations of what was going on reached

ention. Copies of some of these papers and related papers are in AG 580 (10-19-38). Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . .

⁴⁰Minutes of the meeting of the Standing Liaison Committee, Nov. 14, 1938. Office files of the Secretary of the General Staff.

⁴¹Sources cited in n. 36.

⁴²Memo of CofS (prepared by WPD) for ASW, Dec. 17, 38, sub: Two Year Army Augmentation Plan. WPD 3674-10 and AG 580 (10-19-38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . .

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴This account is based upon information supplied the writer in an interview with Gen. James H. Burns in 1947.

the White House and with little delay President Roosevelt summoned his military advisors to another meeting. He informed them sharply that, contrary to the confidence they were showing, it was extremely doubtful whether he could ask Congress for more than \$500,000,000 in new armament money for the coming fiscal year: he had stated his desire to spend that upon the production of Army-type airplanes. He now found the Navy asking \$100,000,000, the materiel branches of the Army \$200,000,000 for immediate outlay, the educational-orders branch \$33,000,000, while unstated amounts were being sought for air bases and air training. He had sought \$500,000,000 worth of airplanes, and he was being offered everything except airplanes.⁴⁵

There followed a careful and thorough discussion of the armed forces' low state and, more particularly, of the futility of producing planes over a long period without producing trained pilots and crews and air bases at an appropriate pace. At the close of the discussion Mr. Roosevelt agreed to find the Navy's \$100,000,000 from another source, and to allot to non-air armaments the scheduled \$200,000,000 of the main \$500,000,000, leaving only \$300,000,000 for the air-expansion program. Of that he also conceded \$120,000,000 for air bases and other non-plane air items, but warned that all of the \$180,000,000 residue must be expended on combat planes with which to impress Germany; he wished 3,000 of them.⁴⁶ This was a considerable let-down. Even so, when the Air Corps recomputed its means for spending the money to best advantage, it reported to the White House that of the 3,000 planes scheduled a considerable number would be advanced trainers rather than combat planes. The President said firmly they must be com-

bat planes; he would get other funds for trainers.⁴⁷ As late as December 14 the Chief of the Air Corps sent to the Chief of Staff the drafts of five bills calling for a 10,000-airplane program and the related Air Corps improvements. On January 11, 1939 there came back to him, by direction of the Secretary of War, a memorandum directing changes which, most notably, would set a 6,000-plane total for combat and non-combat planes combined.⁴⁸ This met the President's reconsidered wishes.

In this manner the rearming of the United States began. The 1938 confusion sprang from the conflict of pressures to correct long-continued lacks—the weakness in personnel of the Regular Army after years of neglect, the fragmentary development of the National Guard, the paucity of weapons and equipment for even the existing military establishment, the peacetime lack of industrial plants to produce wartime needs, the Nation's failure to recognize at its full value the promise of air development, the lessened aggressiveness of the General Staff itself in pressing its views vigorously during the years of discouragingly small appropriations. There now arose in various quarters, as a result of Axis threats, a desire to correct all these faults at the same time, despite the slender resources of new money which had to be divided among so many projects.⁴⁹ It is not surprising that

⁴⁵*Ibid.* See also Frye, *Marshall*, p. 254-255.

⁴⁸These and related communications are in AG 580 (10-19-38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence . . .; and AG 580 (12-14-38), Legislation for Proposed Expansion Program. They led to Senate Bill 842, fixing the 6,000-plane total.

⁴⁹On December 1, 1938 the Acting Secretary of War summarized the 3-point program which he understood the President approved. It itemized a short-lived \$1,832,000,000 addition to the 1940 budget request. Of this \$1,289,000,000 was for a 2-year air program producing 10,000 planes; \$421,000,000, was to meet PMP needs; and \$122,000,000 was to accelerate industrial preparedness. In addition, the Acting Secretary pointed out that the Chief of Staff believed that there should be an increase in strength of the ground forces to the extent of 58,000 men for the Regular

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

⁴⁶*Ibid.*

so sharp a turn of attitude as that of the White House in mid-November 1938 produced confusion; the significant thing is that there was at last a bold step forward on the road to rearming. It was not a sure one, and partly because of the basic conflict between the Army's tenacious desire to attain a balanced force, which professional training recognized as essential, and the President's recognition that even to get a balanced force for modern war there had to be an immense addition to its existing air element. He concentrated on that vital point; the Army on its own and equally sound objective.

A great many revisions were made in the President's hasty program, as noted, even before the plan was laid before Congress, and others followed quickly. The January 12, 1939 message to Congress recommended immediate purchase of only \$110,000,000 worth of new equipment for the ground forces, and this with a small increase was granted by Congress on May 2, following sharp questioning of War Department witnesses.⁵⁰ The pilot-training objective which finally was approved by the Chief of the Air Corps on December 21, 1938 and supported by the Congressional appropriation of April 3, 1939 was for only 4,500 pilots in two years.⁵¹ Both these programs were small, and thereafter numerous upward revisions were to be made at an increasing pace in the programs for air and ground forces, for personnel and

materiel, for long-range and short-range planning. New doubts and delays would furnish serious interruptions to progress. The start, however, was made.

The changes in program, with inevitable loss of momentum, were frequently attributable to hasty judgments based on insufficient data, or to an unpredictable foreign development which completely altered requirements. Some were attributable to understandable efforts to attain too much in a limited time. Some must be recognized as simple errors in professional planning. To regard them all as readily avoidable blunders due to inefficiency would be far from the fact and would miss a major lesson of the war's experience. Far more frequently their occurrence was due to the long years of neglect which affected the General Staff as well as the Army's other elements. The planning of operations for a clear-cut objective in modern warfare is a complex task, which during World War II was entrusted to large, well-trained staffs. Yet the pre-war planning of operations for possible objectives, not clear at all as to time or theater or opponent or available resources, was entrusted in 1939 to a relative handful of officers geared in number to the small Army of that day. With numbers so small it was inevitable that too much knowledge and too thorough appraisal would be expected of each Staff member. It happened, further, that a large part of veteran Staff officers' time was required for the mere routine labors of administration with its harassing but necessary details, instead of being wholly available for the deliberative activities which are the proper and exacting function of a peacetime planning Staff. Much of this routine could have been performed as well or better by junior officers or by trained civilians, but they were not at hand. The peacetime organization of the General Staff, as of the Army, had been restricted

Army and 35,000 for the National Guard, at a two year cost of \$272,000,000. Memo of Actg. SW for the President Dec. 1, 38, no sub. AG 580 (10-19-38), Increase of the Air Corps . . . Correspondence. . .

⁵⁰53 U. S. Stat. 642; and House Committee on Appropriations, *Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1939: Hearings before the Subcommittee* . . . (Washington, 1939), pp. 434-684.

⁵¹The pilot training programs are discussed in Army Air Forces Historical Study No. 7, *Legislation Relating to the AAF Training Program, 1939-1945* (revised 1946). Archives of Air Historical Office. Long before the goal of 1939 could be reached it was superseded by the 7,000 pilot program of June 1940.

by the prolonged compulsion to save money, even at the cost of a thoroughgoing preparation for a war not yet at hand.

The General Staff was then, as previously, made up of selected officers chosen both for general capacity and for special aptitude in special fields, trained in the various graduate schools, exposed to field experience which would familiarize them with practice as well as theory. Their chief lack, other than that of adequate time for mature study and considered judgment, probably was of a quickening environment. They may have been too exclusively exposed to internal contacts and too little exposed to developments in foreign military establishments, particularly that of Germany where in the "Thirties" revolutionary military thinking, far in advance of 1918 concepts, was under way. The contacts of the General Staff in Washington were largely limited to those afforded through military observers who themselves were few and often junior in grade, and through a smaller number of promising young officers who had been accepted as students in foreign armies' staff schools on the same basis that those armies' representatives attended schools in the United States.

Even a fuller inoculation of these new ideas within the Staff, however, could hardly have overcome the deadening influence of the excessive economies in military appropria-

tions. Nor could it have enabled the Staff to cope with military uncertainties which lasted as long as the nation's foreign policy remained indecisive. Military requirements were determinable only by a knowledge of the task expected of the military, that is, by a statement of the foreign policies which the military might be called on to support. To determine accurately the Army's material requirements, for instance, and to permit procurement on an efficient basis, the first need in 1939 was for a fairly complete knowledge of what was expected of the Army, in what theater, against what possible enemy, and at what time. This would have determined the character of the operations the General Staff should prepare for, and permitted the development of a plan, and the determination of, at least, a troop basis for the execution of the plan and, hence, of the armament necessary for an Army of that size. The Protective Mobilization Plan which the General Staff had evolved under General Craig, and which this new \$575,000,000 arms program now was designed to support, was a poor thing if one compares it with the later reality of World War II. It was not a poor thing if one compares it with the still smaller establishment which the Nation was then ready to support with money appropriations or even with Presidential encouragement. It was a start toward the far larger goal which maturer planning sighted only in mid-1941.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESCORT CARRIER

BY HENRY M. DATER*

The aircraft carrier was a product of World War I. At the end of the conflict, the Royal Navy had a number of such vessels converted from merchant hulls, and in 1918 Admiral Sims, then commanding United States Naval Forces abroad, reported that the Admiralty contemplated building a carrier on a 10,000-ton cruiser hull. Although this project seems to have been dropped at that time, the idea of a light vessel for launching aircraft was occasionally raised in the following years.

The first United States carrier, the *Langley*, was a converted collier of 11,500 tons displacement, with a flight deck measuring 534 feet by 64 feet. Experience with this ship, which was frankly regarded as experimental, plus the fact that vessels under 10,000 tons were not subject to the limitations of the Washington Treaties of 1922, led the General Board to make a number of studies of the subject. In 1925, the Board declared that the Navy could "not afford to sacrifice a cruiser for an aircraft carrier of 10,000 tons or less, even if a satisfactory carrier of that tonnage could be built." Two years later, the Board came to the conclusion that a satisfactory carrier would have to displace at least 14,000 tons, and it was on such a basis that the *Ranger* was designed.

There was by no means unanimous agreement with the statements of the General Board. In May of 1927, Lt. Comdr. Bruce G. Leighton, aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, prepared a long memorandum in which he pointed out that advances in airplane design were rapidly bring-

ing into the realm of possibility operations from smaller vessels. Lt. Comdr. Leighton then went on to indicate the uses to which a light carrier might be put. Among these, he included antisubmarine warfare, attacks on enemy war vessels, support of fleet operations, reconnaissance and reduction of enemy shore bases. At that time the Navy possessed only two carriers suitable for operations, the *Lexington* and *Saratoga*. The memorandum suggested that if one of these were destroyed in battle, the loss would be serious, whereas relatively inexpensive small carriers could be operated in groups and, even if one were put out of action, its aircraft could continue to operate from the others.

In 1929, the first year in which the *Saratoga* and *Lexington* participated in maneuvers, the commander in chief stressed the desirability of small carriers to provide scouting and spotting services for cruisers and battle ships because of the difficulties which these types experienced in operating their float planes under battle conditions. He likewise warned that the concentration of so much of the available air power in a single large ship appeared dangerous and that a larger number of small carrier units would obviate the loss by the fleet of all its aircraft by one or two well-placed blows. Although it was still generally felt that naval battles would ultimately be decided by battleships slugging it out in the traditional fashion, both the great striking power of aircraft and the necessity for control of the air over one's own forces were recognized. These two thoughts led to the suggestion that the big carriers might well be used as a semi-independent striking force and that smaller vessels could be developed to protect the cruiser and battle lines.

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They could be used also for scouting and spotting, and the performance of other miscellaneous services for which planes had been found extremely useful.

All through the thirties, the idea of a battle-line carrier with limited speed and other capabilities kept cropping up in the thinking of naval officers. Nothing came of these proposals, unless the *Ranger*, planned earlier, could be said to embody some of these characteristics. Nevertheless, as late as 1939, Capt. (later Vice Admiral) J. S. McCain made a determined plea for eight "pocket-size" carriers of cruiser speed and with flight decks between 500 and 600 feet long and 80 feet wide.

So far as the Navy Department had considered these proposals, the sentiment was toward larger ships capable of operating a maximum number of aircraft. As early as 1935, the Bureau of Construction and Repair, an ancestor of the present Bureau of Ships, began plans for the conversion of large, 20-21 knot passenger liners into carriers with partial flight decks. Even this proposal was allowed to lapse in 1940, when it was decided that changes in aircraft had made a satisfactory conversion of merchant vessels impossible. As for a 10,000-ton carrier, the General Board in 1939 had come to the conclusion that such a ship, if built to Navy standards with thorough compartmentation and other military features, "could not operate even in a moderate swell such as habitually encountered in the Pacific." It was evident that the Navy was thinking in terms of an ideal and was not yet willing to put up with the imperfections that it would be forced to accept under war conditions.

ORIGIN OF THE CVE

The outbreak of hostilities in Europe and the growing realization that the United States would probably become involved changed the basis of discussion from what

was theoretically desirable to what was immediately practicable. Rear Adm. (later Fleet Admiral) Halsey, with strong endorsement from the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, first Admiral Richardson and later Admiral Kimmel, indicated that in event of hostilities, existing carrier strength would be immediately deployed. Furthermore, he claimed some means would have to be devised to train replacement pilots and to transport Army, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft to distant bases. He wanted converted merchant ships and did not believe "that the conversion should proceed with a view to producing a first-class military vessel." These views represented the thoughts of those with their eyes focused on the Pacific. In the meantime, British experience in the Atlantic was presenting another aspect of the problem—the necessity for protecting convoys beyond the range of land-based aircraft.

Impressed by the difficulties of the British, no less a person than the President proposed on October 21, 1940, fitting a flight deck on a merchant vessel of 6,000 to 8,000 tons displacement with a speed of not less than 15 knots. Like Admiral Halsey, the President did not envisage a first-class military vessel. Moreover, he kept urging the need for speed. The experts were of the opinion that about a year and a half would be necessary to effect the conversion. The President refused to listen to this proposition. He indicated that he would not consider any plan that required more than about three months.

By January 17, 1941, the Navy presented an acceptable proposal that answered the demands of both Admiral Halsey and the White House. It suggested a carrier type for escort duty; conversion of passenger liners to accompany an expedition for the purpose of carrying assembled planes to destinations overseas, and the acquisition of sea-train vessels for the transport of aircraft to advanced bases. The second item was

dropped when it was found that all available liners were needed for troop transports. The other two were ultimately carried into effect. Two seatrains were remodeled to become the aircraft transports, *Hammondsport* and *Kitty Hawk*. On March 4, 1941, the Navy acquired the C-3 cargo ship *Mormacmail*, which reappeared on June 2, two days under the President's time limit, as the *U. S. S. Long Island*, with the designation APV-1. This was changed later to AVG-1, then to ACV-1, and finally to CVE-1, each change marking a step up the ladder of respectability. The escort carrier was born, sired by the stern necessity of approaching war.

Another Maritime Commission C-3 hull was acquired at the same time as the *Mormacmail* and, when converted, was turned over to the British as *H. M. S. Archer*. Five other vessels with somewhat larger flight decks than the *Long Island* were also prepared for the use of the Royal Navy, one of which was retained by the United States as the *U. S. S. Charger*. British experience plus our own experiments with the *Long Island* indicated that these craft were limited in effectiveness by their slow speed and single elevator. By the time these defects were observed, the United States had been plunged into war. On December 26, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy approved twenty-four conversions from merchant hulls for the 1942 program. In March, he ordered that nine *Cleveland* class cruiser hulls be turned into light-combat carriers. The former were the basis of the wartime CVE program; the latter type became CVL's.

CVE TYPES

There were only twenty C-3 hulls available for conversion, ten of which were earmarked for the Royal Navy and ten for the United States. The new ships were improved by the substitution of a steam turbine power plant for the Diesel engines employed

in the *Long Island* and *Charger*, and by the addition of a slightly larger flight deck (436 x 79 feet), a small island, and a considerably larger hangar space. They were referred to either as the CVE-6 class, from the numerical designation of *H. M. S. Battler*, or as the *Bogue* class, from the first ship to operate with the United States Navy. The remaining four CVE's authorized for the 1942 program were converted from *Cimarron* class fast fleet oiler hulls and were known as the *Sangamon* (CVE-26) class. These vessels were considerably larger, having a flight deck of 503 feet by 85 feet, and were able to accommodate two small squadrons of aircraft. Because of their size, work was rushed on them during the summer of 1942 so that they would be available for the North African invasion in the autumn. So successful did they prove in that and other operations that the Navy determined to use them as a prototype for future construction when hulls became available. The fleet's need for oilers prevented the inclusion of the type in the program for 1943; however, they were the basis of the program for the following year. When they finally appeared, they were the first CVE's on which tests had been made at the David W. Taylor Model Basin and included improvements based on the lessons learned from the operating experience of the *Sangamon* class. The first of the carriers, the *Commencement Bay* (CVE-105) from which the class took its name, was commissioned on November 27, 1944, twenty-two months after the contract was originally let. It had a flight deck of 502 by 81 feet, a speed of 19.1 knots, and a full load displacement of 24,275 tons.

Both the shortage of oiler hulls and the time required to construct these vessels made imperative the development of another type for the 1943 program. The conversion of C-3 hulls for the use of the British was continued and one of them, the *Prince William*,



was retrieved for the use of the United States. The 1943 program, in the meantime, had developed along unexpected and spectacular lines. On June 8, 1942, the President called to the White House Admiral Land of the Maritime Commission, Admiral Robinson and Admiral Howard of the Bureau of Ships. There he announced his decision that more escort carriers should be commenced immediately and explained that he had been impressed by a plan of Mr. Henry J. Kaiser for the quantity production of a vessel with about 20 knots speed. The program was to be under the Maritime Commission and the President desired that its representatives meet with those of the Navy and Mr. Kaiser to make the necessary arrangements. Actually, the idea appears to have originated with an engineering firm retained as consultants by a number of shipbuilding concerns, including the Kaiser Shipyards. In a memorandum prepared the same day after his return from the White House, Admiral Howard indicated that Mr. Kaiser had had an interview with the President some time before. According to the testimony given by Mr. Kaiser before a Senate investigating committee in the summer of 1947, the interview consisted of nothing more than a brief memorandum left with Mr. Marvin McIntyre, one of the presidential secretaries, explaining his difficulties in obtaining a hearing for his plan from the Navy Department. Mr. Kaiser seems to have visited the Bureau of Ships on June 2 and June 8, and although available files of the

Navy Department do not indicate exactly what happened, it is evident that presidential action was again instrumental in obtaining speedy decision.

The meeting desired by President Roosevelt was held in Admiral Land's office the day after the White House conference. All parties quite frankly recognized that Mr. Kaiser's design was unsatisfactory in a general sense, but that the vessel would be useful as an auxiliary carrier and as an aircraft transport. Admiral Land, in requesting assistance on military features from the Navy Department, emphasized that the ships were basically merchant vessels rather than naval types. Fifty were immediately ordered with deliveries scheduled to start in February 1943. From the beginning, the program encountered difficulties, the first vessel not being commissioned until July 1943. Although the Kaiser Shipyards continued to fall behind schedule, the completion of the program by July 1944 was a remarkable demonstration of the possibilities of mass production, an accomplishment which neither our enemies nor ourselves would have believed possible a few years before.

The first of the new type was the *Casablanca* (CVE-55), from which the class is named, although it was familiarly called the Kaiser class after its builder. With a trial displacement of 9,750 tons and a full load displacement of 10,400, the *Casablanca* possessed a trial speed of 19.3 knots. Its flight deck was 474 feet long by 80 feet wide. For

an "unsatisfactory design," the little ship turned out to be remarkably useful. For a vessel that was a merchant rather than a naval type, it participated in more than its share of combat, including one of the few daylight surface engagements of the war. The fact, however, that the *Commencement Bay* class remained a closer approximation to the best naval thought as it developed during the conflict was indicated by the alacrity with which the Navy returned to this type when hulls became available and by its retention alone of all the various classes in the active fleet after the end of hostilities.

In the CVE, the Navy had acquired a type of vessel it had not previously contemplated; how it would be used, remained to be seen. Previous thinking had envisaged a pocket-size version of the large CV's and, in fact, Captain McCain had proposed fitting his small carriers with an armored flight deck. Hindsight makes it clear that the Navy had been thinking in terms of an ideal, of a ship with characteristics that under the existing conditions were unobtainable with speed or in quantity. Also those who doubted the feasibility of operations except under the most favorable conditions had underestimated the skill of pilots and deck crews. However, these things were not so evident in 1942. What happened under the driving exigencies of war confirmed the dictum of Rear Admiral A. T. Mahan, the great naval historian. Good men with imperfect equipment, he once remarked, were preferable to the most perfect instruments handled by poor men. In any case, the Navy had the ships and, since under the circumstances it had no other choice, it intended to use them wherever possible.

ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

For submarines, the happiest hunting grounds lie close inshore near ports and harbors where shipping is concentrated. In one

of the most interesting documents to emerge from enemy sources, Admiral Doenitz' *The Conduct Of The War At Sea* it is pointed out that as early as 1940 British employment of land-based planes drove U-boats from coastal areas. At the same time, the use of convoys tended to group shipping in small knots and to add immeasurably to the open spaces at sea. From the German point of view, successful submarine warfare came to depend more and more upon locating Allied shipping. The answer was the wolf pack which permitted the U-boats to form a scouting line and then, once a convoy had been discovered, to concentrate for the kill. It was this technique which created the British desire for aircraft escort vessels in late 1940 and 1941. With the entry of the United States into the conflict the Germans found easy picking off the American coast, but it was only a matter of time until land-based air on this side of the Atlantic drove them out to sea once more. There in mid-ocean was a vast area in which the convoys did not have the assistance of aircraft. By early 1943 it became evident that the decisive campaign was to be fought in that area.

Although the *Santee*, one of the *Sangamon* class, was sent to the South Atlantic for anti-submarine and antiraiders duty in December 1940, it did not accompany convoys. The first of the CVE's to take up convoy escort work was the *Bogue* (CVE-9) which joined Task Group 24.4 on March 5, 1943. The following report from the air officer shows the type of tactics in use at that time:

The ship was stationed inside the convoy for this work. The convoys are in columns of five ships each with about 700 yards between columns. They left a double space in the middle in the center of which they placed the *Bogue*. The other escorts were placed around the convoy in a half circle. The idea was, if possible, to use our catapult and to stay in our center position when launching our planes.

Although considerable success was achieved with this tactic, it was clumsy to operate and essentially defensive in character, tying the aircraft to the vicinity of the convoy and failing to take full advantage either of their range or new instrumentation.

By May 1943, Admiral Doenitz became alarmed at his losses, which he attributed to an increase of Allied aircraft and to superior ship and air-borne radar. At the same time, hoping to interfere with the supply lines to North Africa, he concentrated his U-boats off the Straits of Gibraltar. On May 31, 1943, the *Bogue* left Argentia, Newfoundland, as part of a small task group. The account of the operations that followed indicates a new technique of antisubmarine warfare. In the first place, the group took up a position where it could throw its support to either of two convoys in the general area. Secondly, an effort was made to carry the offensive to the enemy by scouting ahead of the convoy with the aim of discovering his patrol line and developing a combined air-surface attack before the wolf pack had sighted the convoy, and long before it had an opportunity to maneuver into position against it. The advantages of this new technique were manifest. It permitted the protection of more than one convoy at a time. It enabled a convoy to avoid the risk of attack by turning away from the areas where submarines had been sighted, it allowed closer cooperation between the carrier and its escorts in developing the most effective tactics, and it transferred the element of surprise that usually accrues to the attacker, from the U-boats to the aircraft and ships. This new technique freed the carriers from the difficulties of trying to operate aircraft from the middle of convoys, encouraged complete utilization of available equipment, and simplified the CVE's task of refuelling its escorts at sea.

The Bogue was soon followed by other

carriers, notably the *Card* and the *Core* which made their appearance in that order. Although some direct accompaniment of convoys continued, the conclusion was reached that it was preferable to separate the carrier and its escort from the main body of troop or cargo vessels. The CVE group was then free to search along the flanks ahead of the convoy, or wherever the presence of submarines was indicated. From these early operations emerged the concept of the hunter-killer group that carried the attack to the enemy. Much that followed, while of great interest, represented the refinement of techniques or the development of new weapons rather than changes in basic tactics. For example, rockets were introduced late in 1943 and night aircraft operations in January 1944.

The effectiveness of United States and British methods can be observed in the efforts of the Germans to meet them. For a time, the enemy attempted to remain on the surface and fight it out with our planes. When this proved disastrous, improved radar was installed on the U-boats, then breathing gear (the so-called Schnorkel) was developed to permit the submarines to remain under the surface for the entire voyage. Because the old type U-boat had a slow submerged speed, this special gear was not so successful as it might have been. Consequently, the German Navy rushed the development of two new types with hydrogen-propelled engines and high under-water speeds. What effect these might have had on the war, if they had been introduced earlier, cannot be definitely ascertained, but they would have presented a serious threat. Fortunately, they appeared in numbers only when the German home defenses were already collapsing.

Although Allied intelligence had given warning of a last concerted effort by the U-boats as early as the autumn of 1944, the

threatened attack did not occur until April 1945. The tactics employed against it indicated pretty well just how far techniques had developed as a result of war experience. On April 9, the Atlantic Fleet set up a barrier composed of two task groups each with an escort carrier and twelve to fourteen destroyer escorts. A CVE, with its screen, operated twenty-five miles beyond each end of a 120 mile surface barrier maintained by the DE's, with a tight air patrol sixty-five miles beyond the last DE. In this fashion it was possible to sweep along a 250-mile line, making as thorough a search as the required speed of advance permitted. When a probable contact was reported, all available ships developed it, leaving the carrier and its screen to plug the gap in the line and to assume coverage, until it was determined that either no submarine was present or an attack had been made.

TRAINING

The victory won in the Atlantic, as well as that in the Pacific, was a tribute to the skill of the men involved. So far as pilots were concerned, their initial acquaintance with carrier flying was in most cases made on a CVE. Even before the commencement of hostilities, experience with the *Long Island* had demonstrated the feasibility of operating combat types from a short flight deck. With all the large carriers desperately engaged in operations, the only ships available for training were the CVE's and the two converted lake steamers, *Wolverine* and *Sable*. The *Long Island* served in Chesapeake Bay from February until May 1942, as a training carrier, after which its place was taken by the *Charger*. As more ships became available, there was nearly always a training vessel in Narragansett Bay and later one off the Florida coast as well. Commander Fleet Air, West Coast, usually had a CVE in the San Diego area to give practice in carrier

landings and take-offs. It was customary also to press into service escort carriers that might be temporarily available on either coast.

The tempo of operations by late 1944 had emphasized an aspect of the training problem that had not existed earlier. When the war approached the large land masses of the western Pacific, it was necessary for the carriers to remain in operation over extended periods of time. In order to maintain the greatest possible air support, groups and squadrons were furnished with replacement aircraft and personnel. To fit into existing units, such personnel required a high degree of skill that could only be acquired from training. At the same time, it became customary to relieve whole squadrons and groups in the forward area rather than to bring the ships back to Pearl Harbor or the west coast. This, in turn, cut down on the time that could be devoted to training on the way to and from operations. On January 1, 1945, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet established the Carrier Training Squadron, Pacific, composed of two carrier divisions, one at Pearl Harbor, the other at San Diego. The normal complement of each division was one CV and three CVE's. During the period from March through August 1945, for which complete statistics are available, 73,416 day and 7,579 night landings were made on ships of the squadron. In his report on the Okinawa campaign, a carrier division commander indicated the effectiveness of this training:

The training of pilots of new air groups . . . and replenishment pilots received during their operation was excellent. These pilots were the best trained new pilots this command has observed. Their combat efficiency was good. They were able to handle bad weather with little or no difficulty and they made sufficient use of radio and radar aids so that they were able to return to the ship without fail.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

When these pilots arrived with their aircraft, they had come from special CVE's which accompanied the fleet for that purpose. Providing replacement pilots and aircraft was only one of the many transport functions of the escort carriers. Before the outbreak of hostilities, the *Long Island* had taken planes to Argentina and Bermuda in connection with the neutrality patrol. Early in 1942 the *Wasp* had carried British Spitfires to the relief of Malta and the *Ranger* had ferried aircraft to Africa, but by November, a *Sangamon* class CVE, the *Chenango*, accompanied the expedition to Morocco with a load of Army P-40's. From that date forward, escort carriers were relied on for ferrying operations in the Atlantic and some even went as far afield as Karachi, India, by way of the Cape of Good Hope.

The distances of the Pacific raised problems of logistic support unique in the history of warfare. As Admiral Halsey had foreseen in 1940, the Navy was called upon not only to furnish transportation for its own plane requirements, including those of the Marines, but also for those of the Army Air Forces. By July 1942 the converted seatrains, which had been supplying various island bases with aircraft, were joined by the ubiquitous *Long Island*, which on August 20 launched from its deck the first Marine planes for Guadalcanal. Before the end of the year, the *Nassau* and *Altamaha* had also visited the South Pacific and during the first half of 1943 other CVE's were added to those supplying the area. In July 1943, the *Nassau*, soon to be followed by others, delivered Army aircraft to Brisbane, Australia, for the Southwest Pacific command. When the *Altamaha* reached Karachi, India, by way of Australia in August, the CVE's had completed their circling of the globe in the task of supplying our far-flung forces.

In the spring of 1944 the problems of avi-

ation logistics were under intensive study by a board whose senior member was Rear Adm. (later Vice Adm.) A. W. Radford. As a result, the Integrated Aeronautics Program was established in May and depended for its effectiveness upon an even flow of new aircraft into the combat areas and the return of reparable planes to Hawaii and the continental United States. To implement the program, Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet, proposed the creation of a Carrier Transport Squadron, Pacific, whose function would be the control of aircraft shipment from the West Coast to forward areas and return. With unified control, scheduling about two months in advance was possible and the whole system rendered more efficient.

On June 1, 1944, when the command was established, it had thirteen CVE's and the pair of converted seatrains. By the end of the war, there were twenty-five CVE's regularly attached and six British and three United States CVE's on temporary assignment. Exclusive of replenishment aircraft for the fleet, 31,701 aircraft were ferried, of which about 4,500 were Marine and Army garrison planes furnished to advance bases as soon as they were captured and made ready to receive and operate aircraft. Since pilots and other personnel were also transported, the number of passengers reached 137,188. The CVE's were also employed to carry aviation materials and, in times of emergency, other types of cargo as well. In all, 7,528,244 cubic feet of cargo was moved between June 1, 1944 and August 15, 1945.

Beginning with the Marianas campaign of June 1944, land masses larger than the small coral atolls of Central Pacific were taken under attack. The necessity for long continued periods in the combat area necessitated the development of replacement techniques. During August 1945, for example, while the Fast Carrier Task Force was raiding the Japanese home islands, four escort carriers

in the train supplied replacement planes to maintain the fleet at full strength. On the way to the operation, the CVE crews put the planes into first rate condition and corrected all deficiencies so that there would be no delay in continuing operations owing to faulty aircraft or equipment. In all, the fleet received some 4,500 replacement aircraft in this fashion in little over a year. The corollary to carrying new planes forward was bringing old ones back for overhaul and re-issue. The Carrier Transport Squadron returned 2,000 reparable planes prior to August 15, 1945.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

The small, unarmored carrier of which the *Long Island* had been the prototype was created for antisubmarine warfare, training, and transport. Although its use as a combat ship had not entered the early discussions, the idea of a light vessel to be used for war operations had loomed large in the proposals of the twenties and thirties. Part of the answer to this was the CVL built on a cruiser hull. As it turned out, however, there were far too few fleet carriers, CV's and CVL's, to meet all the requirements. From 1935 on, the Fleet Marine Force had been busily engaged in the study and practice of amphibious maneuvers and had demonstrated among other lessons the necessity for control of the air over the landing area. When the fast carriers became the principal striking element of the fleet, they were no longer readily available for close support of amphibious landings so that other means of maintaining control over the landing area had to be devised.

It was the CVE, despite its assumed vulnerability, that supplied the answer. Actually the ability of the converted carriers to do the job was demonstrated before it was accepted as doctrine. Because the big carriers which had covered the Guadalcanal landing were all engaged in the Pacific, they were not

available for the attack on North Africa. If North Africa was to receive air cover at all, it must depend upon the *Sangamon* class conversions. These ships were rushed to completion in the late summer and autumn of 1942 and put to sea with the paint hardly dry and with greatly reduced precommissioning and shakedown periods. Even with green crews and inexperienced air personnel, the escort carriers gave a good account of themselves. In his report, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, commented:

The CVE's proved to be a valuable addition to the Fleet. They can handle a potent air group and while their speed is insufficient, they can operate under most weather conditions and are very useful ships.

By the end of 1942, United States carrier strength in the Pacific had been reduced to the *Enterprise* and *Saratoga*, both having suffered battle damage. When the *Nassau* and *Altamaha* ferrying aircraft arrived in the South Pacific in November, they were retained in the area to furnish antisubmarine patrols and to serve as a reserve in case the Japanese recommenced their carrier operations. In January, they were relieved by the larger *Sangamon*, *Suwanee*, and *Chenango*. Although coverage was given the unopposed landings in the Russell Islands and some convoy and antisubmarine work was done, most of the time was passed waiting for enemy action that never materialized.

As the United States prepared to take the offensive, a lively discussion took place among the staff of CinCPac and ComAirPac on the use of escort carriers in combat. In March 1943, ComAirPac suggested that ways and means be found to use CVE's in amphibious warfare. There was much diversity of opinion both about the feasibility of using the small carriers and about the way in which it should be done. An enthusiastic advocate of the CVE's, Capt. (later Rear Adm.) A. K. Doyle of the *Nassau* proposed

a test be made of a division of four ships equipped with increased armament and an additional catapult. This idea received the support of Rear Adm. (later Vice Admiral) F. C. Sherman, then CinCPac Chief of Staff for Operations, who desired to have a number of CVE's organized as a task force and assigned to combat operations.

In May, Captain Doyle gave a practical demonstration of the support of amphibious operations off Attu. The value of this exhibition was enhanced by the fact that most of the scheduled land-based air support failed to appear because of the vagaries of Aleutian climate. The ability of the *Nassau*, operating close in, to take advantage of even minor breaks in the uniformly poor weather was most impressive.

By summer, with five types of carriers on hand—CV's, CVL's, and *Bogue*, *Sangamon*, and *Casablanca* class CVE's—ComAirPac tried various combinations to determine the best composition for task groups. As a result, CVE's were separated from the other types and organized into groups by themselves. At the landings in the Gilbert Islands during November, eight escort carriers were used and were assigned to the support forces. Three *Sangamon* class carriers were organized in one group and three *Casablanca* class in another. The two *Bogue* class vessels, although they operated their planes during the assault phase, brought up garrison aircraft which were flown ashore when fields were ready for them. With complete control of the air, it had proved feasible to operate the CVE's even though the *Liscome Bay* (CVE-56) was sunk by a submarine torpedo. The employment of the escort carriers in the Gilberts was considered to be somewhat experimental, but the success there assured a more complete utilization in the Marshalls during February 1944. Close support in that operation brought the ships in so near shore that deck crews could observe aircraft at

work on the beaches. At the end of the operation, the Commander, Fifth Amphibious Force, recommended that the same units be assigned similar tasks in future operations.

With the capabilities of the CVE's for amphibious warfare amply demonstrated, the question of training arose. Because it was desirable that surface elements and air support groups should maintain the closest liaison, the amphibious force commander suggested that both be trained under his control. CinCPac, however, felt that, while joint exercises should be held, the training and readiness of aircraft units was properly a ComAirPac function and should be left with that command. On the other hand, it was recognized that, since Marine aviators were accustomed to working with ground troops, they might well be used from escort carriers. In October 1944, Col. A. D. Cooley was instructed to commence training Marine air groups for carrier work. Although only two *Commencement Bay* class CVE's with Marines on board actually participated in operations, others were on their way when Japan surrendered.

The last remaining doubts about the combat ability of escort carriers vanished with the Marianas campaign. When the fast carriers were diverted from the immediate area to meet the enemy fleet, the CVE's assumed full responsibility for support operations on Saipan, provided their own defense, and fought off enemy air attacks. Only one of the small carriers was put out of action, and it was not severely damaged. Thenceforward the question became not "Can it be done?" but "How can it best be done?" A division of responsibilities between fast carriers and CVE's became possible. The fast carriers were to be used to knock out enemy air forces over a wide area prior to landing, to protect amphibious forces from interruption by the enemy fleet, and to prevent beleaguered islands from receiving reinforce-

ments. The CVE's were to support the landing forces, to assist the troops, and to provide antisubmarine patrol, air spotting and other miscellaneous services. If necessary, they were to come to each other's aid. Experience at Palau and Morotai and the difficulties encountered later at Leyte all pointed to the need for better planning in advance of operations, if the CVE's were to perform efficiently their enlarged responsibilities. As a consequence, there was created on December 10, 1944 an Escort Carrier Force, Pacific, as a functional type command under Rear Adm. C. T. Durgin.

The epic battle of the CVE's against main elements of the Japanese Fleet off Samar in October 1944 and the damage wrought by Kamikaze attacks during the Luzon landings in January 1945 emphasized what some had tended to overlook earlier—the inherent weakness of the CVE as a combat vessel. Provided with a minuscule screen, the CVE was not a substitute for the CV protected by the heaviest fire power of the Fleet. It should be employed only when reasonable control of the air has been assured. Admiral Durgin pointed out that in the Mindoro and Luzon operations the margin of safety had been too small. Had the enemy concentrated his attacks on the CVE's, the landings might have been indefinitely delayed. In the Iwo Jima campaign, even though Japanese air power was reduced to a minimum, two raids got through on February 21 with the result that one CVE was sunk and another damaged. At Okinawa where the escort carrier groups operated for 95 days, damage to the CVE's was comparatively light, although other elements of the invasion forces suffered the fury of Kamikaze attacks. This sparing of the CVE's was accomplished by stationing pickets well out to give warnings of approaching raids which were then broken up before they reached the CVE's stationed south and east of Okinawa, away from the

direction of enemy attack. As an additional precaution, each six-ship escort carrier unit was given initially a screen of five destroyers and five destroyer escorts, a much larger number than in previous operations. Even at that, one carrier division commander suggested that the old adage might be amended to read: "The Lord looks out for drunks, little children, and CVE's."

How far the Lord would have continued his protection had the little carriers stood to and delivered off the coast of Japan must ever remain problematical. Although the enemy would certainly have hurled his remaining strength at anything that resembled a flight deck, experience seems to indicate that the CVE's would have somehow fulfilled their responsibilities. The little ships—and the *Sangamon-Commencement Bay* type was not so small at that—had become the work horses of naval aviation; no task seemed too great for them to tackle or too minute to warrant their attention. After the Okinawa campaign, Admiral Durgin remarked:

Direct air support, spotting, and photo missions are the support carriers' major missions during an operation. In addition to those tasks, many additional "housekeeping chores" are assigned. These include beach observers, artillery spotters, courier flights, antisubmarine patrols (night and day), DDT spray, delivery of air supplies, dropping of propaganda leaflets, and air searches.

Although he was naturally a little alarmed lest the multiplicity of these miscellaneous chores cut too deeply into the amount of direct air support that could be supplied, the admiral felt that, if no other means were available, the CVE's should be thus employed. Perhaps, the last word on the combat function of the CVE's belongs to those whom they were pledged to support. The Amphibious Force Commander, Vice Adm. R. K. Turner, declared:

The efficiency and effectiveness of the operations of the escort carriers in the long and grueling

Okinawa campaign was highly commendable. These operations merited and received the appreciation of ship and shore-based personnel whom they so courageously supported. It has been gratifying to see that air missions in support of ground troops and amphibious operations have improved with each operation.

CONCLUSIONS

Much that ought to be said cannot be compressed within the limits of an article. Enough has been included to indicate how the Navy used the unarmored carriers that were born of necessity in the dark days of 1941. It is another bit of evidence to sustain the pleasing theory held by all Americans that we are a people with a rare talent for improvisation.

It would be a bold man who would attempt to foretell the conditions of the future. Whether there will ever be another war like the last one with its amphibious operations hopping from island to island across a vast ocean is unpredictable. However, so long as the Navy continues to use carriers, it will require decks for training; so long as the United States is called upon to carry the fighting across the sea to its enemies, it will need aircraft transports and it will need convoys of men and supplies, protected against

air and submarine attack. Even after the German defeat on land, Admiral Doenitz remained convinced that his last model U-boat, given greater opportunity, would have turned the tide.

Type XXI, he wrote, with its great range of 22,000 miles, was capable of scouring all waters of importance for the U-boat war without once having to surface. It was obvious that this would bring about a turn in the naval war. Control of the sea by great sea powers was exercised through surface craft supported by aircraft. A warship whose primary operational sphere lies beneath the surface, immediately renders the greater part of this control of the sea impossible. If, in addition, the warship has a high speed under water, which makes possible an easy approach to the enemy, it is obviously a very valuable instrument of war.

Even if Admiral Doenitz overestimated the effectiveness of type XXI, he certainly left behind a potent weapon that will ensure the employment of submarines in future conflicts and will tax those who may have to combat them. If such operations ever become necessary, the CVE, because of its adaptability and flexibility, will play an important role. Perhaps other improvisations will be necessary, but, as already shown, an escort carrier is a good base from which to improvise.

AN INDIAN RESERVATION UNDER GENERAL GEORGE CROOK*

BY CAPTAIN CHARLES P. ELLIOTT

INTRODUCTION

By BRIG. GEN. CHARLES D. ROBERTS, RET.†

In order to appreciate the conditions existing in Arizona during the period covered by this article, it is necessary to have some understanding of the historical background. From the time of the earliest Spanish explorers, Arizona, much of New Mexico and northwestern Texas, and the Mexican states of Chihuahua and Sonora had been almost completely dominated by the various tribes of Apache Indians. Especially in northern Sonora and Chihuahua had the country been devastated again and again, and many regions were almost depopulated. Warfare was the chronic state of the country.

The building of railways in the 1870's and 1880's in both the United States and Mexico had somewhat simplified the problems of the

authorities in dealing with the Indians. But the greater part of the region, of hundreds of thousands of square miles, remained a wilderness of mountains and deserts with few roads to unite the sparse population. While the devoted Spanish missionary priests had been successful in converting to Christianity the so-called Pueblo tribes of New Mexico, California and parts of Sonora and Chihuahua, the Apache tribes could not be either tamed or civilized by the Spaniards. In fact, in southern Arizona and northern Mexico today there are not a few ruins of missions abandoned as a result of repeated Apache attacks.

The record of the United States Government in dealing with the Apaches is nothing to be proud of. It is the usual story of treaties made and broken, of Indian rights abrogated, of cruel warfare and atrocities. It must be said that the Army's part was usually well and humanely performed. The Army was inclined to be fair and just with the Indians, but, unfortunately, was rarely called upon except for punishment.

By the beginning of the 1880's General George Crook had come to be recognized as the outstanding Army officer in dealings with the Indians. Crook was born on a farm in Ohio in 1828. He graduated from West Point in 1852, well down in his class. For the first nine years of his service he was a lieutenant in the 4th Infantry in Oregon and California and spent most of the time in active operations in command of detachments of troops. In one skirmish he was severely wounded by an arrow, the head of which he carried in his right hip to the end of his life.

*Publication of this article has been made possible by the Order of Indian Wars of the United States, a recent affiliate with the American Military Institute. The author, Captain Charles Pinckney Elliott, was born in South Carolina in 1860 and graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1882. He served for a year in the 13th Infantry, transferred to the 4th Cavalry in 1883, and remained in the latter regiment until his retirement in 1898 for disability incident to the service. In World War I he returned from his retirement as a captain and became a major in the Quartermaster Corps. He was commended in General Crook's Report of Operations, Headquarters Department of Arizona, Fort Bowie, Arizona, April 10, 1886. In May 1943 he died at Seabrook, S. C., at the age of 83. His article bears internal evidence that it was written about 1901.

†General Roberts, Medal of Honor winner in the Spanish-American War, has been Recorder of the Order of Indian War for several years. He was elected this year as Trustee of the Institute and also accepted a position on the Editorial Board of MILITARY AFFAIRS as representative of the Order.

At the outbreak of the Civil War he was returned to the East, promoted to captain, and in September 1861 made colonel of the 36th Ohio Volunteer Infantry. Crook had a distinguished career during the war: he became a Major General of Volunteers and commanded a division, a corps and a separate army in turn. In the Appomattox Campaign he commanded the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, serving under Sheridan, who, like both Crook and Grant, had started his army career as a lieutenant in the 4th Infantry. At the close of the Civil War Crook reverted to his grade of captain. In 1866, he was appointed lieutenant colonel in the 23d Infantry, a new regiment, and was assigned to the command of a District. Later, with a brevet rank of major general, he commanded the Department of the Columbia.

Crook found conditions much disturbed in eastern Oregon, Washington, Idaho and Nevada, and had to carry on long and difficult operations against the Modocs, Paiutes, and other tribes. By 1870 he had succeeded in pacifying his department, but there was not to be a long period of peace.

Conditions in Arizona being in their usual unsatisfactory state, Crook was ordered in 1871 to the command of that Department, still under his brevet rank of major general. After great exertions (hampered more, perhaps, by civilian interference than by the hostile Apaches) Crook succeeded in pacifying the territory and getting the Apaches on their reservations and on the way to self-support. He was rewarded in 1873 by the then very unusual promotion from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general.

By 1875, the long and bloody war against the Sioux, Cheyennes, and other plains tribes was approaching its climax, and Crook was sent to command the Department of the Platte (Iowa, Nebraska, Utah and Wyoming). Here he spent the next seven years, almost constantly in the field. In 1880-82,

comparatively peaceful conditions existed in the Department of the Platte, and it was time for Crook to be sent to a more difficult field.

In Arizona, serious outbreaks of the Apaches had occurred, due mostly to the same old causes of civilian mismanagement and graft in the Indian Bureaus and the encroachment by whites upon the Indians' lands and the stealing of their cattle. So, in September 1882, Crook was again sent to command the Department of Arizona.

In 1886, Crook returned to the Department of the Platte. In 1888 he was promoted to major general and sent to Chicago to command the Division of the Missouri. In 1889, as a member of a commission to treat with the Sioux, he was able by his wide acquaintance with these Indians and by their trust in his word, to persuade them to cede much of their land to the government and to accept more modern and civilized conditions of living. This was Crook's last great service to the United States before he died of a sudden heart attack at Chicago, March 21, 1890.

It will be seen from this brief sketch that, with the exception of the four years of the Civil War, Crook spent his entire career in the West, in intimate contact with the Indians. He understood the Indians as no other Army officer has. While implacable in war, he was the true friend of the Indian. General Sherman called him the greatest Indian fighter and manager the United States Army ever had.

Crook's opinion of the Indians and his policy in dealing with them is well summed up by him in his address to the graduating class at West Point in 1884, the very year covered by Capt. Elliott's article. He said, in part:

"With all his faults, and he has many, the American Indian is not half so black as he has been painted. He is cruel in war, treacherous at times and not over cleanly. But so were our forefathers. His nature, however,

is responsive to a treatment which assures him that it is based upon justice, truth, honesty and common sense; it is not impossible that with a fair and square system of dealing with him, the American Indian would make a better citizen than many who neglect the duties and abuse the privileges of that proud title."

This last advice to the young graduates for their future dealings with Indians could be applied today in our dealings with "occupied territory."

"Make them no promises that you can not fulfill; make no statements that you cannot verify. When difficulties arise, as they occasionally will, endeavor to be so well informed of all the circumstances of the case that your action may be powerful and convincing, just and impartial.

"Let the Indian see that you administer one law for both the white-skinned and the red-skinned without regard for praise or censure, and you will gain his confidence."

After Crook left Arizona in 1875, the usual thing happened. The Army was gradually deprived of its control over the Indians; they were mismanaged and defrauded by inexperienced and dishonest agents; their lands, when of any value, were seized by white miners and ranchers, and their cattle run off or stolen.

The Indians themselves were not blameless: the bad element among them were frequently engaged in raids upon the settlements and upon the friendly and more civilized Indians. To white civilians there was no such thing as a good Indian; every Indian was considered as hostile and frequently was shot on sight.

In the summer of 1881 one of those peculiar semireligious manias, which the American Indians have often experienced, attacked the Apaches. A medicine man named "Nochay-de-Klinné," claiming to be a messiah who was to drive the whites out of the country, started a series of religious dances that in-

creased to such a frenzy that the Commanding Officer at Fort Apache was directed to stop the dances and to arrest Klinné. On August 30, Col. E. A. Carr, a veteran of the Civil War and an excellent officer, with Troops D and E, 6th Cavalry (consisting of six officers, seventy-nine men and twenty-three Indian scouts), went to Cibecue Creek, forty or fifty miles west of the post, where a large part of the reservation Indians had assembled. There they arrested the medicine man without difficulty.

However, as the troops were going in to camp, they were suddenly attacked by several hundred Apaches. Their own Indian scouts mutinied and joined in the attack. After a severe fight in which Capt. Edward C. Hentig and four enlisted men were killed, the Indians were driven off. Klinné was killed by his guard. Only forty men had been left at Fort Apache, and Carr made a night march and reached the post next day about 2:30 P.M. The post itself was attacked in a half-hearted manner, and the Indians easily repulsed. The Indians were severely defeated in the subsequent campaign. The mutineers were captured, tried by courtmartial, three of them executed, and others confined in the military prison at Alcatraz. Nearly the whole Chiricahua tribe, about six hundred in number, retired into the fastnesses of the Sierra Madre of northern Mexico whence they carried on incessant warfare against both Americans and Mexicans. Many people were killed in Arizona and New Mexico; the settlers became increasingly uneasy, and business in the Apache country was paralyzed.

This was the situation when Crook arrived in Arizona for the second time, in September 1882. After a very short visit to his headquarters at Whipple Barracks, Prescott, he went with two or three officers and a few Indian scouts to the San Carlos and Fort Apache reservations and spent several weeks visiting the Indians, many of whom he knew

personally. He said that there were three things to be done at once:

- (1) maintain control over the Indians on the reservations
- (2) protect the lives and property of civilians
- (3) subjugate the hostiles.

Arrangements were made for the relief of incompetent and corrupt Indian agents (as far as political considerations would admit) and for close cooperation between the Interior Department officials and General Crook. Crook visited the principal Mexican commanders in northern Mexico, established cordial relations, and arranged for cooperation. He reorganized the pack transportation of the Department, enlisted some three hundred and fifty Apache scouts, and disposed of the available troops for the best possible protection of the border. He explained to the Indians that he intended to put into effect the rules he had used with great success in the 1870's. He explained to all the sub-tribes that white civilians could not tell a hostile Indian from a friendly, and that all Indians would be blamed for the actions of the few renegades, and it was therefore to the interest of the friendly tribes to help in running down the hostiles.

From September 1882 to March 1883 there was not a single depredation committed by Indians on Arizona soil. But in March some twenty-six Chiricahua braves under Chatto crossed into Arizona to obtain ammunition, and made a raid of six hundred miles in six days before recrossing into Mexico. About a dozen white men were killed and the whole country terrorized. But one of Chatto's braves, called "Peaches" by the soldiers, deserted, went to San Carlos and was captured.

Arrangements being complete, Crook, with two hundred Apache scouts under Capt. Emmet Crawford, 3d Cavalry, with five pack trains (two hundred and fifty mules), with ammunition and sixty days' supply of hard-

tack, bacon, and coffee, and with Capt. Adna Chaffee's troop, 16th Cavalry (forty-two men), crossed the Mexican border and went after the Chiricahuas. The captured "Peaches" was the guide and proved loyal and dependable. Fearing recall by Washington, Crook took care to be entirely out of communication, and not a word was received from him for six weeks. Peaches led the command into the depths of the Sierra Madre where neither American or Mexican troops had ever before penetrated. Crawford's scouts found the hostiles, had a sharp fight with them, and brought them to a stand. The result was the surrender of the entire Chiricahua tribe to General Crook. About four hundred of the tribe, including Geronimo, Chatto and other chiefs, returned to the United States and were put on the San Carlos reservation. Some hundred and fifty of the tribe, mostly women and children, had been killed by the Mexicans. Thirteen white captives were recovered.

On June 12th Crook reported his return to the United States. If he had failed, he would undoubtedly have been relieved from command. After considerable correspondence and numerous trips to Washington, Crook was given complete charge of the Chiricahuas and certain other Indians on the San Carlos and the White Mountain (Fort Apache) reservations. He put Capt. Crawford in direct control at San Carlos. Conditions in 1884 were very satisfactory: the Indians had harvested good crops and peace prevailed.

This brings us down to the period of Capt. Elliott's account.¹

* * * *

For the first time since the occupation of Arizona by Americans, the spring of 1884 came and passed into summer in peace. The

¹Charles Pinckney Elliott was born in South Carolina in 1860, graduated from West Point in 1882. He served for a year in the 13th Infantry, transferred to the 4th Cavalry in 1883, and served in that regiment until

rains fell, were soaked up by the dry soil; grass sprang up and matured and the Apache Indians, the Yumas, Mojaves, Tontos, San Carlos, White Mountains and, most astonishing of all, the Chiricahuas remained on the San Carlos Indian Reservation, contented and hard at work, taking out irrigation ditches, where necessary, and raising good crops of small grain. The reason for the contentment was not hard to find. General George Crook was in command of the Department of Arizona, and Captain Emmet Crawford² of the 3rd U. S. Cavalry was in immediate command of the White Mountain Reservation, with his headquarters at San Carlos, at the junction of the river of that name with the Gila River.

The peaceful condition of Arizona enabled the War Department to effect the transfer of the 6th U. S. Cavalry, which had done long, arduous and distinguished service under Gen. Carr, its Colonel, and other of its officers, among them Gen. Chaffee, who was then Captain, and whose name was known and respected as an Indian fighter, but not as now to the world, as a soldier well fitted to maintain the dignity of our country in far distant China among most trying surroundings.

his retirement as a captain in 1898 for disability incident to the service. He was a major and quartermaster in World War I and was advanced to major on the retired list. He died at Seabrook, S. C., 17 May 1943, aged 83 years. He was commended in General Crook's Report of Operations, Headquarters Department of Arizona, in the field, Fort Bowie, Arizona, April 10, 1886. His article bears internal evidence that it was written about 1901.

²Emmet Crawford was born in Pennsylvania, served as an enlisted man and officer of volunteers for the entire period of the Civil War, and received the brevets of captain and major. He was appointed 2d Lieutenant, 39th Infantry in 1867 and 1st Lieutenant in 1868, transferred to the 3d Cavalry in 1870 and was promoted captain in that regiment in 1879. He died January 18, 1886, "near Nacori, Sonora, Mexico, of wounds received Jan. 11, 1886, in an attack made on his command of Indian scouts, by a force of Mexicans." (*Army Register* for 1887, page 364.) Commended in General Crook's Report of Operation, Headquarters Department of Arizona in the Field, Fort Bowie, Arizona, April 10, 1886.

The transfer of the two regiments was effected by marching and was but little of a change for either the 6th from Arizona to New Mexico or the 4th to take its place. The sun seemed just as hot and the dust as thick and full of alkali on one side of the imaginary boundary line as on the other, and both columns appeared, from a short distance, as moving clouds of dust with no animate object visible.

I was ordered as 2nd Lieut. of Troop "H", 4th Cavalry, to Fort Lowell,³ and soon after reaching that post was detached and ordered to report to Capt. Emmet Crawford for duty as provost officer on the San Carlos Reservation.

I went from Tucson, by rail to Willcox, by stage to Fort Grant,⁴ where I met Capt. Crawford and went with him to San Carlos⁵ via Fort Thomas⁶ by ambulance, as the government conveyances were called.

The heat and dust on the ride down the Gila can only be appreciated by those who have experienced it in mid-summer, and one can fully endorse the wish expressed by an officer leaving the territory, that when next he saw it he hoped the whole country would be turned into a duck pond. San Carlos itself is no paradise but required such a ride to bring out its good points.

From the crest of the hills, about opposite the mouth of the San Carlos River, one catches glimpse of the Agency buildings. The valley of the Gila widens out slightly and with the flats at the mouth of the San Carlos an open space is formed, surrounded on all sides by more or less high and rugged

³Fort Lowell was seven miles northeast of Tucson, Arizona.

⁴Fort Grant was near Mount Graham, twenty-seven miles north of Willcox, Arizona.

⁵Fort Thomas was near the Gila River, about sixty-five miles north of Bowie Station, Arizona.

⁶San Carlos was at the junction of the Gila and San Carlos Rivers, Arizona, about forty miles below Fort Thomas. It was the site of the San Carlos Indian Agency.

hills and mountains, the two rivers breaking through from the east and north and lowing out together through a mild canon to the West.⁷

On the left bank of the Gila were numbers of huts or brush "wickiups", the home of several bands of Mojave and Yuma Indians. On the flats between the San Carlos and Gila were the camps of the Government pack trains, thoroughly equipped, constantly in use, and always ready to move at a moment's notice to any part of the reservation where trouble might threaten.

Near the pack trains were the corrals for "C" Troop, 3rd Cavalry, when at San Carlos. On the bench just above the flats, and towards the west, stood the school buildings occupied as store rooms, officers, and living rooms by the Commanding Officer and his assistants. Still further to the west down the Gila River on the same bench stood the Agency buildings, storehouse, and traders store. Below the Agency building on the flats near the river were the corrals and slaughter house for Indian cattle. The buildings were of adobe or sun-dried mud-colored brick, differing not at all in color from the sun-baked plain on which they stood.

On one of the buildings with walls 18" thick, I have seen a thermometer register 114 degrees at 2 P. M. The only good point that I can recall about San Carlos is its winter climate.

Opposite the Agency building across the river were the Indian camps spoken of before, and below, on both sides of the Gila, and above, on the San Carlos, numbers of camps were scattered.

Down the Gila and opposite the mouth of the San Pedro (on the right bank) was a

considerable band, and on the San Pedro, Es-him-on-zeen, formerly a noted outlaw, had a camp and thriving fields. On the Aravaipa were several small camps, one of them the home of Capaian Chiquito, with his six lusty young wives. And so, over the reservation, wherever the ground was favorable, camps were located.

Frequent reports were received from the outlying camps, and visits were made when necessary by the Commanding Officer or Provost Officer.

In July 1884 the civilian agent of the Interior Department was still in control of issues to the Indians, and the presence of two influences, civil and military, were bound to lead to friction. The presence of the military was a very unwelcome restraint upon the agents, if, as too often happened, it was considered necessary by them to eke out an insufficient salary by small deals with mining towns outside of the reservation.

The successful handling of 5500 Indians, the wildest ever known to us in this country, on a reservation 90 by 60 miles, rough beyond telling, with bands scattered all over it, was a task sufficiently difficult with the governing influences in perfect accord. The discord at headquarters multiplied the difficulties, but Capt. Crawford had mastered them, and his watch over the agent and his employees was as strict as that over the Indians, and he allowed no interference with the police control of the reservation. He, with his officers, Lieut. F. O. Johnson,⁸ Q.M., T. B. Dugan,⁹ Adjutant, both of 3rd Cavalry, Dr. Thos. Davis,¹⁰ and Lieut. Charles P. Elliott, occupied an old adobe building, formerly used by

⁷Strangely enough, an old timer returning to San Carlos now would find the valleys of the Gila and the San Carlos turned into a large lake, formed by the Coolidge Dam.

⁸Franklin O. Johnson, Class of 1881, West Point, was a 2d Lieutenant in the 3d Cavalry, in 1884. Retired as a colonel of cavalry in 1922. Died in 1935.

⁹Thomas B. Dugan, Class of 1882, West Point. Became Brigadier General in the National Army, World War I and retired as a Brigadier General. Died 1940.

¹⁰Thomas Davis was a Contract Surgeon, U. S. Army.

schoolteachers who had vacated at the last outbreak and had never returned.

There were no troops in sight upon my arrival, and there were, in fact, none nearer than Fort Apache,¹¹ many miles away.

To the north of the schoolbuildings was a cluster of huts, where the Indian scouts with their families lived: two companies, so-called, but there was no effort, at that time, to make trained soldiers of them.

There was a third company called home guards, whose members were scattered among the various camps of Indians, tributary to San Carlos. These reported to the provost officer direct and were under his orders, acting for Capt. Crawford.

There were about ten enlisted men at San Carlos in July 1884, acting as clerks, storekeepers, and hospital attendants. The only military organization having station there was "C" Troop, 3rd Cavalry, Capt. Crawford's Troop, under Lieut. Parker West,¹² temporarily absent in mountains. It was there only because Capt. Crawford happened to be and was not utilized in the police control of the Indians, but was subsequently relieved, leaving only a few enlisted men for duty as indicated above.

Capt. Crawford had immediate control at San Carlos of all Indians tributary to that place. Lieut. Britton Davis¹³ was in charge of the Chiricahua Apaches near Fort Apache, and Lieut. C. B. Gatewood,¹⁴ 6th Cavalry,

¹¹Fort Apache was ninety miles south of Holbrook, Arizona, in the White Mountains and about 60 miles north of San Carlos.

¹²Parker W. West, Class of 1881, West Point, served in the 3d Cavalry as Lieutenant. Retired for disability in 1909 as a Major of Cavalry. Died 1947.

¹³Britton Davis, Class of 1881, West Point, appointed 2d Lieutenant, 3d Cavalry. He resigned June 1, 1886, and engaged in ranching and mining until he died in 1930.

¹⁴Charles B. Gatewood, Class of 1877, West Point, was a Lieutenant, 6th Cavalry. He was A.D.C. to General Nelson A. Miles, 1886-1890. He was commended in General Orders 39 and 44, A.G.O. 1891, for his distinguished services in the Apache Campaigns of 1883 and 1886. Died in 1896.

with Lieut. Roach,¹⁵ 1st Infantry, controlled the White Mountain Apaches, with headquarters at Fort Apache, all under command of Capt. Crawford, who reported direct to Gen. Crook. The latter's interest in and supervision of the reservation was keen and direct and he knew in person all of the prominent Indians as well as many of the young men and enjoyed the perfect confidence of all, never making a promise that he could not fulfill and always keeping one made, whether to help the Indians or to punish them, as the case might be. There may have been more successful Indian fighters than Gen. Crook, but in the management of them on their reservations, he was far ahead of any officer that the Army has ever produced. His experience with Indians had been continuous during his service, except during the war of 1861 and 1865. He had studied their nature and habits; was himself a quiet and retiring man, thoroughly familiar with nature, a great hunter, and perfectly fearless. Those Indians who did not like him respected him and trusted him and in turn gave him the full measure of trust to which their conduct entitled them. During hostilities he utilized friendly Indians against hostile ones, and, in their reservations, he made them help to govern themselves.

On the San Carlos reservation were two distinct tribes of Indians, the Mojaves and Yumas constituting one, and the Apaches, of different appearance and language, the other. The latter were designated according to the locality formerly most frequented by them, as San Carlos, Tonto, White Mountain, and Chiricahua.

The Mojaves and Yumas had blended

¹⁵Hampton M. Roach, served as an enlisted man in Troop F, 5th Cavalry, 1876-1883. He was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for gallantry in action against the Utes in 1879. Was appointed 2d Lieutenant, 1st Infantry, 1883, and retired for disability as 2d Lieutenant, 1894. Died 1923.

somewhat with the others, the result being known as Apache-Yuma and Apache-Mojave. These Indians had at different times been gathered in from all over southern Arizona within the borders of the San Carlos Reservation.

In 1884 a complete census had been made, the tribes being enumerated under their head chiefs and each camp of Indians of the same tribe under its head man. Brass tags of different shapes with one shape for each tribe had been provided. The band or subdivision of a tribe was designated by a letter of the alphabet, and each number of a band had his number, stamped by the provost officer on the tag of the proper shape and given to each Indian whose name was recorded in books kept for the purpose. Each man was required to wear his tag at all times and to produce it when called upon by the proper officer. Any failure to comply with these regulations was severely punished, and in a short time the system worked to the perfection I found it on my arrival.

Any American who would attempt to burden himself or his memory with a number of Indian names would soon be hopelessly lost, but tag numbers and the records made it very simple to locate a special individual.

In addition to the home guard of scouts mentioned above, there were a limited number of secret service employees, Indians, who rendered very efficient service.

One of the greatest menaces to the peace of the reservation was due to the efforts of white men to sell or trade guns, ammunition, and whiskey to the Indians, as well as to prospectors insisting on crossing the reservation line and looking for minerals on forbidden ground; many of the latter lost their lives probably, without anyone being the wiser for it. The duty of arresting such trespassers was a frequent and most unpleasant task, and it was never possible to convict

and punish them in the territorial courts, though the sales made by them to the Indians were often directly responsible for outbreaks resulting in the death of innocent and isolated ranchers.

At San Carlos the guardhouse, where all offenders were confined, was under the control of the provost officer with Indian scouts as guards. Offenders could be arrested and imprisoned at all times, at near or distant camps, by members of the home guard or by scouts sent specially for the purpose, but before being confined were, if possible, examined by the provost officer to see that no flagrant injustice was done before a thorough trial could be had. If witnesses were convenient, the Commanding Officer or provost officer, if present, would hear the case and award the punishment; if not, Friday was recognized as the day for hearing all cases, civil as well as criminal, and then all parties and witnesses, willing and unwilling, gathered before the officer who faithfully attempted to sift out the facts and administer justice. Two interpreters were necessary to convert from Apache into English. First, Antonio Diaz, a Mexican, (captive for years among the Indians) translated from Apache to Spanish and Jose Maria Montoya from Spanish to English. If the case required a Mojave or Yuma witness, then a third to interpret from Yuma to Apache was necessary. The use as interpreters of young Indians, educated at the Indian schools in the east, who had returned to the reservation, proved most unsatisfactory.

There was a zealous effort on the part of all officers to assist the Indians in all possible ways and to aid them in making progress in agricultural pursuits.

The younger officers selected sites and laid out irrigating ditches, showing the best places for fields, superintending the digging of the ditches and regulating the distribution of wa-

ter. The result of their efforts was most gratifying and was evidenced by the raising of some two million pounds of small grain in one season, a large part of which was bought by the government at good prices. The effort was also to uplift the Indians in their domestic life and to discourage the custom of having more than one wife, six being the greatest number known. A very thrifty old chief, with an eye to cultivating a good farm with labor entirely under his control, took six young wives, all good workers, and the result was so very satisfactory that it was impossible to induce him to reduce his family.

The habit of beating their wives was one that gave the officers a great deal of trouble and led up to the following occurrence, which given in detail will exemplify the methods employed.

A secret service report came from an Indian camp just across the river from headquarters that a certain Mojave had given his wife a brutal beating the night before, and, fearing arrest, had early in the morning, taken to the hills south of the Gila River, carrying his gun. On the receipt of this report two scouts were sent to arrest him, one an old and reliable man, the other a young Mojave. They struck his trail and about noon came within sight of him near a spring. The older scout, who was a friend of the wife beater, went towards him; the younger remained on the ridge about the spring. The hail of scouts was answered in a friendly spirit and upon the older scouts joining the fugitive, both went to the spring and ate a simple lunch together, the scout telling what was wanted and the other consenting to accompany him when they were through eating. In a few moments the scout was told that if he would start the other would follow at once. He had not gone 20 feet when he was shot dead and another shot directed at the younger Mojave above (it was his baptism

of fire) sent him flying to San Carlos with news of the murder.

A party was put on the trail of the murderer, but a lone Indian in those mountains is too much even for Apache scouts, and all trace of him was lost. He held no communication with any of his people for months, and they thought him dead. Several months elapsed when an Indian runner from the Yavasupai Reservation¹⁶ went to Gen. Crook at Prescott and sent the description to San Carlos. He was the man wanted for murder, and the chief of scouts, Al Sieber,¹⁷ was sent to Prescott to bring him back to San Carlos. In due time Sieber arrived with his prisoner who was a splendid specimen of Indian manhood, six feet tall, broad shouldered and in perfect physical condition, due to the life he had been leading in the mountains for so many months. There was a little excitement among the family and friends of the murdered scout, but no effort was made to try the prisoner, who was kept working under guard with other prisoners until it was decided whether he should be tried by the civil authorities or by tribal custom.

The civil authorities really had no jurisdiction of this particular case, so the trial was conducted according to the custom of his tribe.

Twelve men of his tribe were selected and under the direction of the provost officer proceeded with his trial which was open to all.

The testimony of all witnesses was interpreted into English so that intelligent revision of the case could be made.

Deep interest was manifested by all of the Indians, and every effort was made to arrive at the true facts. The evidence was very clear, and the man in his statement gave no

¹⁶The Yavasupai Reservation was a very small reserve on Cataract Creek, a tributary of the Colorado River in Northern Arizona.

¹⁷Al Sieber was a well-known civilian scout employed by the Army as a Chief of Scouts. (See Lockwood, *The Apache Indians*, for many references to him.)

excuse for the deed, admitting that the murdered scout was a friend of his, but, that having beaten his wife, he knew if he came back to San Carlos, he would be punished for it and saw no other way out of his trouble.

The deliberation of his peers did not take long.

They concluded that having killed a good man, his friend, while in discharge of his duty, the murderer should be shot to death himself.

When this decision was imparted to the provost officer, the prisoner was wild with rage and, ironed though he was, with one bound he reached the spokesman of his tribesmen, wound one hand in his long hair and endeavored to stab him in the throat with a piece of hard wood he had sharpened and concealed on his person. The provost officer jumped on him and pinioned him while Al Sieber caught him by his shackles, tripping him, and, in falling, his hold on the other Indian was broken, the provost officer going down in the fall with the prisoner.

The excitement among the Indians was intense and spread to numbers who were at the Agency drawing rations. Al Sieber and the provost officer, one on either side, hurried the prisoner to the guardhouse. Before putting him in the cell, Sieber was directed to search lest the prisoner should have some weapon concealed there with which he could injure his guard. The provost officer stood with his hand on the prisoner's shoulder and while Sieber was at the far end of the long cell, the Indian wheeled and grasped for the officer's throat, a push on his shoulders was just sufficient to deflect his hands so that they passed under the chin instead of around the neck; then it was a close fight with odds in favor of the Indian who was desperate and as strong as a bull, nor was there time to talk or ask for help, but Sieber heard the scuffle, ran out, grabbed the Indian by the hair,

pulled him away from the officer, swung him off his feet half way around a circle and knelt on his head. It was a wonderful exhibition of strength and one that afforded me more pleasure to witness than any I have seen before or since. The prisoner's head had hardly touched the ground when Sergeant Smiley of the guard had the muzzle of his gun at his ear looked up and said "Shoot?" "No, no shoot," was the answer, "give me a piece of rope."

After having been bound for some time, the prisoner asked to see the provost officer who found him quiet and resigned to his fate. He was released from his bonds, and after several days, the excitement having quieted down, he was started with a firing party toward Fort Thomas, up the river.

The sentence of his tribe was executed upon him, and his life paid for his crime.

The effect on the other Indians was most beneficial, both as regards wife beating and resisting arrest.

The relatives of the murderer made threats to revenge his execution, but no attention was paid to them, and no overt act was committed.

To revert to the brass tags in detecting individuals, I cite the following instance: A complaint came in from the Silver King Mine that Indians had been off the reservation killing deer and that several had visited the store at the mine. The provost officer was ordered to investigate. There was no evidence that the Indians had killed deer, but they had been off the reservation, trading at the store and one of the clerks noticing the brass tags on them had taken, out of curiosity, the letters and numbers on a slip of paper. These were transferred to the officer's notebook. A two days' ride brought the detachment to the camp at the mouth of the San Pedro where the officer crossed the Gila on his mule, called the band of Indians together and walking

along the line without a word, only looking at their tags, selected the men he wanted to see at San Carlos and rode off. The chief and all the band were astonished but promptly complied and their culprits were duly punished.

Infinite patience was necessary in listening to the various complaints made by Indians at the weekly sessions. Every trouble, large and small, was gone into most minutely and every new complainant began his talk by a complete family history reaching back as far as he could go. It made no difference that ninety-nine times out of a hundred the family history had no bearing on the case. As their responsibilities increased, the disputes multiplied, especially as regarded their grain fields, a fruitful source of discord, the differences often very difficult of adjustment, and it was never possible to satisfy both parties. In an attempt to settle a dispute of this kind, Lieut. Mott¹⁸ of the Army, who was on duty at San Carlos after me, was murdered by the party against whom the decision was rendered. Many of the complaints were very childish, but the Indian requires about the same treatment as a child. There was no sickly sentimentality about Capt. Crawford's method of handling the Indians. We allowed them to take no liberties with him, expected them to behave and do what they were told, any failure being visited by swift and sure punishment. The guardhouse was kept clean; the prisoners also kept the premises around the headquarters thoroughly in order and were kept at healthy work during the day.

The Indian has a well developed taste for whiskey or any other strong drink that will intoxicate him. It was difficult for them to obtain whiskey but the older ones knew how to make an intoxicant called "tiswin." Their

"tiswin" drunks were responsible for many fights amongst themselves, but they were so secretive in making and hiding their liquor that it was only after the resultant fight that the fact of "tiswin" came to our knowledge. It was never my good fortune to get possession of any of this liquor but I was told that it was made usually, by the very old women, from corn, and was a sort of "sour mash."

In order to reap the full benefit of a "tiswin" drunk, the bucks fasted for three days beforehand, and then had a royal time, occasionally allowing a woman or two to join in for the pleasure of beating them when they had all reached the proper stage.

The Apache Indian is as perfect a savage as this country has ever produced, and it is impossible to conceive of greater cruelty and less natural affection in any creature that walks on two legs. The fiendish cruelties committed by them when on the warpath give one a creepy feeling while among them, and when a son brings in his father's head on which a reward had been placed, not because he had trouble with him, but because he happened to know where he was in hiding and wanted the reward, it makes one doubt whether they are human.

During my duty at San Carlos, "The Kid" was one of our most trusted scouts. Afterwards he was a terror to Arizona for years.

In the spring of 1885 the 3rd Cavalry was relieved from duty in Arizona, and Capt. Emmet Crawford was relieved from command of the San Carlos Reservation and went with his regiment to Texas.

The peace that had prevailed in Arizona for nearly two years soon came to a sudden end,¹⁹ and it was only a few months before Capt. Crawford was ordered back, at Gen.

¹⁸Seward Mott, Class of 1886, West Point, was a 2d Lieutenant, 10th Cavalry. He died of wounds inflicted by an Indian at San Carlos, Arizona, March 11, 1887.

¹⁹The peace was ended in May 1885 by the outbreak of Geronimo's band of Chiricahuas. The ensuing campaign came to an end in 1886: the last of all the Indian wars in Arizona's bloody history.

Crook's earnest request, to command the battalion of Apache scouts put in the field in pursuit of hostile Chiricahuas. It was my good fortune to be with him for many months during his campaign in Arizona, New and Old Mexico, nor could a young man hope to serve under a better soldier in a better field of instruction. Capt. Crawford was killed by Mexicans in Sonora in 1886, just as, after months of arduous service, he was, with the surrender of the Indians in sight, bringing his campaign to a successful close.

General Crook was called by the Apaches "Nan-tan Cle-pa," which has been wrongly interpreted by many as "The Gray Fox." As a matter of fact, it means "Gray Captain," from his general appearance. There was less of the fox in his character than any man I ever met.

Captain Crawford was "Nan-tan En-das-en," "The Tall Captain," and when I arrived, just as tall but much younger, the Indians were puzzled to name me until I was placed in charge of the guardhouse when I

became "Calaboose Nantan."

The Quartermaster was "Nal-soos-Nantan," writing or letter captain because he gave little written slips as receipts for hay and grain.

One officer was "Big Foot," another "Long Nose," a third "Billy Goat," from his imperial.

Into their own names, it does not do to inquire too closely. One baby was called "White man scratched him on his back," from the marks of an officer's fingernail made on his little brown back. One very young officer was "Nantan Bijaji" (Baby Captain).

NOTE

A complete description of General Crook's methods of handling the Apaches will be found in his *Annual Reports* as Commanding General, Department of Arizona, for 1883, 1884, 1885, and 1886, his *Report of Operations of April 10, 1886*, and his *Resumé of Operations, 1882-1886*, dated December 27, 1886.

Frank C. Lockwood, *The Apache Indians*, (Macmillan, 1938), contains a very extensive bibliography reference to Indian affairs in Arizona, which it is unnecessary to repeat here. A recent book, *General George Crook, His Autobiography*, by Martin F. Schmitt (University of Oklahoma Press, 1946) contains much previously unpublished data regarding Crook and Indian affairs.

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NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

THE PHILIPPINE ARMY, 1935-39 EISENHOWER'S MEMORANDUM TO QUEZON

CONTRIBUTED BY LOUIS MORTON*

On June 22, 1942, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower—then a major general and chief of the Operations Division of the General Staff—wrote a memorandum to Manuel Quezon, President-in-exile of the Japanese-occupied Philippine Commonwealth. In this memorandum, written the day before he left Washington to assume command of American troops in the European theater of operations, he traced briefly the origins of the Philippine Army. General Eisenhower had been associated with the Philippine Army since its inception and had been one of the two officers selected by General Douglas MacArthur, the Military Advisor of the Philippine Commonwealth, to assist “in the establishment and development of a system of National Defense” for the newly created Philippine government. From 1935 to 1939 General Eisenhower served in the Office of the Military Advisor in Manila, and dealt daily with the problems of creating and training a new national army for the Commonwealth. For this reason and because of his subsequent experience with Pacific problems while he was in the Operations Division, General Eisenhower’s account of the origins of the Philippine Army is a valuable and interesting analysis.

June 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT QUEZON:

In the fall of 1935, General MacArthur accepted from the Philippine President-elect Quezon, the post of Military Advisor in the Philippines.

Preceding the actual consummation of the agreement, there was conducted a variety of negotiations involving an amendment to existing United States law in order to permit U. S. Army officers to accept positions with the Philippine Government. The approval of the President of the United States and a vast amount of preliminary study in preparation for the development of the Philippine Army was necessary. General MacArthur selected two officers to constitute his General Staff. They were Majors Dwight D. Eisenhower and James B. Ord. Two other officers were selected as members of the party; one medical officer, Major Huttes, and the other a personal aide and administrative officer, Captain T. J. Davis. In General MacArthur’s preliminary discussions with Mr. Quezon, the necessity for the utmost economy was agreed upon. Conversations on the subject as reported to me by General MacArthur were to the following general effect:

1. General MacArthur assured Mr. Quezon that it was entirely practicable to provide, over a ten year period of preparation, adequate security for the Philippines, provid-

*Dr. Morton is chief of the Pacific section, Historical Division, Department of the Army. The Eisenhower document is on file in the Executive Office, Plans and Operations Division, Department of the Army.

ed that the Filipino Government would support a system of universal conscription and would provide not less than fifteen to twenty million pesos a year for military purposes, including support of the National Police.

Based on this general understanding, Majors Ord and Eisenhower, assisted by a special committee made available by the Commandant of the Army War College, proceeded to develop a Defense Plan.

The entire plan comprised:

- a. An introductory speech to be made by the President before the National Assembly.
- b. The draft of a bill for establishing the National Defense System.
- c. A comprehensive training, organizational, and equipment plan extending over the 10-year period of anticipated preparation.

The gist of the plan was:

1. Establish throughout the Philippines about ninety training camps.
2. Absorb a sufficient portion of the existing Constabulary to serve as commissioned and enlisted officers in these training camps.
3. Induct trainees, under a conscription policy, on a basis of six months for privates; one year for non-commissioned officers and specialists; and eighteen months' training for selected individuals for commission in the reserve corps.
4. Accumulate savings each year from the total amount allotted, to purchase reserve equipment during the latter part of the ten year period.
5. Initiate an Air Corps Training program.
6. Establish a military school, on the pattern of West Point, for the production of junior officers.
7. Set up administrative and logistic groups, to be manned principally by officers that had been engaged in simi-

lar activities under the old Constabulary system.

8. Develop a Marine Force, exploiting, principally, the small motor torpedo boat.
9. Provide a system for organizing and giving yearly refresher and unit instruction to graduated trainees.

The law placing this plan into effect was the first law passed by the Philippine Assembly.

Impelled by economy and terrain conditions, the tactical organization adopted was based upon a very small division of about 7,500 effective strength, with a minimum of transport and with services largely improvised. Armament and equipment was adopted to the terrain of the Philippines and to the Defensive Mission of the Army.

The number of individuals to be trained *annually* was expected to reach a total of about 35,000 trained in two classes. It was intended to call into service on January 1, 1937, 3,000 men. The year 1936 was to be devoted to the building of camps, the organization of overhead, the organization of cadres, and the special training of instructors for the first contingent of trainees. The first group of trainees was expected to give a thorough test of the organizational and training methods. Each six months thereafter the number of trainees was to be stepped up until in the fifth year, the ultimate figure was to be attained.

The law provided that each Filipino between the ages 21-50 was liable to military service. During the first 10 years of this period, the man was to belong to the First Reserve, which he would join immediately upon completion of his training period. In the next 10 years, he would belong to the Second Reserve. In the final ten years he would belong to the Third Reserve. It was calculated that by the end of the first ten year period, allowing for normal wastage and the fact

that the system would not reach its full productive capacity until the middle of the period, that the Army would have an over-all strength of about 200,000. Thereafter, with the system continuing to work at full capacity, it was calculated that this figure would increase to 275,000-300,000.

While General MacArthur hoped that eventually the Second Reserve could be partially equipped, it was obvious to the staff that with the money available, this could not be done and therefore the Second Reserve, in the event of war, could be considered nothing but a replacement pool for the First Reserve.

During the year 1936, General MacArthur informed his staff that the President of the Philippines was not content to develop his Army as slowly, particularly during the first few years, as the program above-outlined contemplated. He stated that it was essential to begin the training of 20,000 on January 1, 1937. This decision caused considerable changes in construction, in training and organization programs, and eventually resulted in a growing shortage of qualified instructors when trainees reported to training camps. This change of planning, moreover, eliminated the financial reserve that was expected to pile up during the first few years and so created difficulties in the purchase of equipment that was desired.

During all this time, the major problems of Philippine Defense were discussed with the American War Department. 75,000 rifles were purchased at a price of \$7.50 each. Later, the War Department decided that it was preferable to give additional rifles to the Philippines on a loan basis and a total of some 300,000 were secured without cost. Much small-arms ammunition was purchased, likewise, at reduced prices. The U. S. Department Commander in the Philippines made available to the Philippine Government a number of Philippine Scout enlisted men to serve as instructors in the Training Camps.

He also provided a number of officers on detached service to help in the general organizational and training problem. This number included all the scout officers of Philippine birth.

On the other hand, the beginning of an Air Corps was attended with considerable success and it was found that young Filipinos showed a satisfactory aptitude for flying. The two American officers responsible for this development were successful in establishing a high morale and a splendid state of discipline in the Air organization. Maintenance of air equipment, which was likewise under the supervision of an American, was of a very high order. In the first three years of the venture, there was no air accident due to mechanical causes.

The Academy established at Baguio attracted a good class of young Filipinos and the school gave every evidence of its ability to produce a satisfactory officer corps, given the necessary time in which to do it. Artillery personnel was trained at Stotsenburg under an arrangement by which the American garrison at that post undertook most of the instructional work. Coast artillery instruction was carried on at Grande Island in Subic Bay. This venture had the cooperation of the Commanding General of Corregidor, who provided a major part of the instructional personnel.

Individual training stations throughout the Philippines, particularly those in remote places, did not show the progress that was found in the special organizations just mentioned. It was difficult to attain desired training standards and to maintain buildings and equipment properly. The problem engaged the entire attention of the advisory staff, but at the beginning progress was slow. It very early became evident that the average Filipino would quickly make a very good soldier given qualified instruction, but it was just as evident that the production of a satisfac-

tory instructional staff could not be accomplished except with the passage of years and with strict adherence to rigid standards.

Meantime, the program was staunchly supported by the President of the Philippines. In 1937, due to difficulties in administration of the Police Forces, the President separated from the Army that portion of the old Constabulary that was engaged in police work and was not involved in actual training of the Army. For the next year or so that Police Force was supported separately so far as finances was concerned—although the original understanding was that the cost of the Constabulary would be included in the 16,000,000 pesos annually appropriated.

AIR CORPS

The Air Corps development was started by the purchase of ground northeast of Manila to build the first Philippine Army Air Field. Three excellent training ships were purchased and by the time the first runway was completed, the planes were in Manila to begin the training of the first cadets.

The training scheme in Manila was organized as a combined primary, basic, and advanced course in flying. This was supplemented by sending selected individuals to Military Flying Schools in the United States to include training in the technical establishments and in tactical squadrons. In this way, specialist instructors in each type of military aviation and in each classification of technical air work were secured. Photographers, engineers, radio experts, and similar specialists' courses were started in Manila.

By December 31, 1939, the Air Corps development had progressed sufficiently so that some 75-100 men had become really good flyers; about 40 airplanes—mostly of a training type—were on hand; practice in gunnery and in light bombing had been given; the whole instructional system was on a very sound basis, and the first tactical unit was

formed—although equipped only with advanced trainer types.

GROUND FORCES

The ground force development followed the planned lines. By the end of 1939, approximately 100,000 individuals had been processed through the training camps and the quality of instruction was improving daily. Reserve units were gradually developing and battalion and regimental formations were slowly coming into being. In addition to the small training camps themselves, one or two larger centers, notably Camp Murphy and the Camp at Parang, were garrisoned with troops among whom were a rather large percentage of regular personnel. These two camps reflected high standards in training and discipline. The supply, administrative, and normal disciplinary processes of the Army had developed satisfactorily. In short, there was at that time present in the Philippines, a very considerable body of men reasonably well trained in the use of their weapons. Field artillery, armed with weapons loaned by the United States, and sizable contingents of coast artillery forces were in existence.

MARINE FORCES

By the end of 1939, only two small vessels of the motor-patrol type had been secured by the Philippines. This was because the beginning of the war in Europe had stopped our source of supply, which was the Thornycroft Company in England. However, great progress had been made in the establishment of small bases, and in training boatmen, mechanics, and torpedo men. In this effort, assistance was rendered by the United States Navy.

OFFICER CORPS

As would be expected, the production of a satisfactory Officer Corps became a most difficult problem. Among the Constabulary were

some commissioned individuals who were natural leaders and who possessed a rather good background of military training. In the main, however, the Constabulary was trained as a police force; its interests lay in law enforcement and its individuals were more concerned in preserving good relationships with local officials than in developing military units.

About 20 scout officers were obtained on loan from the United States Government. Some of these men, particularly people like Lim, Pastor Martelino and others were well trained and fine soldiers. The Overhead Staff had in the beginning to be built up largely around these men because no others, familiar with staff practices, were available.

The great problem, however, was to develop the lieutenants and captains who were to take charge of the training camps and command reserve units, once these were formed. Since the military school at Baguio could not begin producing lieutenants until after four years, and even then in insufficient numbers, a supplementary system had to be devised. This was done by picking selected men from each semi-annual class of trainees to take an additional six months' training as non-commissioned officers. Upon completion of a full year's course, a further selection was made and the individuals concerned were placed in an officers' candidate school of six months' duration. By the summer of 1938 this system began to turn out very satisfactory young lieutenants.

OVERHEAD ORGANIZATION

The general organization of the [Philippine] War Department followed the American pattern. There was established a small General Staff and administrative and supply services including Ordnance, Quartermaster,

Medical, Signal, Adjutant General, and Judge Advocate General Departments. The best available men were placed in these posts and very soon the Overhead organization began to develop a capacity to handle normal problems.

The first Chief of Staff was Major General Paulino Santos who served from early 1936 to January 1939. He was succeeded by Major General Vasilio Valdez.

MILITARY ADVISORS' OFFICE

Not long after his arrival in the Philippines, General MacArthur was named a Field Marshal, Philippine Islands. Except for the scout officers mentioned above, no other American officer held either honorary or official title in the Filipino Army. They served purely in advisory capacities under their own rank and titles of the American Army.

Very early in the venture, it was found necessary to secure additional help in the Advisor's Office. Commissioned officers were provided by the Commanding General Philippine Department and a number of these were attached to the mission to serve in inspectional, instructional, and administrative positions. Their help was invaluable and without them very little progress could have been made. Nevertheless, the General Staff work in the mission was carried during the early years by Majors (later Lt. Colonels) Ord and Eisenhower. Colonel Ord was killed in January, 1938, in an airplane accident. Colonel Eisenhower left the Philippines in 1939. Up until that date, no question or difference ever arose between the Advisor's Office and the Philippine Army, or between the Advisor's Office and the President that was not quickly, amicably, and satisfactorily adjusted.

(signed) DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

MONCADO REVOLVING BOOK FUND

Through the generosity and farsightedness of the Institute's new patron, General Hilario Camino Moncado, a fund of \$5,000.00 has been established for the purpose of publishing significant military books. General Moncado, of Manila, Honolulu and Los Angeles, Philippine guerrilla leader during the war and honor graduate of the University of Los Angeles, recently donated the fund with the stipulations that it would be permanent, that it would be used solely for publishing military books of a scholarly character, and that proceeds from the sale of books would be returned to the fund for use in publishing others. The fund has been named in his honor.

This very important step in the affairs of the Institute is one of the most significant and far reaching of its history. It makes possible a new field of endeavor long regarded as vital to the further advancement of serious military studies in the United States. It provides for the first time an outlet for manuscripts and reference works otherwise unpublishable because of their lack of popular appeal and large scale marketing potentialities.

According to the stipulations stressed by General Moncado upon presentation of the fund, every effort should be exerted to make the fund perpetual. "All income, including profits, will be returned to the fund for the publishing of other books, and although the primary object is not to make money, should any profit accrue it will be applied to the

original sum. General Moncado cited the probability that the sale of some books might prove unprofitable, a risk that all publishers appreciate. However, "if the most careful management possible is exercised the fund should always remain near the \$5,000 level."

Shortly after the fund was officially accepted, Colonel Joseph I. Greene, President of the Institute, appointed a nominating committee to explore the technical and administrative details involved and to elect a committee to review manuscripts and otherwise fulfil the objects of the fund. The nominating committee, headed by Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian of the Army Historical Division, in a recent preliminary meeting discussed general plans and called in for consultation Dr. George Howe who is serving on a similar book committee operating under the auspices of the American Historical Association. It was decided at this initial meeting that the first step should be to prepare a standard editorial policy for the guidance of the book committee in selecting manuscripts for publication and to establish a set of rules for handling the publishing technicalities. These will be drawn up by Dr. Greenfield and presented at the next meeting when the book committee members will be named. It was also agreed that adequate publicity should be given to the establishment of the fund and permanent mention made of it on the back cover of **MILITARY AFFAIRS**.

The officials of the society, and numerous members who are already aware of the "Moncado Revolving Book Fund," have expressed the desire to take this opportunity for con-

veying to General Moncado their sincerest appreciation for his contribution to military studies, thus representing the attainment of an extremely important goal of the Institute.

TROYER S. ANDERSON DIES

Troyer S. Anderson, long a member of the American Military Institute, and since 1945 a member of its Board of Trustees, died at his home in Swarthmore, Pennsylvania recently at the age of 47. Son of a distinguished historian, he in turn attained distinction as a historian and as a public spirited citizen. At Dartmouth College he made a record in athletics as well as scholarship. He acquired an A.M. at Harvard, went to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, and received a Ph.D. in History from Oxford in 1929. He taught history successively at Brown, Swarthmore, and Iowa, and, as visiting lecturer, at Bryn Mawr. At the time of his death was Chairman of the Department of History at Hunter College. Deeply interested in military history, he published in 1936 an important volume *The Command of the Howe Brothers during the Revolution*, and in World War II was called to the War Department and assigned to the office of the Under Secretary of War as its historian. He won the esteem and confidence of Judge Patterson to such an extent that in 1946 he retained him as Consultant. He left behind an unfinished but invaluable manuscript of his history of the Under Secretary's Office.

EDITORIAL BOARD CHANGES

Several new members have been recently named to serve on the Editorial Board of the Journal and one member has resigned due to his change of address from Washington to the West Coast. Lt. Col. Jesse S. Douglas, trustee and one of the early organizers of the Institute, has returned to inactive duty from his assignment as historical officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is now making his

home in Portland, Oregon, where he lived before coming to Washington in 1937.

Brig. Gen. Charles D. Roberts, Ret., for many years Recorder of the Order of Indian Wars, has accepted a position on the Board to represent the Order, which recently affiliated with the Institute. Dr. Rudolph A. Winnacker, another new member, is historian for the Office of the Secretary of War. Miss Lucy E. Weidman who accepted a position on the Board in May, has had several years' experience in the War Records Division, National Archives.

AIR FORCE HISTORY

Vol. I of the seven volume history of the Army Air Forces in World War II, published by the University of Chicago Press, appeared on June 28. The book, carrying the sub-title "Plans and Early Operations, January 1932 to Summer 1942," tells the story of the AAF from 1917 to 1939, evaluates the status of aviation in the first two years of World War II, and carries the story of AAF operations and organization from Pearl Harbor through the first Eighth Air Force raid in August 1942.

The Army Air Forces in World War II is being prepared by the Air Force Historical Office under the direction of Col. W. J. Paul, Chief, and Dr. Albert F. Simpson, Air Force Historian. The Editors are Dr. W. F. Craven of New York University and J. L. Cate of the University of Chicago. Contributors to the first volume—in addition to Craven and Cate—are Dr. Richard L. Watson and Dr. Arthur Ferguson of Duke University, Dr. Kramer J. Rohlfleisch of San Diego State College, Dr. William Goss of San Francisco City College, Dr. John Carter of West Virginia University, Dr. Herbert Weaver of Georgia State Teachers College, Mr. Alfred Goldberg of the Air Force Historical Office, and Miss Kathleen Williams, Fellow at the University of Chicago. All editors and con-

tributors are present or former members of the Air Force Historical Office.

Vol. II of the history which covers the war in the European, Mediterranean, and Middle East theaters to the end of 1943 has been completed in manuscript form and sent to press. It will appear about February 1, 1949. Contributors are Dr. Arthur Ferguson, Dr. Simpson, Alfred Goldberg, and Mr. Thomas Mayock.

NAVAL HISTORY

Progress Of Naval Aviation, covering the period 1898 to 1948, has been prepared by Dr. Mary Catherine Welborn of the Aviation History Unit, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. This 33-page mimeographed study is available from the Chief of Public Relations, Navy Department, Washington 25, D. C.

NAVY HISTORICAL EXHIBITIONS

On April 30, 1948 the Navy Department was 150 years old. To commemorate the event, two exhibitions of historical material were set up in Washington, one at the National Archives, the other at the Navy Department. The exhibition at the Archives was opened by the Archivist, Solon J. Buck, at a private showing attended by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Director of Naval History, and others. The exhibit covers the entire range of American naval history from the Revolution to the end of World War II, including the original act creating the Department, fine naval prints from the collection of the late President Roosevelt, and the World War II surrender documents signed in Tokyo Bay. This show will continue until August 31, 1948.

The Navy Department exhibition, which closed on July 7, was confined exclusively to material on the events surrounding the es-

tablishment of the Department and the first Secretary, Benjamin Stoddert, who served until 1801. Some of the more interesting items shown were autograph letters of Stoddert; a copy of the first printing of "Hail! Columbia," published on the same day the Department was created; photographs of the several locations of the Department in Washington; a unique copy of the first signal book of the Navy, written by Thomas Truxtun; and a fine old model of the frigate *CONSTITUTION*. Material for the exhibit was assembled from the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Office of Naval Records and Library, the Naval Historical Foundation, and private collections.

NAVAL COMBAT ART

OPERATION PALETTE, a collection of 100 original paintings of the Navy in World War II, is on exhibition on the Steel Pier at Atlantic City, New Jersey, from June 15 to September 15, 1948. The work of eight artists, who entered the Navy expressly to make a pictorial record of World War II, makes up the collection of oils, water colors, pastels, and crayon and charcoal drawings that were made on the spot at the time of the actions depicted. Seven of the artists were commissioned officers; the one enlisted man was Specialist A. P. Russo, a native of Atlantic City.

PAINTINGS FROM GERMANY

The exhibition of European paintings from Germany which closed in Washington this spring after forty days at the National Gallery of Art attracted a total of 964,970 visitors. The largest attendance in any one day was 67,490. The fine collection of Italian, Flemish, French, Dutch, and German paintings had been taken from two Berlin museums during the war and stored in a salt mine for safekeeping. They were discovered by U. S. Army personnel after the fall of Ger-

many, and were brought to this country in 1945 to be cared for until conditions abroad made possible proper housing. The show in Washington contained 202 pictures, of which 54 were returned recently to Munich, accompanied by a party under the direction of Comdr. Keith Merrill USNR. Other paintings will be sent back in increments until in 1949 all will have been returned to Germany.

* * * *

The following letters on the article, "Establishing The Bolero Ferry Route," No. 4, Vol. XI, were received by the author, Mr. Samuel Milner. They are reproduced here for the additional light they throw on the subject.

General of the Army H. H. Arnold wrote:

In forming a complete picture of the Bolero operations, it is essential that the following be borne in mind:

1. No one had a complete picture of the problems involved.
2. There were radio difficulties that even our experts could not seem to fathom.
3. There was a feeling of horror and dread among the flying personnel with regard to the flight across the Greenland Ice Cap.
4. As in all first flights, there were so many "unknowns" that the flight, itself, caused much grief, and many troubles that actually did not exist. After the first few flights there was relatively little trouble: radio operators, weather men and pilots, all seemed to get a much better understanding of the problem, and the operations soon smoothed out.

* * * *

Brig. Gen. Milton W. Arnold (Ret.) wrote:

Your treatment of the control of operational units during the first movements of Bolero was quite to the point, and I was sur-

The collection is now on tour throughout the country, with the approval of the Department of the Army. After having been shown in New York and Philadelphia, the paintings will go to Chicago, Boston, Detroit, Cleveland, Minneapolis, San Francisco, Los Angeles, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Toledo. The museums and the dates of the exhibitions will be widely publicized in each city.

prised at the authenticity of your article in this respect. Although there was no great elaboration on this in your article, I felt quite alone when I came back from a survey flight to talk to General George to convince him that we should criticize the judgment of the Eighth Air Force Commanders, namely Generals Spaatz and Hunter, in their insistence that they would control operations of the movement.

Although this was the final decision of General Spaatz during the first movement, it was General Hunter who insisted upon this type of operation. I recall attempting to convince General Hunter at Presque Isle, before the first movement had started, that it was impractical and that his crews were not properly trained to perform these duties. I also recall how very annoyed "Monk" became with me. His black mustache bristled, and he asked me in no uncertain terms who in the hell I thought I was and how I became such an authority on the abilities of his troops. Unfortunately, we had to prove this in the hard way, but, as you stated, fortunately, there were no lives lost.

It was a very sad night over Goose Bay, listening to the confusion and the aircraft landing on the ice cap. It so happens I was en-route and heard the entire discussion by radio. There is certainly no glory in a matter of such importance and saying "I told you so," since such an attitude would not rectify the loss.

The only point which is not covered in your story, but one which you may not have considered appropriate, was that during the second survey flight, prior to the Bolero movement, it was quite evident that each commander had built up a wall around his domain. There was a lack of coordination between these individuals, which was so necessary for continuous operational control through the medium of standard operating practices and standard communication practices.

It was evident that we had to solidify the various bases, at least operational, weather-wise and communication-wise, and to eliminate the operational and weather control of the area base commanders. Later it was extended to messing, housing and general facilities on the individual fields.

I recall on my return I made a recommendation, at a joint meeting presided over by Lieutenant General Craig, that operational control be given to the Air Transport Command, or Ferry Command, in order to link up the bases. His reaction could not have been more violent than if I had suggested that he immediately join the German Air Force. He stated that Army regulations were built around the inviolate prerogatives of the individual commander, consequently this precedent could not be destroyed. I told him

I was not interested in Army regulations or how we have done it in the past in the Indian wars, but we must, for safety and efficiency, consolidate the routes. This was the birth or beginning of the operational and administrative control which the Air Transport Command exerted over its world-wide routes.

Fortunately, General George and Colonel C. R. Smith backed my recommendation and were able to persuade General Arnold that the approach was the only logical way of handling our problem. To say the least, all of us were skating on rather thin ice at times, and had it not been for the support of C. R. Smith and George and their ability to convince Hap Arnold of our new and many problems, the Air Transport Command as such would have never materialized.

To my mind, it was one of the most exciting adventures, and the development of the Air Transport Command required many times the responsibility and proper decisions than was required in combat. I can say this in all due fairness, since I served for almost two years with the Eighth Air Force as Combat Commander. There were, naturally, many times that judgment could be used, but the main problem was a matter of creating a huge organization which overcame the German Air Force by the sheer weight and efficiency of our aircraft and individual pilots.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces. The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, by Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer and Bell I. Wiley. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office. 1947. Pp. 540. \$3.25.)

If the remaining 98 volumes of the Army's ambitious series maintain the high standards set by this first one, military history will have one of its richest contributions. Some of the "shooting" volumes in the operational studies will deal with livelier subjects than this one, but few could prove more useful to those who will have to wrestle with the Army's problems in the future.

Since this is the opening volume of the series, it is worth while to devote part of the review to the program as a whole, before taking up the book itself.

One feels bound to disagree violently with a previous reviewer of this work, who suggested that it might have been better to have followed the precedent of simply publishing the Civil War official records and letting later historians do the analyzing. In the first place, anyone at all familiar with the overwhelming mass of records produced in this war can appreciate the impracticability of such a procedure. It was difficult enough to keep up with the documents as they appeared, without trying to utilize them long afterwards. Time and again, faced with rows of crowded current files, one recalled nostalgically the joys of writing eighteenth century history, where the volume of source material was adequate but still manageable. But the service historian of this war had one valuable compensation for that. In working through the eighteenth century records, one often had the feeling, "If I could only have ten minutes with that man, to ask him why he decided as he did." This time, it was possible to do such asking while the matter was still fresh and one could get the version not only according to Matthew, but also to Mark, Luke, and John.

Another very fundamental justification of the service procedure in this war is the fact that the

findings of the historians are being made available while they can be of some practical use. It may be very well to wait for some new Douglas Freeman to write the classical definitive study of the American effort in World War II around the year 2000. But that would be of little use to the armed forces in the intervening years. Many of the military blunders of 1898 might have been avoided if the experiences of 1861-65 had been analyzed and given publicity quickly; as it was, even General Upton's manuscript was gathering dust, neglected in the War Department files.

This consideration is particularly important in connection with the administrative and organizational aspects. The "shooting" story, with its wider dramatic appeal, will find its way into print in any case, but unless someone had been particularly told off to follow the less lively developments as they occurred, it is doubtful if the findings would ever be made available in time to be of use. And yet it might be argued that volumes such as this may very well be of greater utility for future reference than the operational studies. Because of the effect of technological changes, the obsolescence rate in the pertinence of tactical studies is much more rapid than in the field of military organization and administration. Unless war should become a matter of sudden overnight destruction, armies are still going to have to be raised, trained, and organized, and their material will have to be procured and distributed. Lessons from past experience in such fields are bound to save a great deal of trial and error. Whoever has the responsibility for training and organizing our Army in the future will have cause to be thankful for the patient work and discriminating skill which Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley have put into this substantial volume.

Finally, the Army history program represents an intelligent blending of two types of professional skill. The military professionals were available to explain the technicalities of the subject and, at the highest level, to gear the program into the hierarchy of authority. The bulk of the responsibility, however, was placed in the hands

of professional academic historians, familiar with the techniques of appraisal, emphasis, and presentation. Short of matters involving security, they were free to write critical accounts, calling the shots as they saw them. The authors of this volume stood high in the historical profession; Greenfield, now Chief Historian, Historical Division, Department of the Army, had been chairman of the history department at Johns Hopkins, while Palmer achieved the unique speed record of going through the associate professor grade at Princeton, usually a matter of years, in four days. The final section was very ably written by Bell I. Wiley of Louisiana State University.

As for this first volume itself, it is a high-level headquarters account of the problems faced and decisions reached in the organizing and training of the ground forces before they were turned over to the theater commands for actual combat service. The story is carried from the summer of 1940 to the final redeployment in 1945. There is no room to follow that whole story here, beyond mentioning a few salient features.

From July 1940 until March 1942, these matters of organization and training were handled, along with various operational functions, by the GHQ under Major General (later Lieutenant General) Lesley J. McNair. After the great 1942 reorganization, he headed the Army Ground Forces, which were able to concentrate more fully upon the preparation of the troops.

With Pershing's GHQ of 1917-18 as a model, it was originally planned to convert the War Plans Division into a GHQ which would take over operational control in the field. This time, however, war came to the United States so gradually and in so many scattered areas that the old Western Front model did not meet the situation. The constant shifts in controls during the first twenty months are clearly analyzed in the first section of the book.

Much as General McNair sought unity of command, there were too many centrifugal and conflicting influences to achieve clear-cut results under the GHQ setup. Between the War Department General Staff, the area commands, the gradual spread of overseas commitments long before Pearl Harbor, and the developing of new features alongside the conventional arms, the arrangements were often far from satisfactory. The Air Forces were already winning a position of virtual autonomy; there were questions of what to do with armored, anti-aircraft, and amphibious forces; the role of

supply was a thorny problem. Nevertheless, while the Army grew from a half million men to 1,600,000 in the eighteen months before Pearl Harbor, the staff managed to devise training techniques and policies, to shake down the troops in maneuvers, to eliminate unfit officers, to evolve triangular divisions and other units, and to fit the new features into the general pattern.

The remaining four sections of the book deal with "Ground Forces in the Army, December 1941-April 1945: A Statistical Study," "Mobilization of the Ground Army," "Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat," "Organization and Training of New Ground Combat Elements," and "Reorganizing for Redeployment." Each of those topics deserves discussion here but space forbids. The whole study is fully documented, with specific references to the sources, which will be an invaluable guide for anyone who seeks to study any one of the subjects further. The pertinent statistics are well coordinated to bring out the significant points. There has been no hesitation to criticize where criticism is due, but the tone of the whole work is objective, with no trace of efforts at either muckraking or whitewashing. Finally, the Government Printing Office deserves a share of the credit for the extremely attractive format of the volume.

ROBERT G. ALBION,*
Princeton, New Jersey.

History of U. S. Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. I, The Battle of the North Atlantic, by Samuel Eliot Morison. (Boston: Atlantic, Little-Brown. 1947. Pp. 432. \$6.00.)

This book is the first of thirteen volumes on U. S. Naval operations in the late war. It is devoted to the anti-submarine war in the Atlantic from September 1939, to May 1943.

The author, Captain Samuel Eliot Morison, U.S.N.R., is a distinguished historian, and a master mariner in his own right, who understands the sea and the men who follow it. He has had the assistance of an able staff, many of whom were active participants in the events described. Captain Morison himself spent a large part of his time at sea during the war, gathering at first hand by personal participation in many of the campaigns, material for this history.

This work is not an official history, which is

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fortunate. Having a free hand in the opinions expressed and the conclusions reached, these, coming from an experienced and impartial observer, have far more value than if they had been subjected to official restrictions.

The foreword to this volume states that the author: "has been subject to no restrictions other than those imposed by the necessity of safeguarding information which might endanger national security."

The extent to which this latter clause hampered the author is known only by himself.

This volume is a grim tale of struggle against a resourceful and unseen enemy, with inadequate means, of tremendous losses of shipping and war material, of weary months of escorting and convoying in the stormiest ocean in the world, of heroism, and in a few cases, of inefficiency and cowardice.

One is impressed by the lack of the necessary craft and weapons to meet the submarine attack for many months after it began. This was partly due to lack of funds to build or design the proper types before the war. But this does not excuse the indifference to research and preparation to meet the submarine menace which it was obvious would be a factor in the war to come.

For those in charge of the plans for the future, Captain Morison has a number of pertinent opinions.

In the mind of the reviewer, the most important one is: "that if and when another war occurs, the merchant marine should either be absorbed by the Navy or made an auxiliary service under military discipline, like the Naval Construction Battalions, the famous Seabees." (P. 300.)

The reluctance of the Navy to utilize the services of amateur yachtsmen and civilian aviators for patrol work at a time when the enemy submarine had an almost free hand along our coast receives well merited criticism. As the author states: "The C.A.P. and the Coastal Picket Patrol are outstanding American examples of that fusing of civilians with military effort for which the Russians are justly famous. They are the sort of thing we need more of, instead of inducing citizens to serve their country by swollen pay and enormous bonuses."

With reference to the failure of the Navy and the Army Air Forces to agree on methods of operation in anti-submarine warfare, one must understand the distrust engendered in the Navy after the First World War by the efforts of the Army Air Forces to limit naval aviation in every

way possible. The policy of the Army Air Forces during these years was to secure their independence of the Army, and to include practically all military and naval aviation under their jurisdiction. Naturally, this made co-operation difficult when it was most needed.

The series of volumes projected by Captain Morison, of which this is the second to be published, will be of inestimable value, not only to the public, but to the Armed Forces in their preparation for possible future war.

H. E. YARNELL,*

Washington, D. C.

U. S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War, by Duncan S. Ballantine. (Princeton Univ. Press. 1947. Pp. 300. \$3.75.)

Most of the readers of this book will have heard the word "logistics" before, but very few, it is safe to say, will have a clear notion of what it means. And that not necessarily through any fault of their own, since the term, like that other one, "geopolitics," which the war dragged out from its comfortable obscurity, has had its sharp outlines blurred by the glare of publicity. Mr. Ballantine wisely takes the trouble to set his readers straight at the outset. He defines both the broad meaning of logistics, as the complex of activities, "rooted in the productive economy of the nation and extending through successive phases of planning, procurement and distribution of men and material to the theatre of military operations." He then defines the somewhat restricted area of logistics with which his book deals. Of the two major functional fields into which logistics separates itself—procurement and distribution—he limits himself to the latter. Then, drawing a line at right angles, he excludes the entire field of personnel from consideration, and discusses only the distribution of material. Finally, he points his discussion almost exclusively at the Navy's operations in the Pacific.

This, then, is what he sometimes refers to as "military" logistics, differentiating it from the "civilian" activities—purchasing and production of military material—which in the Navy during the war were controlled by the Under Secretary. Few will feel that Mr. Ballantine's self-imposed restrictions are too narrow. His subject is vast enough for the most insatiable of academic appetites; his treatment of it is a miracle of compression.

*Admiral, U.S.N., Retired.

The central fact of the Navy's logistical experience, as Mr. Ballantine presents it, and the essence of its problem, was decentralization. This stands out in sharp contrast to the Army, where the principle of functional centralization, already firmly rooted in the concept of the General Staff, received a new impetus in the War Department reorganization of March 1942. The keynote of this reform was the centralization of supply and administrative activities in the Services of Supply. True, the submerging of the arms and services was only temporary and never wholly effective, and they emerged triumphantly autonomous again in 1946. But the war-time coordination of such broad functional areas as requirements planning, production, contracting, storage, maintenance and issue—insofar as they were common to the miscellaneous commodity and specialist activities of the services—was vastly more effective at the end of the war than at the beginning. Above all, the precedents were established, the patterns and techniques worked out; it will be surprising if they are not revived in the next war.

The Navy, by contrast, had no general staff, and achieved no such fundamental reorganization to meet the war emergency as did the Army. Its central directing agency, the Office of Naval Operations, never effectively controlled naval logistical effort. Such limited coordination as it did achieve owed more to the persuasive arts of its Vice Chief, Admiral Horne, than to the shadowy authority vested in it. The heart of the Navy's logistical activity was in the bureaus, whose autonomy was scarcely touched even by the belated and timid attempts at centralization made in 1944 and 1945.

To be sure, it is well to distinguish between a decentralizing tendency which leads to continuous fragmentation of authority and organization, and one which concentrates effort and even authority at some mid-point in the organizational scale, usually in the old, well-established departmental or regional centers of peace-time activity. It was the latter tendency which characterized Navy organization and administration of logistics. Within the bureaus, and within the naval districts, (including their elaborate regional organizations) there appeared no serious disruptive tendency. It is significant that the Navy's most effective measures to coordinate and integrate logistical activities were made not at the center but within the West Coast supply organization and in the Central and South Pacific. In these theatres, in-

cidentally, the almost absolute independence enjoyed by the area commander, Admiral Nimitz, seems to have made possible not only a high degree of integration of Navy supply and services, but also the most successful example of Army-Navy unified effort in all fields during the entire war—a success in striking contrast, curiously enough, to the failure of Admiral Nimitz' neighbor to the southwest, General MacArthur, to eliminate the duplication of effort between the two services in his area.

Despite the phenomenal energy and enthusiasm poured into the Navy's logistical effort at the bureau level, however, the absence of effective coordination at the top produced grave consequences. These were felt especially in the last two years of the war, as the emphasis shifted from production to distribution. "It is quite possible," writes the author in commenting on one phase of the situation in 1945, "that once the final operations had got under way the West Coast would have been swamped once again by a flow of goods above its planned capacity which the Navy Department was powerless to control."

Mr. Ballantine's judgment is more lenient with respect to the earlier phases of the war. Here, while acknowledging the confusion and disarticulation resulting from over-decentralization, he is inclined to extenuate the bureau system on the grounds of its quantitative record: "the system produced the goods." This judgment shows a facet of the curiously bifurcated American talent which achieves miracles of efficiency in productive output, while ignoring the most flagrant violations of the principle of economy of force. Efficiency and economy, in the last analysis, cannot be separated, and the genius which enables us to exploit will be sterile and in the end fatal unless we can use it also to conserve.

RICHARD M. LEIGHTON,*
Washington, D. C.

Admiral Dewey and the Manila Campaign, by Comdr. Nathan Sargent, USN. (Washington, D. C.: The Naval Historical Foundation. 1948. Pp. 128. \$3.00.)

Admiral Dewey and the Manila Campaign is one of the exciting naval historical discoveries of the year. This compact book, written under

*Dr. Leighton has been engaged in the historical program of the Army Service Forces since October 1943. He is now with the Historical Division, Department of the Army, writing the history of Army supply in World War II.

Dewey's supervision by his friend and assistant, Commander Nathan Sargent, USN, was completed in 1904, unreservedly approved by Dewey, and then sealed for the Admiral's lifetime. How it became lost in the welter of Dewey papers, we do not know, but the important thing for us is its present discovery and publication by the Naval Historical Foundation.

To most readers, the battle of Manila Bay is familiar ground; we all know the story of Dewey's resolute and seamanlike victory over the Spanish. Less familiar, however, is the story of his subsequent clashes with the trouble-seeking Admiral von Diederich, the German fleet commander ordered by the Kaiser to Manila in 1898, presumably to fish in troubled waters. The detailed information now revealed in this connection is presumably the reason why Dewey withheld this manuscript from publication during his lifespan. It is a dramatic story, and oddly modern in character when we compare it to similarly provocative and truculent behavior of certain foreign military commanders of the present.

For the military student, this book might well have been subtitled, "A Fleet Without a Fleet Marine Force." As we all know, Dewey destroyed Spanish seapower in the Orient on 1 May 1898. Lacking, however, an organized force of Marines within his squadron, Dewey, although he dominated Manila Bay, was unable to secure a base ashore until 12 August, when an Army "joint" expedition was finally able to land (it had been afloat in Manila Bay since 18 July, making preparations to go ashore). During these three and one-half months, even though physically in Manila Bay, Dewey might just as well have been at sea. This sequence of events is, of course, in marked contrast to Sampson's immediate seizure of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in June of the same year with his Fleet battalion of Marines. From then on, until General Shafter could get ashore at Daiquiri, Sampson was able to conduct his Cuban operations with the advantage of a secure advanced base.

No review of *Admiral Dewey and the Manila Campaign* should omit the remarkable battle photographs actually taken in course of the Manila Bay action. I believe that these must be the earliest existing photographs of a naval battle in progress. Together with the simple and clear maps, and the extraordinarily careful documentation, these make an outstanding book.

ROBERT D. HEINL, JR.*
Washington, D. C.

Pontiac and the Indian Uprising, by Howard H. Peckham. (Princeton University Press. 1947. Pp. 346. \$4.50.)

This is the first detailed history of these events since the publication almost a hundred years ago of Parkman's classic, "The Conspiracy of Pontiac." It is a well written and intensely interesting account of perhaps the greatest of all our Indian wars. The author, a trained and thoroughly competent historian, has evidently made a study of all available sources, including many not available to Parkman. The result is exceedingly worthwhile. The book is well gotten up, but the maps could be much improved by the addition of scales of miles, and by more care in the inclusion of names of places mentioned in the text.

In 1760, the British and their Colonials had successfully concluded their long series of wars with the French in North America. It was only necessary for Sir Jeffrey Amherst to take over the French forts on the Lakes and in the West. But he had little knowledge of the Indians and their wants and needs, and he despised their fighting ability. The result was a policy of "too little and too late." Amherst was neither willing to placate the Indians, nor was he willing, nor perhaps able, to send sufficient force to overawe them and keep them in subjection. He garrisoned the long line of forts from Niagara to Detroit, Michilimacknac, Green Bay, and on the St. Josephs, Maumee and Wabash, and from Lake Erie to Fort Pitt, by detachments of the Royal American (60th) Regiment, consisting usually of one officer and fifteen or twenty men. Even Michilimacknac had only thirty and Detroit one hundred.

Fort Pitt alone was strongly held.

The French on the frontier were by no means satisfied with the transfer of the country to the British and constantly prodded the Indians into war.

Louisiana west of the Mississippi had been transferred to Spain, but the French still held the river forts, and Vincennes on the Wabash.

At this time there arose among the Western Indians a "prophet" or medicine man who preached the total destruction of the Whites and the return of the Indians to their former state of savagery and paganism. It is curious to note that this prophecy was strangely repeated in 1889-90, in the "Ghost Dance" troubles.

Pontiac was a war chief of the Ottawas. Like

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all successful Indian leaders he was an opportunist. He was a practical man, for an Indian, and wanted his people to have the advantage of the white man's weapons and tools (and, it must be admitted, the use of the white man's rum), but without the domination of the white man.

Unlike Parkman, Peckham believes that Pontiac cannot be given credit for an elaborate and deliberate plan of attack on all the British posts. However, by his account (which agrees with Parkman's), here is what happened: Detroit was attacked May 9, 1763, Ft. Sandusky was taken May 16; Ft. St. Joseph May 25; Ft. Miami, May 27; Lt. Cuyler's supply convoy destroyed on Lake Erie May 28; Ft. Quittenon, on the Wabash taken June 1; Ft. Michilimackinac June 2; Ft. Venango June 16; Ft. Erie, June 18; Ft. LeBoeuf, June 16; and Ft. Pitt attacked and besieged about June 16.

Nearly every one of these attacks was a tactical surprise, and nearly every one was made before the garrison had any warning of the Indian uprising.

Never before or since has such a record been made by Indians.

Detroit would have fallen but for the fact that it had a commander, Major Gladwin of the 60th, an excellent soldier and a determined and resourceful man. But even he would have failed had he not had two armed vessels to keep open his supply line on the Lakes.

Peckham tells of a curious example of "bacterial warfare" at Fort Pitt. Capt. Ecuyer, in command, gave a Delaware chief who was parleying with him, a present of two blankets and a handkerchief from his small-pox hospital. Regardless of the question of ethics involved, the resulting epidemic of small-pox among the Delawares certainly prevented their vigorous prosecution of the war. Parkman does not mention this incident, but he does quote correspondence of Amherst advocating this method of warfare.

Of course, the revolt was eventually suppressed, but it cost the colonies over 2000 settlers killed or captured.

Pontiac was never punished. He was received and honored by the Indian Commissioners at the big powwow held at Fort Ontario in 1766. For the next three years he was engaged in intrigues with the western Indians, and was assassinated by a Peoria brave at Cahokia, opposite St. Louis, in 1769.

Peckham avoids the pitfall into which many modern writers have fallen, of over sentimentality about the wrongs of the Indians. Of course we

can not avoid sympathizing with the Indian, especially when we are at a safe distance from him in both time and space. But the situation of our ancestors in the American Colonies from the very beginning was not such as to encourage an altruistic feeling toward the Red Man.

CHARLES D. ROBERTS*
Washington, D. C.

Forging The Thunderbolt: A History of the Development of the Armored Force, by Mildred H. Gillie. (Harrisburg: Military Service. 1947. Pp. 330. \$4.00.)

Two-thirds of this volume is built around the work of Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee in bringing the Armored Force into being and virtually pulling it up by the bootstraps; the last third is devoted to the period since Gen. Chaffee's death in August 1941 and to the battle performance of armored units overseas. Readers may challenge this choice of emphasis, yet the author has made conscientious use of the personal letters of Gen. Chaffee and provided much enlightenment on the vital period of Armored Force incubation.

The book gives an accurate and interesting picture of the origin of tanks in World War I, the difficulties of performance and production, and the beginnings of the mechanized force at Fort Eustis, Va., which started after one of Chief of Staff Summerall's famous pink-slip orders: "Organize a Mechanized Force. C. P. S." That pink slip went to War Department G-3 in 1927, and Chaffee as a Major in the G-3 Training Section took an active interest in trying to carry out the directive.

Historians have pointed to the barren 1920's as having sowed the seeds of the second World War because of the backwash of anti-militarism and the effects of isolationism. Too little attention has been paid to the period of the 1930's, when the alarm bells of Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland and Spain met deaf ears and closed minds among many top military men and the general public. The utter stupidity of the Chiefs of Infantry and Cavalry in their opposition to mechanization was matched only by the passive serenity of the American people in their refusal to see the storm clouds abroad. One marvels at the patience and perspicacity of officers like Chaffee, Bruce Palmer, Van Voorhis, Sereno Brett, Alvan Gillem, and others who pushed forward and upward against great

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odds and the opposition of Old Guard military superiors. That took courage and persistence, but it also took considerable tact and end-running to circumvent the stone wall of reactionary military opposition. To speak out of turn, as Bruce Palmer did, meant ostracism from influential military circles and no chance to be "made" a brigadier general. It is a great tribute to General Chaffee that he maintained the respect of his superiors, and yet adroitly mobilized the rising sentiment for mechanization against the outworn ideas of the Chiefs of Infantry and Cavalry.

Gen. Jacob L. Devers, who succeeded Gen. Chaffee as Commanding General of the Armored Force after the latter's death, will receive far more credit for the success of the Armored Force. It must be recalled that Gen. Chaffee was in effect driving a slow truck up a steep grade, with little gasoline and plenty of back seat drivers heckling him. Gen. Devers took over near the top of the hill, junked the old truck in favor of a geared-up speedster, was supplied with all the high-test gasoline he needed, had that incomparably sound and sage Chief of Staff David G. Barr to help him at the controls, and thus roared the Armored Force machine down the straightaway to victory. But the author of *Forging the Thunderbolt* shows clearly what was involved in getting that slow truck up the steep grade.

Every penny spent on the Armored Force in the early years of its development was worth a dollar spent during the war, and Mrs. Gillie depicts the way in which Gen. Chaffee negotiated tirelessly to eke out the highest possible appropriations for the new tank force. His death came at a tragic time—four months before Pearl Harbor—but he had effectively laid the foundations.

Gen. Devers then proceeded to revolutionize the Armored Force, to place new emphasis on the use of armored artillery, to stress air-armored cooperation, to perfect infantry-tank tactics, to develop better tanks and armored vehicles, and in general to condition the Force directly for war. Almost overnight the aggressive spirit of the new Commanding General was infused into training centers all over the country. Gen. Devers brought new blood into the Armored Force, and purged the aged or incompetent who could not measure up to the acid test of war.

The author also supplies some interesting comments on the important role of Maj. C. L. Scott in building up the Armored Force Replacement Training Center and later commanding the

Armored Force; the valuable groundwork of Maj. Gen. Stephen G. Henry at the Armored Force School; and work of countless other armored division commanders in training their troops. In a chapter entitled "Tanks or to Hell With It," the author traces objectively the struggle between the Armored Force and the Army Ground Forces over the proper utilization of armored troops.

In her chapter entitled "Continental Cavalcade," the author races through the history of armor in the European Theater of Operations in 26 pages. This chapter naturally suffers from brevity, lack of analysis, and the fact it is based only on newspaper accounts and Gen. Eisenhower's Report. In addition, there is not a line on the performance of armor in the other theaters of war.

This is generally a well-written and useful piece of work. There are several very minor defects, such as the unmilitary references to "20th Corps" and "3d Armored Corps," but there are evidences of painstaking research and construction in most of the volume.

KENNETH W. HECHLER*
Princeton, New Jersey

The Purple Testament, edited by Don M. Wolfe. (New York: Doubleday. 1947. Pp. 361. \$2.50.)

In the early summer of 1944, Colonel W. A. Ganoe, then Historian of the European Theater, set up a special HQ unit in Britain, the purpose of which was to interview American battle casualties for the broad purpose of adding to our knowledge of what had happened to our forces in battle.

Subsequently, after conferring with him, I changed this mission and gave it a more limited objective. During my own tours in hospital in World War I, and while in the Pacific in the earlier part of World War II, it had come unmistakably to my notice that what a wounded man said of battle had very little bearing. His wounds, and the resulting shock, tended to eclipse all previous impressions of tactics, formations, orders, etc., while on the other hand, he could usually go into infinite detail about his experience on being hit and evacuated. In short, since the dead do not talk, this was the essence of the story of the pain of the battlefield.

Accordingly, we limited the hospital unit's research to these brutal facts. From their work came

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some hundreds of the most stark interviews ever gathered by human hands. They have never been published or edited but they lie there in some War Department file, awaiting such final use.

On picking up "The Purple Testament," I had expected to find just such a collection. But it is an entirely different thing. The writings of fifty-three disabled men and women have here been presented by the man who instructed them in English, prior to their taking service as counselors to other veterans. Some of these were battlefield casualties. The majority were not. But they were told to write of whatever they saw fit and in consequence one man writes of the ordeal of childhood and another of the ordeal of sweating out the line in a bawdy house in Honolulu.

I submit that if any fifty-three Americans of average intelligence are gathered together in a writing class, and are given these general instructions, some few of them will have a story to tell and will be capable of telling it well. The great majority will not, and while the pieces which they produce may be of interest to educators, rehabilitation experts or psychologists, they will not have a general appeal.

Because of the auspices of this book, and the other circumstances which I have outlined, kind words have been said for it by a number of distinguished men of letters such as John Dos Passos and Robert E. Sherwood. Said Edward R. Murrow of it: "The Purple Testament brings you as near to training, suffering, fighting and re-adjustment as words can do."

I wish that this were true, and that one had only to pass on the word to his fellow Americans. Simple honesty requires a quite different judgment of it. There are a few tenderly moving and well-told stories in the volume such as that of the GI who lost his dear friend, a young American scientist, on a coral reef in Fiji, and the determined struggle of an amputee (Irving Peltz) to overcome the handicap of his terrible wounds. Likewise the story told by a veteran of both World Wars of the love he had for a Russian girl whom he knew for only ten days during his experience in Harbin, Manchuria, in 1919, is a model of restraint and beauty.

But these are among the rare exceptions. Most of what has been written establishes only the futility of the effort. Don M. Wolfe, the instructor, says in his preface: "I know of no man who is not disabled; no man who is not scarred and wounded in body and mind; no man who has not borne a unique bitterness and a unique sorrow."

How very true! though it is but a way of saying that the war disabled are at one with the rest of us. Ever man has a story. But only the very few possess the talent which enables the proper telling of it.

S. L. A. MARSHALL*
Detroit, Mich.

Knudsen—A Biography, by Norman Beasley.
(New York: Whittlesey House. 1947. Pp. 397. \$3.75.)

In this book is portrayed the career of William S. Knudsen from his childhood in Denmark to his retirement from the Army and the General Motors Corporation in 1945. It has indeed been a remarkable career. Knudsen is without doubt the most extraordinary contemporary embodiment of the American dream of golden opportunity for the immigrant boy endowed with ability and diligence.

Arriving from Denmark in 1900 at the age of 20, Knudsen rose in twenty years from a ship fitter's helper at \$40 a month to the production managership of the Ford Motor Company at \$57,500 a year. In 1921, he resigned from Ford, and in 1922 joined the top executive staff of the General Motors Corporation. Two years later he became President of the Chevrolet Division and in 1927 he was appointed President of General Motors itself.

When the national defense program was launched in the summer of 1940, Knudsen resigned from General Motors to serve as one of the two full-time members of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense; he was charged with the supervision of industrial production. At the end of 1940 he was appointed Director-General of the Office of Production Management. In 1942 he was commissioned as a Lieutenant-General, the only civilian ever so commissioned, and designated Director of War Production for the War Department. In 1944 he became Director of the Air Technical Command. Finally, in mid-1945 he resigned from the Army and returned as a director to the General Motors Corporation, although now retired from active duty.

This astonishing record was the product of sheer personal merit. No favoritism or influence assisted Knudsen's career; foreign origin and a marked Danish accent were against him. But

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he combined intelligence, tireless application, and unvarnished forthrightness with a unique talent for judging production methods and an intuitive understanding of human beings and organizations. In each of his three principal employing companies, the John R. Keim Mills (bicycle and automobile parts manufacturers in Buffalo), Ford, and General Motors, he emerged at the top by a process of natural selection.

Unfortunately, Beasley's biography is most unsatisfactory. It succeeds in presenting only a blurred and hazy image of its subject. Knudsen's extraordinary qualities emerge mostly from his own words in the introduction to the book and in reports and speeches which are quoted extensively. The author's own description and commentary are disorganized, superficial, anecdotal rather than analytic, and often inaccurate in detail. There is no real exploration of Knudsen's contribution to Ford, to General Motors, or to the war effort in relation to other executives or the operations of the institutions in which he worked.

The study is particularly weak on Knudsen's period of government service. The Defense Commission, OPM, and Army years occupy almost half the volume, but they are devoted largely to quotations from reports and speeches chosen almost at random and interlarded with wholly misleading sniping comments by the author on labor unions, the New Deal, and government and politics in general. The successes of the Defense Commission and the OPM are attributed entirely to Knudsen; their failures and omissions are either disregarded or shrugged off on others.

The single and outstanding failure in Knudsen's career—his being passed over for the chairmanship of the War Production Board in favor of Donald M. Nelson—is imputed by Beasley simply to an evil conspiracy of labor leaders and New Dealers. Except for a parenthetical reference to some "unfortunate estimates" by Stettinius on material requirements, there is scarcely a hint of the OPM's slowness in pushing the conversion to war work of the durable civilian goods industries, its delays in expanding raw materials stockpiles and facilities, its weaknesses in developing an adequate priorities system, or its hesitancy in promoting sound requirements computations and production scheduling by the military services.

To recognize these facts is not to detract from Knudsen's very great contribution in the defense period. His understanding of production methods was unexcelled. His unreserved support of the program enlisted the voluntary aid of many indus-

trialists acutely hostile to the Administration at a time when their participation was indispensable. He brought the tremendous capacities of the automobile industry into defense work when many procurement officers were doubtful of its utility for munitions production.

Nonetheless, while the expansion and conversion of facilities and the organization of munitions production is a part, and perhaps the most important part, of industrial mobilization, it is not the whole. The record certainly appears to show that Knudsen fell short of grasping the more complex relationships of munitions, indirect military, and civilian production; the problems of economic stabilization and manpower direction; and the interrelated priorities, scheduling, and production controls required to achieve a fully mobilized national economy. These were the very problems which faced the War Production Board in 1942. In view of the manifold political and economic forces which came to a focus on the WPB, Knudsen's distaste for politics of any variety was a disqualifying factor. He was far more in his element as chief production inspector for the Army and the Air Force.

It is to be hoped that the publication of this volume will not preclude the writing of a more competent and thorough analysis of Knudsen's life and works. Such a study would provide rich rewards in comprehension of American industrial life and of the problems of wartime mobilization in a democracy.

LINCOLN GORDON*
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Mahan on Sea Power, by William E. Livezey.
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
1947. Pp. xvi, 334. \$3.50.)

Mr. Bernard Brodie has written that "unfortunately for Mahan's memory, he is much more often criticized than read." That is undoubtedly correct, but it is odd that until Mr. Livezey's present splendid study appeared there should have been no full "appraisal of Mahan's ideas, a correlation of them with the climate of opinion in which they took shape, and an estimate of their influence upon the course of events." Brief studies have appeared in abundance, some of them excel-

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lent, notably Mrs. Margaret Sprout's chapter in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, but no full length work other than biographies has been attempted previously. As opposed to the biographies by Taylor and Puleston, this is primarily a critical evaluation. The gap has now been filled most admirably.

Mr. Livezey's book recommends itself for several reasons. First, the contents are logically arranged for the reader's convenience, whether he be wholly interested in the subject (which will most likely turn out to be the case) or whether he merely wishes to "hit the high spots." If the latter is so, he can find practically all the information he needs in the first five chapters and the final one. He will also find the complete chronological list of Mahan's writings and the excellent bibliography essential for further reference.

If the reader is interested in the full account of the development of Mahan's theories and their impact at home and abroad, together with an excellent evaluation of them in the light of the sweeping changes of the past half century, then he will find the book recommends itself for another reason. The author, having determined all of Mahan's interests, made an exhaustive study by subject matter of the admiral's books and articles and the papers, official, periodical, and personal, bearing on those subjects. The result and value of the final synthesis of that material is a critical account of Mahan's attitudes and views and his efforts in influencing government and public opinion on policy on the Caribbean, Hawaii, the Philippines, and naval subjects. No other study of Mahan gives such complete and detailed coverage.

The length of the book provides yet a further recommendation. Brief accounts do not permit such detail as will make the facts stick. The influence of Mahan as a "publicist-propagandist" is often vividly demonstrated by the inclusion of quoted (and very quotable) selections of correspondence to and from such public figures as Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Benjamin F. Tracy, Whitelaw Reid, or Albert Shaw. Also Mahan's moral sentiment as a "Christian expansionist," which pervaded his thinking, is most clearly presented. The book, more than any other writing on Mahan, gave this reviewer the full impression of the intensity of Mahan's belief in the expansion of his country's interests beyond the seas.

Surprising as it may be in view of the above

comments, the one adverse criticism which may be directed at Mr. Livezey's treatment is the fact that his account of the central theory of the doctrine of sea power, covered in Chapter III, is much too brief. It may be, however, that the author agrees with Mr. Brodie and is attempting to have his reader turn straight to the first eighty-odd pages of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*. If such is the case, the chapter's brevity is more than justified.

One word more. This fine study has an equally fine format, with good paper, good printing, and good design throughout. It is also remarkably free, with the exception of one or two typographical errors and two misspelled Hawaiian names, of those trivial but none the less irritating errors that too often are found.

ROBERT M. LUNNY,*
Washington, D. C.

History of the Sixth Marine Division,
edited by First Lieutenant Bevan G. Cass,
USMC. (Washington: Infantry Journal
Press. 1948. Pp. 262. \$5.00.)

Military unit histories, however interesting to members of the unit described, are seldom as interesting or understandable to outsiders and laymen. A notable exception is the *History of the Sixth Marine Division*, and the reason probably may be attributed to three objectives which those who prepared this book set as their goals: first, to make the account of the division's tactical operations factually accurate for the benefit of students of military science; second, to acquaint members of the division with the overall purpose behind the maneuvers of subordinate organizations as related to the larger plan—in this respect, providing the "why" behind orders executed without question, which frequently were not fully understood by the men who executed them; and third, most difficult of all, to tell a comprehensible story to the families and friends of all Marines who served in the division. The full accomplishment of any one of these objectives would have been praiseworthy in itself; the successful accomplishment of all three will assure this book a high place in the field of World War II unit histories.

Well illustrated with hundreds of excellent photographs and numerous maps (drawn by Lieutenant Cass, the editor, whose cartographic ability is of the first order), the story of the Sixth Ma-

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rine Division is told in the highly readable style of Mr. Fletcher Pratt, to whom its writing was entrusted. This, alone, should be enough to recommend the book to most readers, but it must be remembered that the division, activated in time to take part in the last great amphibious campaign of the war—Okinawa, and the units from which it was formed, fought some of the most important battles in the Pacific, thus providing Mr. Pratt with a wealth of good story material. It will be noted by those familiar with the facts that this material was not abused or distorted.

JAMES R. STOCKMAN,*
Washington, D. C.

Four Stars of Hell, by Captain Laurence Critchell. Foreword by Lieutenant General Brereton (New York: The Declan X. McMullen Co. 1947. Pp. 354. \$3.75.)

The title refers to the four battle stars on the ETO ribbon awarded the 101st Airborne Division. On the jacket, the publisher states, "While the book is intended as a record of the 501st Parachute Regiment, the history of the entire 101st Division—in fact of the whole invasion—is seen in accurate, human detail." This claim is an exaggeration. The book is a narrative of the 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, attached to the 101st Division from January 1944 until August 1945.

In his prefatory note and acknowledgements, Captain Critchell indicates that the material for his story was obtained from interviews he had with other members of his regiment, from various source materials gathered by the Historical Section, ETOUSA, from unpublished studies, and from published accounts. He makes it clear that his is not a complete record, but rather a story of the 501st's actions which in his judgment were most important. Finally, he advises the reader: "There is really only one way to look at war, and that is through the eyes of the men who fought it. You gain little by going to the high peaks where the plans are made. . . It is better to stay down where your fellow men stayed, close to the earth and the terror. For the truth of war is there. . ."

The subjective approach to the writing of military history has other proponents but the author might easily get a rise out of some of his practicing brothers who regard plans and the planners

as at least a necessary evil in the waging of war. The problem of the level of treatment does not have a pat answer. The method best suited to the ETO isn't suitable to describe the island hopping campaigns in the Pacific. In final analysis it probably comes down to the writer's purpose. What is sauce for the person interested in morals or heroics isn't necessarily sauce for the student interested in tactics or strategy or logistics.

As to the "truth of war," it appears that one of the author's difficulties arose out of his effort to reconcile the stories obtained from those he interviewed relative to the action at the La Barquette locks with the interviews and other information in the ETOUSA files (see footnote p. 54). The reader should know that the War Department's Historical Division is laboring diligently to get at the truth surrounding the actions described by the author. Of those actions in which the 501st participated no history from official records has yet been published. The only one thus far written is "Utah Beach," which is in the hands of the printer and is scheduled for publication in July 1948.

The careful reader may raise some questions about the details of the actions described. The author states that the 1st Battalion was to seize the La Barquette locks and blow the Douve bridges (p. 47), whereas the planned mission of the 1st was to seize the locks; the bridges were to have been blown by the 2nd Battalion. No mention is made of the important fact that the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion was killed, his executive officer apparently captured and all other company commanders and staff were missing initially. There is a difference of opinion as to the effectiveness of the pathfinder radar devices which the author (p. 45) says flatly "turned out poorly." The drops were scattered, but there is evidence to indicate that the pathfinder teams accomplished at least part of their missions. In the story of Bastogne, the author makes no mention of the fact that Colonel Ewell, commanding the 501st after Colonel Johnson was killed in Holland, had spent part of a November leave in Bastogne and that his knowledge of the terrain gained on that busman's holiday served his regiment and the defense well.

These are not serious detractors. What the author gives the reader is a moving story of some of the experiences of some of his fellow-parachutists. They are experiences which one is not likely to find in any official history—why men volunteered for paratroop service, the reaction to the first jump, the selflessness and devotion to duty

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of the Chaplains—notably Father Sampson. Here is a sympathetic treatment of men and their commanders, their reactions to many things — the higher commanders, cartoons, rations, looting, killing, the enemy, the allies. The reader cannot help but feel that he better understands why the paratroopers were tough and why the 101st earned its reputation as a crack fighting outfit.

CHARLES A. WARNER,*

Washington, D. C.

Dollar-a-Year and Without Compensation Personnel Policies, August 1939 to November 1945, by James A. McAleer. Special Study No. 27, War Production Board. (Government Printing Office. Issued April 20, 1947. Pp. 115.)

Rubber Policies, May 1940 to December 1941, by George W. Auxier. Special Study No. 28, War Production Board. (Government Printing Office. Issued April 25, 1947. Pp. 103.)

These two monographs are among the recent publications of one of the most successful government historical programs. Their subject matter is unrelated, and only the happenstance of their publication date dictates that they be reviewed together.

As in World War I, non-salaried personnel were used extensively by various government agencies during the past war. In most cases these individuals remained on the payroll of their private companies, thus enabling them to make the patriotic sacrifice of serving in wartime Washington while not being chopped down to \$10,000-a-year size. "Non-salaried," therefore, meant simply that it was possible for the government to obtain specialized industrial knowledge with little charge on the public treasury and without the embarrassments of the \$10,000 salary ceiling.

President Roosevelt gleefully recounted to the press in the spring of 1941 that all the dollar-a-year men were listed as Republicans except a boy who had graduated from Yale in June 1940 and had never voted. The President then asked Knudsen if he couldn't scour the country for a Democrat to add to the list, but Roosevelt quoted Knudsen as replying, "I have searched the whole country over and there's no Democrat rich enough to take a job at a dollar a year." As the special study points out, the government had to exercise

extreme care to insure that the public interest was safeguarded in this type of appointment. There is a useful discussion of the ordeal of developing the necessary administrative policies to prevent the use of these appointments to the advantage of private companies and individuals.

This study pulls no punches in describing the early shortcomings which accompanied the haphazard hiring of non-salaried personnel in the tooling-up period of national defense. Nor does it withhold any of the bitterness of the criticisms of the Truman Committee, labor, small business, and the general public against some of the early policies of the War Production Board on non-salaried personnel. The monograph concludes that such personnel provided "an indispensable source of leadership" for the war agencies, and that despite the many criticisms the net contribution of these men was outstandingly high.

The WPB monograph on rubber policies covers the period from May 1940 to December 1941, and also meets the standards of scholarly thoroughness and objectivity of approach. It shows how the fumbling control and resistance of the rubber industry during this period contributed to a dangerous depletion of rubber stocks. In the opinion of this reviewer the Office of Production Management proved even more timid than the monograph would indicate, since it might have saved us many rubber headaches by earlier and firmer determination in its dealings with the rubber industry. Nevertheless, the study presents a well-balanced picture of the difficulties involved in the industry-government relationships, and is a very revealing analysis of the influence of private pressures on administrative policy.

As pointed out in the monograph, the nub of the contention of the rubber industry was that its financial structure might collapse if it accumulated an excessively large supply which might prove unneeded. Until the first bombs fell on Pearl Harbor, there was still the possibility that raw rubber sources in the Far East might remain available, and this bolstered the rubber industry in its resistance to the development of stockpiles and synthetic plants—particularly the latter. Of course the activities of the Rubber Reserve Company of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in financing stockpiling and the construction of synthetic plants is treated incidentally in this monograph; it will be useful to have the full story available when the RFC completes its historical studies on rubber.

In addition to its analysis of the stockpiling and

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synthetic rubber programs, the monograph carefully details the other measures taken by the National Defense Advisory Commission and Office of Production Management to conserve the supply of rubber—such as reclaiming rubber, developing new sources, advising on export control, regulating the distribution of neoprene and other synthetic rubbers, and advising on conservation and rationing.

KENNETH W. HECHLER,
Princeton, New Jersey.

Bomber Offensive, by Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir Arthur Harris. (New York: Macmillan. 1947. Pp. 288. \$2.75.)

This is the best book on the nature, development, and employment of strategic air power that has appeared since the war. It is refreshingly frank and honest. It is well written, with far less emphasis on the personal pronoun, first person singular, than is customary among British soldier-authors.

Most of the book deals with the operations of RAF Bomber Command against Germany. Particular attention is paid to the evolution of tactics and pathfinder techniques. Harris draws two important conclusions: one, that it is far better to bomb industry as a whole than it is to concentrate on a particular target system (such as synthetic oil plants); second, that if the Allied war leaders had possessed enough faith in strategic bombing to give us in 1943 the air force which we had in 1944 "Germany would have been defeated outright by bombing. . . ."

Americans will take exception to some of the author's claims and to his unfavorable comparison of the Eighth Air Force with Bomber Command. But they will enjoy the book, and find in it much that is interesting and valuable.

ALBERT F. SIMPSON,*
Washington, D. C.

Troopships of World War II, by Roland W. Charles. (Washington: Army Transportation Association. 1947. Pp. 374. \$3.25.)

This work furnishes from numerous and varied sources the essential facts concerning the war-time service of 358 troopships which were used to transport U. S. Army personnel overseas with photograph of each of these ships. The author, Mr.

Roland W. Charles, a naval architect who is an Annapolis graduate, has personally inspected a great number of the vessels referred to in his book in connection with his extensive experience in the War Department's water transport activities. The ships described are treated under six groups according to ownership or jurisdiction: Army, Navy, War Shipping Administration (U. S. Registry vessels), War Shipping Administration (Foreign Registry vessels), British-controlled craft, and Army Hospital Ships. Navy attack transports are omitted as are the war-time operations of British-controlled vessels. Appendices include a name list of 33 EC2 Liberty ships fully converted to carry troops and used as such mostly for local theater transport, a name list of Liberties hastily altered to lift prisoners of war, largely from the Mediterranean and European theaters, and to repatriate American troops from the Pacific, and a name list of Victory ships converted to redeploy and return troops. A brief bibliography, a gazeteer, and an index notably increase the reference value of this comprehensive work on Allied troopships.

Using the data here presented the reader can inform himself of the provenance of the net total of 335 troopships that were utilized, their age, speed, and troop capacity; the number of round trips they made by theater; losses (remarkably light) by cause, and the casualties that resulted; and where the ships were constructed. Considerable information is provided regarding conversion and repairs, but complete information on these subjects could not be obtained. The data furnished also permits an estimate of numbers and types of ships and their troop capacity at given times from a date shortly before Pearl Harbor to a date shortly after VJ Day. A compilation of hard facts, concisely presented and attractively illustrated, the volume makes no effort to present the experience of the men and women carried by these ships.

It is to be hoped that a sequel or companion volume will follow as more data is made available concerning such topics as the construction, conversion and repair records achieved, the units and key personnel transported, and the shipments of certain priority equipment of decisive importance in various phases of the war.

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OTHER RECENT BOOKS

As You Were: A Cavalcade of Events with the Australian Services from 1788 to 1947. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. Pp. 202. 1947.)

A compilation of short notes on the military history of Australia; well illustrated and pleasant reading. Typical is "The Songs We Sang," by Tom M. Ronan, which covers the Australian army songs of the last war from "South of the Border" to "Roll Out the Barrell." It was a shock to find that the Australians—at least according to Ronan—never sang "Waltzing Matilda."

Lindsell's Military Organization and Administration, by Brigadier J. F. Benoy. (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Limited. 1948. Pp. 301. 12/9.)

The Essentials of Military Knowledge, by Major D. K. Palit. (Aldershot: Gale and Polden Limited. 1947. Pp. 140. 10/6.)

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Customs of the Services, by Group Captain A. H. Stradling. (The Wellington Press, Gale and Polden Limited. Aldershot. 1947. Pp. 91. 5/-.)

These are four extremely useful, pocket-sized books produced for the modern British army. The first is the 27th revision of an outstanding textbook on the organization and administration of the British army, brought up to the minute. It should be in the hands of anyone doing work on that establishment in view of its considerable change since 1939. The second book by Major Palit is really a brief history of tactics and strategy, with the lessons learned applied to modern problems through a study of the Polish campaign

of 1939. It has many sketch maps. Major Edward's book is full of interesting accounts of existing regimental customs and traditions, proving that their value has not been lost to the modern British army. Group Captain Stradling's volume covers the etiquette of military service, and the reviewer can think of no volume more practical for the American officer to study. It is lightly written and in places highly amusing.

FREDERICK P. TODD,
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D-DAY, ROI-NAMUR

BY LT. COL. ROBERT D. HEINL, JR.,
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Seizure of positions in the Marshall Islands, in January 1944, constituted the second long step of our westward march across the Central Pacific which had been commenced by the V Amphibious Corps at Tarawa and Makin ten weeks earlier.

Notable for boldness in conception and complexity both in timing and execution, the Marshalls assaults contemplated virtually simultaneous landings to secure Majuro Atoll and Kwajalein Atoll, the latter of which was defended and garrisoned in force by approximately 8,000 Japanese. Kwajalein, largest atoll in the world, was controlled by the enemy from two main bases: Kwajalein Island, on the southern elbow of the reef; and the twin islands of Roi and Namur, siamesed together by a connecting sandspit and located at the northern extremity of the atoll. Each of these bases controlled passes, or channels, leading into the lagoon, and each embodied air facilities (although Roi-Namur was the principal air base of the Marshalls, whereas Kwajalein Island was still under development).

Planning for the Marshalls had been undertaken in haste and under considerable pressure. The profound lessons of Tarawa (November 20, 1943) had necessitated basic revisions in work already prepared, and it was as late as December 1943, less than two months until D-Day, that the final objectives

were selected. Both Kwajalein Island and Roi-Namur were to be captured, the former by Army units, and the latter by the 4th Marine Division. Overall command of Expeditionary Troops for the operation vested in Major General Holland M. Smith, USMC, and his headquarters (V Amphibious Corps, Fleet Marine Force).


Typical of all operations against Kwajalein Atoll—and indeed, of atoll operations throughout the Pacific—the capture of Roi-Namur involved the following preliminary tasks:

- (1) Forcing a passage into the lagoon (reef and surf conditions prohibited landings from seaward).
- (2) Gaining control of minor islands from which this passage could be controlled, and from which our anchorages could be protected and supported prior to seizure of main objectives.
- (3) Seizure of minor islands from which our own artillery could bombard Roi and Namur; as well as of islands which flanked the boat-lanes into the chosen beaches on Roi-Namur.

All the foregoing tasks, which must be performed by elements of the 4th Marine Division, were lumped together into a first phase of the operation plan, and were to be executed in the course of a single day, D-Day, January 31, 1944. On the following, it was hoped, the main landings on Roi-Namur could proceed.

It should be explained at this point that the 4th Marine Division, destined to distinguish itself on Saipan, Tinian and Iwo Jima, was at this moment embarking upon its first combat operation. It had been form-

*Colonel Heinl, Chief of the Marine Corps Historical Section, has based his article on Chapter II of the forthcoming Marine Corps narrative of the Marshalls campaign. It describes the operations vicissitudes, and final success of *Ivan* Landing Group (25th Marines, reinforced) in seizure of outlying islands preliminary to the main assaults by the 4th Marine Division on Roi-Namur.



KWAJALEIN ATOLL

Scale in Nautical Miles



ed six months earlier at Camp Pendleton, California, and was commanded by Major General Harry Schmidt, USMC. Both the planning and training of the division had been hasty and under pressure, an inevitable reflection of the haste and pressure to be found on higher echelons regarding the forthcoming operation. In addition, although Tarawa had demonstrated conclusively the indispensability of the amphibian tractor, or LVT, for assault landings against atolls, the supply of these vehicles not only throughout the Pacific, but in the United States itself, was critically short, as was the number of trained operators. These factors necessitated that the division be committed to action with barely enough tractors, at an optimistic estimate, for the tasks which it was to do; and with a considerable proportion of incompletely trained amtrac personnel.

The unit entrusted with execution of the preliminary tasks mentioned above consisted, essentially, of the 25th Marines (Reinforced) with a number of necessary augmentations, the whole commanded by Brigadier General James L. Underhill, USMC, Assistant Division Commander, with a provisional staff group. This force was given the code-name of IVAN Landing Group. It is their story which we recount—the story of their confusions and their successes, a story which typified the first day of the Kwajalein operation, both at Roi-Namur and in the south, at Kwajalein Island.

IVAN AND JACOB

Shortly before dawn January 31, at 0511, the attack transports and fire-support ships of the Northern Landing Force for the FLINTLOCK (Marshalls) operation reached station. On this D-Day, operations consisted of securing certain outlying islands adjacent to Roi-Namur, and of forcing passage into Kwajalein's great lagoon.

The initial objective of the day was to

secure Mellu and Ennuebbing Islands, southwest of Roi, in order that the adjacent passes into the lagoon might thus be opened, and that the guns of the 14th Marines could go into position to support the next day's main assault. Ennuebbing, whose code name was IVAN, and Mellu, designated JACOB, were therefore to become the first Japanese soil ever to be captured in assault by U. S. Marines.

Landings on both Mellu and Ennuebbing were to be executed simultaneously by IVAN Landing Group at H-hour (tentatively set for 0900) by the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, (Lt. Col. Clarence J. O'Donnell) reinforced by Company D, 4th Tank Battalion.¹ Company B, 25th Marines, would seize Mellu—it was planned—from seaward, landing on beach Blue 1; Company C of the same battalion, together with the Scout Company, would land over Blue 2 on Ennuebbing, likewise from seaward. Troops would proceed from their transports² by LCVP to rendezvous with and transfer to the amphibian tractors which would take the leading waves in. Thereafter the minesweepers, a covering fire-support unit, and the balance of the IVAN group would enter the lagoon for the remaining landings, while the artillery went into position.

The morning, save for the rough sea, was typical of the Marshalls. An overcast, with promise of tropical rain-squalls, reddened the sky as the sunrise neared. A steady 19-knot easterly breeze kicked up a chop in the faces of the Marines as the LCVP's butted their way toward the LST areas where, bows-

¹It should be explained that under the organization in effect at this time the missions now performed by a division reconnaissance company were then assigned to one company (scout company), D, within the divisional tank battalion. To prevent confusion, this company will hereinafter be referred to as "Scout Company".

²1st Battalion, 25th Marines, was embarked in USS *Warren*, and the Scout Company, following standard amphibious reconnaissance practice, in a destroyer-transport, USS *Schley*.

on toward the sea and toward the silent objectives, rode the LST's preparing to disgorge their amphibian tractors.

A few minutes before sunrise, the various fire-support units had reached station. Theirs was the task of final preparation for the main landings to come. Southeast of Namur steamed two battleships (*Tennessee* and *Colorado*), two heavy cruisers (*Louisville* and *Mobile*), and a pair of destroyers. These would work over Roi, Namur, and (if needed) Ennugarret. One destroyer each was assigned, from this same area, to bombard Ennumennet (*USS Porterfield*) and Ennubirr (*USS Haraden*). West of Roi lay Admiral Spruance's flagship, the heavy cruiser *Indianapolis*, together with one battleship (*Maryland*), two light cruisers (*Santa Fe* and *Biloxi*), and two more destroyers. These ships would concentrate on Roi, which was believed at this time to be much the "tougher" of the two main objectives.³ Despite the good work of the carrier task force and the fast battleships, much remained to be done in the way of deliberate, short-range destructive fire, and this was the task of Admiral Conolly's saurian, hard-hitting old battleships and escort-carriers. At 0651, the first salvos cracked out, and dawn literally came up like thunder over Kwajalein atoll.

Two miles out from IVAN and JACOB, as the sun rose, the destroyer *Phelps*, primary control vessel, marked the lines of departure for both islands⁴ and conducted fire-support

missions. Nearby would ride the submarine chaser SC-997 bearing General Underhill, who would personally oversee the initial assault of O'Donnell's battalion.

As soon as aircraft could get off carrier-decks by first light, Navy torpedo-planes and dive-bombers were on their way toward Roi-Namur for the day's first air-strike, which was duly executed at 0715 while the ships' bombardment was checked so as not to endanger planes.⁵

The Marines of O'Donnell's battalion had been up since reveille at 0330. Following a typical transport breakfast of canned fruit-juice,⁶ cold meat, and coffee, they had boated in LCVP's at 0530, and were now, after their choppy wet run into the LST area, transferring to the amphibian tractors of Company B, 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, getting thoroughly drenched and occasionally seasick in the process. Furthermore, with the wind blowing steadily from the east, the rough seas could be expected not only to delay all boating and transfers, but especially the movement of the amphibian tractors toward the beaches, which would take them directly into the sea. Amphibian tractors, never the most speedy of craft, could not, in face of this wind and sea, therefore, make good more than two knots, (approximately half speed).

While the IVAN and JACOB landing forces were thus occupied, the balance of the 25th Marines (Reinforced) was likewise boating for its subsequent landings within the lagoon. Due to the multiplicity of objectives scheduled for D-Day, the supply of available am-

³Historical Section Interview with Colonel H. L. Litzenberg, July 10, 1945, hereinafter cited as *Litzenberg*, p. 1. Information on fire-support plan from Commander, Amphibious Group 3 Operation Order A157-44, hereinafter cited as *Opn Order A157-44*.

⁴This ship, whose role was destined to occasion considerable discussion, was also flag of Fire Support Unit 5, composed of herself and six of the new LCI Gunboats which were to support the landings and cover the mine-sweepers. Commander, Destroyer Squadron 1, in *Phelps*, thus had not only his normal duties to perform, but those of fire-support, covering, despatch of boat-waves and supervision of the line of departure. On the bridge of this destroyer, 11 voice-radio circuits were being manned this morning. *Litzenberg*.

⁵This and following chronological narrative of IVAN-JACOB landings and associated operations, represent a synthesis of the following sources, unless otherwise indicated: *4thMarDiv SAR*, enclosure (A), pp. 6-8; *4thMarDiv Journal*, D-Day; Action Report, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, February 16, 1944, hereinafter cited as *1/25 SAR*; Action Report of Commander Destroyer Squadron One, February 25, 1944, hereinafter cited as *ComDesRonOne SAR*.

⁶Styled "battery-acid" in the lingo of the Marines.

phibian tractors would only permit initial embarkation of the assault waves of the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines, in these craft, while the 3d Battalion would embark in LCVP's prepared to transfer later in the day—it was planned—to amphibian tractors released by the Mellu and Ennuebbing forces. Under the best of circumstances this would be a complicated arrangement.

At 0800, not yet fully mindful of the potential delays which were already beginning to become apparent on lower echelons, Admiral Conolly announced by radio that H-Hour (the time for IVAN-JACOB landings) would be 0900, as previously planned; A-Hour (for Ennubirr and Ennumennet), at 1130; and B-Hour (for Ennugarret), 1600. A few minutes after this signal, at 0825, 17 aircraft from the escort-carrier *Chenango* swept down, as the thundering bombardment again lifted, to plaster the southwest point of Roi and the southeast point of Namur, the two promontories (*Sally* and *Wendy*) which flanked the main landing beaches. While this strike was in progress, Major Charles Duchcein, the 4th Division air-observer, flying beneath a thousand-foot ceiling, carefully scrutinized Mellu and Ennuebbing, reporting no signs of enemy activity in the thick brush below.

By the time the airstrike had lifted, it was apparent to the Control Officer at the line of departure in the *Phelps* that H-Hour would not be met. At 0835, he predicted a 15-minute delay; a few minutes later, he anticipated 20 minutes before the leading waves could land. By 0900, Admiral Conolly and General Schmidt, aboard the Northern Attack Force command-ship *Appalachian*,⁷ realized that H-Hour must be officially set back, and this was done at 0903 by a despatch establishing the revised H-Hour as 0930.

At almost the moment of Admiral Conolly's signal postponing H-Hour, the armored

amphibian tractors⁸ of Companies B and D, 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, churned across the line of departure past the *Phelps*, preceded by the specially-armed LCI-gunboats—likewise an innovation—which were to "drench" the beaches with a massive salvo of rockets just before the troops landed.⁹

Ten minutes later, when the amphibian tractors were 3,000 yards offshore, planes from the *Essex* screamed down on Ennuebbing and Mellu, bombing and strafing the still-silent undergrowth of the two green islets. Roi, however, was not silent at this moment, for, hardly had the airstrike commenced (with consequent lifting of the ships' bombardment) than the twin-mount enemy 5-inch battery on the northwest tip of Roi opened on Fire Support Unit Two. To this intermittent and fortunately inaccurate fire, the *Indianapolis* replied with several 8-inch salvos which neutralized, but, as subsequent events proved, did not destroy the Japanese battery.

As the airstrike lifted, the Mellu LCI-gunboats released their rocket-barrages with an unholy roar and hiss, and, a few seconds later, the beach (Blue 1) was smothered in thudding, erupting clusters of smoke, sand

⁷The presence of the *Appalachian*, an amphibious command-ship, was a distinct innovation in Pacific operations. Together with the *Rocky Mount*, flying Admiral Turner's flag in the Southern Attack Force, this constituted the Pacific debut of the "AGC" as these indispensable ships were officially denominated. Originally employed by Admiral Hewitt in the Sicilian landings, the AGC was specially designed in communication-facilities, office-space and accommodations, for the operation afloat of attack and landing force headquarters during the amphibious assault.

⁸Sometimes erroneously called "amphibian (amphibious) tanks"; officially designated LVT(A); and colloquially referred to by most Marines as "armored amtracs".

⁹The LCI(G) (standing for "Landing Craft, Infantry, Gunboat-type"), were a modification of the conventional craft of the LCI type, and were specially armed with a battery of 4.5-inch barrage-rocket launchers and additional 40mm and 20mm guns. These ships were the USS(G) 450, 451, 452, 453, 457, 346 and 449. *ComDesRonOne SAR*, p. 9, and *ComPhibGrp3 SAR*, Encl. (A), p. 5.

and vegetation. At the same time, a final strafing attack by fighter-planes commenced, and both Mellu and Ennuebbing received a ten-minute "dusting".

The armored amtracs passed through the line of gunboats, firing as they advanced, and divided to port and starboard so that one platoon (six LVT(A)'s) lay within two hundred yards of the beach on each side of the boat-lanes, down which the advancing tractors of the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, now headed for Mellu. Within a few minutes, at 0952, the leading wave of Company B, 25th Marines, had crunched over the coral reef, and, for the first time in World War II, U. S. Marines in assault had set foot on Japanese soil.

While all this was in progress, events seemed to be conspiring against the Ennuebbing landing by Company C, 25th Marines, and the Scout Company. Not only had the reef off Ennuebbing proved more formidable than that just crossed, but the heavy seas, heaped up by the wind, seemed enough to daunt even the amphibian tractors, which were, in fact, making heavy weather of it. Despite this, the LCI-gunboats loosed their rocket-barrages, and the LVT(A)'s formed to shell Beach Blue 2 as planned. At the same time, although the ubiquitous fighter-aircraft continued to buzz back and forth over Ennuebbing to cover the mounting delay, fire from Roi began to be received in the vicinity of the *Phelps* and the assemblage of congregated boat-waves awaiting dispatch to the beach.

Realizing the difficulty and danger in attempting to mount Ennuebbing's ironbound reef, the leading waves of the Scout Company—in the absence of effective direction by the control personnel of Transport Division 26¹⁰—were diverted, under their own

officers, to a more suitable beach just inside Ennuebbing Pass, on the southeast (lagoon) side of the island. Here, only three minutes after the first waves had beached on Mellu at 0955, these of the Scout Company reached Ennuebbing while the fighters continued strafing other parts of the island contiguous to Beach Blue 2, where Company C, 25th Marines, was vainly trying to cross the reef.

Meanwhile, after being peppered by what seemed to be light antiaircraft weapons, the *Phelps* was now under fire again from the 5-inch battery on Roi, to which the destroyer promptly replied, finally by silencing¹¹ the Japanese guns after an eight-minute duel.

It was now past 1000, and the situation on Beach Blue 2 was evidently too much for the tractors of Company C, one of which had already capsized in the surf. Observers in the air could see LVT's backing off, and a few minutes later, selecting a more suitable seaward beach on the southwest (seaward) shore of Ennuebbing, just opposite that which the Scouts had already gained. Inasmuch as the latter unit had already built up a cross-island skirmish-line facing north, it was a simple matter at 1015 for Company C to land in rear of this and form in support.

Within another quarter of an hour, as the Marine skirmish-line moved northward up the island, encountering slight resistance from what seemed to be no more than a platoon of the enemy, Lt. Col. O'Donnell had landed, and opened his battalion command post on the southeast beach (lagoon shore) of Ennuebbing. By 1145, after a methodical mop-up, in which 17 enemy dead were counted and two prisoners taken, Ennuebbing was declared secure.

On Mellu, meanwhile, even less resistance

¹⁰Memorandum from Assistant Division Commander to CG, 4thMarDiv, March 24, 1944, pp. 1-3, herein after cited as *Underhill Memo*.

¹¹The 6-inch battery of the *USS Santa Fe* also worked over this battery at 1009. *USS Santa Fe* serial 0034, Action Report on bombardment of Roi Island, February 18, 1944, hereinafter cited as *Santa Fe SAR*.

had been encountered, and, less than a half hour after the initial landing, at 1015, word was flashed back that the island had been secured. Thirteen enemy dead were counted, and three prisoners were in the hands of Company B, 25th Marines, the report added.

All told, the capture of IVAN and JACOB had cost the 25th Marines only 16 casualties: four killed in action, four missing in action, and eight wounded.

It was a matter of only a few minutes, after news of Mellu's capture had reached General Underhill, that the 3d Battalion, 14th Marines (75mm pack-howitzer), were enroute in LCM's to the beach, being ordered in at 1100. By 1145, the artillerymen were landing their pack-howitzers.

On Ennuebbing, while the mop-up progressed, Colonel Samuel C. Cumming, commanding the 25th Marines, landed at 1045, and thereupon opened his command post in the vicinity of that already established by O'Donnell. By early afternoon, the 105mm howitzers of the 4th Battalion, 14th Marines, had been gotten ashore on Ennuebbing and the gunners were heaving their pieces (less one which had been lost at sea in a swamped LCM) into the position-areas previously selected on the north shore of the island.

ALLEN, ALBERT AND ABRAHAM¹²

The second stage of the Northern Landing Force's complex plan of operation on D-Day involved the assault and seizure of three small islands just southeast of Namur: En-

nubirr (ALLEN); Ennumennet (ALBERT); and Ennugarret (ABRAHAM). With these in our hands, it would be possible to emplace the remainder of the 4th Division artillery to support the main landings of Rio-Namur, and the right flank of the boat-lanes for that assault would likewise be secured. Like the capture of Mellu and Ennuebbing, this task was assigned to the IVAN Landing Group.

Ennubirr, wooded site of the main Japanese radio-transmitter, defended by approximately a platoon of enemy (probably communication personnel), was the objective of the 2d Battalion 25th Marines (reinforced), commanded by Lt. Col. Lewis C. Hudson. Ennumennet, slightly smaller, lay just north of Ennubirr, and contained no military installation of importance to the defenders, being held only by a security detachment of ten Japanese, whose sole fortifications consisted of a length of fire-trench. This island was to be overrun by the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines (reinforced), under command of Lt. Col. Justin M. Chambers, who would then be prepared, on order, to cross the shallow strand which separated Ennumennet from Ennugarret, the island immediately adjoining Namur. This last, it was hoped, could be secured just prior to nightfall, inasmuch as the enemy defenders were known to be few and lightly armed.

Due to the shortage of amphibian tractors—in turn an inevitable product of the multiplicity of objectives—only the ALLEN landing force (2d Battalion, 25th Marines which was also to act as reserve for the Mellu-Ennuebbing landings) could initially be boated in tractors, and even this unit was required to embark one boat-wave (the eighth) in LCVP's. As for the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, destined for ALBERT and ABRAHAM, the force would boat initially in LCVP's, remain afloat in the transfer-area outside the lagoon off Mellu and Ennueb-

¹²This account of the *Albert-Allen-Abraham* landings is, unless otherwise stated, a synthesis of the following sources: *4th Mar Div SAR*, pp. 8-10; Two, *Combat Team 25*, February 20, 1944, pp. 1-5, hereinafter cited as *2/25 SAR*; *Report of Operations, D and D-plus 1 Day*, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, February 9, 1944, pp. -3, hereinafter cited as *3/25 SAR*; *ComDesRonOne SAR*; *Report of Operations*, 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, *Flintlock*, March 17, 1944, hereinafter cited as *10th Amtrac SAR*.

bing, and then transfer—it was planned—into amphibian tractors released from the IVAN and JACOB landings by Lt. Col. O'Donnell's 1st Battalion. Both battalion landing teams would then be guided into the lagoon as soon as IVAN and JACOB passes had been secured and swept; and the landings on ALLEN and ALBERT would proceed simultaneously, commencing at A-Hour, which Admiral Conolly had announced would be 1130. As may readily be realized, this boating and landing plan was necessarily complicated and subject to the operation of numerous variables beyond the control of the Marines themselves.

Fire-support for these landings would be provided by two destroyers, one each for Ennubirr and Ennumennet; plus the same combination of LCI rocket-fire and armored amphibian fires as that which had been worked out for Mellu and Ennuebbing. Fifteen-minute air-strikes would hit both objectives prior to the landings.¹³

Since the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines (Reinforced) was in reserve for the landings on Mellu and Ennuebbing, this landing team, embarked in the *USS Sumter*, made early reveille at 0230, and commenced debarkation in the dark, at 0530. By 0645, Companies E and F, together with other assault elements of the team, had completed the wet and arduous transfer to amphibian tractors, and by 0720, the entire landing team was clear of the *Sumter*, destined to spend an unhappy morning in the cradle of the ground-swell.

At 0830, following a more leisurely schedule, the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines (Reinforced) began boating in LCVP's from the *USS Biddle*. This landing team constituted the reserve for IVAN Landing Group as a whole and therefore would be the last battalion to land; as a result it was possible to de-

fer debarkation until daylight.

For both units, however, the morning, though not marked by the urgency and confusion which was already dogging the Mellu-Ennuebbing operations, presented problems. In the case of Hudson's battalion, by 1030 all radio communication was lost due to the drenching swells which splashed over and into the amphibian tractors. Chambers's battalion, although it had commenced timely debarkation into boats, found these operations interrupted from 0950 until 1130, during which period the *Biddle* found it necessary to remain underway in order to maintain correct position. This of course halted debarkation and left part of the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, in boats, while the balance chafed aboard ship. In both organizations, needless to say, individual Marines found the rough seas, the intermittent showers, and the tedium less than welcome.

By mid-morning, with Mellu and Ennuebbing in our hands, it was possible to commence entrance into Kwajalein. Lagoon through the two passes which our forces now controlled. Assured of this at 1023, Admiral Conolly immediately ordered minesweepers into the two channels and thence into the lagoon itself.

As the stubbily-built sweepers butted their way into the lagoon, carrier planes dropped down south of Roi-Namur to lay smoke which would blind Japanese gunners on the main islands to the vulnerable sweepers making their way eastward toward Ennubirr and Ennumennet. By 1116 the sweepers had cleared Mellu Pass and were less than a mile from Beaches Blue 3 and 4, located respectively on Ennumennet and Ennubirr. In their wake followed the LCI-gunboats¹⁴ preparing to rake the two islets with close-range

¹³*Opn Order A157-44, Annex A, p. 2, and Annex G, Appendix 3, p. 4.*

¹⁴One gunboat, the *USS LCI(G) 450*, grounded in the uncharted waters of the pass, however, and remained there until the next day.

40mm and 20mm fire.

While the gunboats drenched ALBERT and ALLEN with flat-trajectory auto-weapons fire, the carrier planes commenced bombing and strafing runs which culminated, as the mine-sweepers and gunboats retired, in a noon strike by six torpedo-bombers (TBM's) and seven dive-bombers (SBD's) on Ennubirr, coordinated with an attack by four TBM's and four SBD's on Ennumennet. Three minutes later, at 1203, the destroyers lying east of the two islands reopened fire with their five-inch batteries.¹⁵

Under this pounding, the Japanese radio-station on Ennubirr, even though built of reinforced concrete, could hardly stand up, and, already afire, by 1219, its central portion caved in, while numerous small fires added smoke and debris to the dust-pall over the island.

A similar fate, though on a larger scale, was likewise befalling Namur, which, as we have seen, was dotted with magazines and ordnance installations. As early as 1123, a 4th Division air observer reported a "huge fire" which obscured much of his observation of the island, the south beaches of which were then under fire from the battleships *Tennessee* and *Colorado*, while the heavy cruiser *Louisville* dropped eight-inch shells into the southeast corner, and the light cruiser *Mobile* covered the north coast with six-inch. Then at 1245, and again at 1256, two immense explosions rocked Namur's central explosives area, throwing skyward great columns of smoke, flame, sand, brush and rubble. Apparently the naval gunners had found their mark.

¹⁵The USS *Porterfield* was assigned to bombard Ennumennet while the *Haraden* worked over Ennubirr. The LCI-gunboats, 82, 345, and 455, likewise formed part of this fire support unit (FSU-5); in addition to inshore bombardment missions, these were to interdict the shallows along the reef between Namur and Ennugarret should the defenders attempt to displace additional troops from the former to the latter. *Opn Order* A157-44, Annex A, p. 2.

Meanwhile, Admiral Conolly, earning the soubriquet which was to follow him throughout the Pacific war, had at 1210 signalled to the USS *Maryland*, then bombarding Roi from the west, that she was to "move really close-in" during the afternoon to fire on enemy batteries and blockhouses. From that moment on, the Admiral became known as "Close-in" Conolly—a nickname which he was destined to justify on future occasions when landing Marines.¹⁶

A few minutes earlier, however, at 1156, the destroyer *Phelps*, control vessel for all the D-Day landings, had received from Admiral Conolly an order which was destined to affect the afternoon's operations vitally and adversely. The *Phelps*, it was ordered, was to leave station as control vessel and enter the lagoon through Mellu Pass.¹⁷ In itself, this procedure was in accordance with plan, inasmuch as it was desired to get a destroyer inside, as soon as possible, in order to support the smaller craft now swooping and bombarding in preparation for the afternoon landings. Moreover, this sequence of events had been anticipated in the operation plan of Commander Initial Transport Group (Trans Div 26), wherein it was directed that, should the *Phelps* quit station, she was to turn over primary boat control to USS LCC (Landing Craft, Control) 33, a craft properly staffed and equipped with the radio gear necessary to continue control of the complex landing plan. Instead of following out the procedure just described, however, the *Phelps* swung by the SC 997, in which General Underhill was embarked, and announced, by bull-horn, "Am going to support mine-sweepers. Take over."¹⁸

As the *Phelps* then headed into Mellu

¹⁶4thMarDiv Journal, D-Day, p. 6.

¹⁷ComDesRonOne SAR, p. 4.

¹⁸Report by BrigGen J. L. Underhill to CG 4th MarDiv, 29 February 1944, p. 3, hereinafter cited as Underhill.

Pass, this left General Underhill and the SC 997 in a predicament for which neither was prepared. The general and his staff (nor the Navy personnel of the SC-boat) were neither prepared nor supposed to control the boat movements into the lagoon; and the little ship in any case did not possess the communication equipment with which to discharge any such task.¹⁹

Thus, with A-hour only two hours away, General Underhill found himself confronted with a major, unexpected task, while the troops involved tossed aboard their LVT's and LCVP's awaiting control personnel to lead them into the lagoon. Moreover, due to the failure of Transport Division 26 to mark the correct transfer-areas in which the 2d and 3d Battalions, 25th Marines, were supposed to remain, boats of both units were in fact off station,²⁰ a matter further complicated by the fact that most of the amtracs of the 2d Battalion had been led off by their control officers in the wake of the *Phelps* as she departed.

The first task of Commander IVAN Landing Group was therefore to regain control of his two battalion landing teams, and to assemble these in the correct transfer-areas. The errant tractors of the 2d Battalion were recaptured and recalled after a chase in the *Phelps's* wake by SC 997. During this maneuver, the LCVP's of Lieutenant Colonel Chambers's battalion were also directed to follow Underhill to the transfer area, where a number of the amphibian tractors from

the morning landings were awaiting orders. To these were shortly added 12 more tractors from Company B, 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, which had been rounded up by Chambers. With these in hand, and anticipating the arrival of more, General Underhill recommended to Admiral Conolly that A-Hour be set for 1430, and, at 1315, this decision was duly promulgated.

The balance of the LVT's for the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, however, failed to materialize, due partly to losses in the Mellu-Ennuebbing landings, and partly to defective control arrangement which permitted many to lie idle on the morning beaches; and the situation at 1250, as described by Underhill's report was as follows:

"By about 1250, a few more LVT(2)'s had come to the transfer area, and I directed SC 997 to lead LT 3/25 and 2/25 through Jacob Pass to the *Phelps*, regardless. . . LtCol Chambers was encountered in his boat. He reported 1½ waves in LVT's. I directed him to make his attack with such LVT's as he had, and boats available, and sent an order to the artillery battalion commander on Jacob (3d Battalion, 14th Marines) to send all LVT(2)'s there to the line of departure. A few arrived later."

At 1305, under pressure of time, and realizing that little more, if anything, was to be gained by further delay in the transfer area, General Underhill therefore led the two landing teams, boated as they were, through North Pass, while a succession of carrier aircraft, mainly from *USS Intrepid*, buzzed, hornetlike, in repeated strikes against Ennubirr, Ennumennet, SALLY Point on Namur itself, and tiny ANDREW, a minuscule islet south of Ennubirr.

The *Phelps*, now nearing station at the new line of departure, although she had relinquished boat-control so abruptly, was in position to observe what slow work was being made of getting the landing teams into the lagoon, and so reported to Admiral Conolly, who had already sought General Underhill's

¹⁹SC 997 possessed four radio sets (two TCS, one SCR-608 and one combined TCE transmitter and NC100 receiver) as contrasted with the 11 aboard *Phelps* which were assigned to control missions alone. Further, due to causes not known, neither TCS had received prior test before D-Day, and one was found to have a faulty transmitter and power-supply, while the other in turn developed a defective receiver. The SCR-608 had been preset for use on naval channels of no service to General Underhill for command purposes, and the TCE combination was the only set which could be used. Underhill, p. 6.

²⁰Ibid., p. 3.

advice as to the most suitable time for a new A-Hour. At 1315, therefore, the Attack Force Commander set this time as 1430. A few minutes later, this was changed to 1500, a more realistic selection, and, at 1342, the *Phelps* reached station for the afternoon assaults.

During the next half-hour, as General Underhill's amtracs (from Company A, 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion) churned the line of departure, naval gunfire continued, mainly on Ennubirr, where the *Phelps* had spotted what appeared to be a concrete pillbox, which she promptly demolished by a direct 5-inch hit. By 1440, as the assault waves of both battalions formed up behind the line, bombers and torpedo-planes from the *USS Cabot* and *Essex* hammered Ennubirr and Ennumennet again, and, as the air-strike lifted, the leading waves of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 25th Marines, crossed the line of departure and headed for Beaches Blue 4 and 3 respectively.

As in the morning, these boat-waves of amphibian tractors were preceded first by LCI-gunboats and then by armored amphibians of Company D, 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion. From this time on, the destroyer and LCI gunfire increased in intensity against the two islands. At 1446, the rocket-boats released their parabolic salvos at the beaches, swept the islands with 40mm and 20mm fire, and then turned to port and starboard as the armored amphibians ploughed past, firing their cannon. Three minutes later the fire-support destroyers, *Haraden*, *Porterfield*, and *Phelps*, lifted fires from ALBERT and ALLEN, while carrier-planes formed overhead for the final strafing attack.

Three hundred yards offshore, the armored amphibians parted, and the troop-carrying LVT's passed through, receiving scattered automatic weapons fire from ABRAHAM; at this moment the air-strike swept down along

the beaches, and, approximately one minute later, at 1510, the first wave of the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, ground through the coral shallows onto the sands of Ennumennet. Within five minutes, at 1515,²¹ the assault wave of the 2d Battalion had likewise landed on Ennubirr.

On Ennumennet, which was held by little more than a security-squad, Lt. Col. Chambers's battalion made quick work in the face of scattering small-arms fire which killed one Marine and wounded seven more. By the time his tanks had gotten in, approximately 1530, the assault companies had already pushed across the island, flushed out ten Japanese (all of whom were killed), and Chambers had reported that ALBERT was secured.

The 2d Battalion, 25th Marines, attacked Ennubirr, with Companies E and F abreast, E on the right with a zone which included the now almost-demolished Japanese radio-station. This company encountered no opposition, advanced rapidly and mopped up the ruins. Company F, however, advancing through the wooded and brushy northern half of ALLEN, ran into the Japanese defenders, about one platoon in strength, who had apparently taken to the woods during the shelling. Backed up by the attached light tank platoon (3d Platoon, Company A, 4th Tank Battalion), Company F attacked this position, and, after sustaining seven casualties, reached its final objective. Twenty-four Japanese were killed.

A secondary mission of this battalion had been to land one platoon from its reserve company (Company G) on ANDREW (Obela Island), which lies south of Ennubirr along the reef. At 1545, supported by five armored amtracs, this landing was accom-

²¹This time, 1515, is that given in the Division's various reports, and is confirmed by air-observers reports, and by those from surface observers in the *Phelps*. For some unexplained reason, however, Lt. Col. Hudson's report states that his first wave of troop-carrying LVT's hit the beach at 1455.

plished without casualties or opposition (although, a few hours earlier, 40mm fire had been reported from here) and, by 1626, Lt. Col. Hudson could report to General Underhill that both ALLEN and ANDREW were secured.

Meanwhile, as nightfall approached, and it was evident that no serious opposition had developed on Ennumennet and Ennubirr, the assault of Ennugarret and the landing of the artillery battalions became the paramount problems.

Well prior to 1700, the artillery was on its way in, the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines, proceeding to Beach Blue 4 on Ennubirr, and the 2d Battalion of the same regiment to Beach Blue 3 on Ennumennet. Both battalions were equipped with 75mm pack-howitzers, boated one per amphibian tractor, and, after the LVT's had gotten ashore, they delivered the howitzers directly to battery-positions previously selected from aerial photographs. By 2000, not only were both battalions in position, but the regimental command post had been established on shore, and the only remaining problems were those of registration (which would be accomplished at dawn next day), and of building up the ammunition-supply on ALBERT and ALLEN, a question which involved repeated hauls during the night by the already overtaxed amphibian tractor units.²²

Ennugarret (ABRAHAM), it will be recalled, was to have been attacked on order at BAKER Hour by the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, the unit that secured the neighboring island of Ennumennet. At 1630, desirous of setting this attack in motion as soon as possible, Colonel Cumming, who commanded the 25th Marines, landed on Ennumennet and conferred with Lt. Col. Chambers²³ as to the

best means of accomplishing the mission before dark.

Chambers's problems, however, had been considerably aggravated by the premature departure of virtually all the amphibian tractors which had landed the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines. These tractors, it appeared, had not received orders which covered the contingency of their employment against ABRAHAM, and, moreover, had found absent the Navy bowser-boat which was to have met them at Ennumennet with fuel. Consequently, after searching in vain for the missing bowser-boat, virtually all of the LVT's and armored amphibians departed in search of fuel and services from the LST's from which they had been launched.²⁴ An exception to this general withdrawal were the two command tractors which had landed Lt. Col. Chambers and his headquarters; these remained with him on Ennumennet.

Added to this situation was the fact that neither air, artillery, nor naval gunfire support could be made available. Although it had been hoped that artillery on Ennubbing could be ready to support this attack, the battalion in question had only just landed and could not fire. Commander Support Air refused a requested airstrike, and at this time no direct support ship was assigned to the battalion for naval gunfire.²⁵ This left Chambers in the position of having to assault a defended island over water (but with no

²³Details regarding the Ennugarret assault have been obtained from a Historical Section interview with Colonel Justin M. Chambers, May 6, 1948.

²⁴Report by 3d Platoon Leader, Company A, 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, March 10, 1944. It might be remarked here that running out of fuel while afloat was a far more serious mishap for the amphibian tractor of those days than may be supposed, inasmuch as the pumps then installed in those vehicles were power-operated, without manual auxiliary, and an LVT out of gas very soon became an LVT sunk.

²⁵PhibGrp3 SAR, encl. (B), p. 7, states, "Final landings on Dog Day were made on Ennugarret with direct support from Fire Support Units One and Five", but Col. Chambers explicitly states that no naval gunfire support was available or employed in this assault.

²²Flintlock Operation, 14th Marines, report submitted by that unit to CO, 4th MarDiv, undated, pp. 1-2, hereinafter cited as 14thMar SAR.

landing craft) and with no support other than the weapons under his own command.

As soon as it had been decided to attempt this assault, Colonel Cumming departed, promising to round up as many more amphibian tractors as he could lay hold of, and Chambers prepared for the attack, which was to jump off—if landing craft were available—at 1800, the most favorable hour in terms of the tide.

During the hour and a half which remained prior to this hour, the battalion secured ALBERT JUNIOR, so-called, a small islet 200 yards northwest of Ennumennet.

After receiving a reconnaissance-report from 1st Lt. Robert E. Stevenson, who had waded, under enemy small arms fire, from Ennumennet almost to the objective, Ennugarret, the battalion commander set up every available weapon to command Beach Blue 5, on the south end of ABRAHAM, and decided to risk the assault with a first (and only) wave of four amphibian tractors crammed with 120 officers and men from Company L, who were to seize a limited beachhead pending the return, by shuttle-trips, of the LVT's with the balance of the battalion.

At 1750, a preparation consisting of fire from all mortars and the 75mm cannon, was laid on Blue 5. Ten minutes later, as the tractors shoved off, the 81mm mortars laid smoke on the intended beachhead, holding it under an impenetrable cloud until the crossing had been accomplished. Enemy resistance, it fortunately turned out, was light, and the Japanese made no attempt to hold at the water's edge. By 1830, all of Companies K and L had been ferried across to Ennugarret, and the attack had penetrated 250 yards inland, the enemy withdrawing in the direction of Namur. Six Japanese were killed, one enemy machine-gun was captured, and the only reported casualty of the entire movement was one Marine wounded by a friendly aircraft which strafed the beachhead through

an excess of zeal or confusion. At 1915, Ennugarret was under firm control.

With Ennugarret in the hands of the Marines, the Northern Landing Force had completed seizure of all its D-Day objectives. Of the individual operations, however, it might well be said that they proceeded and succeeded despite, rather than in accordance with, plan. Accordingly, it may be desirable to summarize the causes for the confusion which unquestionably all but dominated these landings, especially inasmuch as the difficulties of D-Day were destined to leave their impress upon the main landings of the morrow.

Setting aside the more general origins, such as the enforced hastiness of planning and the newness of all organizations, both in the amphibious forces afloat and in the newly-organized division—setting these aside for consideration at a later point, it may be observed that the primary sources of D-Day's troubles were:

(1) Multiplicity of objectives, five of which had to be taken by one regiment during one day on a schedule with interdependent timing; this in turn required a scheme of maneuver which could not be anything but complicated.

(2) Faulty or inadequate communications, a product in part of the almost universal tendency of radio sets then mounted in LVT's to swamp out under high seas.

(3) Failures of control (many of them in turn begotten by failures of communication), especially on the part of the boat-control personnel of Transport Division 26.²⁶

(4) Heavy seas and difficult reef conditions which imposed maximum strain on green amphibian tractor personnel equipped with a previously untried type of tractor, the LVT(2).

Despite all these serious and annoying difficulties, however, the 4th Marine Division was ashore on its objectives, and D-Day, in terms of the missions accomplished and the time-table of the operation, had ended in success.

²⁶For a detailed analysis of this, see *Underhill* in entirety, as well as *Underhill Memo*.

HITLER'S PLANS FOR INVADING BRITAIN

BY H. A. DEWEERD*

Hitler's exact intentions regarding an invasion of Britain in 1940-41 are among the fascinating mysteries of the war. A growing mass of legend already surrounds the subject, and it may be worthwhile to set down the facts that are now available on the matter. Documentation is not complete, but it is possible to reconstruct the major outlines of what happened and what did not.

The Germans have had little experience with amphibious operations. Their attempts at sea-borne landings in World War I were limited to the occupation of Oesel and Dago Islands in the Gulf of Riga in 1917. Despite British pre-war invasion scares, the German high command never seriously contemplated an invasion of Britain in 1914-1918. Not even Tirpitz, the leading advocate of the aggressive use of German sea power, went so far as to suggest that an invasion of the British Isles was a practical operation. Considering the British failure at the Dardanelles in 1915, the fact that Fisher's project for a landing on the Pommeranian coast of Germany did not materialize, and the fact that a projected British landing behind the German lines in Belgium was cancelled in 1917, the experience of World War I did not give much encouragement to the planners of amphibious operations.

The doubts which responsible German military and naval leaders had about the prospects of invading Britain in 1914-1918 were not shared by one post-war German military writer. In a highly controversial book written in 1932, Professor Ewald Banse, occupant of a chair of Military Science at Brunswick Technical School, declared that the

failure of Germany to occupy Holland and attempt an invasion of Britain in 1914-1918 "was a grave error."¹ Banse reasoned that since the British fleet based at Scapa Flow could not be brought into action in less than twenty-four hours after the start of an invasion, it might be possible to transport 250,000 men across the Channel from the Belgian and Dutch coast before the fleet could interfere. German landings in southeastern England and in Ireland would be followed by attacks against the principal industrial districts. When the Liverpool-Manchester area was in German hands, Banse felt that England's backbone would be broken.² He provided a sketch map showing invasion routes and the general direction of attacks after the landings.

Since Banse was at best a dilettante student of military affairs, he did not elaborate on the problem of supplying the German forces in Britain after the twenty-four hour period of immunity from naval interference had passed. He did not bother himself with questions of tide, currents, weather, and landing beaches. These matters, which would have caused utmost anxiety to a responsible staff officer charged with the planning of such an operation, were passed over in what he described as the "attractive prospect of sketching out the downfall at some future time of this proud and secure people." Banse's book created a sensation in Britain; the Nazi government banned it in 1933 and attempted to prevent the publication of an English translation, but it is doubtful if it had any effect on the Nazi planners in 1940-

¹ *Raum und volk im weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1932). American edition under the title: *Germany Prepares for War* (New York, 1934) p. 234.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 224-225.

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1941. The projected landings in 1940 were considerably south and west of the area selected by Banse.

Germany acquired some experience in a sea-borne invasion during the Norwegian campaign. This was a relatively small affair and seems to have been improvised during the winter of 1939-1940.³ German documents make it clear that despite its small size and the weakness of the opposition, the Nazis met with more trouble in Norway than they did in Poland. Jodl's diary shows that there was wrangling between branches of the armed services, that unexpected losses and confusion marred the operation.⁴ Thus German staff officers got some enlightenment on the hazards of ambitious operations—a factor which may have had some effect on the ultimate decision not to launch an invasion of Britain.

There are two schools of thought about Hitler's plans after the fall of France. One holds that Hitler did not anticipate serious military action against Britain but expected peace feelers from London after Dunkirk. They interpret the delay between the end of hostilities in France (17 June 1940) and the beginning of the Battle of Britain (8 August 1940) as indicating Hitler's unreadiness for a continuation of the struggle. Others believe that Hitler did not expect a negotiated peace with Britain and planned for softening up the island kingdom from the air prior to an invasion. Churchill quotes a letter from Mussolini to Hitler June 26, 1940, which shows (if the Duce can be trusted) that a land and air assault on Britain was discussed between the dictators at the Munich confer-

ence in 1938.⁵ None of the German military documents thus far published make any reference to an invasion of Britain at this early date.

At the start of the war Hitler apparently felt that Britain could be brought to terms without an invasion. Speaking before the Supreme Commanders of the Armed Forces on November 23, 1939, Hitler said: "England cannot live without imports. . . . The permanent sowing of mines on the English coast will bring England to her knees. However, this can occur only if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. . . ."⁶ Even before the fall of France he seems to have changed his mind about this for he told Admiral Raeder on June 4, 1940 that he intended to decrease the size of the army and build up the air forces and navy.⁷ These steps were not called for in any campaign Hitler had in mind in the Balkans, or for that matter in a campaign against Russia: they were designed primarily for the campaign against Britain.⁸

It soon became clear after Dunkirk that desperate as Britain's position was, there was not going to be a negotiated peace. The rapidity with which the Admiralty solved the magnetic mine crisis in the autumn of 1939 showed that Britain would not be brought to her knees by mining operations alone. As a consequence Hitler determined to push the war against Britain to a conclusion. On July 16, 1940, he issued "General Order No. 16" calling for the preparation of a landing operation against England.⁹ The order began with these words: "Since despite her mil-

³ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Gathering Storm* (New York, 1948), p. 308.

⁴ Notes on the Fuehrer's Speech to the Supreme Commanders of the Armed Forces, Nov. 23, 1939, in NCA, III, p. 573.

⁵ Report of a Conversation between Admiral Raeder and the Fuehrer, June 4, 1940, *ibid.*, VII, p. 829.

⁶ This is the opinion of a British writer, Peter de Mendelssohn, *Pattern for Aggression* (New York, 1947), p. 188. Published in Britain under the title: *The Nuremberg Documents*.

⁷ See "General Jodl's Diary (Armed Forces Operational Staff) from Feb. 1 to May 16" in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, 1946), IV, pp. 380-396. These are the so-called Nuremberg Documents. Hereafter cited as NCA. German forces employed in Norway were two mountain divisions, three infantry divisions, and four airborne companies and other small units.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 396-404. For German naval losses see below.

tarily hopeless position England shows no willingness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare a landing operation against England, and if necessary to carry it out.¹⁰ Hitler specified that the landing must be carried out on a broad front from Ramsgate to the Isle of Wight. He charged the air forces with assuming the role of artillery; the navy the role of engineers. He laid down five pre-conditions which would have to be met before the landing could be attempted. First, the R.A.F. had to be weakened to a point where it could not interfere with the German plan. Second, mine-free channels leading to the English coast had to be maintained. Third, the invasion area had to be covered by strong coastal batteries. Fourth, the invasion area had to be sealed off by German minefields. Fifth, British naval forces had to be tied down by torpedo and air attacks. No date was set for the operation, but Hitler ordered all preparations to be completed by the middle of August. The rather transparent code name "Seelöwe" or "Sea Lion" was given to the operation. With all these pre-conditions attached to the operation, it is not surprising that certain highly-placed Nazi officers failed to take the invasion seriously.

Whether Hitler was serious or not, the administrative machinery of the German high command went on grinding out orders and directives about the invasion of Britain. On August 1, 1940, Hitler issued his second directive. It called for an intensification of the air and sea war against Britain but warned that "attacks on harbors on the south coast [must] be kept to a minimum in view of our own intended operations."¹¹ Sixteen days later, on August 17, 1940, a detailed opera-

tional order was drawn up for "Seelöwe."¹² It specified that two army groups were to be employed in the invasion of Britain, Army Group A (Ninth and Sixteenth Armies) on the right, Army Group B (the re-inforced Sixth Army) on the left. The first invasion wave was to consist of eleven infantry and two mountain divisions. Immediate reserves to follow up the landing under army group control were six armored, two motorized and one SS division. Nine infantry divisions were in secondary army group reserve. GHQ reserves were eight infantry divisions, making a grand total of thirty-nine divisions.

According to the testimony given after the war by Colonel General Franz Halder, Army Chief of Staff, the invasion was planned in three stages. "Phase I, dealing with the initial crossing was to be carried out in three waves. The first wave was to be formed of fast landing craft. . . . The second wave was to consist of the main body of landing craft, some of which could move slowly under their own power, some of which had to be towed. The third wave was to consist of large sea-going vessels which could carry the bulk of the troops as well as their supporting tanks, engineers, signal units, etc. . . . Phase II provided for the crossing of panzer and motorized divisions from the Dutch area and further infantry divisions from the French coast. Phase III called for the crossing of additional infantry divisions and of large supplies to form a supply base. The details of Phase II

¹¹ Directive No. 17, "For prosecuting the air and sea war against England" is quoted in full in Milton Shulman, *Defeat in the West* (New York, 1948) pp. 47-48. Major Shulman was a Canadian intelligence officer, had access to British intelligence reports and interrogated Nazi officers after the war.

¹² This directive does not appear in either the American or British editions of the Nuremberg Documents. A paraphrase was issued by British military authorities in Berlin on Sept. 25, 1945. The above account is based on Mendelssohn's version of this paraphrase, *Pattern for Aggression*, pp. 188-189. It may be available for historians someday. They will find it in Volume I of OKW I, Directives Seelöwe.

⁹ This top secret document (OKW/WFA/No. 33-160-40) in NCA, p. 399. Apparently this order was not printed in the British edition of the Nuremberg Documents.

¹⁰ Italics mine. This phrase—"and if necessary to carry it out" provides the key to Hitler's real intentions about an invasion of Britain.

and III could be worked out only after it became clear as to the number of sea-going vessels available after the initial landings had been completed. . . ."¹³

Army Group A was to make the initial landing. The Ninth Army sailing from Dieppe, Le Harve, and Caen, was to land in Sussex and Hampshire. The Sixteenth Army sailing from Boulogne, Calais, and Oxtend, was to land in Sussex and Kent. Army Group B, sailing at a later stage from Cherbourg, was to land in Weymouth Bay west of Bournemouth. Main British reserves were to be met and defeated in Kent. The first objective was a line running from the Thames estuary to Portsmouth. The second objective was a line running roughly from Colchester to the mouth of the Severn. After these lines were reached, mobile forces would fan out to occupy the Midlands industrial district and finally London.¹⁴

The Germans went to considerable trouble to prepare for the invasion of Britain. A special set of military maps was published in Berlin in 1940 "for service personnel only," showing harbors, coastal areas, road and rail nets, telegraph and telephone nets, water works and industrial installations.¹⁵ Army and navy units prepared transport craft in the estuaries of the Rhine, Meuse, and Scheldt. Training schools for engineers and armored forces were established on the Frisian Islands.¹⁶ Similar schools for assault troops were set up in France.

On September 3, 1940, Keitel is said to have fixed the tentative invasion date for September 21, giving ten days' advance warning if the invasion was to be launched.¹⁷ This

advance warning was never given. Experience in the daylight phase of the Battle of Britain may have convinced Hitler that a postponement was necessary. An order was issued at his headquarters on October 12, 1940, which said: "The Fuehrer has decided that from now on until the spring, landing preparations for an assault on England will be maintained purely as a military and political threat. Should the intention of a landing in England in the spring or early summer of 1941 be renewed, the necessary state of preparedness will be ordered in sufficient time beforehand. Until then the military groundwork for a later landing will be further improved."¹⁸ From the date of this order, October 12, 1940, it is safe to say that Hitler never seriously intended to invade Britain.

What was it that made Hitler postpone and finally cancel his preparations for a landing operation against Britain? The obvious answer is that the Luftwaffe was defeated in the Battle of Britain. To begin with the Luftwaffe never had as many operational planes as neutral military experts thought. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey shows that the German monthly production rate of 500 combat planes was not materially increased until 1942.¹⁹ At the onset of the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe's operational planes numbered 840 bombers and 1,100 fighters or less than they had at the beginning of the Polish campaign.²⁰ During the daylight phase of the Battle of Britain the R.A.F. damaged or destroyed 900 bombers and 1,000 fighters. During the night attacks (October 1940 to June 1941) 1,850 German bombers and 1,475 fighters were damaged or destroyed.²¹ Thus the Luftwaffe lost its original operational strength in planes twice over without fulfilling the conditions

¹³ War Office Interrogation of Colonel General Franz Halder, Sept., 1945, cited in Shulman, pp. 44-45.

¹⁴ Mendelssohn, p. 189.

¹⁵ *Militärgeographische über England* (Berlin, 1940). These sets were featured by second-hand book stores and collectors in Europe after the war.

¹⁶ Testimony of Halder, cited in Shulman, p. 44.

¹⁷ British War Office Intelligence Review, Nov., 1945, cited in Shulman, p. 323.

¹⁸ Quoted in Shulman, p. 52.

¹⁹ *Strategic Bombing Survey Overall Report—Europe* (Washington, n.d.) pp. 11-13.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

laid down in Hitler's order of July 16, 1940. The losses in planes could be replaced from current production but pilot losses were another matter.

A second reason why Hitler changed his mind about an invasion of Britain was lack of ships, landing craft, and naval cover. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, who was to command Army Group A, told interrogators after the war that the whole project "was nonsense because adequate ships were not available."²² He said that the ships on hand were mostly barges brought in from Holland and Germany and reconstructed so that tanks could be driven off the bows. Troops were given practice in embarking and disembarking, but Rundstedt looked upon the rehearsals as "a game because it was obvious that no invasion was possible when our navy was not in a position to cover a crossing of the Channel. . . ." Blumentritt said that Rundstedt did not make an appearance at the headquarters where the planning for Army Group A was being done nor did he visit the invasion assembly areas.²³

A third reason for the German decision not to push the invasion of Britain may be found in the weakness of their military intelligence. Immediately after Dunkirk there was only one fully-equipped and trained division in Britain.²⁴ Frantic efforts were made to re-equip the 3d British Division (Montgomery) from the slender stock of weapons on hand and get it ready to return to France.²⁵ At the end of August the 2nd

Canadian Division arrived and other British divisions were in much better shape than they were in June 1940, but the situation was still desperate.²⁶ While Britain was still in this relatively defenseless condition, the intelligence section of Army Group A estimated that the British had seventeen coastal divisions and an operational reserve of twenty-two divisions.²⁷ This astonishing figure (the same number of divisions as earmarked for the German invasion) can only be explained in one of two ways. Either there was a complete breakdown of German intelligence, or the figure was set down in the records to make an operation, which few officers expected to take place, look more difficult in prospect. An American naval officer, whose intelligence work in connection with the Pacific war entitles him to a hearing, declared that a change in the British master code at the time of the projected invasion threw the German high command into panic and that Hitler did not dare to act before breaking the new code.²⁸

The fourth, and perhaps decisive reason why Hitler's tentative decision to invade Britain never became firm, is to be found in the vagaries of the Fuehrer's mind. Both Rundstedt and Blumentritt declared that Hitler personally intervened to prevent an attack on the embarking British forces at Dunkirk.²⁹ Blumentritt testified that shortly after the breakthrough at Sedan, Hitler held forth before a group of officers saying that two fundamental institutions had to be retained at least for the time being as cornerstones of western civilization—the Catholic Church and the British Empire. He proposed to make peace with Britain at the earliest opportunity and might even refrain from press-

²² Shulman, p. 49.

²³ Interview with General Günther Blumentritt, cited in Shulman, p. 51. Blumentritt was on the Operations Staff of Army Group A until August. He described the life at headquarters (St. Germain) as "a conqueror's paradise where the atmosphere was saturated with peace" and where no one took the invasion seriously.

²⁴ The 1st Canadian Division. See Peter Simonds, *Maple Leaf Up, Maple Leaf Down* (New York, 1946) p. 12. Shulman (p. 49) credits the British with three divisions and 100 tanks.

²⁵ Alan Moorehead, *Montgomery* (New York, 1946) p. 101.

²⁶ Simonds, p. 13.

²⁷ British Army of the Rhine Intelligence Review, cited in Shulman, p. 49.

²⁸ Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, *Secret Missions* (New York, 1946) p. 87.

²⁹ Shulman, pp. 42, 51.

ing his claims for the return of the German colonies.³⁰ No one can read the published German documents without feeling certain that Hitler and other Nazi leaders were convinced at several stages of the war that a peace with Britain was possible. Hess demonstrated that fact in a striking if absurd manner.

To these considerations must be added the fact that Hitler soon was diverted to other, more immediately realizable projects. General Walter Warlimont, head of the defense section of OKW Operations Staff, has testified that on July 29, 1940, soon after the original order calling for the preparation of "Seelöwe" had been issued, General Jodl called a conference of important army leaders at Bad Reichenhall and announced that the Fuehrer had decided to launch a campaign against Soviet Russia in the spring of 1941.³¹ General Ernest Koestring, then military attaché to Russia, testified that in August 1940, he met Halder at Fontainebleau who told him that OKH had been instructed to prepare for operations against Russia.³² A tentative code name for the Russian operation ("Aufbau Ost") was set in August 1940. Field Marshal Friederich von Paulus testified at Nuremberg that he was made Quartermaster General of the General Staff on September 3, 1940, and that Halder then handed him the plans for the attack on Russia in so far as they had been developed.³³

On November 12, 1940, one month after he had postponed "Seelöwe" until the spring of 1941, Hitler issued "Directive No. 18" which approved operation "Felix" against

Gibraltar as soon as Franco's permission for a German march through Spain could be acquired.³⁴ This directive said that it "might yet be possible or necessary to start operation 'Seelöwe' in the spring of 1941." All commanders were ordered to perfect their preparations. An interesting feature of this directive, which in a sense cancelled the statement about the possibility of starting an invasion in the spring of 1941, is to be found in Hitler's sudden interest in the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands as a help in the U-boat war against Britain. In his lecture to the Nazi Gauleiters in Munich, November 7, 1943, General Jodl gives weight to the idea that Hitler intended to wage war against Britain and her shipping largely by U-boat and air attack after the failure to destroy the R.A.F. in the Battle of Britain.³⁵

Hitler's wavering from one project to another interfered with the German munitions production program. Those in charge of this work wanted a clarification of the situation. At a conference held in Berlin on December 3, 1940, Major General Georg Thomas, chief of the Wirtschaft Rustung Amt, got a firm directive saying that there "would no longer be any mention of an invasion of Britain but only a siege."³⁶ With this clarification the German armament planners could proceed with other projects such as anti-aircraft protection for the Reich and "the big prospective action"—Russia.

For better or for worse, Hitler made the final decision to attack Russia on December 18, 1940. "Directive No. 21" began with the following words: "The German armed forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia (Case Barbarosa) in a quick campaign be-

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52. Quite a different attitude was expressed by Hitler in his conversation with Molotov on Nov. 13 in Berlin. *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941* (Washington, 1948) p. 242. Here Hitler described the British Empire as a bankrupt state to be divided between the victors at the end of the war.

³¹ Affidavit of General Walter Warlimont, Nuremberg, Germany, Nov. 21, 1945, in NCA, V, p. 741.

³² Affidavit of General of the Cavalry Ernest Koestring, in NCA, V, p. 734.

³³ Mendelssohn, p. 223.

³⁴ In NCA, III, pp. 403-407.

³⁵ Notes on a Lecture of General Alfred Jodl, Chief of Staff of the High Command West, to Reich and Gauleiters delivered at Munich, Nov. 7, 1943, in NCA, VII, p. 925.

³⁶ Basic Facts for a History of the German War and Armaments Economy, compiled by Major General Georg Thomas, in NCA, IV, p. 1071.

fore the end of the war against Britain. For this purpose the army will have to employ all available units. . . .³⁷ Though Hitler still referred to the war against Britain, this decision ruled out any further chance to revive operation "Seelöwe."

It should be unnecessary to point out that no invasion attempt was made against Britain despite legends to the contrary. Stories about an attempted invasion with thousands of German troops burned in a bath of flaming oil are still rife in Britain, but the episode was merely an exaggerated account of an R.A.F. attack on a practice maneuver. This incident occurred on September 16, 1940, when R.A.F. and naval units caught what appeared to be a full-dress rehearsal of an invasion force five miles off the French coast.³⁸

What were the prospects of a German success had the invasion been attempted in 1940-41? General Montgomery, who commanded the V Corps in the defense sector after September, believed that there was no chance of a successful British resistance if the Germans had landed a force of fifteen divisions in either 1940 or 1941.³⁹ Whether the Germans could have landed fifteen divisions is another matter. The British fleet would have fought to the last vessel, and the experience of Crete showed what surface craft could do to prevent a sea-borne landing even under conditions of German air superiority. The German surface fleet, heavily damaged in the Norwegian campaign, could not have mustered more than one 8-inch cruiser, two light cruisers, and four destroyers to protect the landing force.⁴⁰ C. C. Grey, long time editor of the authoritative British magazine *Aeroplane*, wrote that during the Battle of Britain only one of the three R.A.F. Fighter Groups was fully used.⁴¹ Churchill put the

average strength of the R.A.F. throughout the Battle of Britain at forty-seven squadrons of modern fighters.⁴² In an all out effort against an invasion every plane that could fly would be used. It is probable that the initial landings could have been prevented with very heavy losses to the Germans. If the Germans had been willing to sacrifice men in the numbers that were afterwards lost in Russia, and had persisted in the attempt, they might have succeeded, but the British would have put up a good show.⁴³

The official German explanation for the failure to launch an invasion of Britain was the heavy loss suffered by the Luftwaffe. In his speech to the Nazi Gauleiters General Jodl said: "One could not take it upon himself to allow the German air arm to bleed to death in the Battle of Britain in view of the struggle which still lay before us against Soviet Russia."⁴⁴ Hitler said the same thing in his letter to Mussolini, June 21, 1941, explaining the reasons for the attack on Russia. The experience in Crete, he wrote, "showed that for an undertaking as considerable as the invasion of England, it would have been imperative to use even our last aircraft." He could not take that risk as long as Germany could be suddenly menaced from the East.

From the time of the decision to attack Russia (December 18, 1940) until June 21, 1941, "Seelöwe" was used as cover for "Barbarosa," and "Barbarosa" was used by Hitler as cover to deceive the German naval staff that an invasion against Britain was still in the cards.⁴⁵ In the preparation stages for "Barbarosa" Hitler spoke of Britain as already being defeated and took comfort in the thought that "when Barbarosa commences, the world will hold its breath."

³⁷ Churchill, p. 338.

³⁸ In NCA, III, p. 407.
³⁹ C. C. Grey, *The Luftwaffe* (London, 1944) pp. 183-184. Simonds, p. 16.

⁴⁰ Moorehead, p. 109.

⁴¹ Churchill, p. 656.

⁴² Grey, p. 186.

⁴³ This is the opinion of the British military critic, Captain Cyril Falls, writing in the *Illustrated London News* (Volume 209) Sept. 30, 1946.

⁴⁴ In NCA, VII, p. 928.

⁴⁵ Memorandum of Admiral Raeder to Admiral Assmann, Jan. 10, 1944, in NCA, VI, p. 887.

GENESIS OF AMERICAN GRAVES REGISTRATION

1861 — 1870

By EDWARD STEERE*

Although many glorious memorials have been erected in ancient and modern times to commemorate the fame of great statesmen and soldiers, it is a melancholy fact that only within the past hundred years has any government been willing or able to assume the obligation of identifying and burying in registered graves the remains of all who gave up their lives in war. The first step in creating a national cemeterial system for the realization of such a purpose was taken in 1862 by the Congress of the United States. The second great stride in this humanitarian endeavor came just fifty years ago, when a special appropriation of the Congress enabled next of kin to exercise the right of expressing a choice in the final resting place for servicemen who fell in the Spanish American War.

In accordance with the policies established in 1862 and 1898, the American Graves Registration Service is now engaged, under direction of The Quartermaster General, in accomplishing the final burial of Americans who fell in the overseas theatres of World War II. Historically, the current program presents no great dissimilarity to the one attending the dead of World War I. While there are marked differences in complexity of organization, employment of techniques, and magnitude of objectives, there is an all-important factor common to both programs—one which differentiates these two wars from all others in the national history with

respect to the care of the dead. This is the existence of a theater graves registration service, the operating unit of which (the Quartermaster Graves Registration Company) was first authorized as an element of the military establishment by War Department General Orders No. 104, 1917, and which became responsible for supervision of burials, identification of bodies and registration of graves, maintenance of temporary cemeteries, and, finally, the recovery of remains in isolated burials behind the battle zone as early as possible during the prosecution of hostilities.

The extent to which the theater Graves Registration Service of World War I accomplished its mission is reflected in the fact that only five per cent of the dead remained unidentified. Although six per cent of World War II dead are now unidentified, it is hoped that the employment of improved techniques will offset the influence of a large number of "non-recoverables" incident to amphibious operations and aircraft crashes and, before conclusion of the program, establish a new record in the elimination of unknowns.

As already indicated, the Spanish American War brought a major development in the national burial policy. By direction of President McKinley, and in consequence of enabling legislation, the Secretary of War took steps in August, 1898, to cause the marking of all military graves in Cuba.¹ In

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¹(1) *U. S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. XXX, p. 730.
(2) *Annual Report of the Quartermaster General to the Secretary of War for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1898* (Washington: G.P.O., 1898), pp. 23-24.
(3) Rpt. D. H. Rhodes to the Quartermaster General, Nov. 14, 1898, sub: Location and Marking of Graves of Soldiers who fell in the Campaign. War Records Office, National Archives.

February, 1899, a Quartermaster Burial Corps composed of civilian morticians and assistants began the disinterment of remains in Cuba and Puerto Rico for shipment to the homeland.² On April 27, 1899, the United States Army transport *Crook* docked at New York with 747 casketed remains. In all, 1,222 bodies were returned to the United States by June 30, 1899. Of this total 13.63 per cent were unidentified.³

At first glance, it seems difficult to account for the fact that this feat falls short of the comparable accomplishment of World Wars I and II in almost the same degree that it surpasses those of previous wars. Yet, in its main essentials, the explanation is simple. Despite the absence of a theater graves registration service in 1899, the time span between original burial and the marking of graves was less than three months, a favoring condition that did not always apply to the recovery of remains in rear areas during the two World Wars.

A lengthening time lag between original burial and adequate registration of graves characterized operations during the War of Secession and the Mexican War, resulting in 42 per cent of unidentified dead for the struggle between the States and, according to available records, few or no identifications during or after the War of 1846-47.

The Mexican War, nevertheless, marked an important advance in burial policy. In appropriating funds in 1850 for a cemetery at Mexico City to serve as the final resting place "for such officers and soldiers of the United States Army . . . as fell in battle or died in and around the said City . . ."⁴ Con-

gress created a precedent for the establishment of permanent military cemeteries abroad some 12 years before legislative provision was made for a national cemeterial system in the homeland. Yet, the cemetery in Mexico serves as a historic reminder that burial practices in the field at that time were hopelessly inadequate. When the bones of 750 American dead were eventually exhumed from their battlefield graves on the road to Mexico City and reinterred at the foot of the monument which now commemorates their fame, not a single remain could be identified.⁵ This, indeed, is a tomb to the Unknown Soldiers of the Mexican War.

The outbreak of hostilities in 1861 on the North American continent was destined to see many revolutionary developments in the conduct of war, not the least significant of which were those pertaining to care of the dead. For the first time in history a productive system based on power machinery and financed by long-term credits made it possible to maintain the traditional standards of peacetime economy and, at the same time, expend sums equaling the annual national income on the prosecution of hostilities. The fact that neither the North nor the South had large military establishments patterned after those of Europe, with stores of equipment, trained reserves, and an officer corps that regarded the business of making war as the monopoly of a privileged social class, did not deter either section from organizing its war potentials of man power and raw materials on a scale of unprecedented magnitude. These adjustments introduced the essential elements of total war—a struggle in which victory depended not so much upon the soldiery displayed by professional ar-

²Rpt, D. H. Rhodes to the Quartermaster General, sub: Expedition for Disinterment and Shipping to U. S. Remains of American Soldiers, Sailors and Marines who have been buried in Puerto Rico and Cuba. War Records Office, National Archives.

³*Annual Report of the Quartermaster General to the Secretary of War for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1899* (Washington: G.P.O., 1899), p. 39.

⁴U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. IX, p. 206.

⁵Rpt, John Agers, Supt, U. S. National Cemetery, Mexico City, Mexico, sub: A Complete List of All Graves in the Mexico City National Cemetery, Mexico (other than those of U. S. Soldiers, Sailors and Marines). War Records Office, National Archives.

mies of the pre-machine age but rather upon the extent to which an integrated social unit composed of democratic committees could sustain a collective will under the pressure of armed conflict geared to power machinery. Thus the problem of control over the state of mind of both troops with the colors and masses of the civil population behind the lines—that is, the question of national morale—became a paramount consideration of the statesmanship of war. Just as democratic Athens, which carried the close-knit economy of the Greek city-state to its highest point of development, had paid signal honors to the remains of its citizen soldiers slain in battle, so now the Government of the United States felt the compulsion of policy in affording a decent burial to those who gave their lives in defense of the Republic. This purpose found official expression within two months after the first major clash of arms at Bull Run.

On September 11, 1861, the War Department directed in General Orders No. 75 that the Quartermaster General supply all general and post hospitals with blankbooks and forms for the preservation of accurate mortuary records, and that he provide materials for the registered headboards which would be placed over soldiers' graves. The following Special Order of the same date and number supplemented this directive:

It is hereby ordered, that whenever any soldier or officer of the United States Army dies, it shall be the duty of the commanding officer of the military corps or department in which such person dies, to cause the regulations and forms provided in the foregoing directions to the Quartermaster General to be properly executed.

In other words, all departmental commanders and officers commanding military corps, together with the Quartermaster General of the Army, became jointly responsible for the accomplishment of burial regulations previously developed in connection with the care

of a few cemeteries at remote frontier posts.

It was soon evident that these procedures were hardly adequate for an orderly disposition of the remains of military personnel who died in considerable numbers at temporary encampments and along the route of march to permanent concentration points. In the first place, the new regulations made no provision for the acquisition of burial sites. Furthermore, the facilities offered at many large troop concentration centers were hopelessly inadequate to meet the emergencies of an unplanned military mobilization. A shocking but unforeseen want of provision for proper burial of the dead aroused the nation to demands for immediate action.⁶

Public sentiment found expression through patriotic bodies before the National Government could shape a comprehensive policy. Cemetery associations throughout the North vied with one another in setting aside plots of ground for burial of the Army's dead, or in conveying such properties in outright deed to the Government.⁷ On July 17, 1862, Congress took action, approving a bill which authorized the President "to purchase cemetery grounds, and cause them to be securely enclosed, to be used as a national cemetery for the soldiers who shall have died in the service of the country."⁸ The patriotic program of cemetery associations was in no way curtailed by legislation empowering the President to purchase land. During the course of the war some three hundred soldiers' plots were put at the disposal of the Government in one way or another. After enactment of the law of July 27, 1862, the Government accepted title to many burial plots. Conveyance of the

⁶"National Cemeteries" (typescript study prepared for the Director, Memorial Division, OQMG, by Elsie Stommel, Special Assistant to the Director in Policy Matters, 1946), pp. 2-3. Hereinafter cited as Stommel, "National Cemeteries."

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁸U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. XII, p. 596.



The soldiers' graveyard at Bolivar Heights, near Harpers Ferry, Va. (*Pictorial Battles of the Civil War*. Vol. II. Artist unknown.)

Allegheny Cemetery in Pennsylvania was typical of many such transactions, it being written into the deed that the land was given "for reasons of Patriotism."⁹

Pursuant to the enabling legislation of July 7, 1862, the War Department established fourteen national cemeteries during the remaining months of that year. The list included two post cemeteries of the prewar period—those at Fort Leavenworth and Fort Scott in Kansas. Several were located at troop concentration points. The burial ground of the Soldiers' Home in Washington, D. C., was designated as a national cemetery, while another was established at Alexandria, Vir-

ginia. A striking feature of this program was the decision to transform the burial sites of major battles into national cemeteries. One was established near Sharpsburg, Md., as a memorial to the dead who fell in the Battle of Antietam. The pattern created in 1862 was extended during 1863. The Battle of Gettysburg was memorialized in the dedication of a national cemetery on the site of that historic encounter. In May 1864, the Secretary of War directed that "a new site be selected on Lee's farm at Arlington, Virginia."¹⁰ Capt. James M. Moore, Assistant

¹⁰"Annual Report of the Quartermaster General for 1864," p. 48, in *Annual Reports of the Quartermaster General from 1861 to 1866* (Washington: G. P. O., 1880). Hereinafter cited as *QMG Reports, 1861-66*. Each annual report in this volume is separately pagged.

⁹Stommel, "National Cemeteries," p. 2.

Quartermaster, noted in his annual report of 1864, relating to National Cemeteries that, "The improvement of the National Cemeteries has been a source of great gratification to all who visit them, and entirely dissipated the prevailing opinion of those living remote from Washington, that soldiers were irreverently or carelessly buried."¹¹

General Orders No. 75, 1862, it will be noted, were framed without regard to the fact that they presupposed a system of national cemeteries. The deficiency, as we know, was speedily repaired by the patriotic generosity of cemetery associations and effective action on the part of the National Government. No corresponding developments, however, facilitated an extension of the program to the active theaters of hostilities. This particular defect, of course, constituted only one of many shortcomings in efforts to accommodate existing organizational forms to the requirements of a war in which an extensive employment of new technological facilities, such as the steam railway and electric telegraph, was revolutionizing the conduct of operations in the field. Failure to adapt many of the services required in support of combat paralleled a want of success in the creation of a supreme command, with staff organs designed to meet the growing complexities of war. In effect, General Orders No. 75 were construed as having application only in that part of the overall area of military operations which is now regarded as the zone of the interior.

The distinction was not so obvious during the War of Secession. In reality, each army command exercised direct control over its communications zone and zone of interior. The distinction between the arms and services was equally indefinite. Quartermaster service troops were nonexistent. Just as the

implementation of General Orders No. 75 in the rear areas was contingent upon the establishment of national cemeteries, so an effective extension of these orders to the battle zone depended upon the creation of a service especially designed for care of the dead after combat.

Six months later the War Department attempted in Section II of General Order No. 33, April 3, 1862, to project the new burial program to the active theaters of hostilities. Army commanders were now assigned definite responsibilities in a plan which required nothing less than a theater of operations graves registration service.

II. In order to secure, as far as possible, the decent interment of those who have fallen, or may fall, in battle, it is made the duty of Commanding Generals to lay off lots of ground in some suitable spot near every battlefield, so soon as it may be in their power, and to cause the remains of those killed to be interred, with headboards to the graves bearing numbers, and when practicable, the names of the persons buried in them. A register of each burial ground will be preserved, in which will be noted the marks corresponding with the headboards.

In overlooking the fact that a revolutionary burial system in the field required services of an extraordinary nature, the regulations of April 3, 1862, can be regarded as scarcely more than an official exhortation to the effect that army commanders were expected to do better by their dead than had heretofore been accomplished by General Winfield Scott in the Valley of Mexico. Use of the qualifying phrases "as far as possible" and "whenever practicable" amounted to a confession that, however beneficial to the national morale, complete execution of the new burial regulations was secondary to the requirements of victory. Experience, nonetheless, had demonstrated in the performance of engineer troops and medical corpsmen that a practical contribution to the primary purpose of combat could be made by proper or-

¹¹*ibid.*

ganization of technical services for the attainment of secondary objectives. While General Orders No. 33 recognized that burial of the dead and registration of graves in the battle zone were secondary objectives worthy of serious attention, no attempt was made to solve the problem by creating a specialized service capable of meeting these new requirements. Instead, the antiquated method of detailing burial fatigues from the line was continued.

Despite an inability to provide the required organization, considerable progress was made in the practice of battlefield burials and graves registration during the War of Secession. This improvement may be attributed to the fact that soldiers with the colors shared much of the sentiment manifested by civilians at home. There are many instances of earnest endeavor on the part of combat troops to realize the ideal of individual burial in a registered grave. The resentment expressed by officers and men of the Army of the Potomac, when they passed over the battlefield of Chancellorsville and witnessed the exposed remains of their comrades who had fallen in that disastrous encounter, offers convincing evidence that citizen soldiers of the North and South alike would not tolerate the burial methods that had sufficed in wars of the past.

Just a year after Lee's victory at Chancellorsville in the Wilderness of Northern Virginia surviving veterans of the Army of the Potomac had an opportunity to visit the scene of conflict. The circumstances were unique. Grant had launched the final drive on Richmond; again crossing the Rapidan and penetrating the Wilderness, his II Corps, Army of the Potomac, bivouacked at Chancellorsville on the night of May 4, 1864. Veterans flocked in droves to see the old battle lines. These were readily recognized by the remnants of log and earth breastworks and rows

of partially buried skeletons. According to accounts left by regimental historians, the visitors were appalled by the scene. Although the Confederates had held possession of the battlefield during the intervening year and had exercised considerable care in burying their own dead, there was much to indicate that they had been satisfied with a perfunctory performance in disposing of the remains of their foe. Quoting a letter written by an observer, the historian of the 124th New York Volunteer Infantry records that "our dead were but partially buried, and the skulls and bones lay about in great profusion."¹² Confederate graves offered a striking contrast.

The Confederate dead, it would seem, had all been decently buried very near where they had fallen. At one place in the woods, just in front of where the battle line of the 124th had been, we found over a hundred graves. They were generally in rows of from three to ten each, under trees, from the trunks of which patches of bark had been blazed. On these blazed places the number of men buried there and the company and regiment to which they belonged, were cut, and in many instances the names were given in full. We counted fifty-five graves marked "23 North Carolina."¹³

Along with a sense of outrage over the plight of their dead was an age-old urge to search through the scattered remains in hopes that the recognition of a bleached skeleton might vivify or even consecrate the memory of a departed comrade. The amateur devices employed on this occasion anticipated many of the standard techniques later written into graves registration manuals, such as the use of identifying marks on clothing and equipment, evidences left by the fatal wound,

¹²Quoted by Charles H. Wegant, *History of the One Hundred and Twenty-Fourth Regiment, N. Y. S. V.* (Newburgh, N. Y.; Journal Printing House, 1877), p. 272. Hereinafter cited as Wegant, *Hist. of 124th Regiment, N. Y. S. V.*

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 272.

and individual characteristics of tooth structure. The identification of Captain Kirk, Fifth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, was established beyond a reasonable doubt.

I saw where poor Captain Kirk lay. His skull was entirely exposed, and lying on top of the grave. The fatal bullet that took his noble life was partly pushed out of the skull. We identified his remains by a peculiar mark on his shoulder-strap, one of which still adhered to his bones.¹⁴

Another positive identification was made by a combination of clues—clothing marks and evidence left by the fatal wound.

Skulls lay around, and among those picked up was that of Sergeant David Bender, of Co. H, with the cap still upon it. He had been shot through the head, the bullet piercing the visor of his cap. Upon the under side of the visor of his cap was stamped, "D. Bender, Co. H, 11 N. J. V." A. B. Searing, of Co. E, cut out the inscription and brought it home.¹⁵

Chaplain Warren H. Cudworth, First Massachusetts Infantry, records a feat of identification that may be regarded as a forerunner of the tooth chart technique, perhaps the first authentic example of its kind. While it is unfortunate that Chaplain Cudworth neglected to give the name of the soldier so identified, there is no reason to question the fact of identification.

Occasionally something would be found to identify the remains, but not often. One former member of the First, whose skull lay bleaching upon the top of the ground, was identified by some peculiarity connected with his teeth.¹⁶

¹⁴K. M. Scott, *History of the One Hundred and Fifth Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-1865* (Philadelphia: New World Pub. Co., 1869), p. 267.

¹⁵Frank L. James, *History of the Eleventh New Jersey Volunteers* (Trenton, N. J.: The Regimental Association, 1869), p. 161.

¹⁶Warren H. Cudworth, *History of the First Regiment (Massachusetts Infantry) From the 25th of May, 1861, to the 25th of May 1864* (Boston: Walker, Fuller & Co., 1866), p. 456.

Many accounts of this incident conclude with the gratifying statement that parties were detailed to bury the exposed remains before the Army of the Potomac moved off, only to become involved the next day in the shambles of the Wilderness. Perhaps the most authentic interpretation of the deep feeling shared by these hard-bitten soldiers of the line was expressed by Capt. Charles H. Wegant, historian of the 124th New York Infantry, and destined two days hence to lead his regiment through its bloodiest ordeal.

We spent the night near these scenes . . . and in many a letter written that afternoon there was enclosed a tiny wild flower, which the writer believed had been nourished by the soil enriched by his own blood, or by that of some friend or comrade who had there fought his last fight. It was a very easy matter to discover just where pools of blood had been, for particular spots were marked by the greenest tufts to be found on the field.¹⁷

Here indeed, is the very sentiment felt a half-century later by John McCrae and immortalized in the lines of "Flanders Fields."

In Flanders field the poppies blow
Between the crosses, row on row,
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.

We are the dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders Fields.

Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with those who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders Fields.¹⁸

¹⁷Wegant, *Hist. of 124th Regiment, N. Y. S. V.*, p. 272.

¹⁸A. P. Sanford and R. H. Schaffer, eds. and comps., *Armistice Day: An Anthology . . .* (New York: Dodd, Meade Co., 1927), pp. 265-66.

In reconstructing the story of this strange pilgrimage one is struck by the fact that no thought appears to have been given in official quarters to at least one of the many devices that have been used since time immemorial to ensure personal identification against the accidents of fate. The literature of the ages abounds with examples of rings, bracelets, and neck ornaments, bearing inscriptions that reveal the wearer's identity. Here, too, the rank and file of the Army was some 50 years ahead of the War Department. It is recorded that a crude form of identification tag came into use on the south bank of the Rapidan during the Winter Campaign of 1863. Swinton, the war correspondent, relates that, when Meade deployed his forces before Lee's field works paralleling the ravine of Mine Run and ordered the V Corps to deliver a frontal attack, soldiers of the assault force, well aware of the cost of such an operation, carefully examined their equipment, then wrote their names on slips of paper and pinned them to their blouses. Happily for those immediately concerned, this early experiment in graves registration technique was interrupted by cancellation of the order to attack.¹⁹

In drafting the act of July 4, 1864, "to provide better organization for the Quartermaster's Department," special attention was given to the problem of proper care for the Army's dead. Among the functions assigned in consequence of this act to the Sixth Division of the Quartermaster General's Office was the supervision of burials and preservation of interment reports.²⁰ In addition to laying out the Arlington National Cemetery,

which was destined to become the largest and best known of the nation's burial places, the new cemeterial agency performed a feat that stands unique in American graves registration annals.

When General Jubal Early, commanding Stonewall Jackson's celebrated Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, dashed down the Shenandoah and then pushed eastward across Maryland, Washington felt the fright of a "bulge offensive" battering at her very gates. The threat was averted by arrival of General H. G. Wright's VI Corps, which steamed placidly in convoy through the interior communications of Chesapeake Bay from the Petersburg front as Early's dusty columns converged on the National Capital. Fearful of delivering a general assault against formidable works about to receive heavy reinforcements, Early paused and cautiously felt the Fort Stevens sector of Fortress Washington's defenses. A vigorous sortie from the works met and repelled the Confederate reconnaissance force. While medical detachments were evacuating the wounded, an improvised graves registration unit under command of Capt. James M. Moore began the work of identifying and burying the dead. If this action seems unimportant in a struggle marked by such battles as Gettysburg, the Wilderness, and Spotsylvania Court House, the skirmish at Fort Stevens is notable in American military history for the very significant reason that graves registration was first accomplished by a service unit specially organized for the purpose, and that this unit made a perfect score, identifying every body on the battlefield and correctly registering each grave. The incident is recorded in the following statement.

The bodies of the loyal officers and soldiers who fell in the sortie [were] buried in a piece of

¹⁹(1) Wm. Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. A Critical History of the Operations in Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania, from the Commencement to the close of the War, 1861-5* (New York: Charles B. Richardson, 1866), p. 397. (2) Francis F. Walker, Assistant Adjutant General, II Corps, *History of the Second Corps in the Army of the Potomac* (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1886), p. 383.

²⁰(1) *U. S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. XIII, pp. 394-398. (2) "Annual Report, 1865," pp. 32-33, *QMG Reports, 1861-66*.

ground selected for the purpose in the midst of the battlefield and in sight of Fort Stevens.²¹

Commenting in his annual report of 1864 on this singular feat, Quartermaster General Meigs expressed a hope that "Congress may see fit to cause a monument to be erected to the memory of these patriots, who fell in the defense of the Capital itself." The wish had its fulfillment that same year in the establishment of the Battleground National Cemetery, which is now entered by a memorial gate in the 6100 block of Georgia Avenue. The cemetery records list the names of 40 dead interred by Captain Moore's unit.²² Unfortunately the organizational principle which momentarily came into play and demonstrated its capabilities at Fort Stevens was not employed during the final operations which overthrew the Southern Confederacy.

It seems doubtful, indeed, if graves registration practices in the battle zone underwent any considerable improvement during the tragic years of 1864-65. The ability conferred by power machinery, steam transportation, and obligatory military service to repair, within limits, the wastage of war as rapidly as it occurred in combat enabled army commanders to fight prolonged battles of attrition and support continuous maneuver without serious loss of striking power. Now, for the first time, these forces were impelled by a supreme command in coordinated movement. As Commander in Chief, Grant directed operations against Lee in the Virginia Theater, while Sherman struck down through the Chattanooga gateway and cut a wide path of devastation through the heart of the Confederacy. Yet in consideration of the losses and exhaustion imposed by such prolonged fighting and maneuver, together with the imperative necessity of keeping combat

units as strong as possible, there should be no great difficulty in understanding why the number of men available for burial fatigues was totally inadequate, and that expectations of a satisfactory performance were scarcely within reason. While there are grounds for condemning a system that compelled army commanders to diminish their striking power at the critical juncture of a campaign in order to dispose of their dead in accordance with ill-considered burial regulations, the evidence seems insufficient to justify any serious charge that Grant and his generals were indifferent to the obligations of affording the dead a decent burial. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that, short of jeopardizing the chances of victory, they did their utmost in adapting antiquated methods to new requirements.

The program of exhuming remains of the war dead from scattered burials and concentrating them in national cemeteries was initiated within three months following Lee's capitulation at Appomattox. Exercising authority comparable to that now vested in The Quartermaster General as Chief, American Graves Registration Service, Quartermaster General Meigs issued General Orders No. 40, QMGO, on July 3, 1865.

Officers of the Quartermaster's Department on duty in charge of the several principal posts, will report to this office, without delay, the number of interments registered during the war, white and black, loyal and disloyal, to be separately enumerated.

All officers of the Quartermaster's Department who have made interments on battlefields during the war, will report the number of the same, giving the localities, dates of battles, and dates of interment.

The first notable operation was planned for the purpose of reinterring the Federal dead at Andersonville Prison, Ga., and establishing a national cemetery on the site. The results of this expedition were reported in

²¹"Annual Report, 1864," p. 21, *QMG Reports*, 1861-66.

²²Battleground National Cemetery, Washington, D. C., "Transcript of Burial Records."



Soldiers burying the dead on the battlefield of Fair Oaks, Virginia. (Sketched by A. Lumley in *Pictorial Battles of the Civil War*, Vol. I.)

some detail by General Meigs to the Secretary of War.

Captain J. M. Moore, Assistant Quartermaster, was, by your order, immediately upon the opening of communications, dispatched in a steamer, loaded with materials, with workmen, and clerks, to identify and mark in a suitable manner the graves of those who died at Andersonville. With the aid of a detail, furnished by Major General Wilson, this duty was performed.

The ground in which 12,912 of our comrades had been buried in trenches was enclosed; the

bodies, where the earth had been washed from them by rains, were again covered. Headboards, painted white, were placed over each, bearing the name, rank, regiment, and State, with the date of death, as ascertained from the captured hospital records.

12,461 were identified, and upon 451 graves Captain Moore was compelled to place the inscription "unknown U. S. Soldier."²³

²³"Annual Report, 1865," p. 33, *QMG Reports*, 1861-66.

After the satisfactory accomplishment of this assignment at Andersonville and a promotion in rank, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Moore undertook the supervision of concentration operations in Virginia. Two separate reports cover this activity and indicate the difficulties under which he labored in the interment of remains yet unburied, the location of isolated graves and identification of the dead. Of the 5,350 killed in action at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House²⁴ only 1,500, or approximately twenty-six percent, were identified.²⁵ This unsatisfactory performance was attributed to the following conditions:

Hundreds of graves on these battlefields are without any marks whatsoever to distinguish them, and so covered with foliage that the visitor will be unable to find the last resting place of those who have fallen until the rains and snows of winter wash from the surface the light covering of earth and expose their remains.

The accompanying list embraces the names of officers and men to whom headboards have been erected.²⁶

In a subsequent report on the progress of concentrating battlefield remains at the eleven national cemeteries established during 1865 and 1866 in Virginia, Colonel Moore made the following comment:

As already stated . . . a large number of graves have never been designated by headboards or stakes; others have already been plowed over, or from other causes have become so obliterated, as to make discovery almost impossible. I am compelled therefore to proceed with the utmost caution, in order to prevent the possibility of

overlooking graves. It is also a source of sincere regret, that notwithstanding every care is exercised to identify the remains, the names of only a small number can be ascertained.²⁷

These pessimistic observations appear to challenge the assertion that some improvement had been made by combat troops in burial of the dead after action. Yet a close analysis of Colonel Moore's report reveals that the loss of many grave markers may be assigned to causes which lay beyond the control of army commanders and, indeed, outside the compass of existing policy. In the first place, no provision was made for the security and maintenance of burial grounds in the battle zones. In the second place, the concentration of battlefield remains for purposes of permanent care took place during the period of hostilities only when a national cemetery was established on the site of combat. Circumstances varied, however, in the establishment of different national battlefield cemeteries. Care and maintenance at the Battleground National Cemetery was continuous from the date of interment of those killed during the action at Fort Stevens. Dedicated within four months after Lee's withdrawal from the scene of conflict, the Gettysburg National Cemetery contained the remains of soldiers killed on the battlefield or in the immediate vicinity. In this situation it was possible to identify eighty-two percent of the dead.

Conditions favoring the perfect performance at Fort Stevens, and a fairly creditable one at Gettysburg, did not apply in the Virginia theater. The battlefield burials of 1862 at Fair Oaks, Gains' Mill, and Malvern Hill were abandoned when McClellan evacuated the Peninsula. Those of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville suffered a similar fate

²⁴*War of the Rebellion, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington: G.P.O. 1880-1901) Series I, Vol. 35, Part I, pp. 133, 149.

²⁵"Annual Report, 1865," p. 33, *QMG Reports*, 1861-65.

²⁶Rpt, Lt. Col. Jas. M. Moore to Bvt. Maj. Gen. M. C. Meigs, QMG, U. S. Army, July 3, 1865, sub: Names of Officers and Men Found on the Battlefields of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House, Va. The complete report and list of names is published in *Roll of Honor, 1865-66* (Washington: G.P.O., 1866), Report No. 2.

²⁷Rpt, Lt. Col. J. M. Moore to the Quartermaster General, sub: Report of Cemeterial Operations, Working Parties, Etc., under his charge for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1866. War Records Office, National Archives.

in 1863. Grant's continuous movement southward after his encounter with Lee in the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania Court House during May 1864, together with his shift of communications from the overland route to the waterway of Chesapeake Bay, abandoned these battlefields to local Confederate forces. Altogether, the Virginia battlefield burials had suffered neglect for one to four years before a concentration program was initiated. As already noted, only twenty-six percent of the dead found in the battlefield graves of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court-house were identified.

While the advance of the Western armies was not conditioned by the many reverses encountered in the East, the vast areas involved in the conquest of the Mississippi Valley and the final thrust into Georgia produced similar problems. Commenting on difficulties encountered in the Military Division of the Tennessee, which included the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia, Bvt. Brig. Gen. J. J. Dana, Chief of the Sixth Division, QMGO, offered the following analysis:

The graves of this military division are very widely scattered, in most cases very imperfectly protected; and throughout the long and various marches of Grant's, Buell's, Sherman's and Thomas's armies, and in the countless skirmishes which took place there, the dead appear to have been buried generally where they fell, with very little attempt to record or mark the place.²⁸

The magnitude attained by the concentration program during 1866 is indicated by the fact that General Dana devoted all but one of his sixteen-page annex to the annual report of the Quartermaster General to operations under the heading "Cemeterial."²⁹ It is interesting to note by way of comparison

that Quartermaster General Jessup's annual report of 1848, which deals with the demobilization following the War with Mexico, makes no mention of military burials during that war, or of any cemeterial problems relating to the invasion and evacuation of Mexico.³⁰ Certain aspects of General Dana's report invite attention. Responsibility had been assigned to Colonel Moore for editing the *Rolls of Honor*, an official compilation of the names of the dead whose remains had been identified and reinterred in national cemeteries. The scope and purpose of this work were reported to the Secretary of War in the following statement.

The names of those who have been interred in the military cemeteries of the District of Columbia and Washington have, by your authority, been published in a general order, which has been distributed to State authorities, public libraries, and to newspapers which publish official advertisements. The list is thus made accessible to the friends of those who have fallen. The list of interments at Spotsylvania and the Wilderness, and those who died at Andersonville, are being printed. As other lists are received at this office they will be submitted to you for publication.³¹

Forty-one national cemeteries, containing the remains of 104,528 "loyal soldiers," had been established by June 30, 1866. An estimate of the total number of "Union soldiers buried throughout the United States was put at 341,670."³² Of paramount importance is the problem discussed by General Dana in connection with permanent graves markers.

Public opinion seems to be turning to a more permanent mode of marking the graves than by wooden head-boards, and I would respectfully give it as my opinion that the sentiment of the nation will not only sustain the expense of marble or other permanent memorial, but, moreover, that

³⁰Cf. Report of the Secretary of War, 1848, (Ex. Doc. No. 1), pp. 187-243.

²⁸"Annual Report, 1866," p. 231, *QMG Reports*, 1861-66.

²⁹"Annual Report, 1866," Annex No. 10, pp. 219-236, *QMG Reports*, 1861-66.

³¹"Annual Reports, 1866," p. 232, *QMG Reports*, 1861-66.

³²"Annual Report, 1866," p. 232, *QMG Reports*, 1861-66.

it will be likely to demand it in a few years, if not now established.³³

Here, indeed, is final recognition that the public demand for "the decent interment of those who have fallen," as originally stated in General Orders No. 75 of September 25, 1862, and the sentiment voiced by Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address must be permanently written into the military code. The Congress, the Secretary of War, and the Quartermaster General were well aware that public opinion and the armed forces would no longer tolerate the indifference that had heretofore attended the care of the nation's dead in war.

Between 1866 and 1870, when the work of collecting and reintering the remains of deceased Union soldiers was, according to Quartermaster General Meigs, "virtually completed," the number of national cemeteries had been increased from forty-three to seventy-three. Within these seventy-three cemeteries the remains of 299,696 Union soldiers had been laid to rest.³⁴ The number of remains of Union soldiers in all types of burial grounds—national cemeteries (299,696), post cemeteries and private plots (13,575), and remains yet to be interred—aggregated 315,555. This final figure fell short by 26,125 of the total of remains of Union Soldiers (341,670) estimated in 1866. Of the total interred by 1870, there were 172,109 positive identifications and 143,446 unknown dead. That is, fifty-eight percent of the war dead were identified.³⁵

Three major aspects of the historical experience in graves registration during and immediately following the War of Secession

should be noted. In the first place, the task completed in 1870 surpasses, with respect to the number of remains involved, all subsequent burial programs of the nation, excepting only the one in which the AGRS is now engaged. Yet even this exceptional case will hardly stand if consideration is given to the fact that the nation's present population is approximately six times that of the North in 1865. Although a firm figure for total deaths in the active theaters of World War II has not as yet been established, consolidated reports from the nine AGRS overseas commands indicate that 317,552 remains (known, unknown and unrecovered) had in one manner or another been accounted for by 31 December 1947.³⁶ This tentative figure, it will be noted, exceeds by only 2,007 the number of interments actually made in national cemeteries, post cemeteries and private plots (315,555) between 1862 and 1870. The comparable number for World War I (79,129 of which 31,595 were left abroad and 46,300 were returned to the United States)³⁷ was one third of the reinterments completed during the Civil War period.

Finally, while the post war organization operating under direction of Quartermaster General Meigs was restricted to military departments within the continental United States and, therefore, encountered few if any of the complicated logistical problems that now condition the support of self-contained AGRS commands in every quarter of the globe, the magnitude of the program completed in 1870 definitely established as a tenet of policy that care and final disposition of American war dead would henceforth devolve upon the Quartermaster General.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 234.

³⁴*Annual Reports of the Quartermaster General made to The Secretary of War for the Year 1870* (Washington: G.P.O., 1870), p. 68.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶Rpt, Mem Div, OQMG, 31 Jan '48, sub: Disposition of Remains (R), p. 1.

³⁷Col. John T. Harris, Chief Mem Div, to Secy, ABMC, 16 Apr '37.

WRITING CONTEMPORARY MILITARY HISTORY

By HUGH M. COLE*

A group of historians beginning a large-scale, multi-volume, cooperative history may be expected to ask when and if the project will be completed—even if this question shows more of human concern than of philosophical historical perspective. A group of military historians embarking upon a multi-volume, official, and avowedly contemporary history of a great war in which 12 million of their compatriots took some part also may be expected to ask this question—particularly with the echoes of the atom bomb reverberating in their consciousness.

The mathematical chances for the completion and publication of an ambitious and contemporary military history, within such a span of years after the event as to make the final history properly contemporary, would not appear to be very favorable. If the contemporary military historian undertakes a prognosis, based on the debatable assumption that history repeats itself, he finds the following: During the three-quarters of a century between the Dano-Prussian War and the beginning of World War II the general staffs of the great military Powers commenced no less than fifteen Official Histories narrating the events of major wars on land. Of this number only six have been completed and published to date—i.e., the German history of the Schleswig-Holstein War and the Franco-Prussian War (the latter so incomplete and erroneous as to require a completely new work—which was begun but never finished); The Austrian and German histories of the War of 1866; the Austro-Hungarian history of World War I;

and the Japanese history of the Russo-Japanese War. To this number three histories may be added, histories on which sufficient progress has been made to warrant a prediction of completion and final publication in the appreciable future. They are the British, French, and American histories of operations on land during World War I—which, at this late date, can hardly claim the title of contemporary military history except for those individual volumes which appeared prior to 1939.

I assume that our own Department of the Army was unaware of this gloomy prognosis when it established the Historical Division, gave it the mission of preparing an official History of the "United States Army in World War II," and set a deadline of five years for the writing and publication of 33 operational volumes. Only one of the 15 predecessor attempts I have mentioned saw the light of day within such a brief period, i.e., the Austrian general staff history of the "War of 1866," significantly, in this connection, known to history as "The Six Weeks War."

Hans Delbrück, the dean of modern military historians, characterized his great *Geschichte Der Kriegskunst* as "a history for the friends of history, written by an historian." Those of us here as civilians may—I presume—lay claim to the title "friends of history" because we are paid-up members in good and more or less regular standing in the American Historical Association. Our military guests may make an equal claim through their presence here and the backing they have consistently accorded the Historical Division in Washington. "Friends of history," and, one may hope of "Military" his-

*A paper read by Dr. Cole before the American Historical Association, Cleveland, Ohio, December 27, 1947.

tory, will be interested in the factors contributing to the failure of other and earlier official projects for the publication of military histories, and will ask to what degree these same factors obtain in relation to the tremendous task undertaken by the Historical Division of the Department of the Army.

Work was begun on nearly all of the 15 histories, mentioned above, within a few months of the cessation of hostilities in the particular war concerned. Many of the historians involved commenced their task in the pious hope of bringing their work to completion while the generation which had fought the war still was alive. Most of these earlier historians—recruited as they were from the military profession and working under the Army General Staff—expected to complete their studies in sufficient time to permit the derivation of military lessons for use in preparation for the next war.

These hopes and aspirations commonly were frustrated by four things:

(1) *The personal and unsympathetic intervention of men at the very top of the military or political hierarchy.* Thus, Bismarck instructed the *Historische Abteilung* of the Great General Staff to tell the truth—"but not all of the truth"—and postponed the publication of the *History of the Schleswig-Holstein War* for twenty years, on the grounds that it would jeopardize the reputation of officers who had exercised positions of high command during the Franco-Prussian War. In a more egregious case the French General Staff, after 1870, entered upon what can best be termed "a conspiracy of silence" in order to prevent the publication of a history which, it was assumed, could not fail to dull further the already tarnished prestige of the French Army.

(2) *The physical and time-consuming difficulties inherent in collecting and screening great masses of military documents.* After 1918 the German historians spent a decade

in gathering and sifting two million war diaries which had been dispersed by the break-up of the German Army and the disorder attendant upon the revolution. The victorious French, whose records were intact, required an equal amount of time merely to organize new archival methods for handling the five hundred tons of military documents produced by the four years of battle, and finally took a short-cut through these nearly impenetrable mountains of source materials by ruling that the Official History of the World War would confine itself to a *précis* of operations, the publication of selected documents in extenso, and a level of treatment covering only the army corps and higher commands.

(3) *The impact of a succeeding war in such a manner as to destroy historical interest in an earlier war, in some instances even resulting in the obliteration or dispersal of the records and semi-finished manuscripts relating to the earlier conflict.* The outbreak of hostilities in 1914 and the subsequent Civil War ended once and for all the prospect of a Russian history of the War of 1904-05, even though some volumes had been published and the entire work was well on the way to completion. The final volume of the German history of World War I, *Der Weltkrieg*, was completed after 1939, but the manuscript was destroyed during the Leipzig bombings. This, coupled with the havoc wrought by war in the Potsdam archives, probably means that we will never have a complete and accurate account of the dramatic dissolution of the Imperial German war machine in the summer and fall of 1918.

(4) *The lack of information from enemy sources, preventing the publication of a sustained, integrated, and coherent military history, complete with the story of "the other side of the hill."* The most common reason for delay in the publication of official war histories has been the lack of documentary

information on the enemy, although, admittedly, this fact has been used on occasion to cloak other and more reprehensible motives at work in high places. Prior to World War I the historical sections of opposing armies consistently were plagued, in each postwar period, with an "After you—my dear Gaston" attitude toward official publication. In those cases where a late opponent failed to make even preliminary publication the other antagonist had three possible courses of action: (a) He could wait until the usual spate of war memoirs and reports of committees of investigation had begun to recede, then use these sources to delineate the enemy picture. (b) He could rely upon his own wartime intelligence reports and abstract from them some story of the enemy order of battle, troop strengths, and command intentions. (c) He could effect a *quid pro quo* interim arrangement in which his own historians answered questions set by the late enemy, and vice versa. Obviously all of these solutions, in varying degrees, could speed the production of contemporary military history. But quite as obviously, none of these solutions could meet the strict requirements of modern historical method.

I have indicated four potential obstacles in the path of the historian who proposes to write contemporary military history under an officialegis. I will mention only briefly the relation of the first three of these obstacles to the work now under way in the Historical Division of the United States Army.

(1) My colleagues and myself have become so accustomed to complete professional freedom during the year and a half we have spent in Washington laboring on the operational history of the past war, that we seldom reflect on what might have been a contrary policy of official scrutiny and control. However, since this paper is in part an accounting to the historical profession, I desire to report these facts: We have been

given access to all pertinent documents—and the question of pertinency has been determined by ourselves. No official strictures, except a few definitely concerned with national defense and policy, have been imposed on us—and in these few cases we see the documents, even though their use in publication is denied. Unlike many of our predecessors in the field of official military history we have been confronted with neither high-level interference, nor—what is worse—high level apathy. The present Army Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, has ruled that the Official History shall pull no punches and has taken a personal interest in securing help for our project throughout the Army. General Handy, former Deputy Chief of Staff, and his successor, General Collins, have strengthened our hand at every point. General Bradley, designate Chief of Staff, first showed his interest in the Historical Division when a Corps Commander. We confidently expect that he will insist that the Historical Division make a complete and truthful report—through its volumes—to the people of this country.

(2) As to the tremendous task of collecting and collating the military documents necessary to the writing and publication of a detailed and sustained history, the Historical Division of the Army is in a position seldom, if ever, equalled—at least in so far as operations in the European theater are concerned. Within eight months of V-E Day the Historical Section of the ETO, under the command of Col. S. L. A. Marshall, had collected, catalogued, and shipped to Washington thirty-four tons of *original* records, containing nearly all of the documentary story of the units which took part in combat. Records of command and decision at higher levels have come into our possession with comparative ease, in part because of the army practice of making multiple copies of even the most secret documents and cables; in

part because of the big-business efficiency introduced into the records system in Washington. Records of the supply services still are somewhat dispersed, but the main corpus has been assembled in St. Louis and subsidiary collections are in the process of being returned from Europe.

(3) It is hardly in the province of the historian to indulge in hypothetics as to the imminence of another war and its possible impact on the historical memory of World War II. True, the military historian cannot escape the uncomfortable feeling that he stands at an obvious turning point in history. He must be fully aware that an atomic war might relegate the history of World War II to the field of military antiquities, leaving it hardly more important than the study of uniform buttons or ornamental sword hilts. But all this should act as a spur, rather than a soporific, for the military historian who has a vital interest in his task. If defeatism does haunt the mind we may emulate Sir John Buchan, who justified the efforts expended on his own history of World War I by reasoning that "the history of the past is comforting, when the future is uncertain."

I turn now to the problem presented by enemy sources. To the Historical Division, as to its prototype in other armies, this problem stands as the most important single factor in determining whether we can or cannot write contemporary military history in an acceptable professional manner.

In the introduction to Milton Shulman's recent book, *Defeat in the West*, Maj. Gen. Sir Ian Jacob assured historians that they would have "the entire political and military archives of Germany to study, since these have fallen into our hands." General Jacobs seems to have been overly impressed with the plethora of riches which avalanched from the most secret German archives into the hands of the Allies just at the close of the war. The sober fact is this: neither the British

nor ourselves have access to anything approaching the entire German military archives for the period 1939-45. But, on the other hand, there is little reason to believe that the next fifty or hundred years will bring to light any extensive body of German military records beyond that we already possess. An intensive search during the past two years—conducted by qualified Intelligence officers, archivists, and trained historians—has made little addition to the military collections which fell into Allied hands intact in 1945.

The question now is: what German sources do we possess, and, are they comprehensive enough to justify the contemporary publication of the history of the past war in Europe? The British and ourselves have in joint possession approximately 1,500 tons of German military documents. Much of this enormous holding is merely so much paper and has little historical significance, but it does contain some 60,000 files from the *Heeresarchiv* which are of the greatest importance. Fortunately, the operational records which have fallen into our hands come from the higher German headquarters and thus provide a causal connective tissue for the skeletal arrangement of facts derived from our own combat intelligence. It is true that the reconstruction of the stenographic minutes of the Hitler Conferences held at the *Führerhauptquartier* are practically worthless in so far as the history of the enemy ground and air forces is concerned. But most of Hitler's orders *re* operations on the Western Front in 1944 and '45 may be found in the War Diaries of the field commands, complete with the statement of the reasoning behind the order. Thus, we are able to reconstruct in detail the manner in which Hitler personally intervened to gather the forces and prepare the plans for the Ardennes counteroffensive. The War Diary of the OKW (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*)

which had grown to some 120 volumes in the one year, 1944, was destroyed. But Major Percy Schramm, an ex-professor of history at Goettingen, who was charged with the actual day to day compilation of the War Diary, saved his working notes for the period 1939 onward. Fortunately for us, Schramm's reliquia are particularly complete and useful for the year 1944. The files of the Organization Division of OKH (the *Oberkommando des Heeres*) are extant in an incomplete form, but they do permit an accurate evaluation of the enemy forces and weapons which opposed the Allied armies at various periods of the war in Europe. I have no doubt that our restatement of actual German strengths will surprise not only the ex-G.I.'s in the general public, but most American commanders as well. Perhaps our most important high level source is the War Diary of OBW (*Oberbefehlshaber West*), the command charged with the conduct of operations in Western Europe. This War Diary is complete for the period between 30 June 1944 and 1 January 1945. Its voluminous appendices are extremely useful, although incomplete. By a stroke of luck, the planning papers for the Ardennes are intact. At lower levels, i.e., Army Group, Army, and Army Corps, our collection of War Diaries and appendices is admittedly fragmentary, and, as might be expected, includes practically nothing for the collapse of the *Wehrmacht* in the spring of 1945. But even at these levels we are able to "mend and make do." The precise formula followed by those who kept the German War Diaries made the inclusion of orders from superior headquarters and reports from lower formations mandatory. Thus, when we lack the Army Group record we can recreate the story of its activities from the War Diary of the Army, or vice versa. By using this cross reference our holdings are sufficient to provide documentary evidence—in as much detail as we require—giving the German

commands and decisions which explain the individual facts of battle recorded in the Intelligence journals of American tactical formations. One great gap does exist in our documentary record of the enemy side of the hill. We possess few War Diaries of German divisions or regiments. This lacuna is irritating—but hardly of vital concern. The Germans themselves had been forced to the conclusion that their history of World War II could not delve systematically into the story below the level of the Army Corps—a conclusion earlier reached by the French vis-a-vis their history of World War I when they reorganized the *Section Historique* in 1919. If the War Diaries of the lower German formations had been maintained throughout the War—a fact concerning which there is considerable doubt—and if these War Diaries had come to us intact, I doubt if we would have found it either feasible or necessary to make more than a random sampling in this type of source material.

Is there any possibility that the passage of time will bring to light any large number of additional German military records of historical importance? We can say that such future finds are possible, but rather unlikely. The possession of indices from the *Heeresarchiv* and the Diary kept by the German Historical Section enable us to determine what documents are missing. We know, for example, that a fire on the night of 27-28 February 1942, destroyed one half of the 6,237 War Diaries which the *Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung* had selected as containing "all of the most important materials" on the history of the war from 1939 to the beginning of 1942. We know that from the end of July 1944 the headquarters of German commands on the Western Front systematically destroyed their records as they retreated to the east. We know that on 7 October 1944 orders were given to curtail drastically or delete operational War Diaries

"for reasons of economy in man-power and paper." We are able to follow the strange peregrinations of the central collection of high level War Diaries which General Scherff, Hitler's Plenipotentiary for War History, had amassed at Potsdam, and which more or less successfully dodged bombs all over southern Germany, only to be put to the torch at Bad Reichenhall, Berchtesgaden and Blankenburg, as the Allies closed in. We know that the major historical repository of the *Waffen SS* still was at Oranienburg when the Iron Curtain closed over it. Only two weeks ago the Soviet representative on the Allied Control Commission informed us that the remnants of the Potsdam archives had reached Moscow. Perhaps in the dim future these documents will be available to the western historian—but we can hardly wait for such an unlikely event. In any case, we have reason to believe that the contemporary documents in the Potsdam archives are regimental and divisional records which Scherff had purposefully left behind. In view of the dissipation of German document collections, therefore, we expect to set forth statements of fact which one day we may recant. But in view of our own holdings and the certain knowledge of archival destruction by the German Army we believe that later finds will challenge us in matters of detail and affect only slightly our major conclusions.

Lest the historical profession complain that the Historical Division of the Army has not exercised due care in seeking to complement the German records by the compilation of other evidence, I mention in passing that we do not accept Von Ranke's dictum: "With-

out documents, no history." Every effort is being made to distill the collective memory of the German officer corps into usable historical material. Here we are running what is often a losing race with the hangman's noose, senility, alcohol, and the "stir-craziness" of the PW cages. But something has been accomplished. The files of the Historical Division now contain five hundred narratives prepared for us by German officers, from Field Marshal to Major, and more are on the way. Preliminary examination, made with German and American documents at hand, indicates that in this collection we have one of the most important contributions to the history of World War II.

I hope that I have conveyed the impression that the Historical Division of the Army approaches the task of writing contemporary military history in a spirit of chastened optimism. We expect our final product will be criticized, as is all contemporary history, on the ground that it lacks perspective. But we believe that the dust churned up by Patton's tanks does less to distort perspective than the dust raised by the archivist as he thumbs through records a half century old. In any case we desire to forestall the kind of criticism visited by a reviewer on a volume of the British Official History, published in 1947, which deals with the summer campaign of 1918. Said he: "It is difficult to see what purpose is served by the publication of this history at this time. . . . Nobody would read it for pleasure and nobody study it to learn the military art. It will go on the shelf of the military library and there remain, consulted occasionally . . . by one silver-haired veteran to refute another."

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

THE LEBANON BLUES IN THE BALTIMORE CAMPAIGN, 1814: EXTRACTS FROM A COMPANY ORDERLY BOOK

BY EARL S. POMEROY*

The War of 1812 is perhaps the clearest exception to the first part of the saw that "the United States has never lost a war or won a peace." In point of failure to win a clear victory over the enemy it is distinct from later international wars of the United States, and yet so close is the balance of military victory and defeat that the main pattern of the war is not unique. It happened that the British enemy of 1812, emerging from the worst pressure of the strictly European conflict even as the United States declared war, was able to transfer a large part of his force across the Atlantic, sufficient to neutralize if not to overcome the American forces, whereas after 1917 and 1941 the enemies of the United States in Europe continued to be occupied in much fuller measure by European armies and navies. Otherwise there are some closer analogies: in unpreparedness in material and personnel, in wartime and postwar discussions of compulsory military training in peacetime, in the painful fitting of civilians into military requirements. The spirit and the discomforts of American citizen-soldiers were less different between 1812 and 1917 or 1941 than the fortunes of American arms, which depended in large part on events in Europe and on shortcomings among generals and politicians rather than on the readiness and military worthiness of rank and file.

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Most of the Pennsylvania militiamen, somewhat as the militiamen under General Hull's command at Detroit in 1812, saw no action in the Chesapeake campaigns, and that, because of mismanagement at the top rather than because of any defects inherent in Republicans or even in the militia system. It was true that by oversight of the legislature the state militia was incompletely organized when it was most needed, in the late summer of 1814,¹ but as the House committee investigating the capture of Washington later concluded, "the difficulties . . . in relation to the militia laws of Pennsylvania had no bearing upon the failure of our arms, as no specific call was made upon that State until the 17th of August . . ."² By that time the battle of Bladensburg was only a week away, though long foreseen. So far as they were tested, the Pennsylvania militia apparently responded adequately to Governor Snyder's invitation "earnestly . . . to rise . . . superior to local feeling and evasions that might possibly be drawn from an imperfect military system . . ."³ The Cumberland county complement, marching at Carlisle earlier in the year, had impressed Hezekiah Niles's correspondent: "Their appearance was truly martial, and their spirits animating. *They*

¹*American State Papers*, Series V, Vol. I, 526.

²*Ibid.*, 531. General Winder had argued otherwise. *Ibid.*, 548.

³August 26, 1814. *Niles Weekly Register*, VII (September 10, 1814), 3.

were all volunteers."⁴ General Harrison called the Pittsburgh Blues "the first in the Northwestern Army."⁵ Before Baltimore only the Baltimore (whom Vice Admiral Cochrane, if not later critics of the militia system, described as "the flower of the enemy's troops"⁶) had opportunity to distinguish themselves in open combat although three companies of Pennsylvania volunteers, from York, Hanover, and Marietta, took part in the defense of the city. Captain Spangler's "elegant uniformed company of volunteers from York" and Captain Metzger's "fine company of volunteers from Hanover"⁷ "recommended themselves in a particular manner to the attention of the commanding general."⁸ Governor Snyder told the legislature in 1815 that experience showed the value of the volunteer system over the "idea of converting every man into a soldier."⁹

The Lebanon Blues, as the six other Lebanon County companies at Baltimore in 1814, had no opportunity even such as Captains Spangler's and Metzger's companies, but their experience in the Baltimore campaign was probably not far from representative among militiamen. It was recorded in unusually full fashion in the company's orderly book, which includes journal entries and company, brigade, and regiment orders as well as accounts proper.¹⁰ The extracts and summarized portions following afford a more personal view of the citizen soldiery of 1814 than is available in most of the published official records. From the beginning there was occasional trouble among the Penn-

sylvania militiamen with individual citizens who did not take easily to military status, but the Lebanon Blues apparently were proud of their company and apparently also had reason to be so.

Lebanon 1st September 1814

Israel Uhler was Discouraged to March and proved Coward he hired A Substitute and when he was hired he Returned again to Middletown and wanted to be reported he Said that he would get clear from Military Duty. he cried like A Baby.¹¹

Lebanon 1st Septemb 1814

Started at 3 O Clock and arrived at Millerstown¹² at 5 in the Evening. Lodged with Michael Forrey.

Millerstown 2d Septem

Started at Millerstown at 7 O Clock and Arrived at Middletown at 5 O Clock Distance 17 Miles John Reinalt fainted with Heat and Mathias Greenawalt had A Battle with A fellow that Said that the Lebanon Blues were Rascals. Lodged at George Etters Tavern.

Middletown 3 Sept 1814

We Quartered at this place and marched Out and put up our tents and agreed not to Lodge in them Capt. Henry Doebler would not agree to it as the place was not Healthy.

By Order.

Middletown 4th September 1814

The Company marched Out to meet the Citizen Volunteers of Harrisburgh and guarded them in to Town. this morning they paraded on the commons and the people of Middletown & Harrisburgh Reported that the Lebanon Blues were the best Disciplined men that composed the Detachment of the Colonel's Command.

¹⁰The orderly book covers the years 1814-29; journal entries are for the year 1814 only. The diarist is anonymous; probably he was First Sergeant Andrew D. Hubley. A few entries are in the hand of Captain Henry Doebler, whose name appears on the title page: "Accounts of the Lebanon Blues: 1st September 1814 Capt. Henry Doebler's Book." The orderly book is in the possession of Mr. William K. Rentz of Berkeley, California, a collateral descendant of Captain Doebler. Except where otherwise footnoted, all following quotations are from the orderly book.

¹¹This entry was concealed by a piece of paper pasted over the page. Philip Greenawalt substituted for Uhler, being one of a total of eight substitutes in the company. *Pennsylvania Archives*, Series VI, VIII, 869.

¹²Five miles west. Later called Annville.

⁴*Ibid.*, VI (March 19, 1814), 46.

⁵John H. Niebaum, "The Pittsburgh Blues," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*, IV (October, 1921), 263, quoting general orders of August 28, 1813. Cf. *American Weekly Messenger*, II (1815), 379.

⁶*Niles Weekly Register*, VII (December 3, 1814), 200.

⁷*Ibid.*, VII (September 24, 1814), 23.

⁸Major General Samuel Smith, September 19, 1814. *Ibid.*, 29.

⁹Annual Message, December 8, 1815. *Pennsylvania Archiver*, Fourth Series, IV, 883-84.

Adam Richard Co[1]¹⁸

Notice the Privats and non Commissioned Officers are to Respect and Obay his Commander the[y] must be up in the morning at Role call and Obay Corporals and Sergeants or Else Obay the Consequences

by order Henry Doeblor Capt'n

* * *

Middletown 7 Sept 1814

Marched from this place and came on to York the Men stood the March Well and in good Spirits. We Drummed A Woman out of the Company at George Etters for being A faggot¹⁴ on the 6th of September and Marched Out to Our Encampment for to do Our Duty we took one man Under Guard for being Saucy to the Captain A Drummer of Privates.

York 8th September

Quartered in the Court House for one Day and Marched to the Camp ground and put up Our Tents on the Same Day.

York 9th 1814

Still Remain in Camp and have to parade twice in A Day.

Saturday York 10th 1814

Still Remain in Camp and have to parade twice in A day pass heare 1 Light Dragoon Company wich have Gid [?] there Discharge in boldimore¹⁵

York 11th 1814

We still remain encamped here and have paraded twice A day. A Picket guard has been Ordered Out to prevent the people from Crowding in to Camp It began to rain on September 13, while the company remained at York.

Friday the 16 th 1814

We started for Baltimore this Morning and came on in as Great A Rain as ever I experienced for five Miles we were as wet through as we could have been and came on 12 Miles and Quartered near Doudies Tavern Martin Yensell has been Sick this Morning

Saturday Camp near Doudies Sept 17th 1814 Started for Baltimore and came on from 10 O'clock 18. Miles till sun down and Quartered in the woods Martin Yensell is not better¹⁶ Peter Cross took sick last evening but has recovered again. Took Dinner at Henry Brookers Tavern on the road

Sunday Morning 18th September 1814 Started from the Woods and came on to A Tavern calld pavillion Garden were we encamped for the Night Distance Fourteen Miles The Men Stood the March well We Drew Rations for this Day in full

Baltimore Monday 19th 1814 encamped at Fairfield Camp which is 2 Miles from Baltimore but we expect to Move off in the Morning¹⁷

September 19th 1814. Fairfield

We had agreed not to encamp here the Men Said that they were Freeman. the Waggon Master Said we must he run to the Waggon and threw out two or three Knapsacks when the Men Run up and pushed him away and Swore they would run him through after that he Chased Out.

Tuesday 20th 1814 September

Remain encamped at Fairfield and have to do Duty twice A Day. But the men are not Satisfied to remain encamped here as the place is not very healthy

21 September 1814. Fairfield

Still Remain encamped here and perform duty twice A day it has been very bad weather this day 22d & 23d Still Rain and leaks thro the Tents so that all the Straw is so wet that we can hardly Sleep.

22d September 1814

The Captain was at Fort McHenry and reports it is all Cut up Round about it he brought A piece of the bumb Shell with him he further

¹⁶On September 20 the brigade surgeon certified that Yensell was "disqualified to perform the duties of a Soldier on account of general debility, under which he has laboured for considerable time previous to leaving home . . ."

¹⁷By this time General Ross' troops had been landed at the mouth of the Patapasco River and Ross himself killed (September 12) in an encounter with the Baltimore militia; Colonel Brooke had reembarked (September 15) and Cochrane sailed for Halifax (September 19). British troops remained in the bay until October 14.

¹⁸Probably Reitscher.

¹⁴Camp follower, *femme de guerre* (rendered by the late Professor J. W. Thompson as *hors du combat*), perhaps officially a laundress or nurse. On women in early American army camps, see James Ripley Jacobs, *The Beginning of the U.S. Army, 1783-1812* (Princeton, 1947), 140, 201, 293.

¹⁵This entry seems to be in Captain Doeblor's hand. The diarist frequently records remaining in camp and marching.

Says that there is some so large that they weigh 200lb

Brigadier General Watson ordered the troops to "hold themselves in Readiness to March at a moments warning" (September 22), but the company remained most of the time at Camp Fairfield, marching twice a day, while the men grew more restless.

[September 26?]

We Still remain encamped at Fairfield and paraded in Battallion on the 25th September 1814 and Still are encamped here and do Duty from the 26th when we Started for Bladensburg and went on to Elk Ridge Landing which is 11 Miles when we were Countermanded and Marched to Baltimore again.

General Watson ordered (Division Orders, September 27) "that no Officers or Soldiers leave the encampment to go into the City or elsewhere without permission from the Officer of the day," and "the guard so placed as to prevent all from leaving the Camp without leave. The example of the Officers will be followed by the Men. The Captains of Companies are particularly charged to prevent the firing of Guns by their Men either in or out of Camp; every man who disobeys must be put under guard instantly for one hour." Later (September 30) each brigade was ordered to furnish a patrol "to be sent immediately into the City and suburbs to take up all non-commissioned officers & privates who are absent without leave, and bring them to Camp to be put under guard."

October the 2d 1814

There was one Man of Berks County drum'd out of Camp for disobedience of Orders he said he did not care A damn for all the Officers that he would be damned if he would not Shoot some of them he was put to Jail then for one Day he was Brought out again and Tried was then found Guilty and Sentenced to be drummed Out All the Troops about Five Thousand were Brought up and he was Marched through he had A Crown Made of Straw and A long plume of the Same with A long hair tail with A parcel of Bones

hanging to it and A head of Cabbage hanging Round his Neck in front of Him The fellow Laughed as he passed through the Ranks.¹⁸

Sunday 9th October. 1814

There were fifteen Deserters came back to camp and were Sentenced to be taken to the fort and to be kept there for A term not known. there were twenty five Men called up out of each company and taken to guard them down They looked quite down hearted and Said they would never take a tour of Duty after this because they had returned again but the cause was they went without Orders

There was no mention of desertions among the Lebanon Blues, and Captain Doebler was able to note, in requesting "a forlow for Going home on Pertigalor business" for the company fifer that "this is the first that Maid obligation for Going home in my Company." (October 13)

Reports of forthcoming British reinforcements in the Chesapeake (which never arrived) demanded readiness, without producing it. "Rigid discipline must be maintained," ordered Major General Smith (October 4), "the training be Continued; No relaxation in preparation must be countenanced." "The commanding Genl Learns, with regret that many outrages have been committed by the Soldiers on the property of individuals about the Camp, in robbing of Hen Roosts, digging potatoes, Carrying off apples, destroying fences, and other petty Larcenies, disgracefull to those assembled for the protection of this City and defense of the Liberties of our Country."

Company, state, and national elections broke the routine, training of battalions and regiments being dispensed with on the day of elections, October 11. All was not holiday, however, for General Watson forbade sale of spiritous liquors on election day and "observed with regret [October 10] that card

¹⁸See John S. Hare, "Military Punishments in the War of 1812," *Journal of the American Military Institute*, IV (Winter, 1940), 225-39.

playing has been permitted within the precincts of the Camp. The Officers of companies and field officers will see that this practice is promptly *suspended*. The General expects that the Officers will set the example to their Men."

The Lebanon Blues (of whom at least thirty voted, out of a total of fifty-six) went Republican by a slight margin, Isaac Wayne,¹⁹ Federalist, receiving thirteen votes to Governor Snyder's seventeen. General John Foster ran behind Melchoir Rahm for state senator, twelve to fifteen.

Thursday 6th of October 1814 This day I was Pollene Captain and had 15 man along for a Potick party over the hole Pennsylv Militia which is hear in Camp Springfield near baltimor²⁰

"A day of thanksgiving and prayer for the recent deliverance of this City from A hostile Fleet & Army" was set (October 13) for October 20, by order of General Smith, but drilling and minor infractions of discipline continued. On October 21 General Watson again cautioned officers "against permitting their men to Straggle beyond the limits of the Camp, as Patrols are ordered to scour the Neighbourhood and take up all persons belonging to the army, who may be found one mile from camp . . ."

October 18 & 19th

This Day there was A party of Men in the City to bring out Stragglers that go to the City without leave of the Officers

October the 20th 1814

This was fast and Prayer Day we were up at the Generals Quarters there was A Sermon preached by A Methodist. Sunday October 23 the whole Regiment was marched up to the Generals Quarters without Arms to hear A Sermon delivered by the Request of Brigad General Watson it was delivered on the Occassion of the

Calamities of the late Invasion this Morning there was three Men Sent to the Fort for Misbehaving to their Officers the Court Martial Consisted of the following Officers Capt. H. Doeblor Lieut. Still & Kline there Sentence was 12 Days hard Labour. to be kept in the Fort On Monday the 26th October 1814 John Baler was Buried with the honours of War A detachment of men from my company consisting of Twelve Men. They fired Twenty Rounds in the Grave and Ten in the Air he was an Inhabitant of Lebanon County

Camp Springfield

October 26th 1814

The First Regiment was Ordered out to Work at the entrenchments and Batteries they done a good piece the Bottom was So Sandy that some fell down and they had to put it up again after they Returned there was no bread here yet the Men Cursed and Damnd the Col^l came up to pacify them they Surrounded him and Said Rum Beef & Bread or no Soldiers the Col^l Said he would Draw his Sword the Men could hardly be kept in at last they let him go

Camp Springfield Octobr 27th 1814

Last Night we had the Severest Storm We ever experienced it blew down the Guard House and A Number of Tents It Rained So hard that all the Tents that did fall were Wet through & through We Sent for A Quart of Whiskey at two O Clock in the Night and drank it for to keep them Warm

29th 30th & 31st October 1814

We received Rations as usual in full for these days the Contractor had given us bad Beef we threw it out of the tents and told them Beef & Bread or No Soldiers

1st 2d & 3d November 1814

We Received good Beef and Bread for these three days past and more regularly than at former times

General orders refer to the perennial problems of poor rations and delinquencies in pay. Drilling continued.

November 1st 2d & 3d

The Weather has been rough and Cold these three or four days past. On Monday the York Volunteers arrived here under the Command of Captn Spangler the company consists of about fifty

¹⁹Wayne was colonel of the Second Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. Snyder had no military record; his German antecedents might have been expected to appeal more strongly in Lebanon.

²⁰This entry is in Captain Doeblor's hand.

good looking young fellows they encamped to the right of us

4th 5th 6th November 1814

This day commenced with Rain and kept on for two days and two nights the rain came through the tents so that the Straw was all wet through Some of the Men went into A Barn to sleep the Straw is Scarce with us at this time but we expect some this day. I hope that it will be received with pleasure.

4 5 6th November 1814

We Received Rations for these three days they Were better than ever we received before especially the bread Salt Soap Candles Beef Bread Vinegar & Rum. Our Men are so hearty that the Beef will hardly last for there Rations

* * *

November 10th 11 & 12th

We Still parade twice A day, in the Morning in Companies in the Afternoon in Regiments the Men march as well in line as the 5th Regiment. Last Night the Second Brigade *Stocked there arms and Said they must pay them or else they would not do Duty*

* * *

13th & 14 November 1814

We had Rain those two days and nights as severe as ever we had so muddy that all the Straw was so wet & Muddy that they could hardly Sleep We had Rain the 16th and 17th November 1814 and Still Continues to rain they promise us Straw this day but I think they will fail in the object

* * *

November 17th 1814

This day we had A heavy Rain it was so wet and Muddy that we could not parade in Regiments 18th Still Continues raining with A great Storm commencing in the Afternoon This day we had no parade in Regiment.

Baltamor November 19 th 1814

This day we had A great Storm from morning to night we had no parade this day I was sick I god a Stiff nack but in 2 Days it was better again²¹

Baltimor November 20 th 1814

This day we had to parade in Regiment again

November 21 th 1814

We Still parade twice A day in the morning in Company the afternoon in Regiment

Baltimor November 22 th 1814

We Still have parade twice A day in the Morning

in Companys in the afternoon in Reigiments the man march very well in line this day

On November 23 General Watson ordered company captains to collect arms and take charge of them until delivered at York, but at the request of the Committee of Vigilance and Safety of Baltimore, the divisions were ordered to give further assistance in completing fortifications and breastworks around the city.

November 23d 1814.

Camp Springfield. near Baltimore

We Still have to parade Twice A day the men are equal to the 5th Regiment in Marching and wheeling forming Column & Sundry Military Movemts

* * *

Received November 22d 23d 24d & 25th Rations in full for the above days we have to quarrel sometimes with the Quartermaster about the Beef

* * *

[November 27?]

We had the greatest Rain on Saturday Night the 26th November and Continued on till Sunday evening I most ever experiences the Men had to Suffer Severely as it was so cold & Wet

On November 28 Major General Scott ordered General Watson's division of Pennsylvania militia to be mustered for final discharge on December 2 and 3, and to be marched to York.

November 28th 1814

This day we had fine weather an continued so untill the 29th in the Evening it began to rain and still keeps on Raining till the 30th

December 1st & 2d 1814.

It is Clear Weather but pretty cold we expect to March on Saturday afternoon homewards the Men are all Glad to be on their March

On December 3 the company members were paid for one month's duty, at the rate of "Eight Dollars for Privates Sergeants Eleven Corporals Ten & Music Nine. . ."

December 3d 1814.

All the Troops under General Fosters Brigade where drawn out to See a man shot. he had

threatened one of his Officers that he would Shoot him he was marched out after his Coffin that was placed on A cart and carried before him he was guarded by Most all the Regular Troops after he was placed on the Coffin there was a Minister there that prayed for him he cried very much and he was pardoned afterwards. There were upwards of fifteen thousand Men present

Sunday December 4th 1814.

We left our encampment on this day in one of the most disagreeable days we ever Marched it rained most all day and was so muddy that we hardly could get along there were 27 Baggage Waggons the distance we Marched that day was Seventeen Miles We quartered at an old Quakers for the Night

Monday 5th December 1814

We took up our line of March and came on Nineteen Miles the day was beautifull till evening it then turned cold and we had Snow that night so that the half of the Tents were covered on one Side.

Tuesday December 6th 1814

It still continues to Snow we Marched Eight miles and it was Snowing all the time till we were within four Miles of York we arrived there at two O Clock we were marched out to the Camp ground and there delivered up our Tents & Camp Kettles.

Wednesday December 7th 1814

We were drawn up this Morning and had our discharge read to us afterwards we Saluted the General and then took up our March for home we came on Eighteen Miles that day and Staid all night at Kapp Tavern

Brigade Orders

York, Penna December 7th 1814

The general cannot take leave of the brigade . . . without expressing . . . his gratitude for their attention to his orders, and his approbation of their general conduct during the campaign They have not met the enemy on the field of battle, but the patriotic Spirit with which they entered the Service; their Strict attention to discipline, their patient endurance of hardships, added to their proficiency in Military knowledge, are sure pledges that had that been their fortune, their conduct would have been honorable to themselves and their

Country The frequent scarcity of necessary supplies rendered the duties of the quartermaster particularly onerous, and it is but Justice to the gentleman acting in this department, to acknowledge their zeal and exertions to render satisfaction to their respective regiments The general has seen with pleasure the cheerfulness with which the disappointment in not being paid for the whole service performed, was borne by the officers and man of his brigade; such privations are unfortunately but too common to a soldier's life, and in the present case, they have been borne with a Spirit becoming Soldiers.

On the return of the troops to their homes and accustomed occupations, and again mixing with the pursuits and occurrences of civil life; To reflect on the events of the campaign, cannot but yield them pleasure and consolation for the hardship and privations they endured, it will have created new associations of friendship among the gentleman of all ranks in the brigade, and will draw closer those previously formed; it will disseminate through a portion of our State correct notions of the duties of an officer and a Soldier, and a mass of information on Military subjects that May be highly useful in the crises of public affairs that appears to [be] approaching. . . . The perfect regularity and good order with which the march from Baltimore to York was conducted, Merits particular Notice. . . .

In commanding the troops the general does not mean to flatter; unmerited praise he would equally Scorn to offer, as they would disdain to receive, it is not to be concealed that commissions of irregularities and omissions of duty have occurred both among the officers and privates; but these it is believed are few in number and such as are perhaps inseparable from any body of troops suddenly transferred from their homes to encounter the onerous and vigorous duties of a Camp. . . .

* * *

December 8th 1814

We Started for Lebanon this Morning and came on as far Orths Tavern where we got our dinners and started afterwards the people of the Borough had the Bells ringing until we arrived for two hours and we formed & Marched in to town and gave five or Six Street fires and then were dismissed for the day.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

MAJOR LARSEN ELECTED CHAIRMAN MONCADO BOOK COMMITTEE

Major Arthur J. Larsen, Chief of the Historical Studies and Editorial Branches of the Air Force Historical Office, has been elected chairman of the newly established Moncado Revolving Book Fund Committee. A graduate of the University of Minnesota, where he received his Ph.D. in history, Major Larsen has written extensively on Northwest history, his field before coming to the Air Historical Office.

Other permanent members of the committee have also been appointed, including: Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian of the Army Historical Division; Dr. Hugh M. Cole, Chief of the European Section; Dr. Rudolph A. Winnacker, also of the Historical Division, and the General Secretary, Mr. Jacob B. Lishchiner.

A meeting of the steering committee was held August 9th to discuss the exact type of manuscript to be considered for publication, the source of procurement of such manuscripts, methods of perpetuation of the fund, publication policy, arrangements with a publishing house, royalty agreements with contributors, and publicity. Those attending this meeting, were: Major Larsen, Dr. Cole, Mr. Lishchiner, Colonel Joseph I. Greene, Lt. Comdr. Robert M. Lunny, Mr. Frederick P. Todd, and Major Robert deT. Lawrence. In addition to discussing the subjects mentioned above, the Committee voted to limit the term of service of its members to one year.

GENERAL SECRETARY ELECTED

Mr. Jacob B. Lishchiner has been elected to the office of General Secretary by the Board of Trustees to fill a vacancy created by the expired term of Mr. Riley Sunderland. The new secretary served with the Historical Division, Department of the Army, as an archivist at the National Archives until the World War I Branch went out of existence. He is now with the Unit History Section. Educated at the College of the City of New York where he received his B.S. and M.S. degrees, Mr. Lishchiner taught English and Psychology in the field of adult education 1935-40. He held a position as information specialist with the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department in 1941-43, and while there he prepared a Government publication entitled "Federal Procurement" its history, principles, practices and programs. During the war he served as an Air Force historian. He is presently a candidate for a Ph.D. in sociology at American University, and has recently compiled a "Bibliography of American Published Sources of Military Literature: 1645-1799."

INSIGNIA FOR INSTITUTE

Continuing generosity of the Institute's new patron, General Hilario Camino Moncado, presently manifests itself in his offer to furnish distinctive insignia, pin or button type, for the membership at large. He has expressed his willingness to bear the initial expense for several hundred. Proceeds from the sale of these would be returned to the support of the Society.

Appropriately enough, the design would incorporate the official seal of the American Military Institute. Bearing the motto: *Historia Mentem Armet* (Let History Arm The Mind), such a device, it is felt, would fittingly symbolize the objects of the Society: "to stimulate and advance the study of military history, especially that of the United States; to diffuse knowledge thereof by publications, displays, and otherwise; and to acquire and preserve manuscripts, publications, relics, and other material relating thereto."

Members are invited to register with the Secretary their views on the desirability of adopting an official insignia.

CANADIAN HISTORICAL PROGRAM

The first section of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second War* was published in May 1948, being a one-volume preliminary "Official Historical Summary" entitled *The Canadian Army, 1939-1945*. It was prepared by the Historical Section, General Staff, Canadian Army Headquarters, under the direction of Colonel C. P. Stacey, O.B.E.

Admittedly a summary, or interim report, this volume makes no claim to being a definitive history. It was published with the idea of placing in the hands of the people of Canada at the earliest possible date an authentic outline of the work of their Army in the last war. It is mainly concerned with the Army's battles, four chapters being devoted to the Italian campaign, six to the campaign in northwest Europe, and considerable space is given to Dieppe and Hong Kong. The volume is illustrated with fifteen folding maps in color, three others in black and white, and twelve paintings by Canadian Army war artists reproduced in full color. An edition in French will be published soon.

This account supplements three booklets already published by the Department of National Defence under the collective title *The Canadian Army At War*. Of these booklets, the first, *The Canadians in Britain, 1939-1944*, dealt with the long static period in the United Kingdom; the second, *From Pachino to Ortona*, chronicled the first six months of Canadian operations in the Mediterranean theatre; and the third, *Canada's Battle in Normandy*, told the story of the Canadian share in the opening phase of the campaign in northwest Europe in 1944-45. The booklets are available from the King's Printer, Ottawa, for twenty-five cents.

Target date for the Official History proper has been set for the end of the year 1950. It is intended that it shall consist of three volumes, as follows:

Volume I: history of the Canadian Army, 1939-43, including organization, training and home defence measures in Canada; organization, training and operations in the United Kingdom and adjacent areas; operations in the Pacific theater.

Volume II: the campaign in Sicily and Italy.

Volume III: the campaign in northwest Europe.

In addition, a volume is to be prepared on Canadian military policy in the broad sense, covering the organization and employment of all three armed services.

The main function of the Official History, according to Colonel Stacey, "is not to instruct the Canadian soldier of today, though we shall be disappointed if he does not find it both useful and interesting; the great object is to tell the Canadian citizen what his army accomplished in the last war, and to provide him, perhaps, with the means of forming an intelligent judgment on military issues that may confront him in the future."

*Review by Dr. Hugh Cole in next issue.

THOUGHTS ON A NATIONAL MILITARY MUSEUM, 1918

The three memoranda which follow were prepared by Major Robert M. Johnston, Chief of the Historical Section, General Staff, A.E.F., in connection with a project for the return of historical material to the United States following World War I.¹ They are dated December 5, 1918, and are addressed to the Secretary of the General Staff, A.E.F.

Robert Matteson Johnston died thirteen years before the American Military Institute was founded, but his connection with the association must be considered close. He became Assistant Professor at Harvard in 1908 and soon interested himself in military history. He wrote a definitive study of the First Battle of Bull Run and, with Colonel Arthur L. Conger—the Institute's first President, edited and produced the *Military Historian & Economist*. He was the creator of the Historical Section, A.E.F., and died in 1920, as his physician predicted he would if he went to France, from the strain on his heart caused by his work overseas. A brief note on Professor Johnston was published in the Summer 1937 issue of this magazine.

The three memoranda follow:

NATIONAL WAR MUSEUM

The idea of a National War Museum is not new, and indeed we have in Washington the beginnings of such an institution. But the essential feature of such a museum should be its close touch with the public and consequent educative influence. It will be of very little use or significance to have such a museum located in one of the less central districts at Washington; while if it could be placed, let us say, in the building at present occupied by the War Department, the affluence of visitors would be immense.

The educative value of a museum of this sort in regard to all things military can hardly be overestimated, and it seems not doubtful that one of our great objects at the present time should be

to attempt to bring the public opinion of our country in closer touch with such subjects. The proposal, therefore, is specifically for a museum on a large scale, and centrally situated, for choice either in the present War Department Building or in one of the blocks nearby. The contents of this museum would include everything from war material to our historical archives, which could be located on the upper floors.

NATIONAL WAR MUSEUM ASSOCIATION

There is little chance of a National War Museum of the type suggested being created unless it is backed by a powerful organization. It is therefore proposed to create an association, either within the A.E.F. or extended to the army as a whole, of which this should be the primary object. Membership would not be open to civilians. The subscription should be placed at a very low figure, say ten cents for privates and a dollar for officers. Even at this rate, a sum amply sufficient to push a very active campaign could be easily secured.

The question then arises as to how such an association could best be formed and made known to the army at large.

MODE OF FORMING A NATIONAL WAR MUSEUM ASSOCIATION

It would appear that the best mode of forming the association proposed would be to proceed through the semi-official channel which is conveniently offered by the "Stars & Stripes." To the editorial staff of that journal could be left the business of announcing the association, of collecting the dues and of supplying a Paris office. Certain committees would undoubtedly have to be formed, the duties of which would be largely honorary. Two committees, however, would need to be active, one of them an executive committee, for which we would look largely to the "Stars & Stripes;" the other a Museum committee, which might conceivably be turned over to the Historical Section at Washington and in the field.

DR. CHARLES A. BEARD DIES

The American Military Institute notes with a deep sense of the loss it represents, the passing on September 1, 1948, of one of its distinguished members, the eminent historian, Charles A. Beard. Dr. Beard, who made his home at New Milford, Connecticut, died at the New Haven Hospital. The

¹A.E.F. Organization Records, 350/1 "War Museum," 1918, in the National Archives.

professional attainments of this renowned scholar are too well known to require enumeration here. A brief review of Dr. Beard's last work, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of War*, 1941, by Dr. Vail V. Motter, appears among the book reviews of this issue.

REGIMENT OF MOUNTED RIFLEMEN (Spring 1947): In his *A History of the Third United States Cavalry*, Chaplain Ralph C. Deibert quotes an earlier historian of the regiment, Captain Charles Morton, as follows:

The Regiment, at its establishment was armed with the hunting rifle, persistently called the "yawger." The barrel was too large for the shank of the bayonet furnished, and the latter was used for a time with a wooden plug fitted into the bore. This was another source of chaff for army wags until the blacksmiths overcame the difficulty by swelling the shanks.

The weapon furnished appears to have been the U. S. Rifle, Model 1841, a percussion cap weapon carrying at the time a triangular bayonet. This model was generally known as the "Mississippi" or "Yaeger" rifle.

Justin H. Smith has written:¹ "The Mounted Rifles had percussion rifles and Colt's army revolvers but no sabres" during the Mexican war, in which the unit served immediately after its organization. A lack of sabers is understandable, since the Regiment landed at Vera Cruz without horses and all but two companies served in Scott's army through the capture of Mexico as infantry. Companies C and I were issued captured Mexican horses in May 1847 and thereafter appear to have served apart from the rest of the unit.

It is clear, however, that the mounted companies did carry sabers, for correspondence from Lt. Col. George Talcott, Chief of Ordnance, shows 1,008 issued the unit by April

1847,² and Morton writes:

The rifle being clumsy to handle mounted, further necessitated firing one round and then riding the enemy down with the sabre—a custom that soon infused the officers and the men with the conviction that they were irresistible.³

Probably the sabers of the dismounted companies were held in store until after the 1847 campaign.

Smith's statement about the revolvers is also incorrect. Samuel H. Walker, the celebrated Texan ranger, was captain of Company C of the Mounted Riflemen. He also appears to have been an agent for Samuel Colt and an enthusiastic user of Colt's newly patented revolver. Together they induced the War Department to purchase 1000 single-action, six-shot Colt revolvers for the Mounted Rifleman, and at least 220 of these had reached Vera Cruz by the time Mexico was captured. It is clear, however, that the unit was not armed with Colt revolvers during the actual Vera Cruz-Mexico campaign. It had been issued 608 flintbox pistols, according to Talcott; these were being used instead by the mounted companies and possibly by the others as well.⁴

To sum up, the Mounted Riflemen were armed initially with the U. S. Rifle, Model 1841, the flintlock pistol (probably the Model 1836), and the saber. In this armament they differed from the Dragoons only in that the latter carried the rifled carbine. During the Vera Cruz-Mexico campaign the two mounted companies carried the rifle, saber and probably the pistol; the dismounted companies, the rifle and bayonet, and possibly the pistol. Not until after the campaign were the pistols exchanged for Colt revolvers.

FREDERICK P. TODD

²See Colt-Walker correspondence in Charles T. Haven and Frank A. Belden, *A History of the Colt Revolver* (New York, 1940), 272-96.

³Theo. F. Rodenbough, *The Army of the United States . . .* (New York, 1896), 196.

⁴Haven and Belden, *op. cit.*

¹Justin H. Smith, *The War with Mexico* (2 vols., New York, 1919), I, 450.

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943, (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume I.), by Samuel Eliot Morison. With an Introduction on "The United States Navy between World Wars" by Commodore Dudley Wright Knox, USN. (Boston: Little Brown. 1947. Pp. lx, 432. \$6.00.)

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume I, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942. Prepared under the editorship of Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate, by the Air Historical Office, USAF. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1948. Pp. xxi, 788. \$5.00.)

U. S. Army in World War II, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops. By Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, of the Historical Section, Army Ground Forces. (Wash., D. C.: Government Printing Office. 1948. Pp. xv, 696, \$4.50.)

Readers of MILITARY AFFAIRS are familiar with the participation of professional historians in nearly every phase of our war effort. Their writings are now appearing, along with a flood of memoirs and other works which it will take a generation to read and assimilate. Some of these last are mere apologies, others (such as the Stimson story) will be indispensable to future historians. But their very number is so great that it is clear that the groundwork of our historical knowledge about the war will rest on at least four major official histories: the OSRD work, which is much the farthest advanced, and those of the Navy, Air, and Ground Forces, the first volumes of which are now appearing. Each of these sets the pattern for the rest of its series, but it should be pointed out at the outset that they all have one common feature. They are not mere official compilations, but serious works by professional historians who have been given full access to the official records. Though they are written by men who have worked or are still working for our government, from documents which, for security rea-

sons, are still partly unavailable to the public, I have been unable to find any evidence of official doctoring in any of them. They have the defects common to such vast historical enterprises, but these defects do not arise from official partisanship.

The first volume of Mr. Morison's history has received a separate review in this journal (*Operations in North Atlantic Waters*, MILITARY AFFAIRS, No. 4, 1946). Dealing with the critical stages of the Battle of the Atlantic, it becomes the introductory volume of the Navy's series on its operations and confirms the impression made by the volume previously published that that service was both wise and fortunate in turning over the whole project to one of the most eminent of American historians, an authority in the field of maritime history, and a master of the nearly lost art of writing and planning a multi-volume historical work. This work promises to be Professor Morison's crowning achievement, in its superb style, its precise evaluations, and in the personal touches which he always brings to his story. As a friend of President Roosevelt's and a supporter of our pre-Pearl Harbor diplomacy, Mr. Morison has a point of view. But it is open and honest and not hidden.

The Air Force's historians in introducing their problem (required reading for those who wish to see some of the complexities which work of this kind involves), note rather sadly that there was no Mahan or Freeman for the Air Force to turn to. They decided to produce a series of monographs and to integrate them by vigorous editing. Their style—the series is directed to both the scholar and the general public—is thus uniform and readable, but naturally lacks the punch and color of Mr. Morison's. But they have not written the type of work which most people might have expected to appear from the wild blue yonder, and it has already been heartily panned by some of the unregenerate air power propagandists. For their skill in dealing with a controversial topic, I would recommend Richard L. Watson's masterly handling of the incomplete evidence on the Clark Field disaster. For compari-

son with Morison, one should read Arthur B. Ferguson's account of the AAF in the Battle of the Atlantic.

The volume, by a university press, is almost as beautiful as Morison's, by a commercial publisher, though the university press has bowed to one sacred cow by putting the footnotes in the back. This is supposed to be more popular, though anyone adult enough to lift the volume would hardly have boggled at having the footnotes where he could use them. The jacket is a modest map, bulbous Air Force art having dated from a later period.

The Army Ground Forces' series is also a collection of monographs. Unity of treatment has been achieved by a unique seminar system. The series' length (99 projected volumes) is not due to greater wordiness, but to the fact that this group of historians has taken on the most difficult job of the lot. They are studying the whole complex of our organization for war, and, in connection with their combat narratives (not much more than a third of the total), the whole of American strategy. They are being excellently printed by the Government Printing Office, no commercial or university press being equipped to sponsor so large a project.

The volume under review is a logical continuation of *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (MILITARY AFFAIRS, No. 2, 1948). A bit more than half of the two volumes combined has been written by Dr. Robert R. Palmer, whose studies deal largely with the top level organization and training of the ground army. His essays (the first three) in this volume tell the story of the general search for quality in the ground forces. The last four studies, by Professor Bell I. Wiley, another contributor to the first volume, cover the vicissitudes of these policies at the divisional level, with a great deal of very interesting material on the 65th Division. The middle three, by Dr. Keast, go over them from the standpoint of the service schools, still another approach to a very complicated problem.

All of these works are absolutely essential to both scholars and libraries. They are above all an indication of the present maturity of American scholarship, and of the maturity of our own high commands, working in one of the most difficult of historical fields and in one of the hardest to keep free from political pressure. As the world stands today, we can expect such works on this war only from scholars of the United States and the Brit-

ish Empire, and, if they can command the resources, from those of France and Italy.

THEODORE ROFF,*
Durham, N. C.

Defense of Wake, by Lt. Col. Robert D. Heintz, Jr., U.S.M.C. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1947. Pp. 76. \$1.25.)

Tarawa, by Captain James R. Stockman, U.S.M.C. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1947. Pp. 86. \$1.50.)

A fine job has been done by Marine Corps historians in the first two monographs of a series that will cover Pacific operations of the Corps. All services will profit by these sober, factual, and detailed narratives, which are well mapped and profusely illustrated. Here is the type of basic material from which military students, at the tactical level, must correct and complete their understanding of lessons which could only be partially grasped during the hustle of operations.

Defense of Wake, despite most difficult and fragmentary source material, reconstructs an amazingly full record of the famous sixteen days. The technical detail is so satisfactory and complete that the action can—and undoubtedly will—be studied as a minor classic in the military art of making more than the utmost out of hopelessly inadequate means. But there is much more to the account than tactical and technical detail: the very smallness of the American force makes the importance of human qualities, of resourcefulness and leadership, stand out the more clearly; the petty scale of events on Wake is given a larger dimension of significance when set in the background of Pacific strategy, as a part of the tragic circumstances which marked the start of war. With excellent craftsmanship, Colonel Heintz weaves all this together in unified narrative which never loses its pace as we shift from the perspective of events on the tiny atoll to Japanese assault preparations at Truk, or to abortive American relief plans at Pearl Harbor. His story proves that we do not need the aid of movies and "romantic" writing to bring out the epic quality of Wake's defense; we feel it all the more strongly when the facts are left to speak for themselves.

Tarawa gives us our first chance to examine in detail what is likely to remain one of the more debated Pacific operations. Here, despite all the

*Professor of history, Duke University.

courage and determination shown, despite ultimate success, things went wrong, losses were unusually high, and there are still lessons to be learned. Even with all the material so carefully assembled in this monograph, some crucial questions seem unlikely to get clear answers without the full record from the naval side. Notably, how far did the planning reckon with the relation of tide to barrier reef, where shallow water produced a major difficulty for the assault? The narrative shows that there were doubts as to the depth of water on the reef, but does not explain why plans apparently made no allowance for any but optimum conditions.

At Tarawa a full division was committed piecemeal and under conditions of unusual confusion; this is the type of action most difficult to present clearly. Granting this, the reviewer still feels that exacting care in the final stages of preparing this account might have done more to avoid some repetitions and loose ends, to produce a tighter pattern for certain parts of the action, and to anticipate questions that are not fully answered in the text. What happened to the attack of 1/8 which was preparing on the morning of D plus 1 (p. 29)? When and on what basis were D-Day and H-Hour determined? What was the relation of the tide to H-Hour, and what were the conditions of the sea on D-Day? The technical student may want much more detail on the initial assault plan, on matters such as the boating of units, composition of waves, assault equipment, and plans for the use of tanks, engineers, and artillery. These points are raised, not to detract from a substantial and useful narrative, but in belief that the Corps historians and their readers will only be satisfied with the best possible product.

CHARLES H. TAYLOR*
Cambridge, Mass.

Normandy to the Baltic, by Field Marshal Montgomery. (Cambridge: Houghton, Mifflin. 1948. Pp. xv, 351. \$5.)

War as I Knew It, by General George S. Patton. (Cambridge: Houghton, Mifflin. 1947. Pp. xix, 425. \$5.)

*Dr. Taylor is Professor of Medieval History, Harvard University, and also serves as a member of the Advisory Committee, Army Historical Division. At the close of the war he was chief of the editorial section, Historical Branch, War Department, holding the rank of colonel. He was the editor and principal author of the Army's official monograph *Omaha Beachhead*.

Operation Victory, by Major General Sir Francis de Guingand. (New York: Scribners 1947. Pp. xii, 488. \$3.75.)

Conquer, The Story of Ninth Army. (Washington, D. C.: Infantry Journal. 1947. Pp. 404.)

These four volumes dealing with the operations of British and American forces in Northwest Europe constitute a valuable study in Allied co-operation, combining elements of suspicion and distrust and of willing collaboration and mutual admiration.

General Montgomery's volume, which first appeared in 1946 as 21 Army Group's historical account compiled by Brigadier David Belchem (G-3), Brigadier E. T. Williams (G-2), and Lt. Col. A. E. Warhurst (historian), is for the most part a formal recital of day by day developments which owes more to periodic and after action reports than to General Montgomery. It is, therefore, a mistake to find in it, as some reviewers have, a reflection of the personality of the British commander. The book was checked against both British and American sources and so far as it goes is dependable for facts. The weakness lies in the omission of much pertinent material. At no place does the book deny credit to American arms, but often the placing of a detailed account of British successes beside a brief statement of American progress has the effect of distorting the picture of Allied operations. In the Ardennes fight, General Montgomery gives credit generally to the American soldier, but says little of the Third Army and the two American armies under British command.

The tendency to overlook the work of other armies, particularly those of another nation, is exhibited also in General Patton's volume. Judicious editing seems to have eliminated some of the bitter statements which have been attributed to General Patton by many admirers who seem to believe that the fighting qualities of a man can best be expressed by the number of insults he hurls at his superiors and brother commanders. Thus the book lacks some of the picturesque elements of General Stilwell's papers, although retaining many biting references to General Montgomery and the High Command. It confirms statements of Colonels Ingersoll and Allen that the Third Army commander engaged in various "sneak plays" designed to outwit the planners at Supreme Headquarters. This type of maneuver, hailed in some military and lay circles

as reflecting great credit on General Patton, involved a type of fast and loose handling of orders which the Third Army commander would have likely called insubordination had it been tried by some of his corps and division commanders. It also indicates a lack of interest in collaboration with fellow commanders which is surprising in a member of a profession which stresses the paramount importance of teamwork.

The impression one gets from the books of Generals Montgomery and Patton is that both were highly competent commanders at those levels where a premium was placed on competitive spirit and the view that "this is the best damned squad in the best division in the best army. . . in the world." At the same time one feels that the Allied cause was fortunate in having men like Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Alexander, and de Guingand in those commands where Allied co-operation was essential to success. Despite this criticism, one sees in the two books evidence of the great fighting qualities of two greatly dissimilar captains of World War II. Montgomery—a Stonewall Jackson type of militant Puritan, difficult in manner, expert in positional warfare; Patton, a dashing figure like J. E. B. Stuart, capable of extremes of sensitivity and callousness, unexcelled in daring and sweeping drives against the enemy. Each in his own way gained the love of his men and the tributes of his compatriots.

Conquer, the Story of Ninth Army—another excellent book in the *Infantry Journal's* list of unit histories—is written in the dispassionate, fair-minded manner of General de Guingand's book. The volume reflects the spirit of an army commander and staff accepted by many British and American commanders as the easiest headquarters to deal with in Northwest Europe. Shorter than the other army histories which have appeared, the Ninth Army book is more compact and readable, although lacking in many maps, reports, and statistical tables which the other armies made available. The Ninth Army, which for three extended periods was under 21 Army Group command, is friendly in tone towards General Montgomery, although not always pleased at the roles assigned it in various campaigns. Unusually modest in its claims, the Ninth Army history sets a high standard for unit histories to follow. It affords an excellent example of the spirit required for true Allied cooperation.

F. C. POGUE*
Washington, D. C.

Bureau of the Budget, The United States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government, "Historical Reports on War Administration," No. 1, prepared under the auspices of the Committee of Records of War Administration. (Wash., D. C.: Govt. Printing Office. 1947. Pp. xv, 555. \$1.00.)

Civilian Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940-1945, Vol. I: Program and Administration, "Historical Reports on War Administration—War Production Board," General Study No. 1. (Wash., D. C.: Govt. Printing Office. 1947. Pp. xviii, 1010. \$3.75.)

These two volumes are part of a larger project undertaken at the direction of President Roosevelt to prepare a series of reports analyzing the administration of the national war effort. The present volumes should prove most valuable to the historian and to those analyzing particular aspects of World War II. They should be equally significant to those who are planning for the military and civilian administration to be established in the event of another war.

The U. S. at War is the broader of the two in scope. It gives an over-all outline of the evolution of policies and administrative organization which led a nation of divided purposes to ultimate victory. As such it provides a broad picture of national policy and administration from the Neutrality Act of 1935 to V-J Day. The emphasis is, of course, on the period beginning with the establishment of the National Defense Advisory Commission in May, 1940.

This study provides a very valuable and readable summary for all who are interested in the general picture of the mobilization effort of our federal government and will serve as a handy reference to scholars in this field. It describes the development and interrelation between such varied organizations as the War Production Board and its predecessors (NDAC and OPM), the Office of Lend-lease Administration, the Selective Service Board, the Board of Economic Warfare, The Office of Price Administration, the Office of Defense Transportation, the War Manpower Commission, the Office of War Mobilization, the Of-

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fice of War Information, the Office of Inter-American Affairs, the National War Labor Board, and many others.

Of considerable interest is its analysis of the reasons for rejecting the industrial mobilization plan in favor of the National Defense Advisory Commission in 1939. It argues that "the plan . . . scarcely merited the build-up it had been given; it was a document dealing only in generalities. . . ." Moreover, it presumed the existence of a state of war in which Congress and the public would countenance full-fledged mobilization, a condition which did not prevail until Pearl Harbor. "Another crucial factor in the rejection of the 'M-day' plan was its provision for a single administrator with vast powers over governmental organization and policy. . . . Delegation of such enormous powers would have made it difficult for the President to control the broad strategy of defense preparation in foreign economic policy during a most critical period. . . . Moreover, the plan carried with it potentialities of far greater military influence in the management of governmental affairs than it appeared either desirable or politic at the time."

It is not possible to summarize such a volume in this short space but perhaps the outstanding contribution of the book is its recognition of the complexity and the delicacy of the problems of administering a mobilization plan. It indicates clearly that the administrative organization for industrial mobilization must be flexible. It must be adapted to the changing climate of public opinion, the proven administrative capacity and even the idiosyncrasies of our leaders, the changing conditions in the international and military scene, and the changing phases of the cycle of production planning and procurement. It is appropriate that the Bureau of the Budget should stress the complicated problems of mobilizing a democracy for war. "The objectives of government, even in time of war, are often in warm dispute and the building of administrative objectives must proceed with great urgency in an atmosphere of conflict of what the objectives should be . . . a government, no matter how wise its judgment may be, cannot for long execute its will arbitrarily against the opposition of substantial blocs of opinion. It must educate, placate, temporize, and act boldly as conditions require. Governmental action on questions of administration, like action on other questions, must proceed within a changing context of public opinion. . . ."

The study also emphasizes the great importance of individuals in the formation of policy and the shaping of administrative organization. It stresses the fact that even in times of emergency the number of recognized leaders of national stature in the United States who are regarded as persons with views transcending their group or class interests is limited. It points out that one of the reasons which led to a delay in the development of a stronger WPB was the difficulty of finding and developing an individual who satisfied this requirement.

Industrial Mobilization for War is a more detailed discussion of the mobilization of industry for the production of the goods for war. It centers upon an analysis of the War Production Board and its predecessors. The recording of this story is a difficult and challenging task, particularly for an official historian. Among the welter of conflicting personalities, policies, and organizations which centered around the WPB it is difficult to steer a course which is neither partisan nor so innocuous as to be ineffectual. The authors have met this challenge well. They have given due credit to the accomplishments of the board and have recognized the contribution of individuals. But they have not hesitated to point their finger at the mistakes and weaknesses of the board and of individual persons. They have documented well the accomplishments of William Knudsen, the genius of production, who had, however, a tendency to rely in his planning too heavily upon large industry. They have told the story of the loss of control of priorities by WPB due to the inability of Edward Stettinius to administer the system. They have given careful evaluation of Donald Nelson, who had a breadth of vision, a sensitivity to public opinion, a valuable sense of compromise, but who seemed to be hesitant to stand up to the services on crucial issues and tended to let vital matters drift when firm action was called for. They have told the story of General Brehon Somervell and of the difficulties which Nelson had in developing satisfactory relations between WPB and the top staff officers of the Army Service Forces. "As viewed by Nelson, the agreement of the War Department crumpled before General Somervell's refusal to recognize any degree of subordination to WPB, his insistence on a dominant say-so with respect to matters involving the civilian economy, and his incessant striving to extend the limits of his jurisdiction at the expense of WPB."

These are only a few of the judgments which this history renders of individuals, judgments which can be tested only with the passage of time and the careful correlation of the personal memoirs of the persons involved and of the official histories written from the point of view of other interested agencies.

Each reader of these two volumes will draw his own conclusions from the record. This reviewer believes, however, that there are several points which deserve stressing. First, the record indicates the serious need for defining more carefully the respective responsibilities of the services and the civilian production agency and for establishing a high policy committee under civilian control to review requirements. The failure to develop satisfactory relations between the armed services and the War Production Board led to much confusion and waste and without a doubt imperiled the success of the mobilization plan. In the matter of requirements the armed services stand as simply one group of claimants whose demands must be balanced against the demands of the civilian economy and against international commitments to our allies and to neutrals. It is imperative in times of major war that some group be established outside of the services to review and compromise these claims in terms of the highest policy considerations. It is also clear that we must develop a more satisfactory concept of the place of labor in the mobilization program. Few leaders except Sidney Hillman were able to conceive of any role which they could play in WPB except as advocates for labor, and the personnel in the operating branches of WPB appeared to be very loath to consult with or to consider the suggestions of labor representatives. For the future we must try to find ways by which labor representatives can take a more active role in shaping mobilization plans and operations. Finally, the record indicates a failure all along the line to take a realistic view of the problems of gearing small business into the war production picture. Too much attention was given to the problem of trying to distribute prime contracts to these smaller companies and too little attention to developing their production capacities.

The story told by these two volumes by its very nature emphasizes the problems of mobilization for war, the conflicts of policies, and the changes and confusion in administrative organization. The positive accomplishments in terms of the mobilization of manpower and the production of goods

plays a subsidiary role in the story. These accomplishments, however, viewed against the background of slow and painful development of policies and administrative organization, as described in these volumes, stand as a striking tribute to the genius of the American people and their capacity for cooperative effort in production.

JOHN PERRY MILLER,*

New Haven, Conn.

The Price of Power, by Hanson W. Baldwin.
(New York: Harper & Brothers. 1948. Pp. 361. \$3.75.)

This book is an estimate of the situation as we Americans face it today. It assesses and compares the strengths of the United States, Russia, and other countries in terms of present and future weapons, political systems, economies, and psychological characteristics. The facts set forth are then analyzed for the bearing they have on military and civilian preparedness for war. In conclusion there is a summary of the pros and cons of each of four objectives Mr. Baldwin feels this nation might seek: isolationism, a world state, a preventive war, a balance of power. He favors the last and develops a program designed to provide a reasonable and efficient national security.

The book is distinguished by its comprehensiveness and by the facts and figures it contains. Of course there may be pertinent facts shrouded in security and unknown to the author. These might alter his analysis and conclusions. On the other hand, Mr. Baldwin is unusually well informed.

Moreover, available to him were the opinion and knowledge of more than one shrewd observer. The preface states, "[this book] represents the product of collective thought, careful research, group discussion and individual opinion. . . . The Council on Foreign Relations . . . decided to constitute a study group on 'National Power and Foreign Policy,' to investigate 'The Power Position of the United States' in this postwar era. This group—which really continued and extended a series of politico-military studies made during the war under the auspices of the Council in close collaboration with the government—was first convened on October 18, 1945, shortly after the war's end, when the awful power of the atomic bomb and the bright dreams of a real world order impressed the minds of men. The group, under the chairmanship of the author, held a series of eight-

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een study and discussion meetings, the last on April 10, 1947, when the dreams had faded and most of mankind had come back to realism with a thud, convinced that the millennium was not at hand and that we were living in the same old world with patches on it.

"Thus, the Council group ran the gamut of emotional and mental experience common to the average American in these past two years,—but, for this group, at least, disillusionment has not been the product of it. For the study goal was a realistic one—to discuss the meaning of the technological and political revolution to the strategic position of the United States and to determine, if possible, the consequential effects upon our military and foreign policies. This was a large order, and it was realized before study was started that no complete answer would, or could, be found. Nevertheless, the data presented and the discussions recorded represented, in the opinion of the study group and of the Council itself, statistics and analyses which, it was felt, should reach a wider audience. The chairman of the group, the author of this book, was 'elected' to weave the material into book form. This book is the result."

The study group was composed of nearly thirty men from such varied fields as finance, law, journalism, industry, the armed services, the social sciences, and the physical sciences. Many of these had held responsible positions in the various government departments during the war. Mr. Baldwin points out that opinions expressed are not always those of the group. He feels that he should be held responsible for the "analyses and conclusions, even though, in many instances, a majority of the group agreed with the views here recorded."

It would be helpful to know which of the views held were not shared by a majority. For example, Mr. Baldwin has for some time opposed Universal Military Training and he argues against it here. Does this group of men as a whole agree? Do they agree, too, with the alternative means of attracting man power into military service on a voluntary basis which is proposed in this book?

Does the group share the antipathy toward and fear of the "military mind" which is a theme running through the book and which has been the subject of at least one earlier article by Mr. Baldwin?

The problem of a sound military policy for the United States is a vital one. It is of sufficient

importance to command the attention of every good mind that can possibly be brought to bear upon it. It is of such complexity and has so many aspects (of which Universal Military Training and the military mind are but two) that no one man's judgments can be accepted.

What is exciting about this book is that it is, in large part at least, a report of a seminar composed of many good men who obviously put the best they had over an extended period into the discussions. Be it said that the author is by no means the least of them; in fact, because of his knowledge and talent, he was an admirable choice both as chairman and as the man to write it up. Nevertheless, we should know whenever in so distinguished a group and in connection with this problem he stands either alone or with a minority.

The idea of focusing a discussion group of talented intellects on the country's military problem and selecting one of their number to record and publish the research and conclusions is a splendid one. The resulting book in this case is good and deserves a wide audience. It clears away a lot of smoke. It consists of one provocative paragraph after another. It could well serve as a basis for discussion by other groups. If such groups composed of civilians and military men could be formed, the results might be greater mutual understanding, a maximum of American talent applied to the problem, and even a sound solution to it.

JOHN M. KEMPER,*
Andover, Mass.

Company Commander, by Charles B. MacDonald. (Wash., D.C.: Infantry Journal. 1947. Pp. 278. \$3.00.)

Already top-level leaders in World War II have begun to pour out a stream of personal accounts dealing with grand strategy and the tactics of large units. But few men on the combat level have yet undertaken to write about the war as they saw it on the fighting front. Captain MacDonald is the first American to do this—and he has done so with the skill and resourcefulness of

*A graduate of West Point in 1935, Mr. Kemper resigned his commission this summer to accept the position of Headmaster at Andover Military Academy. During the war he attained the rank of colonel, and as first chief of the War Department's Historical Branch he made a substantial contribution to the growth of that organization to its present-day scope. His assignment was with the editorial branch of the Army Historical Division at the time of his resignation.

a man who saw battle first-hand and did not rest content until his countrymen saw it vicariously through the realistic eyes of a man who had been through hell and back again.

As Captain MacDonald himself states he did not fight the Germans as long as others. And his experiences as a company commander were almost devoid of extended, costly attacks against heavy enemy resistance. From the operational standpoint a military reader might like to have more samples of that type of action. But Captain MacDonald can not be blamed for his luck. In fact, if he had not been so lucky, *Company Commander* might never have been written—and that would have been a great loss for all who are anxious to know about combat and the way men react to it.

Company Commander is no hero's saga full of the author's inflated ego or even a tale extolling the glory of war. It is a frank, authentic account of what World War II was really like on the fighting front, told simply but dramatically with a keen insight into the actions and reactions of men under the stress of battle. In unvarnished language that bares an unmistakable G-I stamp Captain MacDonald has told of the fears that beset men in combat, private and company commanders alike, of the grim feeling that the war will never end, of the personal quality that makes everything beyond one's own foxholes seem remote, and the terrible responsibility of a leader who is charged with a mission and in a very real sense with the lives of his men. In short, Captain MacDonald writes well. He has a flair for fine description, a sense of humor and proper emphasis and a dramatic touch that should take him far as a writer. The only minor defect noted is the lack of sketches and maps, which would have helped the reader follow the combat action.

For a strictly military leader the book is valuable because it shows how a company and its commander operated in combat, of his feelings as well as his actions, of the small details that make up every operation. No field manual will ever tell so well or in such a stirring manner the technique of company operations in battle or of a leader in command. Every officer who has commanded or may command an outfit will find this volume not only required but good reading.

Because the book sets forth with such fidelity the fighting war it appeals to that larger audience who want to know what it was really like but who only dimly, if at all, understand that wars are

won, in the last analysis, by countless small groups of men—companies, platoons and squads who have to take the ground and defeat the enemy. MacDonald's book is the more valuable because there will be few books like it. Many men who went through combat deliberately shunt into the past the unpleasant realities they experience on the battlefield. At all events, few have the gift of drawing so fine and faithful a picture of their experiences as Captain MacDonald.

SIDNEY T. MATTHEWS,*
Washington, D. C.

Lewis and Clark, Partners in Discovery, by John Bakeless. (New York: William Morrow and Co. 1947. Pp. 498. \$5.00.)

Here is a book, intensely interesting and enjoyable to the casual nonprofessional reader, and yet fully documented and reliable. The text clearly indicates what is proven fact and what is inference or opinion. It is not merely an account of the famous expedition of discovery, although this, naturally, is the main theme of the book. But it gives the prior and subsequent biography of the two friends and compatriots, Lewis and Clark, showing their relationship to the great sweep of events that carried forward the United States toward its destiny of the principal democratic power of the world.

This account is the first to come to my notice which gives due credit to the small but very able Regular Army of the United States in the exploration and development of the country. Both Lewis and Clark were professional soldiers. Both had served in the Indian Wars of the Northwestern frontier, which were unique in our history because the Indians, formidable of themselves, were aided and abetted by the agents and goods, and often by the active military assistance of three great powers, each one of which was immeasurably superior to the infant republic in wealth, military and naval strength, and diplomatic experience. Both Lewis and Clark were trained in the same field, both were thoroughly imbued by the principles of democracy as understood in the United States, and both had the respect for authority and discipline that it is now fashionable to sneer at as "the military mind." In later years, Lewis was a failure as a civilian territorial governor, Clark was

*As a combat historian with the Fifth Army during the Italian campaign, Mr. Matthews is well qualified in his present assignment with the Historical Division, Department of the Army, to write the official volume on operations in Italy during spring and summer 1944.

a great success in the same position. This was because of their individual temperaments, not their training—a fact that is clearly brought out in the book.

Specifically it is refreshing to read the account in this book showing that this first, and most important and successful of the exploring expeditions of the United States was planned with the greatest care, equipped with the most up-to-date arms and implements, and carried out with unexampled efficiency and success. Only one man was lost by death, there was only one brief skirmish with the Indians. The commanders were always scrupulously honest in their dealings with the Indians—which, by the way, has been the usual rule of the Regular Army ever since.

Bakeless is careful to give full credit to the Shoshone squaw, Sacagawea, for her invaluable services as interpreter. He does not fall into the error of most commentators on the expedition in saying that she guided the expedition across the continent. She was certainly not a guide, except in recognizing a few localities where she had been as a young girl. One of the most extraordinary coincidences in history was the meeting at the very crisis of the expedition with the identical band of Shoshones from which Sacagawea had been captured, and the discovery that the chief of this band was Sacagawea's own brother. This saved the expedition from probable failure to cross the mountains, and thus made it certain that the Oregon Country would be a part of the United States. But it should be remembered that Lewis and Clark were real leaders, who not only made careful plans but who made the most of every opportunity, and were thus able to accomplish the seemingly impossible.

This expedition was unique in that Lewis considered Clark as his equal in command and responsibility at all times. The book proves how ably supported were the two leaders by their noncommissioned officers—typical regular soldiers all—who, as usual, proved capable of independent action and responsibility in time of need. It is no wonder that a company commander of the 1st Infantry at a lonely post on the Mississippi strenuously objected to Lewis taking two of his best noncoms for his Corps of Discovery.

This book is so good that it seems almost unnecessary to refer to what appear to this reviewer to be slight flaws. The maps are unusually clear and good, but some places referred to in the text can not be found on the map. The arrangement

of the notes at the end, without any references in the text, makes them hard to refer to. A roster of the "Corps of Discovery" would add to the interest of the narrative. It is even difficult to tell what was the strength of the expedition at various times.

CHARLES D. ROBERTS.*

Washington, D. C.

An Album of American Battle Art, by the Library of Congress. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947. Pp. xiv, 319. \$5.00.)

In 1944, there was a double exhibition of war art in Washington, D. C. The National Gallery exhibited American battle painting, 1776-1918. The Library of Congress showed battle prints, mainly from the unsurpassed collection of the Library. *An Album of American Battle Art, 1755-1918* preserves in book form the outstanding pictures of the latter exhibit.

Their plates deal with the whole panoply of war; battles on land and on the sea, joint army-navy operations, the mutual outrages of the Red and the White man, military pageantry, camp scenes, uniform plates, the lethal prisons of war, and the like.

The media of these pictures is as varied as their subject matter. There are 33 drawings, 30 copperplate engravings, not one steel engraving from the thousands at the Library, five etchings and six aquatints, 53 "popular" lithographs, six wood engravings (mostly bad as art, but historically informative), thirteen photographs, some by the master, William Brady, and four maps.

The format of the volume is worthy of the subject matter. The plates, all of which are done by a collotype process in black and white, are excellently done. The paper stock is both handsome and durable. Even the typography is distinguished. The binding is simple but attractive. In short, as a picture book, the *Album* is the most gratifying volume, of the sort, both in content and format, this reviewer has ever seen.

But the *Album* is not only a picture book, but also a scholarly contribution of a high quality. There are about 70,000 words of text. The authors discuss the event portrayed upon each plate and, where possible, the artist, the plate maker and the publisher. Analysis of plates and commentary indicates that well over half the illustrations were based on eye-witness sketches. This is

*General Roberts is the Recorder of the Order of Indian Wars.

pictorial documentation of a high order. In addition, some fifteen hitherto unrecorded artists are here revealed. Moreover, the authors have used source material which ranges from muster rolls at the National Archives to the measured cadences of Stephen Vincent Benet as well as the memorable lines of the Civil War hospital attendant, Walt Whitman.

There are mistakes, of course. The "Battle of Chapultepec" in the *Album* and the huge painting in the Capitol are not the same. Both stem from earlier sketches by James Walker which have long been owned by the War Department. Major Joseph H. Eaton (1815-1896) painted both in oils and water colors. (Assoc. of U.S. M.A. graduates, Annual Reunion, 1896, pp. 90-96). He may well have done in addition to the *Album's* plate of the "Battle of Buena Vista" an oil painting of the same battle shown at the National Gallery in 1944. Lastly, only the plates and not the text are indexed. Hence, discussions of even the *Album's* most important painter, Alfred R. Waud, or the thoughtful commentaries on the graphic processes themselves are difficult to find.

Since credits are not assigned upon the title page, it may be pointed out here that the original exhibition was suggested by Pvt. Lincoln Kirstein. The *Album* was a dream of the poet-librarian, Archibald MacLeish. The knowledge, the skill, the industry and the artistry of Donald H. Mugridge, assisted by Helen F. Conover, have given life and substance to the poet's vision.

GEORGE C. GROCE,*
Washington, D. C.

President Roosevelt and the Coming of War, 1941, by Charles A. Beard. (New Haven: Yale Press. 1948. Pp. 614. \$5.00.)

Despite the nearly unanimous condemnation of reviewers, this book appeared on the *New York Times* list of best-sellers for nearly three months after its publication last April. Its sale roughly paralleled the rising tension over Russia, suggesting that readers are as concerned as Dr. Beard over the power of the President to involve the country in military action. It may be that some of Dr. Beard's readers have been military or naval men interested in his account of how an evil and

guilty administration saved itself by making scapegoats of innocent men. The topical interest is heightened because two of Dr. Beard's villains are today President and Secretary of State. His censure and innuendo fall upon the administration, officers of the Army and Navy, upon Justice Roberts, upon nearly everybody, in fact, save General Short, Admiral Kimmel and, possibly, Ambassador Grew. Only these achieve parity in innocence with, for instance, Prince Konnoye.

It is doubtful whether, in spite of wide sales, this book can produce many converts to its point of view. Professor Samuel Eliot Morison's extended analysis in the August *Atlantic* of Dr. Beard's errors of omission and commission indicates why. One finishes the book unconvinced that the supreme authority of the President to conduct foreign affairs is a false dogma propagated by venal and subsidized professors. Dr. Beard's thesis, that the country was secretly betrayed into war falls apart in the face of (1) Dr. Beard's own documentation for Roosevelt's open pursuit of openly announced policy; (2) the book's failure to take note that in modern war (a) neutrality is impossible for a great power, and (b) the defensive steps necessary to be taken in the exercise of the inherent right of national self defense are not aggressions. It is not the reputation of Roosevelt's conduct in 1937-1941 that Dr. Beard's book has damaged.

VAIL MOTTER,*
Washington, D. C.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1944-45 (Corrected to April 1946), edited by Francis E. McMurtrie. (New York: Macmillan. 1947. Pp. 635. \$19.00.)

The relaxation of security restriction makes this volume far more useful and complete than its predecessors issued during the wartime years. In addition to the features which have made *Jane's* an indispensable reference work since 1897, this edition contains 700 new illustrations, more complete data on many new ships of various navies, and a quite complete record (544-635) of vessels lost by all navies during the war. This last feature, it is indicated, will not be repeated in subsequent editions, which will be limited to notice of errors or omissions. Consequently, if one does not plan to acquire every edition of *Jane's* for his library, this is a particularly useful one to have.

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*Dr. Groce is compiler of *A Dictionary of 8000 Early American Artists (1564-1860)* scheduled for publication in 1949 by the New-York Historical Society and is a contributor to the *Art Quarterly* and the *American Collector*.

One can, and will, spend hours thumbing through the hundreds of pictures of ships afloat and lost, with the brief statements of their vital statistics and experience. For a brief summary of the whole situation, however, it might be well to turn first to the four-page foreword. It contains critical comments on various important ship types in the light of the war experience; among other things, it includes some skeptical appreciation of the "extremely helpful attitude" of the United States Navy Department, which made possible a particularly full and accurate record of our ships. Another special reason for acquiring this edition is suggested in the remark, "This is, of course, the last time that the German and Japanese Navies are likely to be recorded in *Fighting Ships*."

ROBERT G. ALBION,*
Washington, D. C.

Silver Wings, by Edwin L. Wilber and Estelle R. Schoenholtz. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1948. Pp. 281. \$2.50.)

Silver Wings, the U. S. Air Force's own authorized book aimed at the young men of America, contains fifty fast-moving hero stories, and although its time sequence is that of World War II, it actually looks ahead to military aviation's future—for it clearly shows the pilots of tomorrow a tremendous air organization in action.

The book is prevented from falling into the usual "compilation" category because the true stories from every combat air force around the globe are re-dramatized against a continuing fictional narrative framework. The authors, obtaining their stories from the official historical and intelligence files of the USAF, and by interview with the heroes themselves, have recreated the episodes with living men in the authentic atmosphere of the overseas combat areas. Added visual flavor is given by the profuse illustrations of Milton A. Caniff, whose work is a personal contribution to the AAF Aid Society which is receiving all royalties. General of the Army Henry "Hap" Arnold writes the Foreword.

There are literally thousands of stories that deserve a place in this excellent book, but that is a fault beyond the help of either the Air Force or the authors. *Silver Wings* will be important to the youngsters from 12 to 18, who make up

*Dr. Albion, author of several works on maritime history, is engaged in writing the official administrative history of the Navy in World War II.

the class of sons and young friends of Air Force fathers. It is likely, however, that anyone who has aviation in his blood would re-live 1941-1945 air adventures if he were to poach for a few hours on his youngster's literary grounds.

ROBERT L. SCOTT, JR.,*
Washington, D. C.

Rehearsal for Conflict; the War with Mexico, 1846-1848, by Alfred Hoyt Bill. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1947. Pp. 342. \$4.50.)

Mr. Bill, author of *Beleaguered City*, has now written a "period" history of the War with Mexico. Stating that his book "makes no pretense to profound scholarship," he nonetheless brings to it a wide knowledge of the subject. The character of his narrative is set in the opening chapter which deals with the explosion on the *Princeton* in 1844. From this tragic scene he is able to draw the threads of social, political and diplomatic Washington during the war years and later to weave them into the background of events on the Mexican border. In this small volume he compresses a great deal of military history, unencumbered with such heavy lumber as statistics and concerned with only the major battles. Mr. Bill has a special talent for military history. His clear, concise, and rapid-paced narrations of such battles as Buena Vista are models of their kind. He makes good use of letters, diaries and memoirs of participants. The heat, the horror, the smells, and the camp diseases are all here. So also are the lack of information, difficulties with raw troops, disappointments over supplies or poorly executed missions, and of course the folly back in Washington. With his pen, he has made many good portraits: Winfield Scott, Zachary Taylor, and Santa Anna. President James K. Polk comes in for the kind of fair treatment he is currently receiving from historians. Mr. Bill has succeeded in his purpose: to make familiar to the average reader a war which was overshadowed by the Civil War; and he has correctly called it a rehearsal for that later conflict.

HAROLD DEAN CATER,*
Washington, D. C.

*Colonel Scott, Deputy Commander of the Civil Air Patrol, and at one time commander of all fighter aircraft of the China Air Task Force, is author of the 1943 national best seller, *God Is My Co-Pilot*.

*Dr. Cater is preparing the official history of the War Department General Staff and the Office of the Chief of Staff up to the year 1940.

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

Down Ramp! by Brigadier General William F. Heavey. (Washington: Infantry Journal Press. 1947. Pp. 272. \$5). The organization of the Engineer Amphibian Command and the development of what became known as the Engineer Special Brigades constitute one of the most colorful and exciting chapters in military history. These self-sufficient amphibious assault units supported both the North African and Normandy invasions; their participation in the unprecedented drives from Australia through New Guinea to the Philippines was largely responsible for General MacArthur's description of the Pacific conflict as "the Engineers' War." The author of *Down Ramp!* was commanding general of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade which first brought the new land-and-sea techniques to the Pacific. His volume will serve as an excellent memory book for all who participated in Engineer ship-to-shore and shore-to-ship operations. Veterans will enjoy re-living their experiences in *Down Ramp!*

S. GORDON LINK

Operation Victory, by Maj. Gen. Sir Frederick de Guingand. (New York: Scribners. 1947. Pp. 488. \$3.75). General de Guingand's book is probably the fairest personal history yet to be written by a prominent commander in World War II. Unlike many of the other generals and admirals who have slashed away at individuals with whom they differed, or have omitted mention of the important work done by their colleagues, General de Guingand is generous with praise for all the Allies, and judicious in handling controversial subjects. His book is most valuable for its insights into the personality of General Montgomery and his qualities as a ground commander. In addition to valuable studies of his work as chief of staff to General Montgomery in North Africa, Italy, and Northwest Europe, General de Guingand throws considerable light on the War Office just prior to and immediately after the outbreak of war, the campaign in Greece, and the war in Africa before the arrival of General Montgomery.

FORREST C. POGUE.

NATIONAL WARFARE

"Formation de la frontière sibérienne entre la Chine et la Russie," by Lieutenant-Colonel Druène, in *Revue Historique de L'Armée*, January 1948 (73-93). Note on the strategic significance of eastern Siberia.

"Military Lessons Learned and not Learned," by Bertram Vogel, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1948 (74, 723-731). Air power versus sea power, with a sound appeal to common sense.

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VALMY

BY ALVIN D. COOX*

The campaign of Valmy affords ample scope to the historian with iconoclastic tendencies. Not only do the prejudices and the preconceptions of the uninformed or the half-informed need to be shaken rudely, but, more important, a balanced and studied view ought to be drawn from the major events that took place in the autumn of the year 1792. Was Dumouriez the savior of France, whose young army of inspired demigods charged forward to triumph under the glorious tricolor, against a superb foe who had never before known defeat? Was the clarion call to arms by the invaded *patrie en danger* sufficient to raise a magnificent host of citizen soldiers, fired with the will to maintain the sacred tenets of the Revolution, even unto death?¹

Or were the Prussians in reality a numerically inferior, undergunned, and ill-supplied force, ravaged by dysentery—a foe more dreaded than the Republican armies? Was the day of Valmy a battle, in the military sense? Or was it a mere affair of a single chance cannon shot that determined the decrepit, blundering, and easily disheartened Duke of Brunswick to fall back at once, without attempting a full-scale frontal assault?

There is some measure of truth in both of these polar interpretations. It will be the purpose of this paper to stress the salient facts, influences, and repercussions of the very real "myth of Valmy." At the same time, all attempts at blind detraction, or at

similarly blind idealization of "some beautiful emotional zeal," will be deprecated.

On the twentieth of April, 1792, France declared war on the "King of Hungary and Bohemia." Prussia joined the Austrians against France on May 1 of the same year. Before we enter into a description of actual field operations, let us first consider several important aspects of the French forces then drawn up along the frontiers. What were their composition, equipment, and morale? Were they predominantly Republican volunteers? Who were their officers? How did this army of 1792 compare with that of the invaders?

Any assertion that the victorious armies of the First Republic owed nothing to the former royal forces would be both absurd and ill founded. "The formidable army of the Monarchy did not suddenly disappear with the fall of Royalty,"² but instead remained as a powerful steady nucleus to the raw forces of 1791 and thereafter. The French armies which halted invasion and indeed carried their own crusade deep into Europe were no product of revolutionary invention, but were, rather, an excellent synthesis of com-

¹See Dick de Lonlay, *Notre Armée: histoire populaire et anecdotique de l'Infanterie Française* (Paris, 1890), an extravagant and uncritical work, which calls the French combatants at Valmy "youngsters and . . . men who had no wartime experience," etc. (p. 236). Even Arthur Chuquet, in *Les guerres de la Révolution*, vol. ii, "Valmy" (Paris, 1887), is obliged to disprove, by references, certain writers who have alleged that the *furia francese*, reinforced by ferocious battle cries, checked the advancing Prussians at Valmy! (ii, 207).

²Colonel Ramsay W. Phipps, *The Armies of the First French Republic* (Oxford University Press, London, 1929), i, 38.

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ponents of the old system. Not until 1796 did the Republic restore the army to the general state enjoyed under the Monarchy, whose regiments might better have been continued without break. Although the innovations in French army tactics were not in themselves new, they were the practical result of a more liberal acceptance and practice of the then radical, unorthodox measures that traditional royal armies might have distrusted. The measures adopted were based upon the principles of Saint-Germain, Guibert, Gribeauval, and the other reformers of the reign of Louis XVI. Thus it took over twenty years of strenuous work and thought to effect new organization, tactics, and leadership. This transformation is likened by Spenser Wilkinson, in a rare bit of eloquence, to that of a chrysalis' breaking and setting free a winged creature.³

Formerly, armies consumed much time in perfecting deployment from column to line formation. The Prussians were especially trained in maintaining parade alignment on all terrain, but, being still steeped in the traditional Frederician ways, they preferred to seek ground favorable to the use of the stiff, standard three-deep line. The French had by now, however, abandoned absurdly refined perfection, and insisted upon that mobility which was to engulf them one hundred and fifty years later. Being less welded to one particular form, the Republican armies came to adapt their units to the ground, and thus fought in all types of country and utilized such shelter as might be found. The line was not discarded in battle, but column formation was maintained until the last moment, when the transition was affected quickly and roughly. Perfect dressing of lines was ignored. The column itself was not developed until Imperial days, inasmuch as the

line was the more natural for the early armies, untrained in complex maneuver. Hence, the column was used for movement, and the line for fire. Important attempts to render separate commands self-sustaining in large measure, and not bound to a rigid base, were made. The Austrian skirmish type was adopted early, and became the precursor of modern tactical principles. The British continued to rely upon linear defense, even during the Napoleonic campaigns.⁴

Of the 9,500 officers in the royal French army of 1789, it has been estimated that 5,500 noblemen had emigrated by the end of 1794.⁵ Inasmuch as there were 6,600 nobles in the corps, such wholesale emigration as did transpire might be expected to have disorganized the army, destroyed its discipline, and incited military riots, with total defeat an inevitable consequence. Instead, patriotic junior officers and experienced noncoms of the old army received wonderful opportunities for selection and promotion by merit. As Brinton suggests,⁶ "the career open to talents never worked better than in the revolutionary armies . . . a career open to professional talent, not simply to amateur enthusiasm." Of the future twenty-six Marshals of the Empire, nine had been regular officers and ten had been soldiers in the old army. General Kellermann, whom we shall encounter later at the field of Valmy, had entered the service in 1752, at the age of eighteen—forty-one years before Suchet, an apprentice silk merchant and later Marshal of France, joined the Republican armies in 1793!⁷ There was ample room for promotion in the officer corps

⁴See Major Jean Colin, *L'Infanterie au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1907), vol. i: "La tactique," 246-282. This detailed study was undertaken by the Historical Section of the French General Staff. Also see Phipps, *op. cit.*, i, 39, 40.

⁵Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, 120.

⁶Crane Brinton, *A Decade of Revolution* (New York, 1934), 101.

⁷Phipps, *op. cit.*, i, 42, 43 ff.

³Spenser Wilkinson, *The French Army before Napoleon* (Oxford, 1915), 8.

for many such men of worth. The Revolution purged relentlessly: between 1791 and July 1792 alone, 593 generals were replaced by the *civil power*.⁸ It is only too apparent that the bold might have to fear the axe even more than did the craven. Eventually, however, when discipline was restored throughout the armies, the situation corrected itself, and the military machine was perfected. Throughout the Revolutionary period there was always a leaven of royal regulars to stiffen the levies. The absurd right of election of officers was restricted, in practice, to those officers and *sous-officiers* who had served in the militia or in the regular army.

Of the principal arms, the French artillery was extremely fortunate in not being swamped by volunteers, as was the infantry. For example, no fundamental changes were attempted in the predominantly loyal Regiment de Royal-Artillerie. Although massed artillery concentrations were not then possible, the maintenance of the strength of the arm, Napoleon's own, repaid the French well; we shall see its excellent service at Valmy, where it strengthened the "shaky infantry and weak cavalry." Jemappes and Wattignies are later examples of this great performance. Excellent horse artillery, with mounted gunners and reduced teams, had by now been introduced into service. Gribeauval had made the guns lighter, easier to move; and had increased their range, with limited calibers. "Gribeauval's guns were the best in Europe, and were not replaced in France till 1825."⁹

The engineers were similarly a technical, non-noble corps, and therefore largely escaped the brunt of the Revolutionary ills. The arm carried on in the tradition of Vauban and of Cormontaigne and, like the artillery, was admittedly the best in Europe, which followed the French precepts.

Nor was serious interference attempted with the cavalry, which had sixty-two entire regiments bequeathed it by the *ancien régime*. Only one unit did emigrate, and the remainder, later enlarged to eighty-six regiments, retained their existence. New army group numbers, however, replaced the former royal titles. Entirely new unamalgamated volunteer bodies were formed, predominantly of Chasseurs, a rather recent introduction. While the cavalry arm, as a whole, lost in importance as a means for gaining victory in battle, it remained of great value for exploiting success and rendering it decisive. Frequent tribute is paid to the reliability of the heavy cavalry, even in trying cases of *coups d'état*.

What we should call the function of the quartermaster corps was a primitive feature in the Republican armies. Great mobility was provided through the absence of magazines or of supply trains; even tents were but little used. Pillaging the land for food and for pay became the practice, a hardship both for the inhabitants and for the soldiers when camped in poor lands or for long periods, such as during winter cantonments.¹⁰

The royal army was an effective field force, though inferior in numbers to that of either Prussia or Austria. A publication of the French General Staff¹¹ has itemized the royal troops' strength as of 1789; 146,000 infantry, in addition to 11,000 colonial garrison soldiers, and 76,000 *milices*. The regular infantry comprised seventy-nine regiments, while the red-coated foreign regiments totalled twenty-three (Swiss, Germans, Irish, and Liégeois). Many of the so-called volun-

¹⁰*Les dommages de guerre après Valmy*, published by the Department of the Marne (Châlons-sur-Marne, 1931), a collection of unedited documents relating to the economic history of the French Revolution with supplementary eye-witnesses' reports.

¹¹Captain L. H. Bacquet, *L'Infanterie au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1907), vol. ii, 202-205. This is the second work in the series mentioned in note 4, above.

⁸*Ibid.*, i, 20.

⁹Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, 67.

teers of the infantry at Valmy had served for years before 1792. The levies of 1791 produced good battalions to reinforce the regulars. Recruits were drawn from the old militia, dissolved when the National Guard was instituted; from the former *Maison du Roi*; and from regular veterans of the American Revolution, since discharged, of whom Jourdan was an excellent example. In the *Armée du Nord*, as early as 1792, Lafayette, and later Dumouriez, had brigaded two of these volunteer battalions with one of regulars. This proved to be the highly effective basis for the formal *amalgame*, or *embrigadement*, of 1794. To the regulars (*culs blancs*) and to the reinforcements of the 1791 levies (*bleuets*) was due the check administered the invasion of 1792, at Valmy. This check, in turn, made possible Dumouriez's victory at Jemappes, and the first conquest of the Lowlands.

The weapon of the Revolutionary infantry was the flintlock (*fusil*), which fired a powder charge from sparks struck by flint upon steel, the blow being given mechanically by trigger action. Loading was expedited by use of the iron ramrod, invented by the Prussians in 1719. The bayonet, fixed to a ring on the barrel of the piece, transformed the flintlock into a pike, without detracting from the fire-power. Maximum range of the weapon was 600 yards; effective range, scarcely 275 yards. The flintlock of 1777 was used by the French until 1840.¹²

The armies of 1792 employed drill books that had been repeatedly revised, and that represented the best current military thought. Camps of instruction rendered the men proficient in military evolutions, directed by picked, intelligent noncoms. The masses of later conscripts (the *levée en masse* was decreed in August 1793) were to profit from

the foundations laid for a "nation of camps." In passing, it may be noted that the regulars and the volunteers saw amazingly little of their homes while in service. This is in striking contrast with the conscripts and non-descript *fédérés*, who would desert at their own fancy, and who were untrained, mutinous, and prone to excess. The new irregular levies, the real military products of the early Revolution, were a greater menace to the French commanders than were the foreign invaders. Dumouriez was embarrassed by the disturbing presence of citizen-irregulars at Valmy. As we shall see, the French forces might very well have been driven back like chaff upon Paris, had it not been for the solidifying influence of regular infantry battalions and their crack supporting artillery. Hence, the importance that must be attributed to the military bequest of the *ancien régime* to the Republic. The French army at Valmy was a surprisingly good army, at least potentially. Dumouriez said of it: "Cette armée était donc moins mauvaise qu'on ne l'a dit."¹³

On the other hand, the Prussian army under old Brunswick was not worthy of its reputation as the finest military body in the world. Ardent French Republican writers may term the Prussians "fameux, aguerris."¹⁴ Sounder scholars point out that the Prussian infantry were not the battle veterans of Frederick II and that, except for certain old officers with experience in the Seven Years' War, the troops had only participated in the "promenades" of Silesia or of Holland.¹⁵ Therefore the invading battalions were as new as those of the French and, indeed, had gained most of their experience at the Potsdam maneuvers. Prussian leadership was largely tied to tradition, was exceedingly slow and unimaginative, and generally lacked the

¹³Quoted in Chuquet, *op. cit.*, ii, 57.

¹⁴See de Lonlay, *op. cit.*, 236.

¹⁵See Chuquet, *op. cit.*, ii, 238.

¹²Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, 26.

"spark" of initiative of the French, who, it must be remembered, were then fighting on their home soil. The favorite plan in Prussian offensive operations was the turning of an enemy's flank, rather than the direct frontal assault. Manpower was traditionally expensive with such armies.

The Prussian cavalry was superb, but the important artillery had been generally neglected. As mentioned above, the Prussian infantry was highly skilled in orthodox parade maneuvers, but not so highly trained in practical field operations. In Dumouriez's own words, ". . . the Prussians no longer know how to make war."¹⁶ Routine sanitary and medical services collapsed tragically during the campaign, and the strength of the army was sapped by dysentery and by mud, as we shall have great cause to observe later. Quoting Heigel, Brinton states that when the Prussians were in the Argonne their "bakeries were in Verdun and their flour supplies in Trier!"¹⁷ Thus may be explained Colonel Phipps' assertion that Brunswick would halt the army until six days' rations of bread were baked and then, once the wagons were full, would go on until a fresh baking were necessary.¹⁸

In addition to these supply difficulties, there were the frequent bickerings and distrust (indeed often fostered by the French, indirectly) between the Prussians, their Austrian allies, and the *émigrés*. Nor was all of the strength of Prussia and of Austria concentrated in the west; strong components were engaged in the second partition of Poland, in Thorn and in Posen. One historian goes so far as to suggest that, "in the crucial campaign of 1792, France was unquestionably saved" by the Allied preoccupation in

the east.¹⁹ In addition to diverted military strength, the Allies were to suffer in an enemy countryside, largely deserted by the uncoöperative peasants; the French themselves had ample replacements through universal service.

Such, in brief, were the strong and the weak factors of the Armée du Nord, and of its sister army, that of the Moselle (or, Armée du Centre), as contrasted with the invading Allied forces, whose left wing, on July 31, 1792, crossed the river Rhine at Speyer.

Operations by the French began inauspiciously enough when, in April 1792, two panics occurred among the patriots. A force under Théobald Dillon was retiring west upon Lille after encountering a small Austrian patrol. Suddenly, senselessly, the fear-smitten French broke and fled wildly, murdering Dillon, and later burning his corpse. The very next day some cavalry under Biron became panic-stricken at dusk, and galloped blindly toward Valenciennes. In neither case had the affrighted soldiers been in the presence of an enemy. This was the nadir of French morale; reorganization of the volunteers was necessarily painful and gradual.

Meanwhile the Allies moved forward very, very slowly. Not until August did large forces push across the French frontiers. Brunswick himself crossed the Rhine at Coblenz on August 19. The garrison at Longwy surrendered on August 23, after the methodical Prussians had bombarded the civilian area of the village into rubble.

Chuquet estimates that 42,000 Prussians and 15,000 Austrians, under Clerfayt, were in the advancing Allied army.²⁰ Phipps says the Prussians had 55,000 men, supported by 16,000 Austrians, plus strong rear units, not all of which could be brought to bear.²¹

¹⁶Quoted in Phipps, *op. cit.*, i, 119.

¹⁷Brinton, *op. cit.*, 99.

¹⁸Phipps, *op. cit.*, i, 117.

¹⁹Brinton, *op. cit.*, 98.

²⁰Chuquet, *op. cit.*, ii, 1.

After an attack similar to that upon Longwy, Verdun's defenders, shaken by the flight of Lafayette, capitulated on September 2. The rapid fall of these frontier barriers alarmed France, which saw the path to Paris thus exposed to the invader. Europe, chuckles Chuquet, with his tongue knowingly in his cheek, expected that the war would soon be over, Paris occupied, and France dismembered and restored to monarchy.²² The scornful *émigrés*, who Prussian officers called worse enemies than the French defenders, deluded the invaders into believing that the road to Paris would be an easy promenade of three or four weeks, at the most. One glib seigneur even said that in this campaign no musket would be fired, and that no French patriot would dare to appear.²³

The French, however, acted decisively. Luckner, the commander of the Armée du Centre (Armée de Metz), was "kicked upstairs," as American army jargon would today term it. Kellermann, a favorite with the troops, succeeded the Generalissimo (Luckner's new title). Who was to succeed the unlucky, blundering Lafayette as commander of the Armée de l'Ardenne? Charles-François Dumouriez was the fortunate choice.

I say "fortunate," despite the varied estimates of this remarkable general. Samion, for instance, never tires of calling Dumouriez a "traitor," an ambitious and unscrupulous *condottiere*.²⁴ Few would attempt to white-

wash Dumouriez's later actions, and surely not Phipps, Chuquet, or Jomini. Chuquet indeed calls Dumouriez a "caméléon." But there is a little proverb that may help to explain why Dumouriez was definitely the right man for the French in September of 1792: "Una giornata che tu vinca cancella ogni altra tua mala azione." And so it was with Dumouriez.

He has been well termed "clever, active, restless, enterprising, marvelously self-confident; he knew how to exhort, encourage, . . . rally, and dared to punish."²⁵ His military daring was amazing; he was in company with the few generals in all history who have not paled at a threat to their line of communications. Concerning the action at Valmy, Napoleon himself considered Dumouriez too audacious, "and that from me should count for much, for I consider myself as the most audacious man in war who perhaps has ever existed. . . ."²⁶ Obviously Dumouriez often expected too much of his troops, but he did accomplish wonders with the first demoralized armies. His complete self-confidence buoyed him both in war and in politics. "Nothing overawed him." Perhaps Dumouriez's most redeeming characteristics were what Chuquet says of him: "He knew how to lead Frenchmen, and how to handle soldiers."²⁷

The final advance of Brunswick's army merely served to postpone Dumouriez's own project for the invasion of Belgium, to divert the Austrians from Champagne! The Frenchman nonchalantly abandoned the frontier

²¹Phipps, *op. cit.*, i, 112. See also Albert Mathiez, *The French Revolution*, tr. C. A. Phillips (New York, 1929), 218.

²²Chuquet, *op. cit.*, ii, 2.

²³*Campagne du Duc de Brunswick, by un témoin oculaire*, ed. des Renaudes (Paris, 1794), 42, 58, 152, 51.

²⁴L. Samion, *Kellermann: L'homme du 20 septembre* (Paris, 1892), 12, 27. Samion attacks the later "manipulations" attempted by Dumouriez in his *Mémoires*. For the latter work see *Mémoires du Général Dumouriez*, ed. M. F. Barrière, 2 vol. (Paris, 1848), ii, 9-248. Dumouriez himself claimed "non omnis moriar." See also Lt.-Gen. Jomini, *Histoire critique et militaire de la Révolution* (Paris, 1819), ii; Phipps, *op. cit.*, i, 72-75; Chuquet, *op. cit.*, ii, 8-23.

²⁵Phipps, *op. cit.*, i, 73, 74. Speaking of Dumouriez, Col. Phipps suggests that "he ought to have won the bâton, though it is difficult to imagine him bearing the yoke of the Emperor."

²⁶Las Casas, *Mémorial*, November 10, 1816; quoted *ibid.*, i, 131.

²⁷Chuquet, *op. cit.*, i, 21. Yet that Dumouriez was not blind to the limitations imposed by his men, see p. 24, quoting from a letter of Dumouriez, May 1792: "I have not hidden from myself the insubordination of the troops and the inexperience of the officers, but I have counted upon the French courage."

posts to their fates: "Il s'agit d'ailleurs de sauver le tronc sans s'attacher aux branches." But not until Verdun had fallen and the Austrians were marching upon Stenay did Dumouriez seriously believe that the Allies were heading for Paris, not Alsace. Perhaps Brunswick himself had not been sure of his ultimate direction, but now the French were actually menaced between two fires. Dumouriez wisely realized that his position at Sedan was untenable. Reluctantly, although only temporarily, he fell back upon the defiles of the Argonne, his so-called "Thermopylae of France." But Brunswick was too interested in Verdun to pay attention to the passes; "la lenteur allemande," Dumouriez termed it. Kellerman himself said that if the Duke of Brunswick intended to reach Paris, he should have set out on the same day that he seized Verdun. Under a screening attack by Dillon upon Stenay, the daring Dumouriez and his troops reached Grand-Pré on September 3. Dumouriez still believed that the Prussian moves toward the gorges of the Argonne were merely feints, that they really would attack Metz and Nancy.

The defense of the Argonne passes was poorly undertaken by Dumouriez. On the twelfth of September, Brunswick seized the key La Croix-aux-Bois defile from a handful of defenders, and held it against counter-attack. Dumouriez fully admits his "légèreté" in weakening the pass, under Prussian diversionary threats. The Argonne shield was now pierced, and Dumouriez was cut off from the northern army and its invaluable reinforcements. Normally, a general would immediately have fallen back upon Châlons, where numerically strong reserves were being gathered. Instead, Dumouriez, apparently fearing lest the Prussians catch his shaky troops in the open plain, decided to cling to the Argonne, by drawing in his left and center wings. Even this comparatively simple maneuver proved perilous to the untried troops.

Chazot's weary units, which had been repulsed at La Croix-aux-Bois, now were routed by a small body of Prussian horse. Immediately the terrified French, in an action that dangerously recalled the panics of Dillon's and Biron's mobs, fled wildly. Causing confusion in the main body, they broke to the west, with the shout, "Nous sommes trahis, nous sommes coupés!" This was the pitiful scene of Montcheutin. Only the rear guard, composed of regulars, held. As Dumouriez said of the action, "... a flight of 10,000 men before 1,500 hussards, and if these 1,500 had followed up their advantage, or if the Prussians had sent them 6,000 more, our entire army would have been lost."²⁸ A pathetic description, by their own commander, of the "avenging lions of the sacred Republic!"

Dumouriez and his officers got the mob into some semblance of order at Dommartin-sous-Hans. Having been in the saddle twenty-four hours without rest, the general was about to have dinner. Once again, however, the whole army began to flee in unabashed terror, with the cry of "Trahison!" against their commander. Well remembering the fate of Dillon at Lille, Dumouriez nevertheless took his life into his hands and, "by word of mouth and slash of saber," halted the fugitives. And still Dumouriez would not fall back on Châlons! For, despite civilian fears in Paris, he clearly understood that a city may be fully protected by a force not directly covering it.

Urgent couriers were sent to Kellermann and his Armée du Centre to come up as soon as was possible, but the reinforcing army did not reach the vicinity of Sainte-Menehould until September 18th. Chuquet thinks that if Brunswick had attacked Dumouriez between the sixteen and the eighteenth of September, the French would easily have been defeated

²⁸Dumouriez to Servan, quoted *ibid.*, ii, 138.

by superior numbers.²⁹ Indeed, it is a revealing commentary on the state of mind of the bulk of Dumouriez's own troops that it was deemed imperative to send a token force from the Centre army, to prove its proximity.

There was considerable fumbling by Dumouriez's lieutenants. Beurnonville, who was to bring two needed segments from the northern army, mistook Dumouriez's columns entering Sainte-Menehould for those of Brunswick; whereupon he retreated all the way to Châlons. It took the combined reassurances of Luckner and of Dumouriez to get poor Beurnonville to bring up his forces by the nineteenth of September, the very day before Valmy. In the midst of all these trials and fears, Dumouriez stood firm at Sainte-Menehould. There he awaited the arrival of Kellermann, to bolster, if not to save, his own masses of raw recruits.

"Kellermann came, and with him came the safety of France."³⁰ After the juncture had been effected, 52,000 French troops (of whom 36,000 were in the line) were assembled near Valmy, to counter the 34,000 men of the invader.³¹

Too often the unwary historian is blinded to the truth of the case by the very fact that Dumouriez, a most dramatic figure, appears to overshadow the orthodox Alsatian, Kellermann. It may be true that some tend to quibble over the apportionment of "glory" for Valmy; it is no less true that Kellermann's field army actually won the "battle" itself. Yet that Kellermann did fight at Valmy was due in turn to Dumouriez, who generously coördinated his forces with the former, and skillfully supported him. This support was lent by Dumouriez although he had not asked the Alsatian's aid until as late as

the twelfth of September, and not with extreme urgency until the fifteenth. Brunswick had successfully obscured his true plans, till the last few days before Valmy.

Sixteen thousand troops were in the Armée du Centre of Kellermann. Their worth, however, far exceeded the strength of their numbers. For they were France's finest and most trustworthy field army, an unbroken and untouched entity. Such qualities were to count for much in the essentially *holding* battle of Valmy. All but two battalions of Kellermann's force were regular troops; that is, fourteen battalions and thirty squadrons. Dumouriez, on the other hand, had only twenty-one regular battalions sandwiched in with his thirty-six of volunteers and of *fédérés*.³²

Dumouriez's men were in a nervous state, worried by their recent flights and panics. The Prussians were seeking this new, shaky army. They found, instead, an old, disciplined army, "such as the monarchy was wont to put in the field." For a careful consideration of the composition of the Centre army "will serve to dispel the dangerous delusion once held, that at Valmy a mass of raw volunteers threw back the experienced veterans of Brunswick.

"No man ever went more unwillingly to gain a name in history than Kellermann. . ."³³ First, of all possible positions for a defensive stand, Valmy appeared to the veteran general to be the worst. Disregarding Dumouriez's own theories, Brunswick might logically decide to bypass the weak French position near Sainte-Menehould, and strike behind Dumouriez for Paris. Secondly, the tactical position of Valmy itself was surprisingly weak. Near-by heights might command the whole align-

³²Chuquet, *op. cit.*, ii, 249; 161-2, n. 3.

³³Phipps, *op. cit.*, ii, 14. Except for the memorable day of September 20, when the Centre bore the brunt of the action, the history of the Nord is the most important for the first French armies.

³⁴*Ibid.*, ii, 18.

²⁹*Ibid.*, ii, 151.

³⁰Phipps, *op. cit.*, i, 125.

³¹*Ibid.*, i, 24.

ment; a pond cut off lateral communication with Dumouriez. Mud and marsh lay behind the lines. Kellermann resolved to fall back on the heights next day. Valmy was not for him, said he!

Nor did Brunswick plan to strike west. He had intended to threaten Dumouriez's communications southward to Paris, and cut the French off from the guarding hills, by seizing the pass of Islettes. Logically it was to be expected that, once the French were caught in the plain, they would be swiftly annihilated in open battle. But the obstinate King of Prussia was deceived by faulty reconnaissance into believing that the French were retreating westward. Without investigation, the King overrode Brunswick's feeble protest, and directed the columns west, towards the Châlons road—and Kellermann.

The fog lay thick over Valmy. It was Thursday morning, September 20, 1792. Hohenlohe's column, advancing rather blindly, was fired upon early, by the well-directed artillery of Deprez-Crassier. Kellermann, who had not been expecting an attack upon himself, hastily organized the mass of his troops on the mound of Valmy. He crammed his men between the supporting battalions of Dumouriez, whose superb patriotism fortunately conquered any feeling of jealousy of independent command, on that day of days. Three factors helped Kellermann win time to form his regulars: the energetic defensive action of Valence at La Lune; the obscuring fog; and the indecision of the Prussians, once they had discovered that the French were not in retreat. Heavy cannonading rang out all morning. Brunswick probably did not realize that he had "changed foxes"; Kellermann did not want to risk his men, so long as the steady artillery could wreak havoc on the foe. About 1:00 P.M., the Prussians determined to attempt a decisive blow. The sun had appeared by now. Over the soggy field the invaders deployed in precise parade formation.

The advance was steady but slow, and the exposed troops presented good targets.

On the hill of Valmy, Kellermann dramatically exhorted his men to stand firm and meet the charge with cold steel. The Prussians advanced methodically, while the artillery of d'Aboville and of Senarmont thundered at the guns of Tempelhoff. The French did not break. After moving up about two hundred bloody, futile paces, Brunswick ordered a halt, some 1,300 yards off, facing the French batteries. The trial of endurance now continued, "with increasing confidence among the French and growing disgust among the Prussians." Although the windmill of Valmy made a good target, the Prussian gunners had to elevate their pieces, and the French replied well. Kellermann and Dumouriez both exposed themselves constantly to fire, the former having a horse shot from under him. When Dumouriez soon saw that Brunswick would not dare to attack, he very calmly rode back to his own camp.

The French were easily holding their own, when the unexpected happened, to test the new Republic, perhaps to decide its fate. About two in the afternoon hell suddenly tore loose underfoot when a Prussian shot struck several ammunition wagons parked too close to the line. Entire ranks vanished in air. The front line wavered. Two old regiments recoiled in disorder, while the artillery train, with civilian drivers, fled. Both sides ceased the cannonade, awe-struck, waiting. This was the moment of Valmy. Were the wild panics of the spring to recur? Massenbach saw the chance, spurred from La Lune back to the Prussian commanding general, to get him to assault now.

Kellermann, however, was at the decisive point. By word and by example he rallied, calmed his men. "Où allez-vous donc, Messieurs?" he called (forgetting, in this time of stress, to say "Citoyens"!) Simultaneously, the alert Duke of Chartres, "showing the res-

olution which was to fail him as King in 1848,"³⁵ brought up two fresh batteries of horse artillery, with resolute gunners. And Kellermann's two battalions of volunteers held bravely. Once more the French field pieces rumbled forth.

It was too late for old Brunswick now. For the second time he renounced as too costly and too doubtful a direct assault against the reformed enemy lines. Sadly the Duke told the Prussian King, "Hier schlagen wir nicht." On the French right flank, Stengel (too often ignored in accounts of the battle) had held his ground all day, so that Dumouriez's wing could not possibly be turned. Now night drew near and, between five and six o'clock, rain began to come down in torrents again. The artillery barrage had lasted over seven hours; nearly all the ammunition had been expended on both sides.

The casualties were not excessive. The Prussians left 180 men on the field; the French, about 300,³⁶ a small price for so decisive a check to the invasion. In Voltaire's words, "The place, the time engender the importance of an action."³⁷ The Prussians fired fifty-eight pieces of artillery; the French, over forty. Although the actual number of shells projected was not overwhelming (the French fired 20,000 rounds),³⁸ yet the cannonade was the most vicious that European military history could then cite, as numerous eye-witnesses' accounts testify. Casualties were reduced by the extreme range of the armies, and by the drenched earth, which hindered ricochets.

In addition to the more obvious Prussian blundering and hesitancy, it might be well to

single out, on the French side, those men and those factors which contributed greatly to the outcome at Valmy. Each deserves a notable share of the credit:

First, Dumouriez. Daring as ever, and supremely confident, he unselfishly coöperated with Kellermann, and saved the latter general, by his excellent disposition of supporting troops.

Second, Kellermann (later Duke of Valmy, 1808). He stood and endured with his regulars, on ground that he himself termed "désagréable," a mild understatement. His inherent conservatism restrained him from risking his high-strung troops in a tempting, but dangerous, attack upon the still intact Prussians. That Brunswick, who remained an excellent tactician throughout, could not crack the unwavering French lines "expendably" speaks well for stolid Kellermann and for his men. "The Revolution was saved by the General that was least its product."³⁹

Third, the crack artillery batteries. Well served and well directed, they never rendered greater services, although they may later have gained more brilliant successes.

Fourth, the hussard Stengel, whom Dumouriez termed his best officer, and whom Napoleon esteemed greatly. This French commander held off the Prussian left flank at Mount Yvron and saved Kellermann from being enveloped and beaten.⁴⁰

Fifth, Valence. He gained invaluable time for the French by his well-conducted defense in the morning. Kellermann fully admits his debt to this able officer.⁴¹

The French generals do not seem to have grasped the full significance of the memorable day, or to have realized the profound Prussian "abattement." Dumouriez expected

³⁵*Ibid.*, ii, 23.

³⁶Chuquet, *op. cit.*, ii, 228. Contemporaries overestimate the losses of the Prussians.

³⁷*Siccle de Louis XIV.*, xxv.

³⁸The French fired 50,000 cannon shots at Moscow; 39,000 at Lutzen; 95,000 at Leipzig. Chuquet, *op. cit.*, ii, 233, n. 1; and Dumouriez, *Mémoires*, i, 291.

³⁹Phipps, *op. cit.*, ii, 24.

⁴⁰Dumouriez, *Mémoires*, i, 290.

⁴¹Quoted in Chuquet, *op. cit.*, ii, 190.

a new attack upon him, on the Châlons road. Kellermann still regretted his junction.

Although the French public probably never doubted that the invader would be checked, yet the import of the "affaire de Valmy," as it was called, was apparently not appreciated. The Republic proclaimed by the new National Assembly was applauded more fervently.

The night of Valmy, Kellermann, considering that he had gained a mere respite from the foe, and after conferring with Dumouriez, drew off in the rain. His road lay toward the excellent defensive position that he had previously selected, behind the Yèvre and the Aube. False fires were left to burn on the mound of Valmy.

The Prussians suffered sorely in the hostile land. September was a month of relentless torrential rains that pursued the invaders inexorably. Said a Prussian, "The sky, the land, and man seemed to have conspired against us: always rain, no dry place to lie down, no kindling wood. . . ."⁴² The rains converted the roads into morasses, and caused the drinking water to become chalky, non-potable. What water there was came to be sold at twelve sols the pint. The canvas of the tents proved meager protection against the drenching downpours, and the lack of shoes caused crippling and death. The night of Valmy, it is said, more Prussians died of disease fostered by wet ground and by cold rain than perished in the cannonade.⁴³ Nor

was there even a partial sufficiency of bread or of meat.

Wine, tea, coffee, and sugar became unobtainable. Bread sold for a *louis d'or* per loaf. Dillon says that the desertion of Prussian soldiers was encouraged by the enclosure of Dumouriez's generous decree for deserters in loaves of bread hurled to the enemy lines. The Prussians are said to have been "delighted" to be captured.⁴⁴ Tobacco became so scarce that hay, straw, and leaves were smoked. Forage was lacking to the cavalry, which lost sixty to one hundred horses a day, and which ended up half dismounted. Medical facilities were practically non-existent; many of the wretches had to be taken to Grand-Pré, or even as far as Verdun.⁴⁵

But worse yet were the horrible ravages of dysentery. The Prussian ills, debilitating or fatal, may be attributed to the indulgence in unripe grapes and potatoes, while unfit horses were also devoured by the famished troops. A contemporary French ditty exulted over the plight of the invader:

La raisin donne la foire;
C'est le sort du Prussien.
Il courait à la victoire,
Mais la courante l'atteint;
Il attrape au lieu de gloire
La colique du raisin.⁴⁶

By the end of September there were only 17,000 able-bodied men left in the Prussian camp, and no unit was at full strength.⁴⁷ Three thousand Prussians were buried at Grand-Pré alone; it should be remembered that less than two hundred died in battle at Valmy. When the French entered La Lune on October 1, they found it full of bodies

⁴²*Témoin oculaire*, 297. The Prussian author paints a hideous picture of the camp at La Lune. "Pendant notre séjour en France, je n'ai entendu . . . ni chants, ni bons mots, ni plaisanteries . . ." p. 69.

⁴³See General J. Money, *The History of the Campaign of 1792* (London, 1794); on pp. 73-74 a typical letter is cited, that of the Prince de Ligne, an émigré officer later killed in a skirmish: "We are starting to be tired of this war . . . we have to fight line troops, of whom none deserts, besides national troops, and all the peasants, who are armed . . . it pours, and the roads are so impracticable that . . . we cannot drag out our cannon. And then there is hunger. . . Our shoes and boots are rotted, and our men are becoming sick. The villages are deserted. . . I do not know what we shall do, or what will become of us."

⁴⁴General A. Dillon, *Compte rendu au Ministre de la Guerre* (Paris, 1792), 16, 40.

⁴⁵*Témoin oculaire*, 300, 306; Money, *op. cit.*, 104.

⁴⁶Stanza two, "La déconvenue de l'armée prussienne en Champagne;" in de Lonlay, *op. cit.*, 237.

⁴⁷Jorini, *op. cit.*, ii, 133.

of men and of horses. The cesspools were bloodied; poor wretches had even fallen in and perished. The camp, a veritable cloaca, could not be occupied by the French, for fear of epidemic. "It was from the midst of a cemetery that the Duke of Brunswick published his famous manifesto and wished to dictate laws to France."⁴⁸

It was obviously too late for the invader to consider a further advance, but neither would Dumouriez relinquish his hold upon the Argonne, despite the urgings of Kellermann. The ministry in Paris upheld Dumouriez's decision. Finally, on September 30, the Prussians commenced their painful, slow retreat, after a delay that they could ill afford, coupled with growing suspicions of their Austrian ally (suspicions that were encouraged by Dumouriez's *pourparlers*).

Unknown to the virtuous, blustering Kellermann, the ever intriguing Dumouriez had been carrying on lengthy negotiations with the Prussians, to induce them to evacuate France without a fight. Jomini infers skulduggery on Dumouriez's part.⁴⁹ Not until October 6 did Dumouriez unfold his plan to his colleague, Kellermann, who had previously been shuttled back and forth to prevent his pressing the foe! Dumouriez intended now to invade Belgium with his own army, while Kellermann was left to shove out Brunswick gently, and to retake the frontier fortresses without bloodshed. Kellermann agreed: "Ça ira."

The *dénouement* followed according to plan: Verdun and Longwy were quietly surrendered by the Prussians. On October 23, 1792, three salvoes from the Armée de la Moselle (the old Centre, before October 1) thundered out the glad news that the last

invader was off sacred French soil. Dumouriez was joined by the Ardennes army, as he at last drove north, to Jemappes and the conquest of Belgium.

Estimates of the day of Valmy have varied, but in general have tended to magnify the "affair of Valmy" into a substantial legend, so needed by the early Republic. It is true that the *émigré* Count de Neuilly called Valmy a mere *pétarade*.⁵⁰ But Goethe, soaring to literary heights, told his companions of the battle, "From this place and from this day dates a new epoch in the history of the world, and you will be able to say, 'I was there'." Dumouriez called the engagement a "useless" but terribly sustained cannonade which, however, produced a very good effect upon the French, in proving to them that their morale and their fire could stop a formidable enemy in his tracks.⁵¹ Jomini substantially agrees, adding that, although not a strategic victory, Valmy was a pronounced moral triumph, in that the French kept the field at all.⁵² Massenbach called Valmy "the most important day of the century."⁵³ Boudou said that 10,000 men stretched out on that battlefield would not so definitely have proclaimed the defeat of the Allies.⁵⁴

Chuquet says that this baptism of fire for Republican arms, the first feat since Yorktown and Bergen, produced the needed French *élan*, against those Continental armies they had formerly feared so very greatly.⁵⁵ Phipps suggests that Valmy "was much more a question of nerves than of fighting," that this trial of the spirit of the regulars devolved into a question of "who should pound longest, as Wellington would have said."⁵⁶

⁵⁰Quoted in Samion, *op. cit.*, 152.

⁵¹Dumouriez, *Mémoires*, i, 292.

⁵²Jomini, *op. cit.*, ii, 131.

⁵³Quoted in Chuquet, *op. cit.*, ii, 224.

⁵⁴*Esquisse de la vie militaire du maréchal Kellermann*; quoted in Samion, *op. cit.*, 150.

⁵⁵Chuquet, *op. cit.*, ii, 231-2.

⁵⁶Phipps, *op. cit.*, i, 128; ii, 20.

⁴⁸Money, *op. cit.*, 110. See also Dumouriez, *Mémoires*, i, 309. The camp was indelicately, but appropriately, termed *Drecklager*.

⁴⁹Jomini, *op. cit.*, ii, 137. The author admits, however, that his suspicions cannot be affirmed.

General Weygand, after discussing the psychology of French military patriotism, concludes that Valmy was a mere cannonade, under which the troops held, but admits that new confidence in Republican leadership and discipline was at last engendered. "Les armées étaient en progrès. . . ."⁵⁷

⁵⁷General Maxime Weygand: *Histoire de l'Armée Française* (Paris, 1938), 206.

Battle, cannonade, or skirmish—Valmy produced the wonderful, hoped-for effect: the *nec plus ultra* of the Allied invasion. We need not here discuss the real wisdom of saving the France of 1792 for the butchery and the Terror that were to follow. Party conflict was far from stilled. But the Republic itself was saved from the invader at the little mill of Valmy, where foundered the First Coalition.

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PAST AIRBORNE EMPLOYMENT

By LT. COL. JAMES A. BASSETT*

EARLY IDEAS AND EXPERIMENTS

The idea of *airphibious* warfare is not as new as it might seem. In 1784, Benjamin Franklin remarked:

Where is the Prince who can afford so to cover his country with troops for its defense, as that ten thousand men descending from the clouds, might not, in many places, do an infinite deal of mischief before a force could be brought together to repel them?¹

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 saw the first use of aircraft to carry troops when several men of the besieged garrison of Paris escaped by means of balloons.² In October 1917, Winston Churchill suggested the organization of "flying columns" which would land behind the enemy lines to destroy bridges, factories, etc., thereby forcing the enemy to disperse his defenses.³ In October 1918, the renowned General William Mitchell proposed dropping parachutists from bombers behind the German lines in order to take Metz from the rear, but the Armistice intervened.⁴

About 1928 at Kelly Field, Texas, twelve men made a parachute drop from a single

airplane, demonstrating the feasibility of such operations.⁵ However, the few officers in the United States Army who foresaw the military possibilities of this mode of transport were more interested in the strategic movement of air-landed troops than the direct entry into combat from the air, and this type of experimentation lapsed.

Some of the important aspects of airborne employment in the United States "just grew" as casual but convenient improvisations, without any awareness at the time that something significant was developing. In the mixed air squadrons that existed in the early 'Twenties, mortified bomber pilots on occasion found themselves demoted to mere aerial truck-drivers, transporting mechanics and spare parts from field to field for the fighter planes. Passenger and air cargo service for higher headquarters was already a commonplace. In the Second Nicaraguan Campaign (1925-29) US Marine Corps aviation was originally assigned to provide close air support for the ground forces. Experiments proved that in the primitive Northern Area, where roads were poor and railroads entirely lacking, both time and money could be saved though rotating and supplying outpost detachments by air. Air evacuation was employed from the first. The archives of Marine Corps Headquarters supply the following statistics for the campaign, which appear to imply that a large proportion of flying time was devoted to airborne and air-cargo operations:

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¹Quoted in Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries* (New York: Wm. Morrow and Co., 1946), p. 330.

²Lt. Col. Bassenge, "Air Infantry," *Deutsche Luftwacht (Luftwehr)*, January 1939 (Typewritten translation by Sgt. F. W. Merten, Army War College, May 1939), p. 1.

³Flight-Lt. V. E. R. Blunt, *The Use of Air Power* (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1943), p. ix.

⁴Brereton, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

⁵Related to the author by one of the participants, Master Sergeant Harry Wilson.

Non-aviation personnel transported by air	21,148
Pounds of Military cargo carried	6,451,105
Hours flown in airborne operations	39,440
Aviation contacts with bandit forces	140
Aircraft damaged by bandit fire	138

In 1931 Major General Preston Brown moved a battery of field artillery by air transport from the Atlantic to the Pacific side of the Panama Canal Zone. A similar move was repeated in 1933 with a battalion of field artillery. In 1932 Captain (later General) George C. Kenney astounded his colleagues during maneuvers at Fort Du Pont, Delaware, by air-landing an infantry detachment behind "enemy lines."⁶ This same feature of strategic air movement attracted the British Army, for in June 1932 an infantry battalion was moved by air from Egypt to Iraq.⁷ All of these moves were made by the normal landing of the aircraft.

It was the Russians who first developed mass tactical employment of parachute units, the forerunner of modern airborne divisions. These developments, probably beginning about 1930, startled the world in 1936 when during the maneuvers near Kiev, witnessed by foreign military observers, two parachute battalions equipped with light field guns landed in eight minutes and immediately occupied their objective.⁸ The German Army immediately grasped this new weapon and expanded its scope, utilizing gliders, with which they had become proficient during the period of the "treaty army," as well as parachutes and landed-transporters for placing troops on the ground. By 1938, it was esti-

mated that Russia had 100,000 trained parachute troops,⁹ and by 1939 Germany had one organized parachute division. While Russia had also developed a special air-landing corps, Germany utilized either ordinary infantry or mountain infantry divisions for this purpose.¹⁰ Of the remaining countries of Europe, only Italy had shown other than an experimental interest. The Italian army utilized parachutes as a means of supply in the Abyssinian campaign, and transported a regiment of Grenadiers from Taranto to Tirana by air during the invasion of Albania.¹¹

What were the doctrines for the employment of such forces advanced by the military writers in the various countries prior to World War II? Although there is not much direct evidence of Russian thought available, it seems to have considered the complete gamut of military operations susceptible to the employment of airborne forces: strategically, throughout the depth of the hostile theater of war; tactically, in the operations zone of the enemy; and politically, by the use of agitators and saboteurs.¹² German thought agreed with the Russian in regard to the tactical operations: seizure of critical points close in the hostile rear to either block enemy reserves or assist the advancement of the main assault; but was somewhat skeptical of employment at any great range due to the limitation of such units both in strength and firepower. Another profitable role was also foreseen in rapid reinforcement of the pursuit.¹³ French interest seemed to concentrate on the

⁶Lt. Col. John T. Ellis, Jr., *The Airborne Command and Center* (Washington: The Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), p. 1.

⁷"Transport d'un bataillon par avion," *La Revue d'Infanterie*, Vol. LXXXII (1 February 1933), pp. 238-42. (Typewritten translation by Pvt. Marcel H. Coudry, Army War College Library.)

⁸Major F. O. Miksche, *Paratroops* (New York: Random House, 1943), p. 3.

⁹Lt. Col. Walter Leon, "Parachute Troops," *Militär-Wochenblatt*, 30 April 1937 (Typewritten translation by Sgt. F. W. Merten, Army War College, May 1937), p. 1.

¹⁰Miksche, *op. cit.*, pp. 17ff.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹²Bassenge, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹³Leon, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

use of parachute units in the demolition role, while at least two British writers considered that interruption of communications offered the most fruitful employment for "air brigades."¹⁴ However, France and Britain, along with the United States, placed greater emphasis on the long range movement of strategic reserves by air transport, probably due to their far-flung territories.¹⁵ Liddell Hart prophesied in 1937 that the psychological strain imposed by the advent of the "vertical envelopment" and the resulting requirement for defensive forces in rear areas would be one of the greatest factors of this new weapon. "Thus, by the mere threat of their existence such forces have a promise of great effect—greater than any damage they may actually do."¹⁶

As in most other phases of military preparedness the United States was most dilatory in the airborne field. For, despite the initiative of the few individuals cited above, it was only in May 1939 that the War Department first began to officially consider that a study should possibly be made of this new weapon. Due mainly to inter-branch bickering as to within whose province such a weapon should belong, it was not until July 1940 that a Test Platoon was finally organized at Fort Benning, Georgia; and undoubtedly some credit should go to the success of the German operation in Holland for providing the final shove.¹⁷

Such was the situation at the outbreak of World War II. Let us now review briefly the operations of that war in which airborne forces were employed in order to determine

their capabilities and limitations, and what these may presage for the future.

OPERATIONS OF WORLD WAR II

The employment of airborne forces in World War II may be divided into three classes: (1) Raids, (2) Close-in direct tactical support to land or amphibious operations, and (3) Operations of a strategical nature, either entirely independent of, or in conjunction with but not in direct tactical support of, other land operations. In the latter category are also included those accomplished by air-landed means alone—that is, the troops were conventionally landed by the aircraft rather than by means of parachutes or gliders.

Raids.—As was seen, the majority opinion prior to the war, at least on the Allied side, was that the primary role of airborne troops was in raiding and demolition work. The initial organization of United States parachute troops in separate G.H.Q. battalions stressed this function (although such a limited view was emphatically decried by the early pioneers of the new arm). There are several examples of airborne raids during the war worthy of note.

On 10 February 1941, a British parachute detachment attempted a novel operation which might have had far reaching strategic consequences. Its objective was the destruction of a large aqueduct carrying the main water supply for the south of Italy at the point where it spans a small stream, the Tragino, in Campagna Province, south of Naples. Despite having lost one of the planes containing the demolition expert in the flight from Malta, the loss of some of the explosives in the night drop, and the underestimation of the strength of the supporting piers, some damage was inflicted, causing at least partial disruption of the water supply for about ten days. Most of the detachment of about eighty men were captured in their at-

¹⁴"Air Infantry," *The Infantry School Mailing List*, Vol. XXIV (July 1937), pp. 233-46. Contains a digest of foreign experiments and theories.

¹⁵Bassenge, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-7.

¹⁶*Europe in Arms* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1937), p. 33.

¹⁷Ellis, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-4.

tempt to effect a withdrawal via submarine on the west coast.¹⁸ The overall objective of the plan was apparently to force the Italian fleet's withdrawal from its base at Taranto.¹⁹

During the night of 27-28 February 1942, a British parachute force dropped near Bruneval, on the channel coast of France, with complete surprise and destroyed a German radar station. After some fighting the force was evacuated by pre-arranged assault naval craft with few casualties. The success of this operation was attributable largely to careful planning, including scale models of all enemy installations in the objective area.²⁰

During the battle for Tunisia, in early 1943, a small detachment of United States parachute troops dropped at night near El Djem, on the east coast, with the mission of destroying a railroad bridge. Although landing within one mile of their objective, the detachment moved in the opposite direction due to faulty orientation, and finally destroyed a section of track as a last resort. After breaking up into small parties only a few individuals managed to filter back to their own lines some seventy miles away.²¹

Parachute elements seized Los Baños Prison Camp, Luzon, Philippine Islands, on 23 February 1945, in order to forestall any final Japanese massacre. After surprising and killing 240 Japanese guards, the force, aided by guerrillas, liberated 2,146 American civilians and escorted them back to Manila.²²

It is not intended to consider the almost

continuous dropping by parachute of agents, specialists and supplies to the various resistance movements in the German occupied countries, notably France and Yugoslavia, since these were not truly airborne raids but guerrilla operations. However, it is notable that such were greatly aided, materially and morally, by the possibilities of airborne movement.

Direct Tactical Support.—Airborne operations of the second class were the most numerous in World War II. The first major use of this new arm in a tactical role, in the German offensive against the "West" in May 1940, startled the world; for, unlike Norway, these countries were supposedly prepared. The overall German strategic plan required the rapid seizure of Holland and Belgium. But, not only were there major water barriers to be crossed, but these were protected by extensive fortifications. Airborne forces were employed in three places to assist the ground advance. First, the three major crossings of the lower Rhine and Maas at Rotterdam, Mordijk and Dordrecht were seized just after dawn on 10 May 1940 by a combination of parachute and air-landing action, and held until arrival of ground elements. This action exposed the "inner fortress" of Holland to fast moving armored elements. Secondly an airborne force was landed near The Hague to cut off the capital, the nerve center of Dutch defense, from the remainder of the country, and to retain the Dutch reserves in that area. This action failed in its first intention but did attract Dutch reserves. Thirdly, one of the major routes into Belgium across the Albert Canal was protected by the fortress of Eben Emael. Its guns were silenced by a small demolition group landed on top of the fortress by gliders and reinforced by parachutists, enabling it to be rapidly taken by following ground elements. The securing of the crossings over

¹⁸*Combined Operations: The Official Story of the Commandos* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1943), p. 82.

¹⁹However, the British were apparently not prepared to exploit the situation had the demolition been totally effective.

²⁰*Combined Operations*, pp. 65-70.

²¹Col. Edson D. Raff, *We Jumped to Fight* (New York: Eagle Books, 1944), pp. 182-6.

²²Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 83. Roger W. Shugg and Major H. A. DeWeerd, *World War II: A Concise History* (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), p. 368.

the Albert Canal, which Eben Emael was to protect, plus the seizure of the Dutch bridges were the major factors in the rapid defeat of the Low Countries.²³ The Allies were to execute this operation in reverse in 1944, but with less success.

The first Allied action in which airborne forces were employed in a direct tactical supporting role was the North African invasion on 8 November 1942. One US parachute battalion flew direct from England with the mission of capturing the Tafaraoui naval training aerodrome, and at the same time to destroy fighters on the nearby La Seria military air base and cut communications near the town of Lourmel, some thirty miles away—quite a large order for one battalion. Due to difficult navigation on the long flight, and, mainly, to the confusion caused by the double plan for a "peace" or "war" landing necessitated by the political situation, the mission was a failure. However, some benefit occurred in the fact that French fighters were kept on the ground by the knowledge of parachute troops in the area, until the main attack was ascertained. These might have otherwise affected the amphibious landing at Oran. It is extremely doubtful that the battalion could have accomplished its mission against the French defenses even had it been dropped properly at night under the "war plan"—an example of too large a mission for too small a force.²⁴

In the invasion of Sicily, 10 July 1943, one US parachute regimental combat team, reinforced, and parts of one British airborne division were committed on the night just

prior to the daylight main amphibious assaults. Their missions were to seize critical communication points inland from the beaches, block enemy reserves, and thereby act as covering forces for the two amphibious assaults. General Gavin, commander of the US airborne unit, afterwards stated: "The collective limitations of bad weather, ground haze, inexperience and lack of navigation means made the task almost impossible."²⁵ The troops were badly scattered—the US units over an area of some fifty miles along the southeastern coast. Nevertheless, enough elements landed in the target area, the front of the 1st US Division, and along the front of the adjoining 45th US Division to materially aid the establishment of the beachhead. The later testimony of General Karl Student, German airborne commander, is illuminating:

The Allied airborne operations in Sicily were decisive despite widely scattered drops which must be expected in a night landing. It is my opinion that if it had not been for the Allied airborne forces blocking the Hermann Goering Armored Division from reaching the beachhead, that division would have driven the initial seaborne forces back into the sea. I attribute the entire success of the Allied Sicilian operation to the delaying of German reserves until sufficient forces had been landed by sea to resist the counterattacks by our defending forces.²⁶

The experience gained in conducting large-scale airborne operations, particularly at night, materially contributed to the success of later Allied airborne efforts.

In Italy, a critical situation in the Salerno amphibious assault of the Fifth US Army on 12 September 1943 necessitated a rapid reinforcement of the beachhead. A request was received from General Clark, Fifth Army

²³Miksche, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-46.

²⁴Raff, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-46. Had the mission been flown so as to arrive in the target area at night, a part of the "war plan," it would probably never have reached the target, for final navigation was only made possible by landing one plane beside an Arab hut and asking for directions.

²⁵Gavin, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

²⁶Statement made in 1945 to prisoner-of-war interrogator, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 16.

commander, at about 1400 hours at the 82nd Airborne Division headquarters in Sicily, without previous warning, for two parachute regiments to be dropped inside the beachhead. Accordingly, one regiment was on its way eight hours after receipt of the request and was in the lines by dawn. On the next night, 13 September, a second regiment followed. This operation was decisive in securing the beachhead and was more rapid than any reinforcements could have arrived by water, even had the shipping been available.²⁷

Included in the same request was a mission for a parachute battalion to be dropped some distance behind the German lines, at Avellino, on the night of 14-15 September, to deny that road junction to German reserves. Due to difficult navigation in locating that mountain village without prior reconnaissance, which badly scattered the unit, and the strong German reserves located thereat, the battalion's action was little more than a harassing raid. Approximately eighty percent of the troops gradually filtered back to the Allied lines.²⁸

The Germans utilized a parachute battalion in their recapture of Leros Island in the Dodecanese in November 1943. In conjunction with an amphibious assault on either end of the island, the parachute battalion was dropped across the narrow center, preventing free movement of British reserves against the beachheads. After four days of attempting to dislodge the well-supported parachute battalion's position and the ever-growing beachheads, the nine thousand British, Greek, and Italian forces surrendered; as Allied aid failed to materialize.²⁹

On 6 June 1944, began the Normandy invasion. To assist the amphibious landing, three airborne divisions (one British and two US) were employed. The two US divisions were landed inland from the right flank beaches on the Cotentin peninsula, cutting the main lateral highway which the enemy would use to shift his reserves, securing the long causeway exits from the beaches over a flooded area and seizing a bridgehead over the Merederet River preparatory to a western advance to cut the peninsula. The British division was employed to secure the left flank of the invasion forces by obtaining a bridgehead over the Orne river near Caen. The initial landings of all three divisions were made during the night preceding the daylight amphibious assault. An interesting feature of the British operation was a *coup de main* executed by a small glider force which, released at night over the channel coast, silently glided to its objective, the two bridges over the Orne river and Caen canal essential to internal communications.³⁰ Although fog and enemy flak scattered the air formations, particularly on the US flank, all three divisions assembled sufficient force to accomplish their initial missions, however a few hours late in some cases. The parachute landings were reinforced by glider units during the day. General Bradley, commander of the United States invasion forces, later stated: "In my opinion, airborne operations back of Utah Beach, where there was a water hazard behind the beach, were essential for the success of the attack."³¹

On 15 August 1944, an Airborne Task Force of approximately division strength assisted the Allied amphibious assault in Southern France by seizing, just before dawn, the critical road junction about ten miles

²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 28-31. It is worth noting that based on this experience the 1st British Airborne Division was prepared to reinforce the Normandy beachhead in the same manner, if needed, but was never requested.

²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 30-2.

²⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 33-4; Alfred Vagts, *Landing Operations* (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1946), p. 752.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 63.

³¹Letter to Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater, 25 July 1945.

inland from the beaches. Flanked by hill masses, its possession prevented enemy reinforcement of his beach defenses and secured the main route for the Allied debouchment north. The important factor in this operation was that approximately one third of the airborne force were conventional ground units hastily converted for transport by glider.³²

On 17 September 1944, the Allies attempted to repeat the success of the German Holland Operations of 1940 in reverse; seizure of the vital bridges over the Maas, Waal, and lower Rhine by airborne action, to provide a single corridor, approximately 99 miles in length, through which fast ground elements could reach the Zuider Zee, cutting off the German forces in Western Holland. The Allies, if successful, would then be in a position to outflank the Siegfried line, encircle the Ruhr, and destroy the bulk of the retreating German forces west of the Rhine.³³ This operation, employing three airborne divisions under an airborne corps headquarters, which landed 34,876 troops, 5,230.9 tons of supplies, 1927 vehicles, and 568 artillery pieces by parachute, glider, and landed-aircraft in thirteen days,³⁴ was the first large Allied airborne operation under a unified command, and also the first in Europe conducted in daylight. The Allied Airborne Army controlled both the aircraft and the airborne units, and coordinated the air support. The overall mission failed in that the final crossing over the lower Rhine at Arnhem was not secured allowing passage to the Zuider Zee; however, it did extend the Allied front northward some sixty miles enabling

usage, after clearing operations, of the vital port of Antwerp for Allied logistical support. The estimate for the operation was based on three factors: (1) that the German army could not resist another major breakthrough (2) that the 30th Corps of the Second British Army could reach Arnhem through the corridor in two to five days, and (3) the fact that the weather forecast for 17-20 September was good.³⁵ All these factors proved faulty. The weather turned bad on the second day preventing delivery of reinforcements needed urgently at Arnhem and also further south to capture the bridge at Nijmegen and prevent cutting of the corridor. The Second British Army had already advanced some 280 miles between late August and 11 September and was still based logistically on the original beaches in Normandy.³⁶ It was, thus, not in top condition for a further rapid advance. The German forces still retained considerable strength for counter-attack. In addition, the drop zone of 1st British Airborne Division at Arnhem was several miles from the bridges to be secured, forcing not only a lengthy overland fight to the objective, but a splitting of strength between holding the bridge and securing the drop zone for later reinforcements. After a tenacious nine-day fight what remained of the division, about 2500 men, was withdrawn south of the Rhine on the night of 25-26 September, one battalion having been annihilated while defending the bridge for four days.³⁷

On 24 March 1945, an airborne corps of two airborne divisions assisted the Allied crossing of the Rhine north of the Ruhr. Conducted in daylight, the airborne landing

³²From the author's knowledge as a participant. This force on the second day captured the German Corps Commander and his Staff in command of this sector of the coast, which further disrupted the defense.

³³Brereton, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-341.

³⁴"Operations in Holland, September-November 1944," Report of the First Allied Airborne Army, 16 December 1944. (Mimographed.)

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶Brereton, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-1. See also Major General Sir Francis de Guinand, *Operation Victory* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1947), pp. 416-19.

³⁷Gavin, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-21.

followed rather than preceded the ground assault, with the mission of rapidly enlarging the bridgehead. From a technical viewpoint this action represents the acme of airborne development during the war. The entire force of 17,122 troops was landed in two hours from 1595 transports and 1347 gliders. All units except one parachute regiment were dropped on the planned target; and the latter, being dropped tactically intact, had little difficulty in moving to its objective. C-46 transports with double exit doors were employed for the first time.³⁸

In the Pacific Theater, meanwhile, a few smaller operations had been conducted. A parachute landing assisted in the amphibious conquest of Noemfoer Island in July 1944. Parachute elements of an airborne division in conjunction with the amphibious assault of the remainder of the division landed in Southern Luzon in February 1945, constituting the southern prong of the drive against Manila.³⁹

On 16 February 1945, two battalions of a parachute infantry regiment landed on the top of the fortress of Corregidor in Manila Bay, and assisted following amphibious units in reducing all resistance, some six thousand Japanese, in a matter of several days; thus repeating the German success at Eben Emael five years earlier. Without the airborne landing it is possible that that defended fortress could not have been taken except with heavy losses or a long siege, and the unrestricted use of Manila Bay was needed quickly. It is worthy of note that the Japanese commander failed to provide any anti-airborne defenses because he believed an airborne landing could not be accomplished⁴⁰—the downfall of many commanders in history.

Strategical.—The Germans on three occa-

sions employed airborne forces prior to their use in Holland, but the former operations were more independent. In the invasion of Austria, 12 March 1938, a combined parachute and air-landing force occupied Wagram airdrome without opposition.⁴¹ On 7 October 1938, immediately following the Munich conference, a complete infantry regiment was landed from 305 Junkers "52" transports in a wheat field outside the Sudeten town of Freiwaldau, which was then occupied.⁴² In the invasion of Norway, 9 April 1940, the airports of Fornebo, at Oslo, and Sola, near Stavanger, were seized by air-landed troops with little resistance. At Fornebo three thousand troops were landed beginning at 0830 in the space of two hours, and by afternoon had occupied the capital of Norway. Following one company of parachutists, five thousand troops were landed on the same morning at Sola from 250 transports and rapidly seized the nearby town. One parachute infantry company was dropped a few days later at Dombas, well in advance of German ground units, in an attempt to secure that critical road junction in central Norway, but was scattered in the drop and apparently was quickly dispersed—another example of too big a mission for too small a force.⁴³

In the offensive into Greece in April 1941, the Germans attempted to close off the Peloponnesos to the retreating British and Greek forces by airborne action. About two thousand parachute and glider troops were dropped near Corinth to seize the crossing over the canal. Apparently this action was both too late and not in sufficient strength to

⁴¹Miksche, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁴²Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 1. This was in reality a final training exercise to prove the value of airborne forces.

⁴³Lt. Col. James A. Bassett, "An Example of Extended Strategy: The Invasion of Norway" (Typewritten monograph prepared for Dr. Stefan T. Posony, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., 1 March 1948), pp. 3, 5, and 13.

³⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 131-7. Brereton, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

³⁹Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁴⁰Gavin, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

have great effect, for the majority of British troops evacuated from Greece were embarked through the small Peloponnesos ports.⁴⁴

The most outstanding example of this type of airborne employment was the German seizure of Crete in the latter part of May 1941—a true *airphibious* operation. One author terms it the only important surprise in German land warfare after the battle of France.⁴⁵ Unable to use the sea due to British naval superiority, the Germans bridged the one hundred mile water gap between Crete and the mainland of Greece entirely by air. The British garrison of Crete consisted of 27-28,000 men, but over half were those previously evacuated from Greece and thus only lightly equipped, having abandoned all artillery and heavy equipment in Greece. There were in addition eleven Greek battalions. This garrison was reinforced by eighteen anti-aircraft guns, twenty-two tanks and an additional infantry battalion prior to the attack on 20 May. However, the Germans had undisputed air superiority, since the three airfields on Crete were inadequate and the four hundred mile range from Egypt was too great for fighters. After a short intense air bombardment on the morning of 20 May 1941, German parachute and glider units were launched against the three main airfields of Maleme (near Canea), Retimo, and Iraklion, all situated on the north coast and connected by the only east-west road on the island. The major success was at Maleme, which was quickly seized by about 3500 parachute and glider troops; and then used to land transports, about 650 of which landed

on the first day. The failure to reduce this airhead in a counter-attack, by a New Zealand Brigade unfamiliar with the terrain, on the second night proved the turning point of the battle; for, into this poured German reinforcements. British evacuation began on 27 May and in a short ten days the conquest of the island was complete.⁴⁶ In all, the Germans landed about twenty thousand troops in Crete entirely by air. Their casualties were four thousand killed and missing, including a large number who were drowned when the British Navy destroyed an attempt to reinforce the battle by sea.⁴⁷ The British successfully evacuated about 16,000 men, but lost considerable of their naval strength to German air power. "This operation showed that maneuvers on the strategical scale may be undertaken with air-borne troops and that the plane may serve as a useful means of transport in the case of amphibious operations."⁴⁸

On the Allied side, there were several of this type of operation, although not on as large a scale as Crete. The first of these was at Youks-les-Bains, Algeria, on the morning of 15 November 1942. The same parachute battalion, which a few days earlier had flown from England to Oran, was dropped on the old French airfield at Youks-les-Bains with the mission of securing that field and the one at Tebessa, nearby. This unit landed on top of defenses manned by French troops, who luckily regarded them as allies. This battalion along with French units in the area was instrumental during the next few weeks in securing Central Tunisia for the Allies.⁴⁹

⁴⁴Great Britain, Ministry of Information, *The Campaign in Greece and Crete* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1942), pp. 34-43. Miksche, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-50.

⁴⁵Stefan T. Possony in "Translator's Comment" to Gen. Waldemar Erfurth, *Surprise*, trans. Dr. Stefan T. Possony and Daniel Volfroy (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1943), p. 26.

⁴⁶*The Campaign in Greece and Crete*, pp. 43-64; Shugg and DeWeerd, *op. cit.*, p. 78f; Lord Henry Maidland Wilson, "World War II: The Conquest of Crete," *10 Eventful Years*, ed. Walter Yust (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1947), Vol. IX, pp. 687-8.

⁴⁷General Karl Student quoted in Milton Shulman, *Defeat in the West* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1948), pp. 58f.

⁴⁸Possony, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁴⁹Raff, *op. cit.*, pp. 53ff.

Units of a British parachute brigade performed similar missions at Bone, 12 November 1942, and Souk el Arba, 16 November 1942, along the coast north of Tebessa, and on 29 November 1942 at Depienne, south of Tunis. In the latter, the battalion, although securing the nearby abandoned airfield at Oudna, was forced to withdraw back to the Allied lines when the Allied offensive along the coast was cancelled.⁵⁰ All were part of the Allied effort in the race for Tunis, against which German troops were being poured by air from Italy. It is difficult to understand why the Allies did not make more decisive use of the transport aircraft on hand in Algeria in this vital race, than the above small missions.

In the southwest Pacific, the Markham Valley operation in New Guinea in September 1943 was of greater scope. The Lae-Salamaua area was to be taken by a combined overland advance and amphibious assault, but the seizure would be somewhat nullified if the Japanese defenders were allowed to escape northward up the Markham Valley. Accordingly, on the morning of 5 September 1943, one US parachute regiment dropped a few miles up the valley from Lae, and secured and cleared an abandoned airstrip at Nadzeb upon which an Australian division began to land by air transport the next morning. The valley was then effectively blocked as an escape corridor for the Japanese troops.⁵¹ Thus, the obstacle of the jungle was successfully neutralized by air move-

ment, and an airborne operation utilized to complete a "Cannae."

In Burma, this same type operation was conducted in several instances, notably in March 1944, by employing gliders to land assault units and airborne engineers well in the interior. Airstrips were then constructed, more troops flown in; and, with the airhead as a base, these operated on the Japanese lines of communication supporting their defenses in North Burma.⁵²

In October 1944, as the Russian advance was forcing a German withdrawal from Greece, a British parachute brigade dropped on an airfield near Athens with the mission of securing control over that city in order to stabilize the political situation. This unit was joined later by forces landed by sea. Similarly, the last airborne operation of the war was the flying of the 11th US Airborne Division from bases in Okinawa to airfields near Tokyo, in order to take over control rapidly after the Japanese surrender.⁵³ These may well be a typical end role of airborne forces in a future war.

AIR TRANSPORT

Although not strictly a part of airborne operations some mention must be made of strategical air movement during World War II, in view of the importance placed on this aspect in pre-war thinking.

Throughout the various campaigns in Libya, the Germans used air transport to supply and reinforce their North African forces. After the Allied landings in Algeria the Germans rushed troops into Tunisia by air transport and glider at the rate of a thousand a day, in order to hold that critical area.⁵⁴

At the time of the "Battle of the Bulge," the urgent need of Allied reserves caused the

⁵⁰Report of Lt. Gen. K. A. N. Anderson, "Operations in North West Africa from 8 November 1942 to 13 May 1943," Dispatch submitted to Secretary of State for War on 7 June 1943, *The London Gazette*, 5 November 1946 (supplement, 6 November 1946), pp. 5452-54.

⁵¹Letter, Headquarters 503d Parachute Infantry, to the Adjutant General, United States Army, 26 October 1943, subject: "Report of Encounter with Enemy Forces."

⁵²Shugg and DeWeerd, *op. cit.*, pp. 244-5.

⁵³Gavin, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-9.

⁵⁴Shugg and DeWeerd, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

move of the 17th US Airborne Division by air from England to France. In five days, 22-27 December 1944, thirteen thousand troops and eighteen hundred tons of supplies were transported entirely by air.⁵⁵

In the Burma and China theaters several movements were made by air. The 36th British Division was flown from Ledo to Myitkyina—a distance of two hundred air miles in contrast to three hundred and ten difficult miles by jungle trail—in twenty-six days, July-August 1944, to reinforce the drive in Central Burma. The 50th Chinese Division was moved by air from China to

North Burma between 5 and 12 April 1944—a total of 7,857 men and 12,440 pounds of equipment. From 5 December 1944 to 5 January 1945 the entire Sixth Chinese Army, consisting of 25,352 men, 1,586 animals, 42 vehicles, 120 pieces of light artillery, plus ammunition and rations, was transported by air from Burma to China.⁵⁶

In addition there was continuous movement of key personnel and equipment throughout the war by the Allies all over the world. It is only surprising that the vital factor of air movement was not utilized to a greater extent in World War II.

⁵⁵"Resupply by Air—Belgium, December 1944," Report of the First Allied Airborne Army, 26 April 1945, p. 9. (Mimeographed.)

⁵⁶"History of the North Combat Area Command, CBI and I-B Theaters," prepared by U. S. Military Observers Group, New Delhi, India, April-July 1945, Appendix 12, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 48 and 66-8. (Mimeographed.)

THE BATTLE OF CASEROS— THE DAWN OF MODERN ARGENTINA

BY ARMIN ENGELHARDT*

On February 3rd, 1852, a battle was fought at Caseros, some ten miles northwest of Buenos Aires. The contenders were, on one side, the forces of the then virtual dictator of Argentina, Governor and Captain General of the Province of Buenos Aires, Brigadier General Don Juan Manuel Ortiz de Rosas. Opposing him was an allied army comprising troops of the Provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes, Argentine emigrants chiefly from Uruguay, then called the Banda Oriental, together with Uruguayan and Brazilian troops, all under the command of the Governor of Entre Rios, General Justo José de Urquiza. This battle, while not particularly notable as a military action, was up to that time the largest fought on American soil, with about 50,000 men engaged on both sides. In the words of a modern Argentine historian it "... belongs to the group of great battles on account of its results. It may be considered as the last act of the wars of independence, the same as Rosas' dictatorship may be held to represent an exaggerated resurrection of the Spanish rule, with its restriction of trade, monopolies, isolationist tendencies and personal rule of discretion. Caseros is thus the final step to Argentine national independence."¹

By the beginning of February Rosas had concentrated in Santos Lugares an estimated force of about 10,000 infantry and about 12,000 cavalry. The infantry was divided into battalions, commanded by colonels or lieutenant-colonels, each battalion having six companies: a grenadier company, four regular line companies, and a light company, called "cazadores" (chasseurs). Each company was commanded by a captain and had four subaltern officers, seventeen noncommissioned officers, three musicians and one hundred men.²

The men of the five line companies were armed with smoothbore flintlock muskets with socket bayonets, while the men of the light company and the sergeants of the other companies had shorter muskets. The muskets had no sights; regulations prescribed that "aim was to be taken by looking over the highest points of breech and muzzle at the target."³ At one hundred yards the men were instructed to aim at their enemies' knees, at two hundred yards at their chests, and at two hundred and fifty yards at the top of their hats. The loading of the muskets in itself took fourteen movements and resulted in a very slow speed of fire: about one shot a

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¹R. J. Carcano, *De Caseros al 11 de Setiembre* (Buenos Aires, 1918), p. 86. Other authorities used in preparing this article: E. Vera y Gonzales: F. Vincente López, *Historia de la República Argentina*, Vol. XII (Buenos Aires, 1926). This is a continuation of F. Vincente López' famous book on Argentine history. Enrique

Udaondo, *Uniformas Militares Usados en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires 1922). D. F. Sarmiento, *Campaña en el Ejército Grande*, Vol. I & II. Eduardo G. Alvarez, *Caseros* (Montevideo, 1897). Capdevila, *La Víspera de Caseros* (Buenos Aires 1922). M. Leguizamón, *Hombres y cosas que pasaron* (Buenos Aires, 1926.) Alfredo B. Grosso, *Curso de Historia Nacional* (Buenos Aires 1932).

²Reglamentos para el Ejercicio y maniobras de los regimientos de la Republica Argentina (no date).

³Ibid.

minute. Frederick the Great, one hundred years before, had so improved the loading operation that his musketeers could fire five times and reload again within the time it took Rosas' men to load and fire once.

The cavalry was divided into regiments of four squadrons of two companies each, the companies being further subdivided in two half-companies. The regiments were commanded by colonels, with a lieutenant-colonel second in command. Each squadron had two captains, four lieutenants, four ensigns and one hundred twenty-eight noncommissioned officers and men. According to regulations, copied from those of France and Spain, the cavalry was to consist of regiments of the line, dragoons and light cavalry: hussars and "cazadores a caballo" (chasseurs a cheval). In actual practice the cavalry was composed mainly of lancers, some "carabineros," and a few dragoons.

These last, armed with muskets, bayonets and sabres, were the mounted infantry, trained to fight on horseback as well as on foot. When dismounted, the men slung their sabres across their backs and used their muskets, which ordinarily were fastened to their saddles. The "carabineros" had only sabres and smoothbore flintlock carbines and the lancers were armed with sabres and lances, a few carrying carbines and pistols. The officers carried both lances and pistols.

The regular cavalry lance consisted of a bamboo (tacaura) pole with iron blade and a small—usually red—pennant of varying shapes. These lances usually were about eight to ten feet long. Many officers and men supplied their own lances, some of which were very crude affairs: a knife blade, or even half a sheep-shearing clipper being lashed to the shaft by rawhide thongs. On the other hand, some were very elaborate weapons with blades in the form of a crescent and a long protruding point in the cen-

ter, and some had double crescents. Occasionally the blades were engraved, and the shafts and rests decorated with silver. These lances were very formidable weapons and were frequently used for executions, especially of prisoners of war.⁴

During the war of Argentine independence, when authorities (in forming a new cavalry regiment in the city of Salta) decided to arm in with lances, the soldiers objected on the grounds that the weapon was unmilitary and undignified since only Indians and gauchos used it.⁵ Later it was found that most of the casualties during an engagement had been caused by lance thrusts and the weapon became so popular that the words "cavalryman" and "lancer" became synonymous.

The cavalry sabres were the common ones for this period with heavy curved blades and single hand guards. Commanding officers occasionally had curved swords of oriental pattern, sometimes of elaborate workmanship with real Toledo or Damascus blades.

Beside these arms, each man had his "boleadoras," his knife, and his lazo. The latter was made of rawhide and about fourteen yards long. The "boleadoras," called also "las tres Marias" in the vernacular, consisted of three round stones or lead balls, joined together by three rawhide thongs, each as long as the space between the fingertips of the outstretched arms of the owner. To use, one

⁴When discussing the new constitution in the Assembly of 1853, there came up for consideration an article, forbidding: "... all tortures, whippings and executions by lance and knife." The words referring to executions were dropped as the constituents feared they might be construed to mean that such executions were based on a previous law, whereas they were only the outcome of abuses by barbarous and cruel "caudillos."

⁵Rosas also had some squadrons of Indians used as irregular cavalry, armed with their own lances, about twice as long as those of the soldiers. They were much feared for the tremendous power and ferocity of their onslaught in mass formation and the dexterous use they made of their long lances.

of the stones was grasped and became the handle to swing the other two around the head. Once the necessary momentum was reached, the weapon was released and flew forward, entangling the legs of the victim, occasionally breaking bones by the force of the impact. In hand-to-hand fighting, the "boleadoras" were grasped by all three thongs together, nearer to the balls, and used as a club in the same manner as the medieval "morgenstern."

The knives used by the irregular and militia troops were everything from humble kitchen knives with common iron blades to the "dagas" and "facones" with yard-long elaborate blades and with silver handles and scabbards; twelve to twenty inch blades were not uncommon. Swords were not only weapons, but also tools with which men did everything from cutting throats (sheep or men) to paring their nails and picking their teeth.

The artillery was divided into regiments, each one commanded by a colonel and composed of two squadrons of two companies each. A company usually corresponded to a battery of six guns and was commanded by a captain with seventeen noncommissioned officers and ninety-four men, who were armed with sabres and carbines, which they were bound to carry on their persons. The guns were smoothbore muzzle loaders of 4-6- and 8-inch bore and fired round solid shot and canister. Frequently guns of different bore were combined in the same battery with all the consequent difficulties in the supply of ammunition.

There were field batteries in which the men, except the officers and drivers, rode on the gun and ammunition carriages. There were also mounted batteries, called "flying batteries," with the total personnel on horseback. The lighter guns were normally drawn by six horses, the heavier ones by oxen. On

bad roads, the number of draught animals per gun had to be increased heavily.

The auxiliary services were practically nonexistent. There was an attempt to create a medical staff by forcing all students of medicine to serve three years (or through three campaigns) as officers with the army. However, there were practically no hospitals, no remedies, no regular evacuation of casualties, and each physician had to provide his own instruments and bandages.

The most efficient part of the Army of Urquiza, the self-styled "Grand Allied Army of Liberation of South America," was the Brazilian division. This consisted of six infantry battalions of 3,130 men, which were divided into three brigades, one cavalry regiment of five hundred and fifty, one regiment of mounted artillery with two hundred men and twelve guns and one rocket battery of one hundred and sixty men and four rocket tubes. In total, 4,140 men were under Brigadier General Manuel Marquess of Souza, Baron of Porto Allegre, with Colonel Osorio as Chief of the cavalry regiment. All the officers had passed through the excellent military school at Rio de Janeiro. The army in general was organized after the French pattern, whereas Rosas had followed the Spanish form of organization.

The Uruguayan detachment, also called the Oriental Division, consisted of four battalions of infantry, a total of 1,442 men, and one squadron of artillery, 188 men and six 6-inch guns, or a total, including its commander's escort, of twenty mounted men and a few miscellaneous services, of 1,671 men under Colonel César Diaz.

Both the Brazilians and Uruguayans had doctors and field-hospitals, which were used by all the troops when the occasion arose.

The Argentine contingent opposing Rosas included Urquiza's own Entre Rios troops, those of Corrientes and those of Oribe, which had surrendered at Montevideo and been

pressed into his service, and some of those that had taken part in the defense of Montevideo. The following table shows the strength:

	<i>Artillery</i>		<i>Infantry</i>		<i>Cavalry</i>	<i>Total</i>
Entre Rios	430 (2 squadrons)	850	(2 battalions)	9,390	(12 divisions) ⁶	10,670
Corrientes	130 (1 squadron)	710	(2 battalions)	4,420	(7 regiments)	5,260
Buenos Aires	210 (2 squadrons)	1,720	(4 battalions)	1,800	(4 divisions)	3,730
Aggregate _____						19,660

The total strength of the allied army as it started south from Diamante was approximately 25,470 men. It is estimated that the total number of men who deserted reached some 1,500.

As most of the allied troops had formerly been part of the army of the Argentine confederacy, they still wore the scarlet uniform of the confederacy. In order to distinguish them from Rosas' men Urquiza had them wear white linen breastpieces. In general the organization and the armament was essentially the same as that of Rosas' troops.

On the night of February 2nd Rosas called a council of war with General Pinedo and Colonels Martiniano Chilavert, Pedro José Diaz, Hilario Lagos, Jeronimo Costa, Julian Ciriaco Sosa, Bustos, Cortina, Juan Jose Hernandez, and Mariano Maza in attendance. Rosas stated that, in his opinion, the principal enemy was neither Urquiza nor his Argentine emigrant followers, popularly called the "savage, rotten, dirty unitarian traitors" (salvajes, asquerosos, inmundos traidores unitarios) but the foreign invaders, especially the Brazilians. This he justified on the basis that Brazil was an Empire, whereas he, Rosas, and his men represented the "free" republics of America. Colonel Chilavert, in analyzing the position of both armies, pointed out that the enemy, instead of keeping open his communications with the rivers, had committed the mistake of invading the country to the

west of Buenos Aires, being thereby cut off from his base of supplies in case of a reverse. It was presumed that he had been influenced by reports received of the probable help the

population of the invaded territories would give him, since public opinion was supposed to be in favor of the allies.⁷

Chilavert added: "I think that we should not accept the battle offered us to-morrow as we shall be compelled to do, if we remain where we are, but that we should retire our infantry and artillery this very night and cover the city, while simultaneously sending the cavalry—about 10,000 strong—by the northern route to reach positions somewhere around Arrecifes, where they should manoeuvre in the rear of the enemy. From there they should detach a strong force southward to

⁶The allied cavalry, like that of Rosas, was divided into detachments called "divisions" and named after their commanders. These divisions had nothing in common with the modern term of cavalry divisions, and their strength varied from several regiments to as few as two squadrons. In this article, the term "division" is used to correspond with the usage of the times.

⁷"Whatever the feelings of the population of the invaded districts toward Rosas and his methods may have been, there can be no doubt that they bitterly resented the invasion of the country by the Brazilians. Even in those unitarian circles that had managed to survive in Rosas' territory the general feeling was against introducing a foreign element in an Argentine domestic quarrel, and one so much despised as were the Brazilians." Adolfo Saldías, *Historia de la Confederación Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1911). The foregoing opinion of Saldías is questionable. Many of the cities through which the allied army had marched, like Sante Fe, Rosario, San Nicolas, had revolted as soon as they conveniently could risk it. The masses probably were for Rosas, and the upper classes for Urquiza, but remembering former experiences the latter were afraid to rise too soon. As a result, Urquiza must certainly have wondered about the lack of support received from the population of a country he had come to free from "unbearable tyranny."

keep open the roads over which possible reinforcements might reach us. It is clear that the enemy is unable to take the city by assault. Neither has he the means to do so, nor will the Brazilians march to certain destruction. And then one of two things must happen: either the enemy advances and begins the siege of the city or he retires to the northern coast to keep open his line of supplies and await reinforcements from the Banda Oriental (Uruguay). In the first case the forces which must eventually destroy him, as outlined above, will make themselves felt more strongly with every day that passes; in the second we would be in a very advantageous position to attack and beat him during his march to the coast, by using our strong cavalry detachments which we can place in the most favorable positions just for this kind of warfare. And in the worst case it is always the enemy that must lose, because as said before, every day that passes weakens him and reinforces us."

Chalivert's plan was approved by the more experienced of those present, but the others were of the opinion that the offered battle should be accepted there and then. Rosas himself at first favored the plan, as it fell in with his general "wait-and-see" policy and because its adoption protected the city from the Brazilians in Colonia,⁸ but finally decided against it and in favor of an immediate bat-

tle. A later explanation⁹ for Rosas' decision was that he did not completely trust Chilavert, whose former record was full of double dealings. But the official explanation¹⁰ was that, if Chilavert's plan was adopted, it would be impossible to restrain, either in victory or defeat, the division of Pampa Indians who had lived under the strictest discipline in Santos Lugares, and who would break loose and ravage the country. The latter explanation probably was thought up afterwards as a convenient excuse for an evidently wrong decision.


The same night (February 2) Rosas, accompanied only by Major R. Reyes and his orderly Lorenzo Lopez, rode out to choose the battle positions for his troops. He decided against Colonel Chilavert's and Colonel Diaz' opinion that the army should occupy the ridge running parallel to Moron brook, and instead placed his army, with its fifty-six guns and four rocket tubes, in a line running from the house of Caseros on the right to his camp at Santos Lugares.

This house of Caseros, from which the battle took its name, and which was occupied by three hundred men, was a solid, quadrangular building of brick and mortar, having a flat roof with parapets, iron-grilled windows on all four sides, and at its south-eastern corner a turret (mirador) offering a wide view over the surrounding landscape. It was further protected by a ditch and defended by ten guns. About one hundred and fifty yards north of and at a right angle with the house an entrenchment of wagons had been constructed. This too was protected by a ditch and was occupied by two infantry battalions with two cavalry regiments, commanded by Colonel Santa Coloma and Colonel Belvis, in reserve; two more battalions equipped with

⁸This Brazilian force at Colonia consisted of 4,000 Germans in Brazilian pay. They were stationed just across the river from Buenos Aires with the object of falling on the city as soon as Rosas should leave his camp at Santos Lugares. These troops seem to have been very much dissatisfied with conditions and had already opened negotiations with Rosas in order to desert in a body and enter his service. Ships had been prepared for them, and Major Reyes, of Rosas' immediate entourage, left at the end of December with the steamer "Merced" and several big whaleboats to pick them up at Colonia. But an engine defect obliged him to postpone the trip, and later events moved so fast that the plan could not be executed for lack of time. (Saldias, *op. cit.*, p. 294).

⁹Colonel Alfredo F. de Urquiza, *Campañas del General Urquiza* (Buenos Aires, 1924), p. 226.

¹⁰Saldias, *op. cit.*, p. 286.



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF CASEROS

FEBRUARY 3, 1852

From Captain Beverlin's book "Caseros"

- ROSAS' ARMY
 (1) HOUSE OF CASEROS
 (2) TRENCH, FORMED BY WAGONS & A DITCH
 (3) 1 INFANTRY BATTALION
 (4) 2 CAVALRY REGIMENTS
 (5) 1 INFANTRY BATTALION
 (6) 1 INFANTRY BATTALION
 (7) CAVALRY DIVISION VIBELA
 (8) 8 INFANTRY BATTALIONS, CORTA & HERNANDEZ
 (9) CAVALRY DIVISION SOGA
 (10) 1 INFANTRY BATTALION
 (11) CHILAVERT'S 30 GUNS
 (12) COL. DIAZ' INFANTRY BRIGADE
 (13) 1 INFANTRY BATTALION
 (14) SUPPORT COLUMN, COL. LAOIS CAVALRY

- ALLIED ARMY
 (A) URUGUAYAN DIVISION
 (B) BRAZILIAN DIVISION
 (C) RIVERA'S ARGENTINE BRIGADE
 (D) 1 INFANTRY BATTALION
 (E) COL. GALLA'S 5 ARGENTINE INFANTRY BATTALIONS
 (F) CAVALRY DIVISION COL. MEDINA
 (G) CAVALRY DIVISION COL. GARCIA
 (H) CAVALRY DIVISION COL. ALVAREZ
 (I) CAVALRY DIVISION GENERAL LA MADRID
 (J) CAVALRY DIVISION COL. GARCIA
 (K) CAVALRY DIVISION COL. URBANNAH
 (L) CAVALRY DIVISION GENERAL LOPEZ

ELEVATIONS IN METERS
 0 500 1000
 METERS

Bridge over which the
 Allied Army crossed

guns were entrenched behind a thorn hedge (also protected by a ditch) in the area between the house and the pigeon loft or "palomar." This pigeon loft was a circular building of three tiers, the groundfloor of which was subdivided in several small rooms, and the center part, three stories high, rose above the rest, making the whole building resemble somewhat a Babylonian temple. This was garrisoned by the militia battalion formed of the "tenientes alcaldes" (minor judicial employees) of the city and province of Buenos Aires, with an estimated strength of nine hundred. At the base of the building was a battery of guns, and the rocket battery. The whole was under the command of General Pinedo, with Colonel Maza commanding the infantry.

To the east of the fortified position, a space of some three thousand yards was occupied by the cavalry division of Colonel Juan de Dois Varela and eight infantry battalions under Colonel Costa and Colonel Hernandez. The next thousand yards to the east were occupied by Colonel Chilavert's thirty guns of various calibers, and by Colonel Diaz' three infantry battalions with a total strength of about fifteen hundred. Then followed Colonel Lagos' three cavalry divisions, with about two thousand lancers in line and two strong detachments in column formation behind both wings. As a general reserve, the cavalry divisions of Colonel Sosa (six hundred men) and Colonel Bustos (thirteen hundred men) were placed in the rear of Costa's and Hernandez' infantry. Rosas' flag,¹¹ a red phrygian bonnet on a blue and black field had been raised in several places along the line, notably on the house of Caseros and on top of the "palomar."

¹¹This is not the present Argentina national flag, created by Belgrano in 1813. Its colors are light blue, white, and light-blue in three horizontal strips. Because the unitarians chose lightblue as their color, Rosas forbade the use of this flag, and the army and navy thereupon used various other patterns and colors.

Early in the morning of February 3 the allies crossed Moron brook by a small bridge which Rosas had omitted to destroy and took position on a slight ridge parallel to the one occupied by Rosas' army. For some unknown reason Rosas did nothing to oppose the crossing or harass the enemy during this delicate operation.

On the extreme right of the allied position, facing Rosas' cavalry, was the cavalry division of General La Madrid, to which the Brazilian regiment had been assigned. This division was intended to envelop Rosas' left wing. Further to the left and a little more in front was Colonel Anacleto Medina's cavalry division, supported by those of Colonel Galarza and Colonel Avalos. Then came five Argentine infantry battalions: two from Entre Rios, two from Corrientes and the Battalion Constitución, all under the command of Colonel Galan, and finally the twenty-eight guns and four rocket tubes under Colonel Pirán.

To the left were three more Argentine battalions, which formerly belonged to Oribe's army, under Colonel Rivera. These were attached for the day to the Brazilian division, whose six battalions came next with their twelve guns in the intervals between the battalions. At the extreme left of the line were the four Uruguayan battalions with six guns, and somewhat in the left rear were the two cavalry divisions of General J. P. López and Colonel Urdinarraín under the overall command of Major General Virasoro. Urquiza himself commanded the cavalry of the right wing. Both armies had no infantry reserves of any kind: Rosas had all his light infantry in line, with no skirmishers whatsoever in front; the allied infantry was formed in columns of battalions.

The battle opened shortly after 8 o'clock. Rosas gave the order to Colonel Chilavert to commence firing. A lively cannonade began

between the two artilleries, but the results were negligible. Urquiza, thinking that Rosas' left wing (composed only of cavalry), was the weaker one, and that his own cavalry was better, at 10 o'clock ordered an attack there, intending thereby to outflank the enemy infantry standing further to the right. The attack was so furious and the dust raised was so thick that General La Madrid's division completely missed the enemy, passed by on his right, and could be brought to a stop only some five miles from the battlefield. The commander of the Brazilian regiment, furious at having been deprived of a chance to fight, had his men return from there at full speed but arrived too late to take any part in the actual battle.

Lagos awaited the attack with two thousand lancers of his first line at a standstill. Some of Medina's squadrons struck an obstacle and had to swerve to the right to avoid it; others were repulsed with the loss of a few killed and wounded; but on the whole, the attack, led by Urquiza personally, was eminently successful. Lagos' line was broken and the two supporting columns, having been placed too near the front, at once became involved in the general flight and were of no further use as support for the beaten first line. Rosas tried to save the situation by sending Sosa's and Bustos' divisions to Medina's flank and rear, but those were easily repulsed by Galarza, coming up behind Medina.

As a result of the attack, Rosas' cavalry, together with that of the allies, practically disappeared from the field of battle. Urquiza seemingly forgot that he was the commander-in-chief and became a cavalryman again as he led the pursuit.

According to the prearranged plan of battle the whole allied line should now have advanced. But as the commander-in-chief

was still busy chasing fugitives on the right, only the Uruguayan division and Rivera's Argentines moved forward. The rest waited for an order, which did not come.

First came the Uruguayans. One battalion, reinforced by an additional company, crossed the swampy ground somewhat to the left front between the two ridges amid a lively fire from guns and rockets. Their object was to envelope Rosas' right wing and attack the wagon entrenchment. At about two hundred and fifty paces from the wagons the attack came to a halt, and the men were ordered to kneel, being protected by the fire of their own light infantry (cazadores) in front. The six guns took position on a ridge further northward, from where they could fire not only at the entrenchment itself but also at the rear of the front line and thus support the attack there.¹² But the fire of the defenders disabled two guns and from further north a cavalry force appeared. The latter was forced to retreat by a timely attack by Colonel Urdinarraín's lancers from Entre Rios. The allied attack on the house also encountered difficulty as did Rivera's brigade which was stopped some five hundred meters from Rosas' lines.

At this point Colonel Indalecio Chenault, aide-de-camp of General Urquiza, on his own initiative ordered the Brazilian and Galán's divisions to advance. The Marquess of Souza sent the first brigade to support the Uruguayans in the attack on the house, the second to advance on the "palomar" and the whole line now moved forward. Under this combined attack the defending militiamen broke and fled, but those in the house had no time to imitate them. Estimates vary as to the number of casualties, but it would ap-

¹²According to Antonio Díaz, *Memorias inéditas del general oriental César Díaz* (Buenos Aires, 1878), the Uruguayan guns fired about 80 rounds in all.

pear that they were not unusually heavy.¹³

In the meantime, the third Brazilian brigade, together with Rivera's, which had now resumed its advance, attacked and routed the enemy on their front when panic broke out among Costa's and Hernandez' battalions. These battalions, consisting of young men under fire for the first time, when they saw the enemy advancing broke and fled to the cornfields in the rear of the position, where they were later taken prisoners by the victors. During this panic Colonel Hernandez and eleven other officers were killed by their own men.

Colonel Diaz' infantry and Colonel Chilavert's guns still held, but seeing themselves enveloped from both wings determined upon a change of front to try to cover their line of retreat towards the city. It was in this spot that some of the bloodiest fighting of the day took place, the victorious allied troops converging there. After an hour of hard fighting Diaz' battalions, badly reduced in numbers and enveloped on both flanks, exhausted with fatigue and short of ammunition, began to give ground, retreating behind ditches and hedges and protecting their threatened flanks as best they could with lines of light infantry skirmishers. Colonel

Diaz was taken prisoner later in the day at Palermo.

Chilavert, who had never stopped firing, found himself in a still worse position. He had only a very few rounds of ammunition left and his whole force had been reduced to about three hundred men, while the attackers numbered close to twelve thousand. As the ammunition supply decreased, Chilavert ordered the men to use stray shot that lay on the ground. Even this eventually ran out, and the men were reduced to fighting with sabres and carbines, but it was only a matter of time before they were taken prisoner. Chilavert was the only commander in Rosas' army to see the battle through to the bitter end.

Rosas had observed the first part of the fight from the turret of the house of Caseros. When he saw his cavalry dispersed and realized that defeat was imminent, he fled with an orderly to Buenos Aires, and then to England. By 3:00 P.M. that same afternoon Urquiza had set up headquarters in Rosas' house.

The allies took about seven thousand prisoners and four thousand muskets, some eight hundred carts, five hundred wagons and large quantities of uniforms and provisions. The exact casualty rate for either army is not known, but it has been estimated that there were about two thousand killed in both armies, and that six hundred of these were Allies.

¹³Captain Juan Beverina, *Caseros* (Varese, Italy, 1911) claimed there were no casualties. Saldías (op. cit.) claimed there were about eight hundred killed. Later the Uruguayans admitted having had one officer and fifty men killed and three hundred wounded.

SUBSISTENCE OF THE ARMY OF THE VALLEY

BY LUDWELL LEE MONTAGUE*

Jackson's Valley Campaign has been re-fought in countless books and classrooms. The strategy of the General has been analyzed, the fortitude of his men praised, the marching and fighting meticulously described,¹ yet history is silent as to the means whereby the Army of the Valley sustained its expenditure of energy. If Napoleon was right about how an army travels, the operations of the Valley commissary of subsistence were a vital factor in the campaign. The unpublished papers of Major Wells J. Hawks, the commissary officer, throw some light on this neglected subject.²

Before the war Major Hawks had been a carriage maker at Charlestown in the lower Valley. His appointment as commissary officer may have resulted from a business association with Major John A. Harman, part owner of a stage coach line on the Valley Pike, who became, with obvious qualifications, Jackson's quartermaster.³

The functions of a commissary of subsistence were limited to the procurement and issuance of provisions. Their transportation was a responsibility of the quartermaster. Normally wagons and teamsters were furnished by the combat units, although the quartermaster might hire others locally to meet extraordinary requirements. Seven wagons sufficed to supply 10,000 men for one day: three for bacon, three for flour, and one for miscellaneous stores. Beef traveled on

the hoof.

As commissary for the Valley District, a territorial command, Hawks was responsible for both the subsistence of forces operating in that area and local procurement for the Commissary General. Eventually he became commissary to a particular field force as the Army of the Valley evolved toward its ultimate status as the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.

As originally constituted (November 1861) the Valley Army consisted only of the veteran Stonewall Brigade, two new, under-strength brigades, six batteries, and sundry small, local cavalry units—in all some 4,600 men. This local defense force, in effect a weak division, was augmented from time to time by the temporary attachment of Loring's Division (late December to early February) and of Ewell's Division (April 30), the absorption of Edward Johnson's command (May 5), the assignment of Lawton's Brigade (June 16) and the temporary attachment of Whiting's Division (June 17). Thus the aggregate strength for which Hawks had to provide subsistence varied as follows, in round numbers:⁴

January, 1862	10,000
February, March	4,600
April	6,000
May	17,000
Early June	12,700
Late June	18,500

Hawks's field notebook opened with a tabulation of the ration which he proposed to deliver to the troops. It appears to have been his own local adaptation of the official Confederate ration, itself an adaptation of the pre-war U. S. Army ration. Hawks's inten-

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¹ See particularly G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson* (2 vols., London, 1898), and Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I (New York, 1942).

² These papers are preserved in the Duke University Library. Except as otherwise noted, the information here presented is derived from them.

³ Henderson, *op. cit.*, I, 182.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 219f, 284, 424; II, 9.



tions compared with the latter as follows:

	Hawks	U. S. Army ration 1860 ⁵
Beef, oz.	20	20, or 12 oz. of pork or bacon
Bacon, oz.	9	
Flour, oz.	19	18, or 20 oz. of corn meal
Rice, oz.	1.6	1.6, or .64 oz. of beans, or 1.5 oz. of dried potatoes
Coffee, oz.	1	1.6, or .24 oz. of tea
Sugar, oz.	4	2.4
Salt, oz.	0.5	0.54
Vinegar, gill	0.16	0.32

Hawks's allowance of bacon was presumably in lieu of beef, as in the U. S. ration. His more generous allowance of sugar reflects the relative abundance of that commodity in the Confederacy before the loss of New Orleans. Confederate disregard of beans and potatoes

in favor of South Carolina rice is understandable, but a Southern commissary's rejection of corn meal requires explanation. Before the development of the Western wheat belt the Valley of Virginia was a major wheat producing area. (It was not by chance that the reaper was invented there in 1831.) A plentiful supply of flour was available to Hawks, while in local esteem corn was regarded as fit for human consumption only in the form of pork or liquor.

From the abundance of beef, bacon, and flour available in the Valley Hawks was able not only to supply the Valley Army, but also to export a surplus to Johnston's Army at Centreville and Manassas, to the Commissary General's meat packing plant at Thoroughfare Gap, and to depots in the interior. His activities in behalf of the Commissary Gen-

⁵ Revised U.S. Army Regulations, 1861, para. 1191. See also *Legislative History of the Subsistence Department of the United States Army* (Washington, 1877), pp. 97, 102.

eral were affected by operations as remote as those of Grant in the West. On February 18, two days after the fall of Fort Donelson, Hawks was directed to buy and ship all the bacon to be had in the Valley, in anticipation of heavy losses in the evacuation of meat stores from Tennessee. Thus Hawks's activities could be a matter of some concern to an Army retiring on Corinth, Mississippi.

Jackson was conscious of the national importance of his commissary's operations. Plentifully supplied himself, he projected a midwinter advance into West Virginia to gather meat and flour. "The resources of that region . . . are in greater abundance than in almost any other season of the year," he explained.⁶ "Postpone the occupation . . . until spring, and we may expect to find [them] greatly exhausted." On New Year's Day, 1862, the Army moved out from Winchester and ten days later it was at Romney. Thereafter a steady procession of cattle and wagons was crossing the mountains until Hawks reported, on February 14, that the area had been swept clean of purchasable supplies.

Except for the bitter Romney march, the first two months of 1862 were spent in camp and Hawks had no difficulty in keeping the men well fed by ration standards. There was no lack of bread and meat. There were, however, minor shortages of components supplied from Richmond and a real dearth of sugar and coffee. As early as January 24 the Commissary General was regretting his inability to provide a full ration of sugar, "culpable negligence" at New Orleans having resulted in a general shortage. On February 26 he declared that the forty bags of coffee just sent had been the last on hand at Richmond. But the U. S. commissary and sutler's stores captured at Bath and Romney provided unusual fare and the countryside

afforded various delicacies. Officers' mess accounts show that Hawks dealt in turkeys, butter, sausage, oysters, rabbits, eggs, hams, and peaches as well as in the components of the ration.

In the evacuation of Winchester Hawks met and passed his first severe test. On February 23 he directed that further shipments from Richmond be held at his Strasburg railhead and that reserve stocks be removed thence to Mount Jackson. These precautions were taken four days before the opposing Federal force, under Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, actually began its passage of the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. When, on March 11, the Valley Army withdrew from Winchester, Hawks left nothing behind, a fact which the Commissary General noted to his credit in criticizing the heavy losses suffered at Manassas and Thoroughfare Gap on Johnston's precipitate withdrawal from Centreville.⁷

March and April were hardly more strenuous than January and February had been. During that time the Valley Army made four marches, totalling 165 miles, and fought in one engagement (at Kernstown, March 23), but the marches were by turnpike and fifty-one of the sixty-one days were spent in camp.⁸ Hawks was inconvenienced by the loss of his railhead at Strasburg, which meant that he must receive supplies from Richmond through distant Staunton, but the basic components, meat and flour, were still abundant locally as he moved into the untouched upper Valley. At the beginning of March Hawks had on hand a month's supply of all components. During April he was able to procure more than enough meat and flour to provide full rations, but his receipts from Richmond were inadequate, ranging from a half-ration of salt and a quarter-ration of sugar to a tenth-

⁶ *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, V, 965.

⁷ *Official Records*, LI, Pt. 2, 534.

⁸ Henderson, *op. cit.*, I, 403.

ration of coffee and almost no soap. The papers do not indicate what supplies Hawks received during March or what he had on hand at the beginning of May, but it may be deduced that the Valley Army ate plenty of bread and meat, even if it did run short of other articles of subsistence.

During May the Valley Campaign entered its spectacular phase. The troops broke camp at Elk Run on April 30. On June 1 they were retiring through Strasburg, having marched 370 miles, won three victories (at McDowell, Front Royal, and Winchester), neutralized four times their number of the enemy, and disrupted the plans of the Federal high command. On only five days of that month was the Army at rest.⁹

The commissary papers for May are fragmentary. It may be that, in the rush of events, accounts were neglected. Occasional vouchers show Hawks to be purchasing cattle and bacon here and there and to be receiving coffee and sugar in dribbles from Richmond. There is evidence that "Commissary" Banks was indeed the chief source of Valley Army subsistence during this month. He abandoned large herds of cattle in his unpursued withdrawal from Harrisonburg to Strasburg. (Jackson was then sixty miles away pursuing Milroy toward Franklin.) Subsequently his commissary stores at Front Royal, Strasburg, Winchester, Martinsburg, and Charlestown provided the Valley Army with a feast in celebration of its victory. On May 30 Major Hawks had the personal satisfaction of entertaining the Commanding General at dinner in his own home at Charlestown.¹⁰

The quantity of captured supplies which the Confederates were able to carry away seems to have been greatly exaggerated, however. Henderson, crediting the testimony of

enthusiastic participants, refers to a double column of wagons seven miles long,¹¹ but Hawks's tally indicates no such booty. As the Army cleared Strasburg on June 1 the commissary had in hand approximately a month's supply of meat and rice at full rations (for 12,700 men), but only one half-ration of hardtack, no flour at all, and meager supply of other articles. Beef traveling on the hoof, fifty wagons would have carried the entire load.¹² Nor was there much prospect that additional provisions could be found in quantity in the depleted upper Valley before the next harvest, or that anything at all would be received from Richmond. Hawks must have been a worried rather than a happy man as the Army moved southward with much glory but little grub.

During June the Valley Army marched 240 miles, fought three battles, and enjoyed nine days of rest.¹³ So far as concerns provisions supplied by the commissary, it sustained this effort on less than seven days' rations of flour and hardtack, less than six days' rations of meat and of salt, less than one day's ration of rice and of sugar, and insignificant quantities of other components. Harman, the quartermaster, was simply unable to deliver to the troops additional provisions which Hawks had actually on hand. It may be presumed, however, that the farmers along the line of march made further contribution to the subsistence of the Army of the Valley, voluntarily or involuntarily.

The march southward from Strasburg was made on the contents of pockets and haversacks and on captured supplies otherwise in

⁹ Henderson, *op. cit.*, I, 349.

¹² This figure does not take into account commissary stores in the actual possession of combat units, or the ordnance, medical and quartermaster stores being carried off. The captured ordnance and medical supplies were considerable in volume and importance. Freeman, *op. cit.*, I, 407, 411.

¹³ Henderson, *op. cit.*, I, 403.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Freeman, *op. cit.*, I, 415.

the possession of combat units rather than of the commissary. Some units going into action at Cross Keys and Port Republic (June 8 and 9) had not eaten at all for twenty-four hours.¹⁴ Even the rest camp at Mount Meridian was cheerless for several days. It was not until June 14 and 15 that Harman was able to bring up any of the supplies which Hawks had had in hand since the beginning of the month. On those two days, however, Hawks was able to issue provisions as follows:

45,300 lbs. of fresh beef	Nearly 4 days' full ra-
4,511 lbs. of bacon	tions for 11,500 men.
15,484 lbs. of flour	1 day's full ration.
500 lbs. of rice	A half-ration for 1 day.
160 lbs. of coffee	A quarter-ration
2,823 lbs. of sugar	Nearly one full ration.
25 gals. of vinegar	An eighth ration
1,020 lbs. of salt	3 days' rations.
191 lbs. of lard	
45 gals. of molasses	
82 gals. of whiskey	

As the Army crossed the Blue Ridge on June 17 it left behind it in the Valley most of Hawks's remaining supplies. Nothing could be expected from Richmond, the railroad having been cut at Beaverdam. During the eight-day march to Ashland Hawks was able to issue only the following provisions:

10,935 lbs. of bacon	Two days' full rations for
10,200 lbs. of pork	18,500 men
210 lbs. of flour	Six days' full rations for
110,270 lbs. of hardtack	18,500 men.
220 lbs. of rice	One-quarter of one day's
100 lbs. of beans	ration for 18,500 men.
1,665 lbs. of salt	2.8 days' rations for
	18,500 men.
336 chickens	

Thereafter, for five days, the Army of the Valley received no provisions whatever as it marched into battle, fought at Gaines's Mill, crossed the Chickahominy, and came to a halt before the Federal rearguard in position

behind White Oak Swamp.

Critics have noted the painfully slow march of the Valley Army from Beaverdam to the battlefield of Gaines's Mill, its delay at Grapevine Bridge, and its inactivity at White Oak Swamp. The explanation involves many factors: the obstacles and difficulties actually encountered, the physical exhaustion and peculiar psychological state of the General.¹⁵ One factor overlooked would seem to have been the longstanding undernourishment of the troops. Significantly, Gen. D. H. Hill, who bore a familiar relationship to Jackson and was with him on June 30, attributed the Valley Army's inaction at White Oak Swamp to Jackson's "pity for his own corps, worn out by long and exhausting marches. . . ."¹⁶

By possibly significant coincidence, it was on June 30, while the Valley Army lay idle north of White Oak Swamp, that Hawks issued most of the provisions which that Army received during the entire month of June. Some of these supplies were probably the first Hawks had received from the depots in Richmond. Others may have been found in McClellan's abandoned camps, through which the Army had passed that morning. The quantities issued, while inadequate as substantially a month's supply, were ample enough to require a busy afternoon's work for their receipt, distribution, cooking, and eating. These quantities, and the corresponding figures for the entire month of June, were as follows:

	Total issued during June*	Issued on June 30
Fresh beef, lbs.	460,001	414,701
Bacon, lbs.	57,656	42,210
Pork, lbs.	10,226	26
		22½ days' rations for 18,000 men.

*Excluding minor issues to prisoners, guards, sick, and wounded remaining in the Valley and at Mechum's River.

¹⁵Freeman, *op. cit.*, I, 498-513, 523-524, 560-564, 569-580, 655-659.

¹⁶*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, II, 389. Hill was Jackson's brother-in-law.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, I, 377.

Flour, lbs.	280,098	264,404	} 13½ days' full rations
Hardtack, lbs.	132,499	22,220	
Rice, lbs.	5,117	4,397	} 2.3 rations
Beans, lbs.	100	None	
Coffee, lbs.	160	None	
Sugar, lbs.	6,077	4,254	} 1.5 rations.
Vinegar, gals.	252	227	
Salt, lbs.	5,700	3,025	} 2.5 rations
Molasses, gals.	230	185	

* * *

Thus the Army of the Valley, reasonably well fed during the first four months of 1862, subsisted on meager fare during May and June, the period of its most strenuous opera-

tions, finding provisions in quantity only after victory, in the camps of its enemies. The apparent breakdown of the commissary, however, is attributable primarily to the inadequacy of available transportation in the face of strategic and tactical requirements. That Hawks, the commissary, and Harman, the quartermaster, had accomplished all that could be expected in the circumstances is indicated by their exacting General's continued confidence in them.

Major Hawks is forgotten in the histories, but he was remembered in his great chief's dying moment. "Order A. P. Hill to prepare for action! Pass the infantry to the front! Tell Major Hawks. . . . Let us cross over the river and rest in the shade of the trees."

HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

Despite a sudden change of editors (see below), every effort is being made to bring out this issue of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* before the end of the year; hence the optimistic use of the future tense in describing the annual meeting of the *Institute*.

Arrangements have been completed for the joint session of the *American Military Institute* and the American Historical Association at the December meeting of the AHA in Washington, D. C. The session is scheduled for 10 A.M., December 28th at the Mayflower Hotel. Dr. Douglas S. Freeman will preside. The speakers will be Dr. James Phinney Baxter III, Professor Robert G. Albion, and Professor Theodore Ropp. The subject is: "What Place Should the Study of Military History have in American Colleges and Universities?"

The object is to get a genuine and helpful discussion of a question that is obviously basic with regard to the future of the type of history now being written under the auspices of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. There is little reason to believe that such studies can be carried on successfully in government organizations beyond the term of the present programs. If such work is to go on, the profession, reinforced by people returning to academic careers, must be ready to carry it on. The discussion in December is one step in preparing the ground for this transition.

CHANGES IN THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Dr. Louis Morton has accepted a position on the Editorial Board of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*. As Chief of the Pacific Section of the Army's

Historical Division, he is himself writing two volumes on the Pacific war, and supervising the writing of nine others. Dr. Morton will address the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association at their Seattle meeting on December 28th. The title of his paper is "The American Surrender in the Philippines."

Dr. Rudolph A. Winnacker has resigned from the Editorial Board. Appointed last Spring, he has found that he cannot spare the necessary time from his new duties at the National War College.

PROGRESS IN ARMY HISTORICAL PROGRAM

The Historical Division, SSUSA, has announced the following particulars concerning forthcoming volumes of the official *U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II* series: *Okinawa* will probably be published prior to this announcement. *Guadalcanal*: galley proofs are now being corrected. *Lorraine Campaign*: completed MS now in the hands of the Review Panel. The final drafts of three MSS are now being typed for review and editing: *The Cross-Channel Attack*, *The Gilberts-Marshalls Campaign*, and *Operations Division, WDGS. World War I Order of Battle, Vol. III* (on ZI units) is now in the galley stage.

NEW EDITOR OF *Military Affairs*

We regret to announce the sudden resignation of Major Robert deT. Lawrence, editor for two years of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, who was forced to leave the Washington area for reasons of health. Major Lawrence reports from Orlando, Florida, where he is in the Public Relations Office of the Fourteenth Air Force, that the change of climate has already proved beneficial.

The new editor, elected by the Board of Trustees late in October, is Captain William F. Ross, who has been with the Planning Branch of Historical Division, SSUSA, for a year in charge of publications and publicity. A graduate of Hamilton College, Clinton, N. Y., Captain Ross has also studied at the University of Berlin and Harvard University, majoring in modern languages. Inducted into the Army early in 1942, he graduated from Field Artillery OCS in the autumn, and completed the German POW Interrogation Course at Camp Ritchie before the end of the year. During most of 1943 he was assigned to the Order of Battle Branch, G-2. Captain Ross was Assistant Military Attaché at Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey, for three years, reverting to inactive status in 1946. He was for nearly a year a researcher for the World War II Records Survey of the National Archives, specializing in the Technical Services of the Army, before his return to active duty in 1947.

NEW MARINE PUBLICATION

Lt. Col. Robert D. Heintz, Jr., USMC, Chief of the Historical Section, U. S. Marine Corps, and a member of the Editorial Board of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, is the author of *Marines at Midway*, third monograph of a series published by the Marine Corps. Colonel Heintz describes Marine contributions to the successful defense of Midway in December 1941 and June 1942, and maintains the standards for accurate, interesting history by which he distinguished himself in his earlier work, *The Defense of Wake*.

NAVAL MUSEUM PLANNED

A museum of naval and maritime history in the city of Washington is being planned by the Naval Historical Foundation of which Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King is President. By arrangement with Mrs. Truxtun Beale, the Foundation has taken a 50-year lease on

the carriage house of the historic Decatur House on Lafayette Square. The carriage house, which fronts on H Street, is to be remodeled early next year in accordance with plans now being drawn by Lavoné Dickens Andrews, wife of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Mark E. Andrews. Mrs. Andrews, one of the distinguished woman architects of the country, has donated her services to the Foundation.

This museum will be designed along the latest functional lines for effective exhibition of the paintings, prints, documents, and ship models which the Foundation has been collecting since its organization in 1922. These will be shown in exhibitions periodically changed, each of which will be devoted to a particular phase of naval history. Lieutenant Commander Edward Morris Davis III, USNR, at present Director of the Norfolk Museum of Arts and Sciences, who will return to active duty in January to become Curator of the Navy Department, has also been appointed Director of the museum of the Foundation. By frequent change of exhibits, Commander Davis will carry out the policy of the Foundation's trustees to make the museum one in which our naval and maritime history will have continuing interest for visitors.

Membership in the Naval Historical Foundation is open to all who are interested in the history of American sea power. Inquiries concerning the Foundation and its work should be addressed to Captain A. D. Turnbull, USNR, Secretary, 1410 Navy Department, Washington 25, D. C.

PRINCETON-MARINE STUDY

The Princeton-Marine Corps Historical Project is producing a history of modern amphibious developments in the United States. This will be an independent, critical, and analytical study of the subject from the turn of the century through World War II.

Its central theme will be the role of the Marine Corps in the development of amphibious warfare and the contribution of the Corps in the winning of the past war. This one-volume study will not be an operational history; campaigns and engagements will be included in it only as examples of stages, trends, and case histories in amphibious development.

The project was approved in 1947 by James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy; and General Alexander Archer Vandegrift, 18th Commandant of the Marine Corps. Completion is expected during the last quarter of 1949. A steering committee composed of Princeton faculty members and one representative of the Corps is in charge. Gordon A. Craig has general oversight; Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowel are the actual authors; and Gordon Turner is the senior research assistant.

COMMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN MILITARY MUSEUM ARTICLE, SPRING 1948

Thanks for the very interesting reprint on the Military Museum in Europe from *MILITARY AFFAIRS*. There certainly should be one here. About 35 years ago I tried very hard to get the G.A.R. to establish a Civil War Museum in Washington. I realized that the Posts were dying out, records were being lost, and I pointed out that an immense amount of material could be gathered, and also from my experience at Ticonderoga that it could be made self-supporting. But I got no response. The attitude was that they had saved the Union and it was not up to them to do any more, so I abandoned the idea.

S. H. P. Pell, Director,
Fort Ticonderoga Museum

I read your article on "Military Museums in Europe" with much interest as I knew several of them: Munich, Kaunas (Kovno), Stockholm, Leningrad, Bucharest, etc. Last

year I was in Munich again, but the museum had been destroyed. It was an excellent one, in my opinion, and had apparently been built for a museum. Strangely enough, the military museum in Kaunas was built for this purpose and was by far the best building in town. It contained almost nothing except a few new paintings of old battle scenes and a few arms from World War I. It was the center of town and most ceremonies were held there. Bucharest was poor and contained mostly trophies taken from Hungary after the war.

COLONEL W. E. SHIPP, GSC
American Embassy,
Baghdad, Iraq

I have just completed reading your article in the current issue of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*—"The Military Museum in Europe." I was a trifle surprised that you did not mention the very fine modern military museum located in Rome, which I inspected several times in 1944 while taking part in the Fifth Army Campaign up the peninsula. This museum is housed in a fairly large modern building, constructed during Mussolini's regime, and houses military articles of all kinds in exhibits that are arranged in a modern manner. I was particularly interested in the museum because it stresses military engineering and engineering materiel. There are some very fine scale models of many of the European fortified cities as well as scale models of Italian military engineering works in the First World War.

Robert A. Lincoln
Great Neck, N. Y.
(Charter Member, A.M.I.)

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ACQUISITIONS

The letters and papers of the late General of the Armies *John J. Pershing* have been bequeathed to the Library, and will be trans-

ferred after his executors have removed correspondence of an entirely private nature. Public figures all—among them Secretary of State Marshall—the executors may have difficulty in finding time for this duty. No final accession date has been set.

Correspondence, original war maps, field sketch books and other papers of *Major Jedediah Hotchkiss*, topographical engineer under "Stonewall" Jackson, are described in the Library's *Quarterly Journal of Current Acquisitions*, November 1948.

Also of Civil War interest is the cartographical diary with marginal notes, kept by *Sergeant Angelo Wiser*, Company H, 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, from March to June 1865. It records a march of the regiment from Huntsville, Alabama, through parts of Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, South

Carolina, and Georgia, and back to Huntsville.

General Carl Spaatz, recently retired Chief of Staff, US Air Force, has presented his papers pertaining to World War II to the Library. Use of these papers, which more than fill 14 standard file cases, is restricted. They will be described in an early issue of the *Journal of Acquisitions*.

AIR FORCES HISTORY

The European War: TORCH TO POINT-BLANK, second volume of the official history of the Army Air Forces in World War II, is now in the hands of the printer. The publication date is expected to be in May. The first volume of this series was reviewed in the Fall 1948 issue of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

The Canadian Army 1939-1945, by Col. C. P. Stacey. (Ottawa: Government Printers. 1948. Pp. 354. \$2.50.)

Col. Stacey and his co-workers in the Historical Section of the Canadian Army have provided a positive answer to a question that has been posed universally in the general staff historical sections of the democratic nations who participated in World War II: How best to reach the erstwhile citizen-soldier (and his family) with an accurate and readable "official" report of the war in which he took part before the passage of time has erased his personal and indeed proprietary interest in the events of that war? This volume in effect provides an official historical accounting to the stockholders who shared and risked in the Canadian war effort of 1939-1945: the soldiers who did not return; the survivors of those who were killed in action or died in noisome prison camps, the families and neighbors of those who lived but whose deeds are too quickly forgotten; the taxpayer who bore the crushing financial burden of a great military effort by a small country, and the average citizen who surrendered cherished rights in order that the greater rule of human liberty might obtain.

The American military historian and the soldier who has done his duty can not help but envy Col. Stacey and his staff, for they have written a proud—and rightfully proud—story of Canada at war, the like of which in the United States probably would bring forth denunciation by the professional historian as an example of "nationalism" and "flag waving." Actually the story as here set forth does not obscure national failures or gloss over defeat; it has heroism but not "heroics." It does sustain a note of pride in valor and a love for the nation which can only stem from a keen national consciousness and an intelligent appreciation of the importance of the military traditions of the people. This note sounds throughout the entire book, from the "little moving island of Canadian territory" which was the train carrying the 48th Highlanders back to St. Malo as France

fell, to the final statement of the percentage of men and women in the Canadian Army who "reported Canada as their country of birth."

This story, for it is treated as a story, is an interesting one, a pleasure to read. The pictures—which this reviewer cannot forbear raising from the obscurity of the conventional last line of the review—are the result of paintings done by war artists in the field. They tell more than three times the number of photographs. In what other media can one find so graphic a representation of the Dieppe raid? How else to depict the livid yet somber coloration of the enemy wreckage, human and material, on a road in the Falaise pocket? The maps too are eye-catching, providing sufficient detail but not cluttered with the same.

Is the book factual and accurate? It is, although the three volume Official History promised for 1950 may change some points of detail and give more sustained treatment to interesting episodes and intriguing questions which here are relegated to a few sentences. Is the presentation unbiased in the traditional scholarly sense? Yes. The Canadian accolade is given more than once to the American Army, while the role of the British high command *vis-a-vis* the Canadian troops is presented fully and without nationalist recriminations. The scope of a popular single volume does not permit detailed investigation of such moot points as the strategic differences between Eisenhower and Montgomery, or the failure to seal off completely the Falaise pocket. But in such cases Col. Stacey recognizes the question and notes the arguments which have been advanced by various protagonists.

After reading this very excellent short history the reviewer looks forward to the publication of the three volume Official History proper. He hopes to find there as complete a coverage of the South Beveland operation as is accorded in the present volume to Dieppe. He would read with interest a fuller story of the tragic Canadian battle at Hong Kong—if the interrogation of returning prisoners permits. Finally, all Americans might read with profit a detailed recital of the Canadian

experience when torn between the historic volunteer system and the military necessity of conscription.

H. M. COLE,*
Washington, D. C.

The Second World War: The Gathering Storm, by Winston S. Churchill. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948. Pp. 784. \$6.00.)

This volume is one of the really important books of the late war—important to soldier and civilian alike. The method of presentation “in which the author hangs the chronicle and discussion of great military and political events upon the personal experiences” is particularly interesting and impressive. The reader will agree with Mr. Churchill’s doubt “whether any similar record exists or has ever existed of the day-to-day conduct of war and administration.” In my present position, I can fully sympathize with the author’s conclusion that “it would be wrong not to lay the lessons of the past before the future.”

The progress of the World War I Allies down the road to World War II is closely plotted. Mr. Churchill marks plainly each milestone. The comment of Marshal Foch regarding the Versailles Treaty: “This is not Peace—it is an armistice for twenty years” marks the beginning of that *via dolorosa*. Clemenceau, the Old Tiger, Lloyd George, and Wilson all take their places in that diversity of motives which had its fruition in the Weimar republic, through whose hazy and impotent mists emerged the maniacal figure of Hitler. The effective efforts of the Allies to disarm each other in the very teeth of a resurgent, militant Germany bred on a diet of hate and desire for revenge appear in their stark and lamentable grimness. There will certainly form in the mind of every American reader the U. S. parallel to the successive positions of Britain in the ghastly period between the wars. The methods employed by the Germans in an effort to re-establish their military strength will appear all too familiar to the professional military, and that they were effective we who faced their product know well.

The attitude of the United States during these fateful years does not escape the author’s attention. “. . . they simply gaped at the vast changes which were taking place in Europe and imagined

they were no concern of theirs. The considerable corps of highly competent, widely trained professionals formed their own opinions, but these produced no noticeable affect upon the improvident aloofness of American foreign policy.”

The period of the “phony war” did not affect the war on the sea which began immediately with the torpedoing of the 13,500 ton *Athenia*. As First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill was immediately alert to naval dispositions and the sea capabilities of the Germans. In this connection it is interesting to note Mr. Roosevelt’s parallel interest in our own sea preparations and dispositions. Indeed, Mr. Roosevelt’s letter to Churchill in September, 1939, indicated his awareness of that parallelism.

There is an interesting estimate of the situation in connection with the proposed Allied operations through Belgium and some of the difficulties, inherent in Allied planning and administration, are outlined. The profitless expedition to Norway and the relations between the combat commanders and the political heads are recounted in the final chapters of the volume. They form a good preview of things to come.

Of extraordinary and timely interest is the chapter on “The Soviet Enigma.” It is worthy of careful study and much of the material included cannot be found elsewhere in English.

Mr. Churchill conveys considerable kudos to the U. S. Army for their coinage of that phrase which is familiar to all War College graduates: “over-all strategic objective.” In passing, I note he admits its utility. This is a point which might be borne in mind in reading his remarks on conducting war by committee, a method contagious enough to have made its way into U. S. organization.

The volume is most significant to the professional soldier who is given a behind-the-scenes look into political decisions which culminated in the battles for which he spent his military life in training. Prior to World War II the conduct of war was regarded as the role of the soldier. As far as U. S. participation in World War I was concerned, its conduct was conspicuously confirmative of that view. Mr. Churchill’s book should be read thoughtfully with respect to the age-old problem of relationship between soldiers and statesmen.

HARRY J. MALONY*
Major General, U.S.A.

*Chief, European section, Historical Division, Army.

*General Malony is Chief, Historical Division, Department of the Army.

History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931—April 1942, by Samuel Eliot Morison. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948, Pp. 411. \$6.00.)

No period of the war in the Pacific is as little known or understood as the first six months when the Allies drank deeply of the cup of bitterness and defeat. With the exception of the report of the congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, no accurate and detailed account of this little-known period was available to the public until a few months ago when the first volume in the Air Forces history appeared. Now we have an account of naval operations in the Pacific during the first five months of the war by Professor Morison (Captain, USNR). With the air and naval story in, all that is missing is the Army's history of ground operations in this period. Such a volume is in preparation. Its publication will complete the story of the American effort in the war against Japan during this period of defeat and humiliation.

The Rising Sun in the Pacific is the third volume in Professor Morison's 13-volume history of naval operations in World War II. The first two dealt with operations in the Atlantic and North African waters to June 1943. The present volume is the first of eight dealing with the war against Japan. Morison has exploited fully all naval material—post-war Japanese interrogations, Japanese reports prepared especially for him, official records of the Navy Department—and has interviewed responsible naval officers.

"For a historian of the United States Navy," says Professor Morison, "a brief inquiry into the causes of the war in the Pacific is peculiarly appropriate; upon that Navy fell the first fury of the enemy attack, and by that Navy—alone, or as a spearhead for other armed forces—Japan was utterly defeated." No one will question the appropriateness of the inquiry. There is room for a difference of opinion as to the Navy's role in the Pacific war. But this volume is in a real sense an inquiry and that is one of its chief merits. Professor Morison has not been content merely to tell what happened; he also tells why and analyzes the reasons and results.

The chapter on the Pearl Harbor attack is clear, crisp, and dramatic and contains some of the best writing in the book. After summarizing the Japanese plan for the attack, and the execution of that plan, Morison considers the responsi-

bility for the disaster. It is impossible, he says, in writing such a book "to avoid reaching an opinion on the subject, a statement of which is the readers' due." Admiral Kimmel's error, as well as that of the high command, was in failing to realize that the Japanese had sufficient strength for a simultaneous attack to the south and east and in giving them credit for more intelligence than they actually showed. In the author's opinion the attack on Pearl Harbor was not, as the Japanese claimed, "a strategic necessity." On the tactical level it "was wrongly concentrated on ships rather than permanent installations and oil tanks;" on the strategic level it was "idiotic," and on the political level "disastrous."

The story of the months following Pearl Harbor is a record of confusion. Professor Morison has caught the spirit of blundering and defeat, the bitterness, hope and bravery which marked operations during those months. In the Philippines, Admiral Hart's Asiatic Fleet was "unable to prevent the enemy from landing wherever he chose, or even to delay his efficient timetable of conquest." Despite this clear statement one would like a clearer explanation of why the twenty-seven submarines of this fleet accomplished no more than they did. The story of Admiral Fletcher's efforts to relieve Wake Island is well told and demonstrates Morison's willingness and ability to analyze critically the decisions of higher commanders. In his account of the ABDA command and the defense of the Malay Barrier, the author is at his best in describing naval engagements. Although written primarily for the general reader, such accounts will be read with much interest and profit by the professional sailor as well. The story of these five months of war, "neither pleasant to investigate nor inspiring to read about," comes to a close in April 1942. By that time there were encouraging signs on the horizon that the Allies were not yet defeated and that they could still find the strength to hurt the enemy. Professor Morison fittingly concludes his volume with a brief account of the Tokyo Raid, the "first light" in an otherwise dark world.

There are occasional errors in detail where the book deals with the activities of other services, and too great a reliance upon secondary or unreliable sources for other than naval operations. Such errors could have been avoided by checking against the sources being studied by the historical organization of other services. There is also an unevenness in research, due probably to the fact that the author did the research for some of the

chapters himself and for others relied upon the research of his staff.

Few write history as engagingly as Professor Morison, and he has brought to this work his best powers of description. The use of detail is extremely skillful, the writing informal and easy, lightly salted with nautical terms by a man who knows the sea. The book is amply illustrated with photographs, charts, and maps. All in all, this is a splendid job and presents a challenge for readability and clarity to all historians of military operations.

LOUIS MORTON*

The Stilwell Papers, by Joseph Warren Stilwell.
Arranged and edited by Theodore H. White.
(New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc.
1948. Pp. 357. \$4.00.)

"The storm center of the world has gradually shifted to China. . . . Whoever understands that mighty Empire socially, politically, economically, and religiously has the key to world politics for the next five centuries," write John Hay, appraising the situation in the Orient a half century ago. Joseph Warren Stilwell, on the basis of three tours of duty in China totalling ten years, added a fifth factor—understanding China militarily. Here was his contribution to history. That contribution is presented, in part, in the *Stilwell Papers*, as here published. These papers consisted of entries carefully prepared by General Stilwell for the express purpose of keeping a true and factual record of his intimate association with Chinese military leaders and of his earnest effort to improve the combat efficiency of Chinese soldiery. On the latter point, General Stilwell held the belief that with good equipment and sound training and under capable leadership the Chinese soldier could equally match any other man in battle. The *Papers* reflect almost daily what he thought of his success or failure to implement his mission and to assist China in becoming what the United States had desired since John Hay's time—a strong, united, and friendly China. General Stilwell's vocabulary omitted the word "democratic," an undefined term where the China of 1942-1944 was concerned.

Valued as the most important single estimate of China's wartime collaboration with American

armed forces during World War II, the *Stilwell Papers* fortunately appeared in print in record time. By permitting her deceased husband's diary and letters to be printed, Mr. Winifred A. Stilwell has contributed admirably to a clearer understanding of the military problems which the United States faces in China today. But when the future biographer of General Stilwell or the serious student of Far Eastern affairs turns to use the *Stilwell Papers* as raw historical data, he will find that he has in these papers only a broken outline of the General's thesis. This might, indeed, not clearly and fully appear even if the *Papers*, as published, contained all of his personal notes. If the biographer or historian has not carefully searched and analyzed the records of the Army or the published memoirs or despatches of Stilwell's contemporaries, the *Stilwell Papers* will fail to reveal their real meaning.

In the *Introduction*, Mr. Theodore H. White states that each journal entry is "usually a short, clipped telegraphic note, serving more as personal symbols of memory than a narrative of events." Almost none of these entries, except the General's letters to his wife, can be understood without a study of communications, completed staff studies, official letters, or state papers which are in the records of the government. The historian studying them in this context will find that the *Papers* provide valuable interstitial data to fashion into a sound, interesting, and comprehensive narrative. But, as selected, arranged, and edited by Mr. White, they will have to be re-evaluated, since much of the editor's interpretation—as presented in his narrative—is inconsistent even with the *Papers* themselves. For instance, Mr. White neglects to trace President Roosevelt's changing attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek and his government during the war years. The strong White House messages of 1944, transmitted through General Stilwell's Headquarters, are quite a contrast to the ones of 1942 when the President stated that Chiang Kai-shek should not be treated as a "Sultan of Morocco." While the Stilwell "symbols of memory" imply this profound change of policy in Washington, unsupplemented they fail to reveal the true role that General Stilwell had in shaping that change. Moreover, Mr. White lacks entries for a period of two months (April and May, 1943) to analyze; a period which saw the birth of General Chennault's command, the only independent tactical air force, with its own strategic plan and supply support, during World War II. He lets General Stilwell on pages 204-5 sum-

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marize the strategy conference at Washington (TRIDENT, May, 1943). From Mr. White the reader learns that this conference had been "unsatisfactory" (p. 206), but no explanation is given as to why the Stilwell-Chennault impasse had developed. Yet it was on this very issue that Stilwell's program to improve the Chinese Army in China bogged down, with the consequence that today Chiang Kai-shek does not have the nucleus of a modern war machine.

The index reflects Mr. White's appraisal of the entire collection of *Papers* that he edited. It places emphasis on personalities. Far more important to General Stilwell were the problems of strategy, lend-lease, personnel, administration, logistics, and combat intelligence which he was struggling to understand and surmount. But these topics receive no headings in the index.

CHARLES F. ROMANUS*
Washington, D. C.

Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War, by George Morgenstern. (New York, Devin-Adair Co., 1947. Pp. 425. \$3.00.)

This is Pearl! The United States and Japan—1941, by Walter Millis. (New York, Morrow, 1947. Pp. 373. \$4.00.)

The forty volumes produced by the Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack served history by making public many documents which might otherwise have long lain buried under high classification. But, for all their quantity and quality, they yielded no categorical answer as to the responsibility which the committee was seeking to determine. They are a mine from which it is possible to extract various sorts of ore to support widely divergent points of view. Some would blame Kimmel, Short and their military chiefs at Washington; some would hold accountable President Roosevelt and his civilian policy-makers; still others stress the idea that the Japanese deserve no small share of the blame.

The two 1947 books under review here represent the first flight of the analyses of the voluminous evidence. They divide as sharply in their conclusions as do the 1948 pair which followed them, and which will be reviewed separately. The first pair were written by journalists; the second by professional historians. Morgenstern developed much the same Roosevelt-guilt thesis which Charles A. Beard would stress more

thoroughly in his more ample volume. Millis arrived at somewhat the same conclusions as Samuel E. Morison, allocating primary responsibility to the Japanese and secondary blame to sins of omission on the part of the military.

Morgenstern, a member of the *Chicago-Tribune* staff, had served with the Marine Corps combat correspondents. His book, the first to appear, follows closely the Brewster-Ferguson minority report, which held the President responsible. The title of the book is explained in his recapitulation of his thesis (pp. 329-30): "Pearl Harbor provided the American war party with the means of escaping dependence on a hesitant Congress in taking a reluctant people into war. . . Pearl Harbor was the first action of the acknowledged war, and the last battle of a secret war upon which the Administration had long since embarked. The secret war was waged against nations which the leadership of this country had chosen as enemies months before they became formal enemies by a declaration of war. It was waged also by psychological means, by propaganda and deception, against the American people, who were thought by their leaders to be laggard in embracing war." The style is lively, but the treatment is less thorough than Beard's final opus, stressing that same theme.

Millis, of the *Herald-Tribune* staff, had already told the story of the nation's approach to its two previous wars in *The Martial Spirit* and *The Road to War*. He presents a vivid play-by-play analysis of the events of the year 1941, with apparent objectivity. His conclusions, as expressed in the Foreword (pp. x-xi), are: "It is plain that there can never be a final answer to the question of who was 'responsible' for the Pearl Harbor disaster. It was the end of a highly complex chain of actions, reactions, good decisions and bad ones; in which human foresight and failure were inextricably mingled; and the issue of responsibility, which in the last analysis is a moral rather than a factual issue, must turn in the end upon the particular standards which the observer applies to it. For myself, I find it difficult to see how Admiral Kimmel and General Short can escape the major responsibility for the military surprise, not because they were necessarily any more blind, less able, or more negligent than others, but because as the commanding officers concerned it was on their shoulders that the burden lay. . . There can be no final accounting. And merging with the question of immediate responsibility for surprise there is the larger ques-

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tion of responsibility for the policies which led to it. Here again opinion will probably always differ. Many of the grosser suspicions which attained currency during the war and were kept alive afterward are emphatically dissipated by the evidence. The record offers no support for the view that the Roosevelt Administration plotted to invite a Pacific War or even wished for one. There is, on the contrary, overwhelming evidence that the guiding thought was to stave off war as long as possible. Yet it is true that President Roosevelt and his advisers followed policies which, under all the circumstances, made the Japanese attack virtually inevitable. Why? The only valid answer must be sought in a consideration of the alternatives available at any given point in the process. To my mind, the Roosevelt Administration had no other choices than those which it successively took."

ROBERT G. ALBION*

The Last Days of Hitler, by H. R. Trevor-Roper. (New York: Macmillan. 1947. Pp. 254. \$3.00.)

Dead or alive today, Hitler is of little importance, since the government and political system which he personified are destroyed beyond any possibility of resurrection. To prove that Hitler did die, and how he died, made an interesting exercise for British Intelligence. Trevor-Roper, to whom the assignment fell, has done more, however, than reconstruct the final hours of the Nazi *Götterdämmerung*.

This volume is a case study in the pathology of power. In the last years of the regime Goering was content with the outward trappings—the baronial residence, flowing robes, works of art, and an electric train. He seemed equally indifferent to the fate of the German Air Force and the German economy. But Hitler the ascetic, relying upon his unquestioned self-confidence, fortified by astrology and drugs, was the true Oriental despot. From the cramped bunker in the garden of the Reich's Chancellory his word was as powerful as ever. Or had indifference arrived with defeat and did men still know only how to obey the master they had followed for so long?

It is Hitler living in 1944 and 1945 which makes this book so fascinating. Trevor-Roper has sketched the court in broad but concise and clear strokes. In their strength and weakness

the leading personalities posture and plot for us. We learn incidents not previously revealed—such as the Army High Command scheme to overthrow Hitler in 1938 (Chamberlain and Daladier disposed of that conspiracy when they signed "peace in our time" at Munich), and Albert Speer's abortive interest in a means of destroying Hitler early in 1945. And yet through victory and defeat Hitler himself dominates word and action. Decimated by execution, excoriated as incompetent, the Army High Command still feebly carries out the orders. Himmler who could send millions to death without emotion cannot make the fateful decision; and can perceive no reason why the Allies should not negotiate with him. Although he has sabotaged the scorched earth policy, Speer goes to pay his final respects on April 23, half expecting to be executed. What man in modern times has been so completely, so destructively served?

Trevor-Roper does not speculate why. He only puts all the pieces together. It is a story both exciting and repelling—one to reread and re-think. Incidentally, it also disposes of an old chestnut that history written with a scholar's care for fact and detail must be deadly dull.

JOHN D. MILLETT,*

New York, N. Y.

The Navy of Britain, by Michael Lewis. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1948. Pp. 613. 30s.)

How the naval power of Britain developed, rather than what it did, is the principal theme of this exceedingly entertaining, instructive, and unique book. What the Navy did, from Medieval times to the recent past was necessarily a primary influence upon its development, since all evolution is a product of experience. To a considerable extent, therefore, a narrative of the Navy in action threads its way through the book, with interest enhanced thereby, but only as being incidental to progressive changes in six main features. Each one of these is treated separately, with its own chronological narrative.

For nearly 1,000 years prior to the creation of the permanent "Royal Navy" by Charles II, the

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naval power of Britain took on a variety of impermanent forms. In the main it consisted of an "occasionally evoked collection of privately owned ships, assembled temporarily for warlike" purposes. Although some monarchs built their own ships-of-war, the backbone of the whole force consisted of merchant ships, commandeered under feudal principles. These merchantmen were temporarily outfitted for warfare by the Crown, which also furnished the necessary additional combat personnel of soldiers from shore.

The evolution of warship types in northern waters is interesting. Neglecting the Viking era, "long" ships with oar propulsion found little favor, because of weather and difficulty in supplying oarsmen. For many centuries the chief reliance was upon the cargo-carrying "round" ship with sail power—an elongated tub. For war, temporary fighting towers were built on deck as citadels for soldiers with man-killing weapons, since naval warfare was a matter of boarding.

With the introduction of guns of ship-killing size they became too heavy for the old deck towers, which consequently disappeared. The urge for more guns created longer ships until a basic difference grew between men-of-war and merchantmen. The old ship-of-the-line type with heavy guns in boardside ruled supreme, even after the advent of steam and iron ships. The next basic change in general design of the battleship came with the advent of turrets whose worth was proved in the *Federal Monitor* in 1862.

The coming of underwater weapons (torpedoes and mines) led to a multiplication of naval types—destroyers, submarines, mine-layers, mine sweepers, etc. Similarly the airplane brought the "flat top," the latest capital ship type. Rockets seem destined to multiply types of naval vessels still more.

Having thus traced the evolution of fighting ships the author next turns to their personnel. Officers and men are each treated chronologically in separate sections. In early days land troops embarked on merchant ships for combat service only. With the coming of peace they evacuated the ships completely. Only gradually were the fighting and seamen groups merged into permanent ship's complements, organized into ranks and ratings appropriate to their duties and abilities. In this however the highly disciplined Marines survived as a separate group for amphibious and police duties.

Another section of the book deals with higher

naval management. It traces the slow progress, stemming from experience. First came tenuous control by a Lord High Admiral, later integrated with a Navy Board and leading to the creation of a Board of Admiralty. The fundamental defect of dual control, as between operations and maintenance, proved to be a grave handicap for centuries and was not finally corrected until 1832.

Of special interest to the general reader will be the final section with its stirring narrative of sea battles. Chronologically arranged, they are selected to illustrate the evolution of naval tactics, as influenced by developments in weapons, propulsion, mobility, ship-construction etc. From the days of boarding and man-killing we came to ship-killing as the basic element. And ship-killing finally reaches the incredible modern refinements due to variety and precision of weapons and instruments as well as to high speed, long radius and toughness of ships, with other factors.

Each section of the book is a fascinating story within itself, very informative in many aspects of sea warfare, including customs, uniforms, signals, living conditions, recruiting and what not. It should please any reader of special or general tastes related to naval affairs.

DUDLEY W. KNOX
Commodore, USN (Ret.)
Washington, D. C.

The Goebbels Diaries, with an Introduction and Notes by Louis P. Lochner. (New York: Doubleday. 1948. Pp. 566. \$4.00.)

One of the most striking features of this important book is the palpable and disturbing sincerity of the author. Intellectually brilliant and, consequently, one of the most dangerous of the Nazi hierarchy, Dr. Goebbels has left a testament which is of outstanding value not only to students of history and to those who are concerned with the future of the German people, but also to the populations of countries which have not yet directly experienced dictatorship from within or from without.

Here in all its callous cynicism is the blueprint for control of a nation by a chosen few. It is not to be dismissed as the criminal formula of a perverted mind; it is not to be disregarded as impracticable and harmless now that the mind and the regime have disintegrated. On the contrary, the warning in this book is horrifyingly clear. It has happened once. It could happen again. Particularly could it happen in countries where popula-

tions are bewildered, disillusioned, or complacent.

The Goebbels Diaries should be required reading for every human being who still retains a minimum hope of freedom. It is a must for the military whose duty it is to defend that freedom.

For centuries Germany has been war-bent and military-minded. Its Prussian officer class was ruthless in subordinating everything to its own policy of militarism and aggression. The Nazis, in substance, exploited that. But Dr. Goebbels makes clear the comparative ease with which a handful of civilians succeeded in reducing the Army and the General Staff to puppets. Of the top leaders only Goering was raised in the service tradition and before the end he, like the generals, had been stripped of power and was impotent before the authority of his civilian colleagues. The very men who should have been the strength of the nation were the tools of its destroyers. The significance of this should not be underestimated.

Never before has the power of propaganda been made so manifest. Goebbels knew, as did Hitler, the force of this intangible element which he controlled. But he was more subtle than Hitler and more sensitive to the exigencies of the moment and the needs and desires of his listeners. Yet despite his sagacity, one of the most remarkable aspects of the man was his pitiful misconception of the political climate outside Germany, notably in England. A hypocrite and a liar, he demonstrated a scrupulous regard for truth whenever he imagined that it had been violated by the opponents of nazism.

Vain, conceited, jealous of his authority and position, Goebbels was a shameless intriguer. A ruthless opportunist, he stopped at nothing to eliminate opposition to himself or to the Party. Yet he was not prepared to allow even Party interference with his Propaganda Ministry. Nor was he content to confine his activities to his duties as Minister for Propaganda and Gauleiter for Berlin. There was practically nothing with which he did not concern himself. His ambition was inordinate, his power unquestionable.

Behind the pogroms, the mass murders, the forced labor of enslaved peoples, behind the curtailment of authority of the generals, is disclosed the malevolent purpose of Dr. Goebbels.

Here, in a record made for his most entranced admirer Goebbels spoke as he could to no one else. Not even to his beloved Fuehrer could he be as candid as he was to himself. So that here is the

awful story of unsurpassed evil, of hopes, ambitions and fears. A bewildering story, since it contradicts some of our earlier beliefs, a maddening story since it confirms some of our wartime hopes, a disturbing story since it emphasizes fears that we cannot dismiss.

HUGH CORBETT,*
Washington, D. C.

Constitutional Dictatorship, by Clinton L. Rossiter. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1948. Pp. ix, 322. \$5.00.)

This volume is a study of the theory and machinery and, to some extent, of the operations of crisis governments in the German republic of 1919-1932, the United States, Great Britain, and France, with a chapter on Roman dictatorship thrown in which the author says "may be ascribed to a classical education." It is an attempt to answer the question, predominantly in terms of the experience of the four countries mentioned, which President Lincoln asked near the beginning of the Civil War about the power of republics to defend themselves adequately without the attainment of such strength as to destroy their essential character. Was there in all republics, he asked, an inherent and fatal weakness? "Must a government of necessity be too *strong* for the liberties of its people, or too *weak* to maintain its own existence?" The author rephrases the Lincoln question in modern terminology as follows: "Can a democracy fight a successful total war and still be a democracy when the war is over?" He answers affirmatively "by the incontestable facts of history."

The author finds three types of crisis in the life of a democratic nation which threaten its existence both as a nation and as a democracy: war, rebellion, and economic depression. The governmental devices for coping with crises are both legislative and executive. Outstanding in the executive field is martial rule, which commonly makes its appearance in the common law countries of the British Empire and the United States as martial law and in the civil law countries of continental Europe and Latin America as the state of siege. He finds the state of siege and martial law so nearly identical in action that they can hardly be distinguished. The principal legislative contribution is the delegation of legislative

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power, which means the voluntary transfer of law-making authority from the representative assembly to the nation's executive.

Reference to the story of crisis government in the United States will illustrate the author's approach. That story includes the sweeping exercise of power by President Lincoln at the beginning of the Civil War, partly without reference to the letter of the Constitution; the exercise of great power by President Wilson during World War I largely on the basis of constitutional and statutory authorization; the sweeping delegations of power to the executive during the depression of the 1930's; and the similarly sweeping delegations of World War II. Resort to martial law was important during these crises only during the Civil War and in certain outlying possessions during World War II. Although the instrument is available, as was illustrated by recent experience in Hawaii, extensive use of it has not been made. Emphasis has been upon the consolidation of power in the hands of the executive. The author takes the position that the two war governments, that is of World War I and World War II, had remarkably little impact on the normal operations of the government apart from setting important precedents for future crisis action. He finds that economic emergencies, however, and particularly the New Deal, have had lasting effects upon democratic government. He does not discuss the extent to which New Deal government was patterned after that of World War I.

The volume is in large part a judicious discussion of an important subject, a subject with such breadth of scope, however, that the data presented can only illustrate the story rather than tell it in all its fullness. The author rightly regards as both dangerous and inevitable the concentrations of power in the forms mentioned when the national safety is at stake. As safety measures, therefore, he contends that no regime conferring broad emergency powers should be initiated except in case of clear necessity; that the decision to institute it should not be in the hands of the man or men who will exercise the power; that specific provision for termination should be made at the time of the initiation; and that all action taken should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements.

A major criticism of the book is the phrase "constitutional dictatorship," which is employed in the title and is used repeatedly in the text, in spite of the fact that for his own protection the author finds it necessary to explain away most of

the content. He characterizes the phrase as "hyperbole," but says that it "will serve as the general descriptive term for the whole gamut of emergency powers and procedures in periodic use in all constitutional countries" (p. 5). He refers to it elsewhere as "a rag-bag phrase" (p. 8). He says again that "the application of this book's title to American experiences with crisis government is little more than a convenient hyperbole" (p. 209), that "when it is considered what forms of government have in recent years been labeled 'dictatorship' the application of his word to Mr. Lincoln's few weeks of unrestrained power is a blatant exaggeration" (p. 228), and that "it is somewhat of a misrepresentation of history to cite the World War government of the United States as a clear-cut example of constitutional dictatorship" (p. 240). He uses the term repeatedly, however, in spite of the necessity of continuous re-explanation, definition, and apology; to the constant confusion of the reader who has a vital interest in the problems of crisis government.

CARL BRENT SWISHER*
Baltimore, Md.

Air Power in War, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948. Pp. 124, 9s. 6d. and Toronto: Musson. \$2.25.)

That this small book, comprising the Lees Knowles Lectures of 1947, has escaped notice in America is as surprising as it is unfortunate, for as Air Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean and later as Deputy Supreme Commander of SHAEF, Marshal Tedder speaks with the authority of experience in the successful application of the "unities of land, sea and air." His modesty in respect to the accomplishments of the latter branch is refreshing; he admits not only that "we did not attempt to win [the late war] by means of air power alone," but does not claim that we either should or could have.

The first of his four lectures is entitled "The Unities of War." He makes the point that since the techniques of war are dynamic and that victory ultimately goes to the side with the greater military potential, the intelligent approach to preparation for the future is to analyze the mistakes of the early phases of the preceding war, rather than to dwell on the accomplishments of the

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later phases, when the commanders were given, in effect, blank checks. For the sake of economy of lives and treasure as well as for time, which in World War II England secured because Hitler attempted to secure his objectives by political means first, he pleads for "a united, efficient and economical armed force: not an embryo Goliath which would take years" to mature.

The second lecture, "Air Superiority," deals explicitly with that subject: That it is a pre-condition to the exercise of land and sea power, that securing and keeping it is the first task of the air arm and that the German Air Force was frittered away because it was used as an auxiliary to the ground is repeated with abundant clarity and eloquence. But these conclusions must be related to the author's frame of reference, which is: "In my view, air power is an immense entity in itself, but it is interlocked with sea and land power, and all three are interdependent." The third lecture (remember, he is talking to an audience which learnt "Britannia Rules the Waves" in the cradle) is, therefore, addressed to the subject of "Air Power in Relation to Sea-Power." He points out how British naval superiority in the Norwegian Campaign could not be exercised without air superiority but that with it the German forces in North Africa were weakened from supply deficiencies and thus defeated. Neither, similarly, could the U-boat have been controlled without the air arm. He concludes with a *caveat* against the application of the "fleet in being" principle in the future to the air force.

The concluding lecture deals with the "Exercise of Air Power" in warfare, and for his conclusion the author draws largely on the experiences in Western Europe. This conclusion, here somewhat contracted but well documented in the text, is that by the exercise of air power on "common denominator" targets, that is on communications and oil, the Normandy battlefield was isolated and the German economy was so affected that military collapse became inevitable.

If this be the "age of anxiety," whether because of our uncertainty about the direction and force of the aspirations of our probable opponent, or of our inability to decide upon just which aspect of our own preparedness to place the emphasis, then this book deserves most careful attention. While it offers no panaceas, it does submit a rational and balanced solution by a reasoned application of the lessons of the past. Written in a style that he who runs may read and with a logic that is

persuasive, one concludes this book by hoping that more will follow and that more of the great commanders will write such histories as has Marshal Tedder.

ADOLPH G. ROSENGARTEN, JR.*
Philadelphia, Pa.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1946-47. (New York: Macmillan. Pp. 471. \$20.00.)

Here is the 51st edition of the standard naval annual. In it the editors and publishers have returned to their pre-war excellence and produced a comprehensive survey of the post-war navies of the world, with over 600 new illustrations. The tremendous concentration of sea power in the hands of England and the United States becomes very clear in Jane's pages, as does the fact that the Royal Navy must now yield first place to the American. The former service has effected interesting changes in its composition, with increased emphasis on aircraft carriers, particularly the light fleet aircraft carriers. These have been given names traditionally associated with ships of the line, suggesting their new role in the anatomy of British sea power. The Royal Navy's destroyer flotillas have also been modernized with war-time construction. The war-shattered fleets of Greece, the Netherlands, and Norway have been re-constituted with 21 British destroyers and 14 submarines, while China, Chile, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, France, and Turkey have received one or more vessels.

The Russian section reveals four good light cruisers of Russian construction, one ex-German light cruiser (*Nurnberg*), some large destroyers of Italian inspiration, and a very large submarine fleet. The remainder of the Soviet Navy is an imposing collection of marine antiquities. Of the Mediterranean powers, France is handicapped by the economic crisis, and Italy by economic troubles and treaty restrictions. The Spaniards reveal considerable energy, with 11 destroyers under construction, and eight 1,700 ton frigates built during the war years. Reflecting the economic position of the nation, the U. S. Navy reveals the greatest progress in new construction and technology. The handsome new single-funnel cruisers are the only considerable amount of new construction taken in hand by any naval power, while the automatic 6- and 8-inch guns are the outstand-

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ing post-war development in naval ordnance. These formidable weapons are to be mounted on the *Worcester* and *Des Moines* classes respectively. The need for added magazine and handling space results in a "heavy" cruiser with a displacement once thought adequate for a battleship, 17,000 tons. It is probable that the new automatic guns mark an advance in naval ordnance that makes older vessels obsolescent.

RILEY SUNDERLAND,
Washington, D. C.

From the Ashes of Disgrace, by Franco Maugeri. (New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948, Pp. 376.)

Admiral Maugeri's book, rendered into English with the help of Victor Rosen, contains much interesting material on a variety of aspects of Italy's participation in World War II. His accounts of the battle of Cape Matapan, of his operations as head of Italian naval intelligence, of the achievements of MAS (antisubmarine motorboats), of his conducting Mussolini as a prisoner to Ponza and Maddalena are dramatic and first hand. Equally interesting are his characterizations of the King, Mussolini, Ciano, and others in high position. In the period of co-belligerency Maugeri served underground in intelligence work. Here too he presents dramatic and first hand material. Interlarded with the record of his experiences are comments on Allied strategy and policy, and parts of a gentle sermon directed to the Italian people and even more to the English speaking world regarding the sin of Fascism, and appropriate methods of confession, atonement, and national salvation.

HOWARD MCGAW SMYTH*

One Story of Radar, by A. P. Rowe. (Cambridge: University Press; New York: Macmillan, 1948. Pp. 208. \$2.50.)

A. P. Rowe presents a brief, very readable book of reminiscences about a remarkable British organization which pioneered many applications of radar. Eventually known as TRE (Telecommunications Research Establishment, in which Rowe served as Superintendent from 1938 to 1945), this organization of scientists seeking to apply their knowledge toward a solution of military

needs had taken form by 1935 as the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defense under chairman H. T. Tizard. Thus the British organization preceded by five years the comparable American NDRC (National Defense Research Committee) and the subsequent OSRD (Office of Scientific Research and Development) under Vannevar Bush.

The originally small group of Englishmen worked with the intellectual ardor of university researchers, fired with the desperate needs for air defense. In rapid succession they developed a whole series of specialized radar systems to fill specific military needs.

Others in other lands were at work with radar, but none approached the degree of progress which in England made possible the superlative centimeter radar. Centimeter or microwave radar sprang from TRE's development of a special tube, the resonant or multi-cavity magnetron, during 1940. Late that summer Tizard himself brought a sample tube to America, a sample which Dr. James Baxter, the historian of OSRD described as "the most valuable cargo ever brought to our shores."

Rowe tells his story of TRE as but "one story of radar" because TRE was not the only radar group at work in England; others worked for the Admiralty and for the Army (for example, gun-laying radar came under the War Office). The story is told from Rowe's point of view as an administrator, with stress upon the organizational prerequisites to a smooth and successful working group. The author emphasizes the informal nature of this British partnership of scientists and the military, their conclaves and cooperation in the laboratory and in the field, all in an atmosphere entirely free from coercion and dictatorship. Secrecy, which deters many scientists from military employment, Rowe recognizes as often necessary in applied research for defense purposes. Yet he also recognizes that within TRE the fullest possible disclosure of the purposes and results of its activities stimulated the efficiency and spirit of the workers both in the laboratories and in the shops. This book adds a most valuable chapter to the story of radar which the ending of the war has made it possible to unfold.

G. RAYNOR THOMPSON*

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Operation Lifeline: History and Development of the Naval Air Transport Service. By James Lee with photographs by Joe Rosenthal. (New York and Chicago: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company. 1947. 171 pp. \$5.00.)

Operation Lifeline does not live up to its subtitle. It is not so much a history as a listing of NATS achievements and a description of the system as Mr. Lee found it during an extensive trip through the Pacific after the conclusion of hostilities. The most thoughtful note is struck in a two page foreword by Rear Admiral J. W. Reeves, Jr., commander of NATS. Although some errors were noted, the text is on the whole adequate. The real feature of the book is the pictures taken by the celebrated Joe Rosenthal who was catapulted into fame by his shot of the flag raising on Iwo Jima. These have been supplemented by photographs from Navy files and the private collections of Admiral Reeves, Lieutenant Commander H. C. Ruckmick, and the Consolidated and Martin companies. The book will be primarily of interest to present and former members of NATS and to all others who wish a pictorial record of an important factor in the success of the Pacific War.

HENRY M. DATER,*
Washington, D. C.

The Hard Way Home, by Colonel William C. Braly. (Washington: Infantry Journal Press. 1947. Pp. 282. \$3.50.)

The Hard Way Home is a restrained and well documented account of the experiences of Allied officers and men in various Japanese prisoner of war camps. It starts with the surrender of Corregidor on May 6, 1942, describes the stopovers in Luzon, Formosa, Japan and Manchuria, and ends with the surprise arrival of an American OSS team at the remote prison camp in Manchuria on August 17, 1945. The period of imprisonment—3 years, 3 months and 11 days—was long; the effects, physical and mental, were probably equal to three times the wear and tear resulting from normal living.

Japanese brutality and inhumanity to their prisoners of war have been the subject of numerous

was crimes trials during the past year. *The Hard Way Home* paints a vivid picture of the every day prison camp life which lent itself so well to Japanese cruelty.

The restraint and documentation of the book are likely to be misinterpreted as lending an aura of respectability to the actions of the Japanese unless we understand the author himself. Colonel Braly is a man to whose nature hysteria and self pity are foreign. He does not attempt to sensationalize the actions of the Japanese—the actions speak for themselves.

Life as a prisoner of war is never pleasant; life as a prisoner of the Japanese forces was degrading and vicious. In accord with their feelings that the war was won in 1942 and that the white races should be eliminated from the Far East, the Japs apparently established a policy for the progressive extermination of all their prisoners. Japanese instructions to their prison camp commanders in Southeast Asia specifically provided for public humiliation of their American, English and Dutch prisoners of war. The precise words used: "Treat them as coolies to set an example to our Co-Prosperity friends" were sufficiently clear to the subordinate commanders.

To what extent Japanese efforts to exterminate their prisoners met with success can be seen from the statistics of prisoners taken and prisoners released after V-J day: about 20,000 Americans were captured in the Philippines—about 4,300 are now alive. Colonel Braly's group was, perhaps, more fortunate than most prisoner of war groups of the Japanese. In this group were the prizes of war—generals and full colonels—whom the Japanese hoped to exhibit or use for trading purposes. As prizes, they had to be preserved.

Japanese treatment of their prize prisoners left much to be desired. The depths to which these men were reduced can be surmised from their inordinate joy at receiving a bit of gravy for their rice meal, the promise of a few potatoes or some sugar, or the promise that they could send letters home each month. The fact that there was no thought or expectation of receiving such civilized comforts as soap, bathing facilities, clothing and adequate food, is sufficient proof that their thoughts were concerned primarily with survival. Those who returned should be exceedingly proud, as well as glad, that they had the mental and physical stamina to go through this ordeal and come out alive.

The book can well serve as a text book on Japanese behavior. It points out their stupidity, bru-

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tality, callousness and disregard for human life in cold-blooded terms which we can believe. The most ominous trait I find in the book is the Japanese indifference to their prisoners; the facile assumption that they were merely animals, and required no more care than that given animals.

The book can serve equally well as a text book on what will happen if America is conquered by an oriental power. Conditioned as we are to a high regard for life and personal liberties, we trustfully assume that other nations follow the same customs. Official Japanese statements acknowledged their responsibilities towards their prisoners of war; their official actions leave no doubt that they had no intention of living up to those responsibilities.

STEPHEN M. MELLNIK,*

Washington, D. C.

The Armed Forces as a Career, by North Callahan. (New York: Whittlesey House. 1947. Pp. 334. \$3.00.)

This is a comparatively impartial and unbiased presentation of the career opportunities offered by the various armed services—the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, including the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard. It is written specifically for the young American who today is weighing the advantages of putting on a uniform—and trying to decide which uniform to choose. Its appeal to the Regular who has long since cast his lot with one arm or another of the services depends upon his immediate interest in the serious manpower problem today confronting the armed forces. But as a piece of recruiting literature it is a must for the bookshelf of every officer and non-com assigned to this type of duty.

Many factors influence the decision of a young man considering the armed services as a career. Colonel Callahan takes each one of these individually and deals with it point by point in a most thorough and painstaking manner. By way of giving the prospect a little background, he traces briefly the history of each service from its origin. This inevitably leads into a short description of the traditions and customs which give to each particular arm its color and individuality. These factors, while intangible, nevertheless have an important influence on the decisions of prospective enlistees.

The major portion of the book is devoted to a thorough and detailed enumeration of the wide variety of opportunities awaiting the smart, ambitious young man in the service today. It makes a good case for the "career training" plans which all three major forces are featuring in their recruiting and advertising publicity. The high school graduate, unable to enter college for any reason, here may find a complete presentation of the almost unlimited choice of fields and specialties in which the armed forces today offer him both schooling and on-the-job training.

The possibilities for promotion, always an important factor in the decision of any youngster with vision and ambition, are fully covered. It is made clear that under the new "career planning" system the enlisted man in a sense writes his own ticket for his future. His opportunities for advancement depend directly on his ability to qualify for the next higher rating. Colonel Callahan points out that the enlisted man today may advance even more rapidly than in wartime. With the new warrant officer ratings now authorized, the enlisted man will have ample opportunity to move up into that category with its higher pay and better retirement income. His chances to rise above master sergeant no longer depend on his ability to graduate from O.C.S.

The prospective candidate for West Point or Annapolis will also find the book a source of valuable information. In addition to listing the necessary qualifications for acceptance in the service academies, it includes an interesting description of the life of undergraduates at both institutions and some helpful hints for the plebe.

The young officer entering on a service career also comes in for some advice on the social aspects of his position. This is counsel of the type generally imparted to the dashing young officer at his first duty station by some cynical veteran of regular Army or Navy social life. The author fails to mention his source or authority for this information.

Armed Forces as a Career accomplishes its purpose by providing the answers to the many questions a young man generally asks when he is considering entering the service. The information is laid out in a neat, orderly manner so that the prospect may shop around between the pages and choose what interests him most. Colonel Callahan's former assignment as Executive Officer for the U. S. Army Recruiting Publicity Bureau, Governor's Island, qualifies him as an authority

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on the subject. The only error that is evident is in the pay tables on pp. 283, 284 and 285, which should be re-computed.

DONALD J. WILKINS,*
Washington, D. C.

Overdue And Presumed Lost, by Martin Sheridan. (Francistown, N. H.: Marshall Jones Co. 1947. Pp. 143. \$2.75.)

"The Silent Service" earned its sobriquet during World War II because our Submarine Force realized, soon after the commencement of hostilities, that the less the enemy knew about our submarine operations the better. This policy paid off, both in greater damage to the Japanese, and equally important, in less losses to ourselves. However, realizing that a story of consuming interest to the American people was being held under cover, several war correspondents at various times requested permission to make submarine war patrols. Finally, in March of 1945, the Navy allowed Martin Sheridan to become the first and, as it developed, the only war correspondent to make a war patrol into enemy waters. Even then, Sheridan was to write only about human interest items and was permitted no reference to the tactical or other aspects of the patrol.

So when *Bullhead* departed from Guam on her first "hunting trip," Martin Sheridan went along. Since submarines cannot afford to carry a supercargo, he was assigned as assistant to the Ship's Photographer. But his principal mission was to write the story of her patrol in newspaper articles for the folks back home.

Bullhead's first patrol, even by standards existing in 1945, was rather uneventful. There simply were no Jap targets left in her area. Therefore, there was little excitement for Sheridan, although he made the most of the rescue of three Army aviators off Hongkong. But at least he had made a "typical war patrol" (for 1945), and his account was full of little tidbits about *Bullhead's* officers and crew, and particularly about the skipper, Commander Walter Griffith. When the submarine arrived at Subic Bay at the conclusion of her patrol, Sheridan was greeted with a message from Fleet Admiral King: "WAR CORRESPONDENTS

MAY NOT REPEAT MAY NOT GO ON SUBMARINE WAR PATROLS." That ended that, and Sheridan's position as the only correspondent to make such a trip was secure.

Bullhead made one more patrol under Commander Griffith after Sheridan left her, and Lieutenant Commander E. R. Holt, Jr., then assumed command. She departed from Fremantle, Australia on her third war patrol on July 31, 1945, spoke the Dutch submarine O-21 on August 4, 1945, and was never heard from again.

Naturally, it was a shock to Commander Griffith and Martin Sheridan to hear that their old shipmates were gone, but in this instance they were in a position to do a little more than merely grieve about it. The war correspondent resolved to put his experiences on board the *Bullhead* into a book as a memorial to the departed; the ex-skipper helped him, in order to keep the book free of those irritating minor errors which sometimes creep into naval stories when written by non-naval men.

The result is *Overdue and Presumed Lost*, a book which is not great literature, but which adequately fulfills its stated mission, that of a memorial to the lost officers and men of USS *Bullhead*.

To Sheridan's credit it must be stated that *Overdue and Presumed Lost* is carefully, even reverently written. There are innumerable pitfalls into which he might have fallen as regards both strict detailed accuracy and appropriate treatment of a delicate subject, but he has apparently avoided them all. Part of the praise for this, no doubt, belongs to Commander Griffith and others who proof-read the manuscript but, whoever may be responsible for it, the book in all details is a creditable job.

EDWARD L. BEACH,*
Washington, D. C.

The Face of Robert E. Lee: In Life and in Legend, by Roy Meredith. (New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1947. Pp. 143. \$5.00.)

Roy Meredith, who is justly famed as the author of *Mr. Lincoln's Camera Man*, offers in this

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volume a pictorial record of the beloved and almost legendary Southern leader. Although Robert E. Lee was probably one of the most photogenic of the notable men in America's history, he was camera shy. The majority of the photographs in existence were taken after the War Between the States, although there are said to be at least eight originals taken during the war period and a few before that time. Mr. Meredith has, however, gathered an impressive number of representations made from life, including portraits and sculptures as well as photographs. He devotes a section to artistic concepts of Lee after he became a legend.

The author has done an excellent job of collecting and interpreting his material, but the book may become a bit wearisome to the general reader; for whereas the Brady volume is a study of an era reflected by the camera, the *Face of Robert E. Lee* is just that—more than a hundred times repeated. The book is a splendid one to give to Aunt Agatha the next time she attends the annual meeting of the Daughters of the Confederacy.

M. HAMLIN CANNON,*
Washington, D. C.

Slightly Out of Focus, by Robert Capa. (New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1947. Pp. 243. \$3.50.)

The Blue Ghost, by Capt. Edward Steichen, USNR. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1947. Pp. 155. \$3.75.)

Out of the efforts of an "enemy alien" in New York comes the humorous adventure of a somewhat itinerant news photographer to keep himself employed, out of the hands of officialdom, and at the same time cover with his camera one of the world's most important events, World War II. Interspersed with a nebulous quest for romance and a very concrete search for *spiritus fermenti* is Hungarian-born Capa's well-illustrated narrative of how a war photographer must get into the front lines or miss the story. He jumped with the parachute troops, chased the war across Europe, lost the girl, and found the peace, with a not-unusual hangover.

* * * *

Weaving a story around an unusually fine set of combat pictures, Captain Steichen tells of one

adventure of the USS *Lexington* in the Pacific war. Without the personalities which he so well photographed in "The Blue Ghost," *Big Lex* and her aircraft might easily have been lost in the battle of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. But, as the 109 illustrations bear out, the *Lexington* fought her way through and was ready to fight another day.

ROBERT BODELL,*
Washington, D. C.

The Campaign of Princeton, 1776-1777, by Alfred Hoyt Bill. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1948. Pp. 145. \$2.50.)

Mr. Bill in his *Campaign of Princeton* continues to write the same kind of enlivened history he gave his readers in recent studies of war-time Richmond and the Mexican War. Careful of his sources, and alert to the human side of war, he has written a sound volume which has the narrative force of a historical novel such as Howard Fast's *Unconquered* which, incidentally, ends as Washington's men start their crossing of the Delaware—just where Mr. Bill begins his book.

Although Mr. Bill has looked for the most part to the older books on the Revolutionary period, doubtless in the effort to capture a contemporary flavor, he is aware of the newer interpretations of the last fifteen years. His desire to praise Washington's campaign does not lead him to give credence to Frederick the Great's alleged tribute to the brilliance of the Christmas campaign, although he lists less familiar but better established statements of Horace Walpole, Cornwallis, and Heinrich von Bülow.

True to his practice of giving a view of battle as it appeared to the GI, Mr. Bill includes with his technical discussions of maneuver an idea of the daily life of the soldier. One who has read his pen portraits of Mexican War generals and privates in *Rehearsal For Conflict* will not be surprised to find a detailed discussion of Billy Howe's experiments with the theater in New York while the Americans were active in Jersey.

Mr. Bill follows a rather well established historical pattern in his strictures on the fighting qualities of the Hessians, although he tries to clear them of the charge of drunkenness at the than most historians to Cornwallis for the latter's

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*Capt. Bodell was formerly Illustrations Director, Historical Division, Department of the Army.

battle of Trenton. He is far more charitable failure to forestall Washington's march on Princeton after he had "the fox in the bag."

In general, the book is attractive in format and binding, and has excellent maps to aid the reader. It is an unusually readable account of a ten-day campaign of crucial importance in the war for American Independence.

FORREST C. POGUE,
Washington, D. C.

I Fought With Custer: The Story of Sergeant Windolph, Last Survivor of the Battle of the Little Big Horn, as told to Frazier and Robert Hunt. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1947. Pp. 236. \$3.50.)

There could be little new in Sergeant Charles Windolph's story. There has been too much written about Custer's last fight for any possible source of information to be overlooked. Yet it was well worth while to get this detailed account written down as an added contribution to an ever-popular subject.

Windolph joined the 7th Cavalry in 1870—he was 18 then, a green immigrant lad from Germany. By the time of the Yellowstone expedition of 1873 he was able to understand what was going on; by the time of the Black Hills expedition of 1874 he was an experienced soldier. In the campaign of 1876 he was in Captain F. W. Benteen's company. In the fight on Reno's Hill he was awarded the Medal of Honor for exposing himself to heavy fire from the Indians to cover a party that went down to the river for water.

Frazier Hunt, who once wrote a biography of Custer, and his son first interviewed Windolph ten years ago. They got further information more recently, and although Windolph is now 95 he retains a vivid memory of his early experiences. It must be remembered that he has told the story many times before; and also that the story was taken down by two men thoroughly familiar with the history of the period. There is no doubt that this simple narrative can be trusted as adequate testimony from an eye-witness.

Windolph's story is not long, and the Hunts have chosen to interrupt it to add comment, source material and background. Even so, only about half the book is taken up. The rest is a compilation of further source material, much of it not readily available, throwing further light on disputed points.

There is one suggestion that has not been much exploited. Windolph notes that the march on the night of June 24 was made in silence, and that the command was concealed in a ravine the morning of the fatal 25th. There had been no bugle calls for two days. Then two Indians were discovered breaking into a lost cracker box. Immediately Custer threw aside concealment. Trumpeter Martini's story confirms the fact that "Officers' Call" was sounded for the conference that preceded the last march. Windolph assumed that Custer might have waited for the junction with Gibbon and Terry, arranged for the 26th, had he not supposed that the Indians had just discovered the command. This may throw light on the dispute whether Custer disobeyed orders.

Westerners will be interested in the reproduction of the Becker picture facing page 168 and the legend that it "was destroyed by fire at Fort Bliss, Texas, on June 13, 1946." No, it is not the Cassilly Adams picture, and a reading of the November Brand Book would have enabled the authors to avoid this error. The Thomason version of the last fight is also reproduced.

The Hunts also produce an interesting series of letters from Benteen to Godfrey and from Godfrey to Westerner John G. Neihardt, a speech by Godfrey and a note by W. J. Ghent bearing on a proposal of Reno to retreat, abandoning the wounded, on the night of the battle.

DON RUSSELL,*
Chicago, Ill.

The Conquest of the West, by Walter F. McCaleb. (New York: Prentiss-Hall, Inc. 1947. Pp. 336. \$3.75.)

This book purports to give the story of the conquest by the United States of the territory between the Mississippi and the Pacific, from the date of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, to the signing of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. To accomplish this in twenty-eight short chapters is rather a difficult task. It is not, perhaps, to be wondered at that the author, as a Texan, has devoted twenty-five of these chapters to the history of Texas up to the time of its annexation to the United States, and to the

*Mr. Russell, authority on western military history, is presently on the staff of the *Chicago Tribune*. He has been a frequent contributor of articles about the west, and was one of the Journal's first members of the Board of Editors.

resulting war with Mexico. The history of the acquisition of the Oregon country and of California and New Mexico is touched upon but briefly as compared with Texas.

In his account of the Oregon negotiations the author shows quite clearly that we surrendered a large portion of our territory to the British in order to avoid the danger of war on two fronts. The Oregon map on page 222 incorrectly shows the compromise boundary as 48 degrees instead of 49, and the symbols on this map are otherwise confusing.

The slavery question has for a hundred years confused the issues relating to the acquisition of Texas and the war with Mexico. As time passes it is becoming more and more evident that the United States government made every reasonable effort to avoid the war. The terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo were, in fact, much more moderate and considerate of Mexico than might have been expected. All this the author brings out.

This is diplomatic rather than military history. A bare outline of the military operations of the Mexican War is given, with a strong bias against both Taylor and Scott, perhaps against "brass hats" and professional officers in general; though the credit is given to the Navy for its efficiency during the war.

CHARLES D. ROBERTS,*
Washington, D. C.

Thirty-five Years Scrapbook of Antique Arms, by F. Theodore Dexter. (Topeka, Kansas, 1947. The Author. 2 Volumes, \$13.00.)

The scope and form of this work are well de-

scribed by the compiler when he states in his preface that it is "an informal and unconventional presentation of pictorial and textual points of interest in antique arms types. It follows no sequence, advances no opinions. . ." This disarming honesty, which extends even to the "Scrap Book" title, leaves the critic no excuse to indicate those things which he thinks should have been included or to point out what might have been done. He can only accept the statement and indicate the contents more exactly.

Each volume is made up of photographs of several hundred arms. Each piece is identified and the author's opinion of its monetary value is given. Volume One consists of a selection of choice guns sold by Mr. Dexter during his many years as a firearms dealer plus a section on 19th century metal powder flasks. Volume Two pictures the private arms collection of Miles W. Standish. It should be noted that the great majority of specimens listed are hand guns. These greatly outnumber the long arms and powder containers. Other phases of the subject are almost totally ignored.

From the standpoint of format, it is necessary to state that the two volumes are printed by a photo-offset method, and that there is a wide variation in the quality of the prints.

The value and function of such a work is directly comparable to that of a super, priced auction catalog. It excels the usual priced auction catalog in three ways. It contains more listings, all of which are of good quality. All listings are pictured; and in many instances the selling price of them is traced back many years and the rate of increase is thus indicated.

HAROLD L. PETERSON*
Washington, D. C.

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

The Mediterranean: Its Role in American Foreign Policy, by William Reitzel. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. Pp. 198. \$2.75.) A rather disjointed and repetitious review of U. S. policy in the Mediterranean from 1942 to 1947. The author presents a sound case for the vital importance of the area to the U. S. and for a regional policy in place of the current dispersed local commitments.

For Want of a Nail; The Influence of Logistics on War, by Hawthorne Daniel. (New York: Whittlesey House. 1948. Pp. 279. \$3.75). An analysis of six historic campaigns since the American Revolutionary War, including the recent operations in Europe, illustrating the influence of logistics in the conduct of military operations.

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*Mr. Peterson is employed in the Historical Section of the National Park Service, Department of the Interior. He is an authority on antique firearms.

Rudolph L. Treuenfels, Eisenhower Speaks, A Selection of His Speeches and Messages, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Co. 1948. Pp. xix, 299. \$3.00).

This collection of Eisenhower speeches, which would have been a best seller if the General had become a candidate for the Presidency, is a valuable index to the philosophy of the new head of Columbia University.

While most speeches given by important figures in public life owe much to the research of staff writers, they usually reflect accurately the philosophy of the man who gave them. When, as is the case with General Eisenhower, the speaker has a horror for verbosity and pomposity, the speech is likely to bear the imprint of the man who wields a blue pencil to bring the text into line with his viewpoint and his way of speaking. The idiom of these speeches reflects the straightforwardness and the forcefulness of "General Ike". They emphasize his faith in the United States, the American form of government, and the American way of life. Running through all the speeches is a sincere desire for peace, a willingness to do what is necessary to make a world which can keep the peace, a belief that Americans must be prepared to sacrifice for world order as well as for war, and a willingness to keep trying to attain an understanding with the peoples of the world.

The Tennessee Vol. II: "The New River, Civil War to TVA," by Donald Davidson.

(New York: Rinehart. 1948. Pp. 377. \$3.50). Approximately the first hundred pages of this second volume by Donald Davidson on the Tennessee River are of interest to the reader of military history as a very well written and smooth flowing account of the operations in the river valley. As this is the story of a river and not of the campaigns along that river the treatment is far from that of military history. However, that river was the corridor by which the Federal forces first pierced into the heartland of the South and provided the bases and chief communication lines for such key operations as those at Fort Henry, Shiloh, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and the invasion of Georgia. Davidson wisely lets the river carry the war and unfolds a readable popular account of a very complicated military situation. Of special interest are his remarks on Confederate guerrilla warfare in the valley and on Gen-

eral Forrest's cavalry ambush of the Federal gunboats and raid on their base at Johnsonville.

Crosses in the Wind, by Major Joseph James Shomon. (New York: Stratford House. 1947. Pp. 191. \$3.00). This brief story of the dead who fell in the epic march from Normandy to Berlin is deeply imbued with the sentiment expressed in its title. After a quick review of the organization and training of his 611th Graves Registration Company, Major Shomon swiftly narrates events attending the advance into Germany and establishment of the United States cemetery at Margraten. The story of transforming a Dutch turnip field into the greatest burial ground of American military history is interestingly told, and with fitting tribute to local officials and people of the countryside who contributed much to beautification of the site. The narrative of events in Europe is appended with a concise analysis of the program for final disposition of the war dead. Never morbid nor embittered this book gives a new meaning to the terse official phrase "killed in action."

No Peace For Asia, by Harold R. Isaacs. (New York, 1947. The Macmillan Co. 295 pp. \$3.50). In the first half of his book, Mr. Isaacs, *Newsweek's* correspondent in the CBI area during the war, records why one billion Asiatics continue to march along the road toward permanent war. He contends that the Pacific War settled nothing because the great powers did not bestow political freedom and economic security upon the struggling Koreans, Annamites, Chinese, and Indonesians. Pleading with the powers to unshackle Asiatic nationalism from the stake of imperialistic greed, Mr. Isaacs' book ends with the warning that peace must come throughout Asia or the "inevitable World War III" cannot be avoided. Despite the fact that Mr. Isaacs is a crusading humanitarian, he challenges his "realistic critic" to seek a different answer than his for the question—"Why is there *No Peace For Asia?*"

The Hidden Weapon, by David L. Gordon and Royden Dangerfield. (New York: Harper & Bros. 1947. Pp. 238. \$3.50). The economic struggle between the Allied and Axis powers, with the neutral nations as the gaming table between them.

The AAF Against Japan, by Vern Haugland. (New York: Harpers. 1948. p. 515. \$5.00). From Pearl Harbor to the Atomic Bomb payoff with the AAF in the war against Japan. Chronological narrative of air operations on the Asiatic mainland as well as in the Pacific islands. Also included are topical chapters on such subjects as air transport, morale, air-sea-rescue and various types of specialized equipment and weapons. The author, a newsman in the Pacific during the war, prepared this volume partly from personal experience and partly from sources made available by the Personal Narratives Division of the Air Force Public Relations organization. As a result, it emphasizes personalities and anecdotes rather than critical evaluation of operations.

Air Victory, by Harold B. Hinton. (New York: Harper & Bros. 1948. Pp. 428. \$5.00). The growth of American air power from its earliest beginning through its use in the last war.

The Story of H. M. S. Victory, by F. W. Engholm. (London: Lindsay Drummond Ltd. Pp. 55. 3/). A history of the exploits of H. M. S. Victory from 1759 to the present.

The Wings of Warfare, by Geoffrey Block. (London: Hutchinson's Scientific & Technical Publications. Pp. 133. \$3.50). A general survey of the employment of military aircraft by Allied and Axis powers in the West.

The Australian Economy In War And Reconstruction, by E. Ronald Walker. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1947. Pp. 426. \$6.00). Australian industrial expansion during the war, subsequent economic reorganization, and postwar economic problems.

Rebel Raider, edited by H. Allen Gosnell. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1948. Pp. 218. \$3.75). Admiral Raphael Semmes's cruise in the C. S. S. *Sumter*.

The Case of Rudolf Hess, edited by J. R. Rees, M. D. (New York: W. W. Norton. 1948. Pp. 224. \$3.00). An account by the eight British and American psychiatrists who had Hess in charge, from his landing on the Scottish moors through the Nuremberg trial.

We Need Not Fail, by Sumner Welles. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. \$2.50). Many readers will agree with the author's criticisms of U. S. policy vacillations on Palestine, but the argument regarding the harmful effects of this policy on the future of the United Nations is weakened by an emotional, one-sided plea for political Zionism.

The Reshaping Of French Democracy, by Gordon Wright. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock. 1948. Pp. 277. \$3.50). An interpretation of postwar French constitutional development for the founding of the Fourth Republic.

Fighting Politician: Major General N. P. Banks, by Fred H. Harrington. (Philadelphia: University of Penn. Press. 1948. Pp. 301. \$3.50). The story of Major General Nathaniel Prentice Banks, a political general appointed by Lincoln and one devoid of military knowledge. He outranked Grant for three-fourths of the Civil War and Sherman, Sheridan and Thomas for the duration.

Personnel Research and Test Development in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, edited by Lt. Comdr. Dewey B. Stuit, U.S.N.R. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1947. Pp. 513. \$7.50). An evaluation summary of the research in selection, classification, and training of personnel conducted by the U. S. Navy's Bureau of Personnel.

The Solution of the German Problem, by Wilhelm Röpke. (New York: G. P. Putnam. 1947. Pp. 282. \$3.00). An analysis of the German nature and how his basic mentality and temperament have lent themselves to his becoming the tool of the Junkers and then Hitler.

Take Up Thy Bed And Walk, by David Hinchshaw. (New York: G. P. Putnam. 1948. Pp. 262. \$2.75). The story of the concept of human rehabilitation, and the teamwork of specialists studying medical, physical, psychological, social, and vocational needs of the crippled and disabled.

Weapons of World War II, by Barnes. (New York: Van Nostrand. 1947. Pp. 317. \$7.50). Illustrations and text of all ordnance used in the late war.

Battle Report: The End of an Empire, by Captain Walter Karig, USNR, Lt. Comdr. Russell L. Harris, USNR, and Lt. Comdr. Frank A. Manson, USN (New York: Rinehart, 1948. pp. 532. \$5.00). Prepared from official sources and numbered Volume IV, this is the record of the U. S. Navy during the final mopping-up in the Southwest Pacific which culminated in the Battle for Leyte Gulf. The series will soon be completed with the publication of Volume V, which covers events leading up to the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and the final Japanese surrender aboard the *USS Missouri*. (Battle Report: The Atlantic War, Vol. II, by Captain Walter Karig, et al, reviewed by Donald Armstrong, *Military Affairs*, Spring 1946, pp. 126-27.

22 Cells in Nuremberg, by Douglas M. Kelley, M.D. (New York: Greenberg, 1947. Pp. 245. \$3.00). A psychiatrist examines the Nazi criminals.

Problems In Price Control: Pricing Standards, by David F. Cavers, et al, and edited by James B. Eckert. (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1947. Pp. 522. \$1.00). The basic legislative and administrative standards developed to govern the course of price control. One of the narrative and analytical volumes in the OPA series of Historical Reports on War Administration.

Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, by Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky. (Duke University Press, 1947. Pp. 428. \$5.00). A history of Russian participation in Western European affairs during the reign of Alexander I, with liberal coverage of Russia's military operations in the coalitions against Napoleon.

A Soldier's Poems, by Sgt. Robert A. Harter. (Detroit: S. J. Bloch. Pp. 70. \$1.00). A collection of poems by the author that reflects the mind of the soldier in camp and combat.

SELECTED PERIODICAL LITERATURE

NATIONAL WARFARE

"A Suggested Guide for Amateur Military Critics and Prophets," by Captain Whitaker F. Riggs, Jr., USN, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1948 (74, 935-949). Thoughts on latest weapons and defenses in future wars.

"Building the Nation's Armies," in *Army Information Digest*, September 1948 (Vol. 3, 29-32). Recruiting, past and present, pictorially presented.

"Military Justice Procedures," by Major General Thomas H. Green, in *Military Review*, October 1948 (XXVII, 21-27). Changes in administration of military justice effected by Selective Service Act of 1948.

"The New Articles of War," by Colonel Frederick Bernays Wiener, in *Antiaircraft Journal*, September-October 1948 (LXXXI, 12-16). Abridged version of article that appeared in September 1948 issue of *Infantry Journal*.

"Special Court," by Major Stanley Disney, in

Infantry Journal, November 1948 (LXIII, 24-6). To be read along with *The New Articles of War*.

"The Nuremberg Trials and Their Implications for the Armed Forces," by The Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in *The Journal of the Royal Artillery*, July 1948 (LXXV, 173-82). A serious consideration of moral responsibility vs. discipline as affecting German service chiefs, particularly, and Armed Forces generally.

"America's Post-War Military Policy," by Donald W. Mitchell, in *Current History*, September 1948 (Vol. 15, 134-7). An analysis of America's attempt to formulate a realistic military policy in the light of its World War II experience.

"Sherman and the Press," by John B. Spore, in *Infantry Journal*, October 1948 (LXIII, 28-32). A running battle between members of the third estate and a general who regarded newspaper correspondents as "... too lazy, idle and cowardly to be soldiers."

SEA WARFARE

"Are Navies Obsolete?" by J. Levert, in *The Military Engineer*, October 1948 (XL, 451-5). The author of *Fundamentals of Naval Warfare* poses a challenging question, which he attempts to answer with facts and figures.

"Gunfire Support Lessons Learned in World War II," by Commander I. E. McMillian, USN, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1948 (74, 979-989).

"Pay and Prize Money in the Old-Navy, 1776-1898," by Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Daly, USCGR, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1948 (74, 966-971).

"The Frigate *Constellation* Puts to Sea," by Captain Lucius C. Dunn, USN (Ret.), in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1948 (74, 1005-1007).

AIR WARFARE

"Education in the Air Age," in *The Royal Air Force Quarterly*, July 1948 (Vol. 19, 172-81). British estimate of "Education in The Air Age," appearing in Vol. 2, No. 2 of the *American Quarterly Air Affairs*.

"Operation Vittles—Berlin Lifeline," by Captain Gerald A. Harty, in *Army Information*

Digest, November 1948 (Vol. 3, 7-13). An account of the project of aerial feeding and fueling of Berlin.

"Naval Contributions to Aeronautical Science, 1908-1913," by Mary C. Welborn, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1948 (74, 990-997). An excellent brief account.

ESTABLISHMENTS

"The U. S. Marine Corps in World War II," in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1948 (74, 1012-1021). Fine official photographs and a brief note.

"Fort Bliss Expands," in *Antiaircraft Journal*, September-October 1948 (LXXXI, 2-6). Biography of a 100-year old military installation.

"Oregon Volunteer Reminiscences of the War with Spain," by H. C. Thompson, in *Oregon His-*

torical Quarterly, September 1948 (XLIX, 192-204). How Second Oregon U. S. Volunteer Infantry came to be formed, and the part it played in the Spanish-American War.

"The Royal Artillery Bands," by Brigadier F. C. F. Cleeve, in *The Journal of the Royal Artillery*, July 1948 (LXXV, 199-208). The role of military music—an historical survey of the development of Royal Artillery Bands.

OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

"The Armistice of Cassibile," by Dr. Howard McGaw Smyth, in *Military Review*, October 1948 (XXVII, 36-43). The Italian Armistice in 1943—an abstract from Vol. II, History of the War in the Mediterranean Theater. Printed by arrangement with *Military Affairs*.

"Smith versus Smith," by Edmund G. Love, in *Infantry Journal*. November 1948 (LXIII, 3-13). A comprehensive airing of the story of the Saipan controversy.

"The Action at Robaa," by Major Donald T. Kellett, in *Infantry Journal*. September 1948 (LXIII, 12-16). An account of a small-unit action that took place early in the Tunisian campaign.

"Notes and Documents," by George W. Kyte. Edit., in *The Journal of Southern History*. Au-

gust 1948 (XIV, 401-8). An interesting note on the undeclared naval war with France which never came off.

"The Jeopardy of Washington," by Victor Hugo Paltsits, in *The New York Historical Society Quarterly*, October 1948 (XXXII, 253-68). A restudy of original sources bearing on the landing of the British army on Manhattan Island, 15 September 1776, and Washington's attempt to stem the stampede of Connecticut militia.

"U.S.S. *Oregon*: Pathfinder," by William O. Foss, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1948 (74, 950-955). The familiar story of the famous dash in 1898 from San Francisco to the Caribbean interestingly retold in some detail.

CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

"The Exploratory Excavation of Fort Clatsop," by Louis R. Caywood, in *Oregon Historical Quarterly*, September 1948 (XLIX, 205-10). An attempt to determine the 1805-06 site of the Lewis and Clark winter camp.

"Caves and the War of 1812," by George F. Jackson, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, September-October 1948 (Vol. 38, 217, 19). Coming events cast their shadows before. Shelter and factory role of caves—an historical note.